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THE    CAUSES    OF    WAR 


INCLUDING  AN  OUTLINE  AND 
STUDY  OF  THE  WORLD  WAR  AND 
OFFICIAL  PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS 


BY 

ROBERT  EARL  SWINDLER 

Author  of  '^Methods  and  Suggestive  Outlines  in  History.^' 

Head  of  the  Department  of  History,  Humboldt  State  Normal  School, 

Areata,  California 


BOSTON 
RICHARD  G.  BADGER 

THE  GORHAM  PRESS 


Copyright,  1920,  by  Richard  G.  Badger 


All  Rights  Reserved 


U'  .        i'^"  '^ 


Made  'in  the  United  States  of  America 


The  Gorham  Press,  Boston,  U.  S.  A. 


TO 
LIEUTENANT    ORAN    L.    RABER 

MY    ONE-TIME    CLASSMATE    IN    COLLEGE 

AND   EVER  A  SYMPATHETIC 

FRIEND 


417312 


PREFACE 

WE  believe  we  are  justified  in  starting  out  in  this  volume 
upon  the  fundamental  and  scientific  basis  that,  if 
we  are  to  cure  a  malady,  we  must  understand  its  cause, — 
we  must  properly  diagnose  the  case;  that  in  order  to  find 
a  remedy  for  war  and  build  securely  on  the  foundation  for 
a  lasting  peace,  we  must  understand  the  underlying  cause* 
of  conflict.  Accordingly,  the  first  part  of  this  work  is  the 
outgrowth  of  the  author's  interest  in,  and  study  of,  the 
causes  of  war, — with  particular  reference  to  the  wars  of 
the  past  half-century.  This  study  naturally  and  fittingly 
led  to  a  more  intensive  study  of  the  European  background 
of  the  World  War,  its  remote  and  fundamental  as  well  as 
its  immediate  causes. 

There  was  also  recognized  the  need,  well  nigh  universal 
up  to  the  very  present,  of  a  brief  suggestive  course  in  book 
form,  for  the  study  of  the  Great  War, — its  background, 
progress  and  issues,  and  the  peace  outlook,  which  would  be 
suitable  for  the  busy  student  and  the  busy  citizen,  who  are 
simply  bewildered  in  the  great  mass  of  unorganized  material 
that  confronts  them, — and  that  this  should  be  adapted  to 
the  schoolroom  as  well  as  the  home.  Hence  the  second  and 
third  parts  of  this  work. 

For  the  most  part,  in  following  out  the  two-fold  plan 
just  mentioned,  the  author  presented  his  material  in  his 
original  articles  for  the  schools  and  the  public,  year  by 
year  and  month  by  month,  as  the  Great  War  progressed. 
Necessarily  therefore,  the  chronology  and  subject-matter 
as  continued  in  the  present  treatise  are  largely  as  they  were 
written  then.  This  accounts  for  present-tense  verbs  and 
descriptions  occurring  in  a  number  of  places  where,  if  writ- 

5 


0     ,,.,,,'  Preface 

ten  from  the  present  field  of  view,  they  would  occur  in  the 
past  tense,  etc.  But  these  matters  do  not  materially  alter 
the  nature  or  the  accuracy  of  the  book.  On  the  contrary, 
they  show  points  of  view  and  problems  of  the  recent  past 
that  it  is  well  to  keep  in  mind,  in  our  attempt  to  understand 
and  interpret  the  present  world  status,  and  to  follow  the 
tremendous  work  before  the  peace  conference,  in  the  adjust- 
ment of  the  pending  momentous  and  multitudinous  issues  of 
reconstruction. 

As  mentioned  a  number  of  times  in  the  body  of  this  work, 
the  treatment  of  our  subject  herein  presented  is  not  in- 
tended to  be  exhaustive.  Already  too  much  of  such  ma- 
terial is  presented  to  the  ordinary  reader.  There  is  a  very 
great  amount  of  information,  covering  all  phases  of  this 
war :  its  causes,  the  peace  movements  and  propaganda  dur- 
ing the  war;  diplomatic  relations  of  the  various  govern- 
ments ;  international  movements  of  various  sorts  and  inter- 
national law,  with  its  violations ;  official  "books"  of  the  war- 
ring and  other  nations;  the  tools,  implements,  inventions, 
provisions,  regulations,  etc.,  of  war;  the  issues  of  the  war; 
forms,  theories,  ideals  and  practices  of  the  different  govern- 
ments and  peoples  involved  in  the  war;  finances  and  financial 
problems ;  possibilities  in  peace  terms  and.  arrangements, 
including  the  much  discussed  League  of  Nations  and  the 
Bolshevist  movement  and  danger, — and  so  on.  But  in  all 
this  there  is  for  the  general  reader  absolutely  no  systematic 
organization  or  uniformity  of  plan  for  study  or  teaching. 
The  author's  plan,  therefore,  is  to  present  as  adequately  as 
may  be,  in  a  very  brief  treatment  like  this,  the  essential 
points,  so  that  they  may  be  better  grasped  and  understood 
by  the  average  reader,  and  to  suggest  a  wider  reading  and 
study  for  those  who  may  have  a  little  more  time. 

R.  Earl  Swindler. 
Areata,  California 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTBB  PAQE 

I    Introduction — Our  Schools  and  a  New  Patriotism  ...  11 

II    General  Statement , 17 

III    Classification  and  Comment 23 

rV    Fundamental  Causes 31 

V    Pretexts  and  Excuses  for  War — Some  Illusions      ...  40 

VI    The  Immediate  Background  of  the  War  in  Europe       .     .  51 

VII    Causes  of  the  Present  War 58 

Vni    Causes  of  the  Balkan  Wars  (1911-1913) 74 

IX    Causes  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (1904) 81 

X    Causes  of  the  British-Boer  War 91 

XI    Causes  of  the  Spanish-American  War  (1898) 105 

XII    Causes  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  (1870) 115 

XIII    The  United  States 121 

XrV    German  Diplomacy  and  Strategy 128 

XV    Outline  of  the  War  and  Armistice  Terms 135 

XVI    Official  Peace  Discussion  and  Negotiations       ....  160 

XVII    Peace  Negotiations  (continued) 168 

XVIII    Official  Peace  Negotiations  (concluded) 176 

XIX    The  League  of  Nations 186 

XX    The  Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations       ....  202 

APPENDIX 

I    President  Wilson's  Address  at  Paris 215 

II  President  Wilson's  Address  at  Boston 223 

III  President  Wilson's  Address  at  New  York 233 

rV    Final  Draft  of  the  League  Covenant     .      ......  245 

Bibliography         263 

Index 265 


THE  CAUSES  OF  WAR 


THE  CAUSES  OF  WAR 


CHAPTER  I 

INTRODUCTION OUR   SCHOOLS    AND   A   NEW   PATRIOTISM  ^ 

YOU  will  recall  readily  the  famous  poster  for  the  Sec- 
ond Liberty  Loan,  with  the  picture  of  the  statue  in 
New  York  harbor,  of  "Liberty  Enlightening  the  World." 
The  lady  artist  who  designed  this  poster  received  a  splendid 
prize  from  the  United  States  Government,  and  she  deserved 
it,  for  that  poster  went  a  long  way  in  raising  nearly  $5,000,- 
000,000,  to  help  make  the  world  "safe  for  democracy."  The 
appeal  that  "Liberty  must  enlighten  the  world"  had  its  ef- 
fect. But  let  me  tell  yow,  recent  conmdsionSy  as  in  Russia, 
are  teaching  us  that  not  only  must  liberty  enlighten  the 
world,  hut  intelligence  must  enlighten  liberty,  in  order  to 
save  the  world.  Our  schools  must  save  the  democracy  for 
which  we  fight.  Our  students,  by  muking  the  most  of  their 
education  and  their  American  ideals,  are  to  help  gain  and 
preserve  the  blessings  of  liberty  to  mankind. 

Many  of  the  nations  which,  up  to  the  present,  have  been 
taking  leading  places  in  the  affairs  and  problems  of  the 
world,  can  do  so  no  more.  The  war  is  sapping  their  man- 
hood and  retarding  their  institutions  that  train  for  greatest 
worth  and  usefulness  to  their  fellowmen.  Other  nations,  in 
their  new-found  freedom,  know  not  how  to  use  it,  because  of 
past  oppressions  and  inexperience  in  self-government.  Never 
did  the  world  need  leaders  as  it  does  today ;  never  did  it  so 
need  men  of  vision  and  of  high  ideals,  men  of  incorruptible 
*  Written  February,  1918. 

11 


12  The  Games  Of  War 

moral  fiber  and  integrity,  men  of  sacrifice  and  of  unfaltering 
determination  in  the  arduous  paths  of  service.  The  youth 
of  America  should  be  made  to  realize  that  here  at  once  is 
their  rich  heritage  and  their  unexampled  opportunity.  Not 
with  one  speck  of  pride  or  of  superiority  should  they  look 
upon  this  situation,  but  as  a  privilege  to  serve  unequaled  in 
the  history  of  man.  Out  of  this  vision  and  this  great  op- 
portunity is  to  come  a  new  patriotism  that  has  no  bounds 
less  than  the  planet  itself. 

We  must  become  more  familiar  with  our  country's  most 
cherished  ideals.  We  must  see  to  it  that  our  youth  are  in- 
telligently imbued  with  those  ideals.  Only  by  so  doing  are 
we  to  vitalize  our  teaching  and  our  training  for  citizenship 
in  our  schools.  TJie  principles  of  democracy  are  at  stake 
in  the  world  today;  and  if  the  major  portion  of  the  stu- 
dent's education  in  these  trying  times  is  not  the  gaining 
and  putting  into  practice  of  these  principles  of  patriotism 
and  SERVICE,  his  education,  costly  as  it  is,  is  a  failure. 
To  the  extent  that  his  science,  his  art  and  his  philosophy  of 
history  and  of  life  fail  to  serve  these  ideals,  just  to  that 
extent  our  educational  system  is  serving  the  same  base  end 
as  has  Germany's  in  the  past  generation.  Many  of  our 
students  and  teachers  do  not  need  this  warning;  yet  there 
are  many  others  that  do,  for  to  be  asleep  to  the  real  needs 
and  vital  test  of  democracy  in  this  time,  is  to  be  playing 
with  our  destiny  as  a  free  people.  The  supreme  test  of 
/'mankind  today  is  a  test  of  ideals,  of  moral  and  spiritual 
principles  and  standards  of  conduct;  and  everything  ma- 
terial on  earth  must  serve  one  or  the  other  of  these  two 
opposing  ideals.  The  one  we  hope  America  will  be  as  ready 
to  stand  for  as  her  patriots  have  always  professed  for  her; 
the  other  we  know  autocratic  powers  have  always  stood  for, 
and  have  made  the  lovers  of  freedom  pay  the  price  in  suf- 
fering and  blood.  The  clearer  these  principles  are  held 
before  the  younger  generation,  the  safer  are  American  de- 
mocracy and  world  liberty  to  be. 


Introduction  13 

The  provincialism  in  many  circles,  and  the  still  prevalent 
Ignorance  of  the  present  world  conflict  aff^ord  most  con- 
vincing evidence  of  the  universal  need  of  enlightenment.  And 
we  know  whence  that  training,  to  be  effective,  must  come — 
it  must  come  through  the  education  of  the  youth  of  our 
land.  We  should  never  forget  that  it  was  from  the  enlight- 
ened walls  of  schools  throughout  the  nations  that  liberty 
was  bom — both  religious  and  political  freedom — and  this 
fact  answers  the  question  why  the  schools  of  the  nations 
have  furnished  the  first  martyrs  in  every  great  struggle  for 
liberty. 

It  is  truthfully  said,  that  in  a  democracy,  where  the  peo-  ^ 
pie  themselves  rule,  they  should  always  know,  before  they 
embark  on  any  great  project,  why  they  are  going  into  it. 
Yet,  even  today,  after  the  United  States  has  witnessed  this  | 
titanic  world  struggle  for  four  and  one-half  years,  not  one 
boy  in  one  hundred  can  give  the  essential  causes  of  the  war. 
This  is  not  the  student's  fault,  but  the  fault  of  aimless  and 
indefinite  teaching  and  training,  for  which  we  are  all  to 
blame — even  the  government  of  the  United  States  (for  it 
simply  reflected  the  general  disinterestedness  of  the  masses 
of  the  people)  which  should  have  kept  us  better  informed  of 
the  facts,  from  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

What  are  these  American  ideals,  for  which  we  now  stand 
and  stake  our  all?  What  is  this  liberty  and  democracy  of 
which  we  rather  flippantly  speak  in  this  generation,  the  self- 
ish side  of  which  we  have  appropriated  so  well,  but  which, 
nevertheless,  is  the  message  of  our  great  republic  to  the 
world?  The  answer  has  come  over  and  over  again  in  the 
lives  of  our  great  American  patriots,  in  their  fervent 
speeches  and  their  earnest  devotion  and  invaluable  service 
to  their  country.  Their  conduct  is  our  creed,  and  we  should 
therefore  study  their  lives  with  a  new  purpose.  The  an- 
swer must  likewise  come  in  the  present  crisis.  The  war  has 
brought  out  what  sacrifice  there  is  in  the  great  heart  of 
France.    It  has  enabled  England  to  find  her  soul,  and  with 


li  The  Causes  Of  War 

it  a  truly  new  England  is  born.  Likewise  must  Columbia 
find  her  heart  and  her  soid  if  she  would  realize  her  high  mis- 
sion in  the  world.  As  never  before  our  citizens  must  be  filled 
with  the  conviction  that  America's  lesson  is  an  abiding  faith 
m  humanity,  and  in  the  growing  principles,  the  institutions 
and  the  final  triumph  of  democracy  among  men;  that  here 
we  worship  principles,  not  personages,  but  have  the  highest 
regard  and  greatest  reverence  for  our  statesmen  who  have 
so  nobly  embodied  those  principles — a  Washington  and  a 
Lincoln,  not  ^^sacred  majesties*'  to  be  bowed  down  unto,  but 
citizens  enshrined  in  the  hearts  of  their  countrymen  because 
of  the  service  they  have  rendered  free  government  in  the 
hours  of  its  utmost  need.  Let  our  boys  and  girls  feel  a  new 
thrill  of  pride  in  our  magnificent  Stars  and  Stripes,  because 
in  them  they  see  a  new  meaning,  whether  floating  in  home 
breezes  o'er  the  peaceful  institutions  of  a  free-born  people, 
on  the  great  marts  of  trade,  or  on  the  blood-stained  and 
treacherous  field  of  battle,  unfolding  to  the  oppressed  peo- 
ples of  the  earth  the  foundation  tenets  of  American  free- 
dom, and  giving  to  all  the  assurance  that  true  representa- 
tive democracy,  by  the  grace  of  God,  shall  no  longer  be  an 
experiment,  but  a  triumphant  realization,  destined  to  pre- 
serve to  the  nations  government  by  the  initiative  and  consent 
of  the  governed.  v 

How  much  in  this  day  do  we  really  appreciate  the  coun- 
try in  which  we  live?  How  much  thought  do  we  give  to  the 
blessings  she  affords  us?  Does  it  often  come  to  our  minds, 
that  for  every  pleasure  that  is  ours  today,  some  one  in  the 
past  has  dared  to  sacrifice  comfort  and  life  to  give  us  that 
pleasure?  For  centuries  our  forefathers  have  been  fighting 
the  battles  of  liberty  and  pouring  out  their  life-blood  that 
we  might  be  secure  in  that  liberty.  They  did  it,  as  one  has 
said,  that  these  priceless  heritages  "might  not  perish  in 
the  graves  of  the  fathers.'* 

How  much  we  owe  our  ancestors  for  all  that,  and  how 
much  we  are  in  debt  to  our  country !     God  pity  the  boy  or 


Introduction  .   15 

girl  who,  when  knowing  this,  would  give  nothing  in  return. 
It  is  no  idle  dream  that  Uncle  Sam  is  urging  us  to  do  our 
part.  Would  we  curse  the  generations  yet  to  come  by 
failing  to  uphold  liberty  in  this  crisis  ?  The  words  of  Patrick 
Henry  are  still  as  apphcable  as  they  are  eloquent,  "Is  life 
so  dear,  or  peace  so  sweet,  as  to  be  purchased  at  the  price 
of  chains  and  slavery?"  From  all  over  the  world  comes  the 
statement  that  never  did  America  fight  in  a  juster  cause 
than  she  has  just  been  fighting.  And  that  cause  she  must 
still  uphold.  In  failing  to  do  our  part  now,  we  should  be 
recreant  Americans.  Rather  let  us  pause  in  our  mad  rush 
for  the  perishing  things  of  life,  to  appreciate  the  compli- 
ment the  world  is  today  paying  to  American  citizenship. 

But  our  schools  must  hasten  to  give  to  this  citizenship 
a  vision  which  comprehends  not  only  its  own  state  and  na- 
tion, but  is  world-wide.  Indeed,  Columbia's  highest  resolve 
must  be  to  be  true  to  the  principles  that  gave  her  birth,  and 
gave  to  the  world  the  inspiration  of  liberty.  For  it  is  her 
privilege,  in  this  "age  of  ages  telling"  to  move  under  the 
impelling  conviction  that  this  world  cannot  remain  perma- 
nently half  free  and  half  enslaved  by  privileged  autocracy; 
and  that  the  God  of  human  destiny  has  decreed  that  it  shall 
become  free — that  the  faith  in  which  American  citizenship 
was  born  and  has  been  nurtured,  the  faith  in  which  other 
peoples  have  come  to  believe,  and  which  is  now  the  only  hope 
of  the  race,  shall  be  realized  in  fact — and  that  "govern- 
ment of  the  people,  by  the  people,  for  the  people,"  carmot 
"perish  from  the  earth.'* 

Citizens  of  America:  it  is  your  duty  to  know  the  justice 
of  your  country's  cause.  And,  you  who  have  not  gone  to 
war,  it  is  your  privilege  and  opportunity  to  serve  your  coun- 
try in  the  highest  sense.  All  this  and  more,  you  have  the 
opportunity  to  stand  for  those  principles  that  have  made 
America  what  she  is,  and  so  honored  throughout  the  world. 
Yours  is  the  leadership  in  these  great  movements  whose 
watchword  is  service  and  whose  task  is  to  keep  our  people 


16  The  Causes  Of  War 

at  home  and  at  the  front  true  American  patriots  and  citi- 
zens, through  all  the  grime  and  mud  and  fire  and  terror  of 
war,  and  until  thej  all  come  home. 

Only  when  she  realizes  that  it  was  in  a  righteous  cause, 
can  a  mother  be  comforted  for  the  loss  of  her  son  in  France. 
Only  when  a  father  sees  that  the  liberty  he  holds  so  dear 
was  at  stake,  and  might  have  been  lost  for  generations  to 
come,  if  the  enemy  had  won,  can  he  be  reconciled  to  have 
sacrificed  his  valiant  son  on  the  altar  of  war.  It  is  because 
of  these  things  that  the  writer,  though  late  as  it  now  is  to 
learn,  is  attempting  to  give  you  the  causes  of  this  mighty 
conflict. 


CHAPTER  II 


GENERAL    STATEMENT 


WITHIN  the  last  generation  there  has  been  a  world- 
wide uneasiness  and  expectancy  that  has  never  been 
equalled  in  the  past.  The  decade  before  the  present  war 
witnessed  the  greatest  unrest  the  world  had  ever  known. 
Statesmen  and  seers  everywhere  felt  that  something  was 
going  to  happen,  but  no  one  knew  just  what.  Now  we 
have  learned  what  was  imminent.  The  recent  revolution  in 
Russia  and  the  entrance  of  United  States  into  this  war  will 
prove  to  be  the  greatest  events  of  the  World  War  period. 
It  is  but  the  continuation  of  the  fight  of  the  peoples  of  the 
earth  for  their  liberties  from  oppression.  It  is  another 
powerful  link  in  the  mighty  chain  of  which  the  English  revo- 
lutions of  1642  and  1688,  the  American  Revolution  and  the 
French  Revolution  were  the  first  links.  And  men  will  see, 
as  never  before,  that  the  French  Revolution  of  1789,  with 
the  single  exception  of  the  present  conflict,  is  the  greatest, 
most  tremendous  event  of  modern  times. 

If  there  is  one  thing  above  all  else  that  the  study  of  his- 
story  teaches,  it  is  that  there  is  a  unity  or  continuity,  in 
human  events  and  purposes  and  that  man's  true  progress  is 
through  evolution.  In  this  truth  is  found  the  explanation 
of  the  fundamental  causes  of  war.  The  revolutions  referred 
to  above  are  a  few  of  the  many  examples  of  this  fact.  It  is 
equally  true  that  revolutions  of  the  people  never  go  back- 
ward, ultimately;  every  one  spells  progress  in  the  end.  We 
should  therefore  in  view  of  this  fact,  keep  our  faith  in 
democratic  Russia,  for  like  France  she  will  recover  from 
her  period  of  anarchy  and  severe  trial — ^her  deception  and 

17 


18  The  Causes  Of  War 

spoilation  by  German  perfidy — and  will  come  out  all  right 
in  the  end,  although  it  may  be  generations  before  she  is 
fully  recovered.  The  very  means  of  oppression,  such  as  abso- 
lute monarchies,  the  "armed  peace,"  under  which  the  nations 
have  groaned,  ambition  of  rulers  and  of  governments,  and 
often  war  itself — are  but  the  means  by  which  the  people  may 
rise.  At  a  terrible  cost,  it  is  true;  yet,  progress  is  always 
costly,  and  in  its  truest  sense  the  survival  of  the  fittest  holds 
even  unto  the  last. 

Whether  recognizing  this  evolutionary  principle  or  not, 
we  know  that  there  has  been  for  years,  and  still  is,  among 
the  most  intelligent  and  best  classes  everywhere,  a  great 
cry  and  longing  for  world  peace — not  simply  a  cessation  of 
military  warfare,  but  an  era  of  peace  for  weary  mankind. 
This,  however,  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  present  social- 
istic and  pacifist  movement,  which  is  wholly  abortive,  and 
would  be  in  the  interest  of  the  autocratic  central  powers, 
and  not  in  the  interest  of  democracy.  Yet,  despite  all  we 
have  heard  and  been  taught  in  recent  years  concerning 
p€ace  and  the  end  of  warfare,  we  are  learning,  what  the 
American  people  have  been  slow  to  learn  hitherto,  that  there 
are  times  in  the  history  of  nations  when,  in  order  to  enjoy 
peace,  they  must  be  prepared  for  war.  It  would  be  suicide 
for  any  great  nation  at  the  present  time  to  act  otherwise. 
One  people,  in  its  philanthropic  enthusiasm,  cannot  bring 
peace  to  the  world,  much  less  any  little  group  of  peace  advo- 
cates. Nor  can  it  guarantee  its  own  peace — it  cannot  adopt 
a  policy  of  peace,  and  say  it  will  have  it,  whether  others 
will  or  no.  We  see  this  in  our  own  experience  now.  Indeed, 
the  realization  of  this  fact  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  the 
President  and  Congress  plunged  this  peace-loving  country 
and  non-aggressive  American  people  into  the  mighty  world 
conflict  that  rages  today.  France  has  been  confronted  with 
such  a  situation  in  the  past,  and  other  examples  are  not 
wanting.  It  amounts  to  this — as,  I  have  believed  for  years 
— that,  instead  of  diminishing  the  chances  of  war,  the  anti- 


General  Statement  19 

preparedness  peace  tendency  may  augment  these  chances, 
may  invite  conquest,  or  as  in  the  case  of  the  United  States, 
because  of  the  aggressions  of  others,  may  help  to  drag  an 
unwilling  people  into  war.  There  are  several  nations  fight- 
ing today  that  not  only  did  not  want  war,  but  did  not 
expect  it,  and  those  least  prepared  have  suffered  most. 
War  was  thrust  upon  them;  there  was  really  no  choice. 
The  nations  of  the  world  are  so  close  together  and  so  in- 
terdependent in  our  day  that  one  cannot  have  peace  when 
others  are  determined  upon  oppressive  war.  The  allied 
nations  were  unwillingly  dragged  into  war,  let  me  repeat, 
but  thanks  to  the  people's  instinct  for  human  liberty,  they 
are  in  the  war  heart  and  soul  now,  and  are  in  it  to  crush 
the  inhuman  and  merciless  beast  of  autocratic  and  bigoted 
oppression !  Pity  it  is  that  many  of  us  have  not  seen  until 
now  that  autocracy  has  always  been  the  arch-enemy  of  free- 
dom and  human  rights,  and  never  could  be  trusted.  Its 
whole  foundation,  as  history  shows,  has  been  laid  in  hypo- 
critical presumption  and  class  privilege  and  selfishness,  play- 
ing upon  the  innocence  and  ignorance  of  its  unfortunate  and 
incapable  victims. 

The  trouble  with  the  peace  advocates  before  the  war  ( and 
all  honor  to  them — God  forbid  that  the  teachers  of  the 
young  should  be  aught  else)  it  seems  to  me,  has 
largely  been  this:  they  have  observed  particularly  the  ef- 
fects of  war,  but  have  done  little  along  the  practical  line  of 
studying  its  causes  and  proposing  effective  remedies.  Not 
until  the  present  gigantic  conflict  has  there  been  anything 
like  concerted  and  serious  action  on  the  prevention  of  war; 
and  still  less  is  the  understanding  of  its  causes.  Many  peo- 
ple, indeed,  declare  useless  any  study  of  the  causes  of  war. 
With  this  view,  the  writer  cannot  at  all  agree;  it  is  but 
blind  fatalism,  dangerous  and  utterly  helpless  in  the  face  of 
the  world  situation  and  of  most  wars.  How  are  we  to  apply 
the  remedy — How  are  we  to  have  peace — if  we  do  not  under- 
stand the  cause?    As  in  the  study  of  medicine  and  disease, 


^  The  Ccmses  Of  War 

so  in  this  field,  the  search  for  causes  is  no  less  indis- 
pensable than  the  search  for  remedies;  and  certainly,  the 
scientific  method  of  treatment  requires  that  we  find  the 
causes  before  we  apply  the  remedy.  The  failure  to  do  this, 
I  maintain,  is  just  the  reason  why  so  much  that  has  been 
said  and  attempted  in  the  past  has  been  fruitless  and  dis- 
appointing. Men  have  not  made  a  careful  and  systematic 
search  into  the  causes  of  war.  It  is  remarkable  how  little 
space  is  given  to  the  causes  of  war  in  our  histories.  Gen- 
erally speaking,  they  have  been  examined  most  superficially 
— ^have  been  strangely  neglected.  With  one  breath  history 
instructors  are  teaching  that  causes  and  results  are  more 
important  than  wars  themselves,  and  in  the  next  breath  they 
are  hurrying  their  classes  on  from  the  causes  to  the  wars 
and  their  results.  Better  not  know  the  names  of  battles 
and  leaders  than  not  understand,  in  some  degree  at  least, 
why  the  armies  are  fighting. 

Those  who  oppose  an  intensive  study  of  the  causes  of 
war,  because  they  think  it  would  increase  the  warlike  spirit 
from  the  mere  thinking  upon  the  subject,  have,  it  seems  to 
me,  a  most  peculiar  and  illogical  method  of  reasoning.  It 
is  the  people's  not  knowing  the  causes  of  wars  that  has  often 
enabled  their  rulers  to  plunge  them  into  conflicts  and  keep 
them  there.  This  is  true  to  some  extent  in  the  present  war, 
as  most  of  us  know,  particularly  with  the  central  powers. 
The  search  for  the  truth  is  dangerous  only  to  its  enemies. 
An  acquaintance  with  the  causes  of  war,  even  modern  con- 
flicts in  civilized  countries,  can  but  lead  the  people  to  hate 
it  more!  When  they  see  all  the  greed,  the  haughtiness,  the 
selfishness,  the  blasphemous  presumption  of  "divine  right" 
monarchs  and  privileged  classes,  and  sometimes  the  igno- 
rance, misunderstandings  and  honest  diff*erences  of  peoples, 
that  are  back  of  war,  they  will  certainly  be  greater  lovers 
of  peace,  and  more  intelligent  workers  for  it. 

Moreover,  it  must  be  understood  that  there  can  be  no 
real  progress  toward  the  peace  we  covet  if  we  deny  that 


General  Statement  %\ 

there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  righteous  war.  The  liberty  of 
American  democracy  rests  on  that  foundation  stone.  God 
has  so  willed  it,  and  we  cannot  change  it,  although  we 
believe  it  is  God's  will  that  some  day  wars  shall  cease  from 
the  earth.  War  has  often  rendered  a  great  service  in  the 
past,  and  even  today  it  must  be  seen  that  in  the  struggle 
for  political  and  economic  independence,  as  well  as  that  for 
physical  existence  and  comfort,  the  necessities  and  ambi- 
tions of  the  strong  will  be  satisfied  at  the  cost  of  the  weak. 
We  say  this  should  not  be.  Christianity  and  our  finer  in- 
stincts are  trying  to  lead  us  away  from  it.  Nevertheless,  it 
is  the  physical  law  of  nature,  has  all  our  past  history  as  a 
race  back  of  it,  and  is  the  "survival  of  the  fittest,"  one  of 
the  greatest  of  all  biological  laws;  and,  as  Emerson  says, 
the  student  of  history  may  become  more  reconciled  to  this 
"copious  bloodshed  of  ages  past" — bloodshed  often,  too, 
in  the  name  of  the  Prince  of  Peace^when  he  reflects 
that  it  is  a  temporary  and  preparatory  state — age- 
long though  it  be — and  has  actively  forwarded  the  cul- 
ture of  man.  Nor  is  this  any  argument  in  favor  of  war 
as  such,  today ;  it  is  only  a  recognition  of  the  service  of  war 
in  the  past.  It  is  folly,  it  is  a  manifestation  of  ignorance 
of  the  history  of  mankind's  development,  to  try  to  get  away 
from  or  ignore  the  benefit  of  wars  in  the  past.  They  are 
the  price  man  has  paid  for  his  civilization,  whether  they  be 
against  kings  on  their  "divine  right"  thrones,  autocratic 
governments,  religious  bigotry  and  intolerance,  or  what  not. 
Civilization  has  been  destroyed  by  these  conflicts,  it  is  true, 
and  is  being  destroyed;  yet,  more  still  of  civilization  has 
been  preserved  and  gained,  else  we  could  not  have  democracy 
and  enlightenment  today;  for  man's  normal  condition 
throughout  the  ages,  almost  up  to  the  present,  has  been  a 
state  of  warfare  and  strife.  Through  the  countless  ages  of 
the  past  these  wars  have  raged.  From  it  all  there  has  come 
an  evolution  into  the  present  state;  and  our  faith  can  but 
repeat,   "as  was   said   three  thousand  years   ago,   so   stiU 


22  The  Causes  Of  War 

it  must  be  said,  the  judgments  of  the  Lord  are  true  and  right- 
eous altogether."  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  wars  have  taken 
the  physically  best  in  all  ages,  they  have  sifted  humanity, 
both  physically  and  intellectually,  and  have  found  the  best 
for  its  leaders.  War  has  brought  different  races  and  na- 
tions of  the  earth  together — at  first  to  blows;  but  from 
blows  to  truce,  to  trade,  to  inter-marriage,  and  finally  to 
peace. 

Considerations  of  this  kind  help  to  bring  us  to  a  true 
view  of  the  nature  and  function  of  war.  We  became  con- 
scious of  the  fact  that  it  is  mingled  with  everything,  that 
it  is  the  subject  of  the  greater  part  of  historical  treatment, 
if  we  take  the  human  race  as  a  whole;  that  it  has,  until 
very  recent  times,  been  the  chief  occupation  or  employment 
of  the  most  conspicuous  men  of  the  world's  long  history ;  and 
that,  in  one  form  or  another,  it  is  the  law  of  nature.  With 
this  view,  we  may  study  the  causes  of  war  intelligently, 
without  prejudice,  and  be  better  able  in  consequence  to 
utilize  the  knowledge  thus  gained  in  applying  it  to  the 
remedies  for  war  and  the  "fight  for  peace."  So,  the  rela- 
tionship of  the  causes  to  the  ends  of  war  must  never  be  lost 
sight  of.  Also,  on  the  severity  of  wars,  on  the  degree  of 
their  necessity,  on  the  extent  to  which  they  go  in  violating 
the  laws  of  civilized  warfare  and  outraging  the  sense  of  hu- 
manity, will  depend  the  opportunity  of  modifying  their 
character  and  the  probability  of  an  evolution  into  a  world 
peace.  "Civilized"  warfare,  as  practiced  by  Germany  in  the 
present  conflict,  has  become  so  horrible  as  to  generate  one 
of  the  most  powerful  reactionary  influences  against  it.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  measure  in  which  wars  are  inevitable, 
or  have  been  (and  this  can  be  found  only  by  a  close  study 
of  their  causes)  will  furnish  the  character  and  limits  of 
remedial  measures. 


CHAPTER  III 

CLASSIFICATION    AND    COMMENT 

TT  is  manifestly  true  that  in  the  present  day  there  are 
-*•  only  two  classes  of  wars  that  are  justifiable,  namely, 
those  for  defense  or  self  preservation,  and  those  for  liberty 
or  freedom  from  oppression.  Yet,  the  attempt  to  classify 
the  causes  of  war,  past  and  present,  is  difficult,  and  results 
are  more  or  less  inaccurate  and  uncertain.  For  convenience, 
however,  and  for  the  sake  of  discussion,  they  may  be  grouped 
as  follows: 

1.  Dynastic  affairs.  (Have  ceased  to  be  fundamental 
causes.) 

5.  Religion.     (No  longer  exists  as  a  leading  cause.) 

8.  Love  of  a  people  for  war.     (Becoming  rarer.) 

4.  Colonial  expansion.  (Recent,  but  has  lost  its  attrac- 
tion, except  perhaps  for  Germany.) 

6.  Racial  predominance — tendency  to  domination  by  one 
race  in  a  composite  nation,  as  in  Austria-Hungary.  (Still 
a  cause  for  strife.) 

6.  National  or  race  hatred.  (Still  strong,  as  in  Ger- 
many vs.  France  and  vice  versa — inherited  from  the  past, 
with  distrust  and  misunderstanding.) 

7.  Growth  of  nationality — to  secure  national  unity. 
(Chief  cause  of  most  wars  in  latter  part  of  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, and  some  today.) 

^'8.     "Balance  of  Power,"  in  Europe.     (Still  a  contribu- 
ting cause. ) 

9.  Imperfection  of  government — ^weakness,  anarchy,  as 
in  Mexico  and  a  few  small  states  in  Europe  today.  ( Still  a 
cause  and  excuse.) 

23 


24i  The  Causes  Of  War 

10.  Territorial  adjustment — tendency  to  secure  natural 
boundaries. 

11.  Trade  rivalry  and  commercial  motives.  (Many  of 
England's  petty  wars  in  the  past  century,  also  other  Euro- 
pean countries.) 

12.  Conquest — ambition  of  leaders.  (Napoleon  Bona- 
parte best  modem  example.) 

13.  Great  navies  and  standing  armies  of  Europe — the 
"armed  peace." 

14.  Suppression  of  democratic  and  revolutionary  move- 
ments of  the  people,  by  autocratic  governments.  (Ever  a 
leading  cause,  but  especially  1820-50.) 

15.  Desire  for  political  freedom  and  democracy,  na- 
tional, world-wide,  against  autocratic  governments.  (Most 
recent,  and  greatest  now.) 

16.  To  uphold  the  principles  of  international  law. 
(More  or  less  connected  with  several  above.) 

We  can  get  some  idea  of  the  multiplicity  and  complexity 
of  the  causes  of  the  present  war  when  we  note  that  nearly 
all  of  the  foregoing  causes — all  except  possibly  three — con- 
tributed to  the  conflict.  It  might  be  well  also  to  state  in 
passing  that  this  all  foreshadows  greater  problems  of  read- 
justment when  the  fighting  ceases  and  even  more  complex 
than  the  problems  of  the  war,  the  peace  negotiations  taking 
perhaps  a  longer  period  than  the  war  itself,  for  the  whole 
world  will  be  vitally  interested  and  must  take  part. 

One  reads  in  a  good  many  historic  works  and  treatises 
on  peace  that  wars  usually  have  very  trifling  causes.  This 
has  sometimes  been  true;  and  some  people  think  by  this 
means  alone  to  discredit  war.  Others,  on  the  contrary,  are 
partisans  of  great  causes,  and  they  likewise  are  sometimes 
right.  Both  these  tendencies,  however,  lead  to  erroneous 
conclusions,  for  neither  represents  the  facts  of  history.  So 
many  times  the  writer  has  heard  men  say  that  the  present 
world  war  is  without  cause ;  from  the  pulpit,  from  the  lecture 
platform,  from  the  press — from  all  ranks  of  life  comes  this 


Classification  and  Comment  25 

statement;  also,  that  it  is  useless,  and  serving  no  purpose. 
If  so  then  the  United  States  has  erred  and  most  grievously 
sinned  in  going  into  it.  But  let  us  remember  that  things 
do  not  happen  in  this  world  without  cause,  be  that  cause 
good  or  bad.  The  laws  of  nature  and  of  God — ^which  are 
one  and  the  same — teach  us  that  just  as  sure  as  there 
are  events,  these  events  have  causes  and  results.  Then,  just 
as  sure  as  there  are  wars,  these  wars  have  causes  and  re- 
sults. Here  again  we  get  back  to  the  fundamental  proposi- 
tion that  to  understand  wars  we  must  become  familiar  with 
their  causes.  The  American  people  would  do  well  today  to 
read  less  about  the  details  of  what  is  happening,  and  the 
continual  conjecturing  that  gets  nowhere  (leave  that  to 
the  experts  and  tliose  whose  duty  it  is  to  give  their  atten- 
tion to  it)  and  devote  more  time  to  a  study  into  why  the 
great  world  tragedy  has  come.  We  could  then  be  more  use- 
ful and  ready  to  do  our  part  when  peace  finally  comes.  We 
are  in  the  war,  and  are  called  upon  for  untold  sacrifices.  We 
should  know  why  these  things  are  necessary  and  what  really 
is  at  stake.  It  is  no  credit  to  the  American  people  that 
when  this  mighty  conflict  began  in  1914,  they  stood  aghast, 
and  in  their  ignorance  of  world  problems  and  conditions 
said:  "What  are  they  fighting  for  over  there,  anyway?" 
"I  don't  believe  they  themselves  know ;"  "It  is  only  a  family 
quarrel  between  King  George  and  the  Kaiser,"  etc.  We  have 
been  too  self-contained  and  selfish,  and  have  not  realized 
how  much  their  problems  are  ours,  how  the  whole  world  is 
one  brotherhood,  and  how  close  and  interdependent  all  peo- 
ples are.  At  last  we  are  being  brought  to  realize  that  we 
must  be  citizens  of  the  world,  not  alone  of  our  state  or 
nation,  and  that  as  citizens  of  the  world  we  have  obliga- 
tions no  less  binding  upon  us  than  are  those  of  our  country. 
It  is  idle  to  talk  of  a  world  peace  without  an  intelligent 
world  understanding.  And  once  again,  this  goes  to  show 
how  poor  students  of  history  we  have  been.  It  is  not  ex- 
aggerating to  say   that   a  few   farseeing   statesmen   were 


M  The  Causes  Of  War 

trembling  at  the  prospect  of  this  war,  and  were  trying  to 
tell  us  the  signs  of  the  times,  that  in  1898,  when  the  Span- 
ish-American war  broke  out,  in  1908-10,  when  Austria  an- 
nexed Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  without  their  consent;  in 
1912-13,  the  period  of  the  Balkan  wars — ^we  persistently 
refused  to  listen,  because  indeed,  we  thought  we  were  still 
living  in  an  age  of  isolation,  and  had  no  concern  in  the  prob- 
lems of  the  old  world.  We  have  continued  to  refuse  to  listen 
until  it  has  all  come  home  to  us,  with  an  outlook  that  is  by 
no  means  a  reassuring  one.  We  should  be  given  a  few  facts 
to  disabuse  our  minds. 

For  instance,  it  is  not  right  for  teachers  and  text-books 
to  build  up  prejudice  against  England,  even  though  it  be 
done  through  ignorance,  by  representing  her  as  the  England 
of  George  III,  when  she  was  an  aristocracy,  instead  of  the 
Britain  of  today,  which  in  all  but  name  is  as  much  of  a 
democracy  as  our  own.  We  should  know  that  England  alone 
prevented  Germany  from  going  to  war  with  us  in  1898. 
The  children  should  know  that  England's  fleet  has  a  num- 
ber of  times  kept  us  out  of  war.  Moreover,  it  is  not  right 
to  teach  our  youth  that  our  own  Revolutionary  war  was  the 
only  nor  the  first  nor  the  greatest  revolution  of  a  people 
against  their  oppressors.  Justice  to  the  troubled  history 
of  France  demands  that  we  be  brought  to  see  that  it  was 
France  that  saved  what  democracy  there  is  in  Europe, 
though  she  may  have  taken  courage  from  our  example  a 
few  years  before,  that  it  was  France  who,  single-handed,  for 
years  fought  for  liberty  against  the  combined  autocratic 
thrones  of  Europe  (England  at  that  time  being  one  of 
them),  and  that  a  chastened  France  at  last  survived  even 
the  heartless  Napoleon,  who  would  have  ruined  her,  because, 
recognizing  his  first  service,  she  was  too  faithful  to  him. 
The  youth  should  likewise  know  that  the  Kaiser  and  the 
autocratic  government  of  Germany  (the  same  kind  of  gov- 
ernment that  England  had  a  hundred  years  ago)  have  had 
designs  on  the  United  States — ^her  Monroe  Doctrine,  her 


Classification  and  Comment  27 

democracy,  her  influence  in  the  direction  of  liberty  for  a  full 
generation.  We  should  not  be  deceived  about  the  character 
of  the  Kaiser  and  his  government.  He  was  too  autocratic 
even  for  a  Bismarck  to  support.  Single-handed  he  has  di- 
rected the  policy  of  the  Empire.  His  ministers  have  always 
been  only  his  servants.  As  the  historian  West  says,  "He 
believes  thoroughly  in  the  'divine  right'  theory,  and  he  has 
repeatedly  stated  it  in  as  striking  a  form  as  ever  did  James 
I  of  England  or  Louis  XIV  of  France,  two  or  three  cen- 
turies ago."  Whether  he  believes  in  that  theory  personally 
or  not,  he  has  certainly  tried  to  get  his  people  to  accept  it, 
and  has  acted  upon  it.  Read  this  statement  of  his  to  the 
city  of  Munich :  "The  will  of  the  king  is  the  supreme  law." 
And  again,  to  a  body  of  teachers  upon  the  proper  teaching 
of  history:  "You  must  teach  that  the  French  Revolution 
is  an  unmitigated  crime  against  God  and  Man!"  Address- 
ing a  body  of  military  recruits  in  1891  he  said:  "You  are 
now  my  soldiers.  You  have  given  yourselves  to  me,  body 
and  soul.  There  is  but  one  enemy  for  you  and  that  is  my 
enemy.  In  these  times  of  socialistic  intrigue,  it  may  hap- 
pen that  I  shall  call  upon  you  to  fire  upon  your  brothers 
and  fathers  *  *  *  in  such  a  case  you  are  to  obey  me  with- 
out a  murmur!"  In  1897  he  referred  to  himself  as  the  "Vice- 
regent  of  God."  His  relatives  and  friends  have  preached 
the  same  gospel  everywhere  they  have  gone,  and  especially 
in  the  Oriental  countries  and  Turkey — they  knew  they  did 
not  dare  to  do  so  openly  in  America;  but  they  did  just  as 
bad  a  thing — they  deceived  us  as  to  the  purpose  of  their 
visits  here.  A  nominal  friendly  visit  was  nothing  less  than 
the  perfecting  of  a  knowledge  of  our  military  conditions  and 
resources  and  of  the  German  spy  system  in  America.  And 
this  august  mission  was  headed  by  no  less  distinguished  a 
personage  than  the  brother  of  the  Kaiser  himself !  They  have 
relied  oh  that  impression  of  the  American  people  as  proof 
that  we  would  not  go  to  war  with  Germany.  The  German 
government  and  Kaiser  have  little  understood  the  true  spirit 


28  The  Games  Of  War 

of  American  democracy !  Why  should  we  not  fight  with  all 
our  might  the  power  that  would  wipe  democracy  from  the 
face  of  the  earth?  We  have  seen  the  fruits  of  liberty  and 
democracy  so  bountiful  all  about  us  in  the  world  that  we 
have  not  understood  nor  appreciated  this  mighty  counter- 
current  that  still  survives  out  of  a  medieval  age.  It  is 
high  time  that  our  eyes  were  opened,  and  that  we  see  the 
greatest  of  all  causes,  for  which  we  are  fighting. 

We  need  also  to  distinguish  carefully  between  real  causes 
and  pretended  ones.  The  little  things  which  are  spoken  of 
as  causes,  and  are  generally  given  by  the  parties  engaging 
as  causes,  are  usually  but  pretexts,  or  mere  occasions,  and 
not  efficient  causes.  A  king  may  lead  a  country  into  war 
on  a  slight  pretext,  as  in  Austria  in  1914 ;  but  the  ideas  and 
principles  that  are  back  of  such  acts — the  type  of  govern- 
ment that  they  stand  for — are  the  causes,  and  are  not 
trifling.  They  represent  a  system,  whose  earmarks  are  op- 
pression, whose  gospel  is  greed.  The  fundamental  cause  for 
Austria's  plunging  the  nations  of  Europe  into  this  war  were 
her  designs  upon  the  Balkan  states  and  her  fear  lest  Rus- 
sia might  gain  or  control  them,  and  with  them  Constanti- 
nople. And  Russia,  with  her  Czar,  was  equally  culpable, 
except  that  the  Balkan  states  had  a  racial  sympathy  with 
Russia  that  they  did  not  have  with  Austria,  But  now,  thank 
God,  the  Russia  of  the  Czar  is  no  more.  And  America's 
greatest  obligation,  next  to  saving  her  own  liberties,  is  to 
help  that  struggling  New  Russia. 

Often  a  long  standing  and  vital  cause  of  conflict  is  hid- 
den behind  such  pretexts,  or  excuses,  and  is  revealed  only 
by  the  results  of  the  war.  This  is  one  of  the  curses  of  auto- 
cratic governments  and  of  ambitious,  powerful  monarchs. 
This  leads  us  to  say  that  while  a  war  cannot  be  without 
causes,  the  cause  may  be  unjust,  or  even  useless,  though 
the  war  itself  cannot  be,  to  the  side  that  is  wronged.  If 
both  sides  have  real  grievances,  as  is  often  the  case,  the 
reason  for  each  going  to  war  must  be  understood,  else  we 
are  partisans  of  the  one  and  unfair  to  the  other.     On  this 


Classification  and  Comment  ft9 

point,  here  in  America,  many  a  student  and  teacher,  both 
North  and  South  has  misunderstood  and  misrepresented  the 
Civil  War  and  its  causes,  in  the  United  States.  We  have 
therefore  been  unable  to  reconcile  the  causes  with  the  re- 
sults of  the  war.  There  are  usually  at  least  as  many  causes 
of  war  as  there  are  parties  engaged  in  it.  Ruin  and  sorrow 
for  a  lost  cause  was  the  price  that  the  South  had  to  pay  for 
not  understanding  why  the  North  and  those  devoted  to  the 
national  cause  should  fight  for  the  Union  and  liberty,  for 
the  negro.  The  "crime  of  reconstruction"  is  the  reproach 
that  the  South  can  lay  at  the  feet  of  the  North  with  a  radi- 
cal Congress,  for  not  understanding  why  the  South  fought 
and  sacrificed  and  suffered  so  long,  having  been  taught  by 
masters  of  thought  to  distrust  a  strong  central  government, 
as  did  their  forefathers  the  government  of  King  George.  This 
is  one  of  the  many  instances  that  go  to  show  that  peoples* 
ignorance  of  each  other  and  their  misunderstandings  are 
one  of  the  most  potent  causes  of  trouble. 

Now,  let  us  return  to  a  brief  discussion  of  a  few  of  the 
causes  grouped  above.  Wars  of  religion  have  ceased  to  exist ; 
but  religious  prejudice  has  been  taken  into  account  in  re- 
cruiting for  the  present  war  in  those  countries  where  "holy 
war"  has  been  declared,  as  in  Russia  and  Turkey,  with 
slight  traces  of  religious  appeal  otherwhere.  Dynastic  af- 
fairs in  themselves  can  no  longer  cause  war.  Men's  intelli- 
gence in  times  of  peace  has  triumphed  over  their  love  for 
mar.  Hence  but  for  the  others  we  could  dispense  with  the 
first  three  causes  entirely.  Yet,  it  is  not  out  of  place  to  dis- 
cuss the  love  of  people  for  war  in  the  past.  It  helps  us  to 
understand  what  the  war  passion  and  loyalty  let  loose  on 
the  battlefield  means  today. 

Man  has  inherited  the  fighting  instinct  from  his  remote 
ancestors,  who  lived  in  a  state  of  nature,  with  the  lower 
animals.  In  that  environment  war  is  the  effect  of  a  need — 
the  need  to  exist,  to  survive.  It  is  the  instinct  to  live,  which 
is  the  greatest  of  all  instincts.  The  farther  we  go  back  in 
the  history  of  man  and  the  nearer  we  find  him  to  nature,  and 


80  The  Causes  Of  War 

the  more  he  is  under  the  control  of  his  animal  nature — ^why, 
the  more  we  find  that  war  with  him  has  been  the  effect  of  a 
human  need,  and  its  end  the  satisfaction  of  that  need. 

There  are  hundreds  of  cases  on  record  of  wars  of  con- 
quest due  to  the  migrations  of  peoples  who  had  outgrown 
their  native  valleys,  plains  or  desert  pastures.  The  pinch 
of  hunger  and  famine  drove  them  on,  and  the  more  satisfied 
and  peaceful  peoples  whom  they  invaded  became  their  vic- 
tims and  slaves,  or  were  pushed  on,  to  struggle  for  existence, 
or  fight  for  it  elsewhere.  Again,  it  is  nature's  law  of  the 
survival  of  the  fittest.  We  recognize  this  principle  in  all 
animal  life  in  nature.  The  big  fish  devours  the  smaller  one ; 
the  forest  giant  makes  the  smaller  beast  its  prey,  as  it  does 
the  still  smaller;  the  eagle's  mighty  strength  was  developed 
in  order  that  he  might  prey  upon  more  helpless  creatures. 
The  same  law  rules  the  plant  kingdom.  The  large  sturdy 
plant  crowds  out  and  kills  its  weaker,  more  delicate  com- 
petitor. The  more  warlike  plant,  as  the  thistle  and  the 
thorn,  "chokes  out"  the  tenderer  stem.  So,  savage  man  took 
his  lessons  from  nature  and  from  necessity,  since  he  had  no 
religion  of  the  higher  life  and  of  unselfishness  to  guide  him, 
except  as  his  imagination  slowly  and  feebly  led  him  to  "the 
gods"  as  arbiters  of  human  destiny  and  judges  of  his  deeds. 
It  is  only  the  religion  of  one  God,  a  God  of  mercy  as  well 
as  of  judgment  upon  mankind,  that  can  save  the  race  from 
its  animal  instincts  and  from  war.  And  were  it  not  for  that 
in  man  that  is  spiritual,  and  above  nature,  the  principle  that 
"might  makes  right"  would  still  hold  undisputed  sway.  The 
warlike  instinct  is  therefore  inherent  in  human  nature,  and 
man  has  to  conquer  it  with  his  reason,  else  he  is  no  better 
essentially  than  the  brute.  The  war  spirit  we  have  inherited 
from  generations  for  countless  ages  past,  and  it  is  only  the 
long  process  of  man's  evolution  into  a  higher  state  that  can 
save  that  civilization  for  which  we  fight.  Not  until  the 
spirit  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth  has  met  its  response  in  the  spirit 
of  man  and  has  supplanted  the  beast  in  nations,  will  war- 
fare cease. 


CHAPTER  IV 


FUNDAMENTAL.    CAUSES 


BECAUSE  of  their  close  relationship,  we  may  treat  com- 
mercial  causes  and  those  of  colonial  expansion  together. 
There  are  those  who  hold  to  the  materialistic  conception  of 
history,  and  claim  that  at  bottom  the  real  causes  of  war 
are  economic  in  nature — that  they  even  go  back  to  a  basic 
wrong  in  society — namely,  the  production  and  distribution 
of  wealth  in  the  capitalistic  form.  This  is  so  far  from  the 
truth  of  the  history  of  wars,  however,  that  it  may  be  dis- 
missed as  altogether  too  narrow  a  view.  Yet,  the  economic 
factor,  and  greed  for  gain,  cannot  be  ignored.  To  a  cer- 
tain extent  in  the  recent  past,  society  has  had  an  economic 
basis  in  much  the  same  way  that  in  medieval  times  and  in 
the  ancient  world  men  sought  through  war  to  secure  mines 
and  treasures,  as  for  example,  the  ancient  Romans  and 
Carthagenians,  as  well  as  other  peoples.  It  is  true  that 
military  politics,  built  upon  an  economic  basis,  still  domi- 
nates to  a  large  extent  in  some  countries.  Some  of  the 
latest  and  best  examples  are  Germany,  Austria  and  Russia. 
This  evil,  however,  has  been  no  less  true  of  international  re- 
lations. The  opium  war  between  China  and  England  was 
inspired  by  the  very  basest  cupidity  on  England's  part,  and 
remains  one  of  the  black  pages  on  English  history.  In  fact, 
colonial  wars  have  sought  primarily  and  generally  the  em- 
ployment and  security  of  capital,  the  monopoly  of  com- 
merce, or  the  exclusive  use  of  the  shortest  and  most  lucrative 
trade  routes.  It  is  an  earnest  of  better  things,  however,, 
that  now  most  of  the  greatest  world  powers  are  seriously 
considering  the  neutralization  of  the  strategic  commercial 

31 


32  The  Causes  Of  War 

points,  such  as  Constantinople,  Gibraltar,  the  Suez  and  Pan- 
ama canals,  etc.  That  these  places  be  dismantled  and  in- 
ternationalized is  one  of  the  strong  demands  that  will  be 
brought  upon  the  parliament  of  the  world  at  the  conclusion 
of  this  war.  This  all  is  a  gigantic  task,  however,  and  may 
not  be  accompanied  in  the  near  future. 

There  has  also  been  a  certain  degree  of  necessity  in  these 
economic  wars,  especially  on  the  part  of  some  peoples.  Re- 
peatedly have  nations  felt  it  necessary,  because  of  the  over- 
weening ambitions  of  others,  to  engage  in  war,  under  pain 
of  being  reduced  to  an  inferior  position  among  the  states  of 
the  world.  Besides  Belgium  in  this  war,  Denmark,  China, 
some  of  the  Barbary  States,  and  the  South  African  repub- 
lics may  be  cited  as  examples  in  recent  times.  Under  pre- 
text of  defending  its  flag,  its  citizens  or  its  interests,  a  Euro- 
pean nation  has  taken  advantage  of  the  occasion  to  estab- 
lish itself  and  extend  its  power  and  control  gradually.  It 
was  indeed  a  surprise  to  the  world  that  the  United  States 
did  not  do  this  thing  in  the  case  of  Cuba  in  1898,  and  again, 
in  Mexico  more  recently.  The  general  result,  however,  has 
been  to  supplant  a  backward  and  most  unprogressive  civil- 
ization with  a  progressive,  more  enlightened,  sanitary  and 
democratic  one;  and  this  result  is  at  least  gratifying.  It  is 
remarkable,  for  instance,  that  the  Boers  of  South  Africa 
have  so  loyally  and  with  so  very  little  friction  supported 
England  in  this  war,  against  their  kindred,  the  Germans. 
The  explanation  lies  in  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  has  given 
them  self-government,  with  more  efficient  administration,  has 
taught  them  democracy,  and  they  are  far  more  prosperous 
than  they  were  under  the  old  regime.  This  is  not  to  argue, 
however,  that  the  end  justifies  the  means.  We  may  add  in 
passing  also,  that  we  have  been  guilty  of  the  same  conduct 
toward  the  American  Indians  that  the  European  nations 
have  been  toward  the  untutored  and  backward  peoples  of 
the  Old  World. 

With  regard  to  our  fifth  cause,  racial  domination  in  a 


Fmidamental  Causes  3S 

composite  wnion,  we  may  say  that  it  is  one  of  the  greatest 
crimes  of  which  governments  and  rulers  have  been  guilty 
in  the  past.  In  most  instances  it  is  one  of  the  basest  forms 
of  slavery,  and  has  scarcely  any  justification  whatever. 
There  can  never  be  world  peace  so  long  as  an  alien  race  or 
nationality,  with  different  ideas,  ideals  and  political  instincts 
and  institutions,  lords  it  over  a  subject  people,  simply  be- 
cause chance  and  might,  or  physical  force,  have  triumphed 
over  justice  and  humanity.  The  world  can  never  breathe 
freely  until  the  Polish  people  get  their  freedom  and  inde- 
pendence, as  do  the  various  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary — 
and  are  free  to  gravitate  to  those  states  or  confederations 
to  which  they  by  race  and  right  belong.  Turkey  must  leave 
Europe,  where  she  never  has  had  a  right  to  be.  Turkey 
is  not  a  nation  in  the  true  sense,  anyway,  and  never  has  been. 
She  has  no  right  to  exist,  for  she  has  ever  existed  unnatu- 
rally, by  criminal  subjection  of  peoples  who  otherwise  would 
long  have  been  free,  and  arbiters  of  their  own  destinies.  If 
there  ever  was  a  chimerical  state  it  has  been  the  Ottoman 
Empire.  Its  whole  history  has  been  one  of  cruelty,  rapine 
and  murder. 

Our  sixth  cause,  national  or  race  hatred  may  also  be  dis- 
posed of  rather  briefly.  To  the  desire  for  revenge  has  been 
attributed  by  many,  and  perhaps  justly,  the  greater  part 
of  wars.  The  German  kaiser  was  right  in  part  at  least, 
when  he  said  that  this  present  conflict  has  its  basis  in  the 
Europe  of  the  past  centuries.  Nations,  no  more  than  indi- 
viduals can  violate  the  laws  of  justice  and  right  without 
at  later  times  having  to  pay  most  dearly  for  these  viola- 
tions. Like  individuals,  "the  sins  of  the  fathers  are  visited 
upon  the  children  to  the  third  and  fourth  generation,"  and 
on,  and  on,  until  the  wrongs  inflicted  are  fully  atoned  for. 
It  is  hard  to  forgive  and  forget  great  crimes.  Nor  is  there 
so  much  virtue  in  forgetting  as  we  are  sometimes  wont  to 
believe.  It  is  Christian  and  wise  to  forgive,  but  it  is  not 
always  wise  to  forget.     Particularly  is  this  true  in  interna- 


34  The  Causes  Of  War 

tional  affairs.  To  forget  the  past  is  to  fail  to  understand 
the  present  and  to  read  the  future.  In  the  study  of  the 
history  of  mankind,  this  distinction  needs  to  be  made  clear 
and  appreciated.  We  can  safely  forget  only  when  to  for- 
get is  to  further  the  cause  of  liberty,  as  in  the  case  of  our 
past  relations  with  England,  and  the  troubles  of  our  own 
civil  conflict.  We  can  forget  in  the  case  of  England  because 
we  know  that  the  England  of  a  powerful  aristocracy  and 
"divine  right"  monarchs  is  no  more.  For  the  same  reason 
we  should  have  known  and  remembered  the  principles  and 
conduct  of  the  present  kaiser  and  government  of  Germany. 
It  is  a  sad  fact  that  in  the  past  the  nation  that  has  not 
been  able  to  return  evil  for  evil  has  been  doomed  to  disap- 
pear from  among  the  independent  nations  of  the  world.  Let 
us  hope  that  such  a  thing  in  the  future  cannot  be.  It  is  a 
terrible  test  of  our  faith,  in  the  midst  of  the  present  whirl- 
pool of  horror ;  but  when  faith  is  lost,  all  is  lost.  In  ancient 
times,  among  the  uncivilized  peoples,  even  by  scriptural  in- 
junction, it  was  "an  eye  for  an  eye,  and  a  tooth  for  a  tooth"; 
but  when  the  world  is  "made  safe  for  democracy"  the  prin- 
ciples of  Christ  can  reign  in  the  nations  as  well  as  in  the 
hearts  of  men.  Poor  Belgium,  poor  Belgium !  What  a  com- 
ment on  our  Christian  civilization!  The  time  must  come 
when  the  innocent  cannot  be  made  to  suff^er  for  the  sins  of 
the  plunderers  of  justice  and  virtue,  for  the  crimes  of  the 
privileged  parasites  of  the  human  kingdom. 

In  considering  our  seventh  cause,  i.  e.,  the  gromth  of 
nationality^  we  note  that  the  present  German  empire  was 
built  upon  a  series  of  wars  none  of  which  was  really  justi- 
fiable, and  Germany  today  is  paying  the  price  of  her  past 
perfidy — that  of  the  founders  of  her  empire.  The  union  of 
Germany  would  indeed  have  been  delayed  to  a  later  genera- 
tion, but  who  dare  say  she  would  not  have  been  better  for 
the  delay?  It  would  have  been  a  Germany  of  democracy,  no 
matter  how  long  delayed,  if  it  had  been  allowed  the  natural 
course  of  development.     In  taking  Schleswig-Holstein  Bis- 


Ftmdamental  Causes  d6 

marck  was  thinking  of  German  imperial  interests,  not  of  the 
true  interests  of  those  provinces,  much  less  of  the  interests 
of  Denmark  whom  he  robbed  of  them.  Shortly  after,  he 
showed  his  perfidy  by  driving  Austria  out  of  Germany  and 
German  affairs,  in  the  "Six  Weeks  War,"  just  after  he  had 
persuaded  her  to  help  him  conquer  Denmark  and  take  from 
her  the  two  provinces,  with  the  tacit  understanding  that  the 
booty  was  to  be  divided  between  the  two  victors,  Austria 
to  have  her  full  share.  It  is  likewise  well  known  that  Bis- 
marck was  courting  war  with  Louis  Napoleon  of  France,  in 
1870,  and  that  his  mutiKzation  of  the  telegram  of  the  king 
of  Prussia  to  France  was  the  occasion  of  France  declaring 
war.  In  other  words,  he  tricked  Napoleon  and  the  gov- 
ernment of  France  into  declaring  the  war  which  he  (Bis- 
marck) desired.  Nor  did  the  "Iron  Chancellor'*  conceal 
to  his  people  the  fact  that  he  proposed  to  create  a  German 
empire  on  the  principle  of  "blood  and  iron."  That  was 
his  gospel  for  Germany.  We  know  how  dangerous  to  the 
peace  and  safety  of  the  world  it  is  for  the  government  or 
people  of  a  great  country  to  revert  to  the  war  instinct,  to 
become  militaristic,  in  the  sense  that  Germany  has  been  since 
the  time  of  Frederick  the  Great.  The  war  spirit  is  the 
most  violent  of  emotions,  and  in  its  desperation  is  much 
akin  to  insanity !  On  the  pretext  of  nationality  there  have 
always  been  certain  nations  that  have  had  a  predilection 
for  the  life  of  war — different  peoples  (led  by  their  rulers) 
at  different  times.  At  one  time  it  was  Rome;  at  another, 
Spain;  at  another  time  France,  under  Louis  XIV;  at  an- 
other, Italy.  For  more  than  fifty  years  it  has  been  Ger- 
many, led  by  Prussian  autocracy.  How  well,  how  thorough- 
ly, how  efficiently  have  the  German  people  obeyed  that  gos- 
pel! Even  their  most  wonderful  arts  of  peace  have  been 
made  to  contribute  to  that  end,  instead  of  to  the  far  nobler, 
disinterested  end  of  charity  for  the  whole  world.  "Gott 
straffe  England"  is  the  gospel  of  hate,  not  of  patriotism — 
of  hate  in  its  most  malignant  form,  and  obedience  to  that 


86  The  Causes  Of  War 

gospel  is  the  explanation  of  the  many  outrageous  acts  of 
barbarism — the  atrocities  of  Germans — of  which  we  hear  so 
much,  and  with  which  we  are  so  famihar,  today.  But  "Gott 
straffe  England"  was  only  the  beginning.  "Gott  straffe  de- 
mocracy" is  the  true  purpose  and  watchword  today;  and 
that  means  the  United  States  of  America,  first  and  fore- 
most of  all,  for  America  is  first  and  foremost  in  democracy. 

The  other  great  struggle  for  nationalism  in  the  past 
century,  namely,  the  unification  of  Italy,  which  is  still 
going  on,  we  need  comment  upon  but  very  briefly.  While  it 
has  not  been  unmixed  with  injustice  on  Italy's  part,  no  such 
crimes  can  be  laid  at  the  feet  of  Victor  Emmanuel,  Cavour 
and  Garibaldi  as  at  the  feet  of  the  leaders  for  an  imperial 
Germany.  On  the  other  hand  the  history  of  Austria,  the 
arch-enemy  of  Italian  freedom  in  the  past  century,  is  even 
worse  than  that  of  Germany.  And  now,  that  the  whole  world 
is  reaping  the  fruits  of  these  past  wrongs,  it  must  be  a  lib- 
erty washed  in  blood  that  is  to  rise  upon  the  ruins  of  the 
past.  One  of  the  fondest  hopes  of  the  best  servants  of  the 
world  at  present  is,  that  this  great  catastrophe  may  be 
bringing  near  the  end  of  the  era  of  selfishness  and  of  might. 

In  considering  the  "balance  of  power"  as  a  cause  of  war, 
we  find  that  it  has  contributed  to  wars  in  Europe  for  cen- 
turies past;  that  it  has  its  weight  in  the  present  war,  and 
is  dangerous  for  the  future  until,  or  unless  the  results  of  the 
present  conflict  and  coming  peace  give  guarantees  that  will 
obliterate  the  natural  distrust  of  states  and  peoples  for 
each  other,  together  with  the  disturbance  of  peace  and  pros- 
perity throughout  the  world. 

Our  ninth  cause,  imperfection  of  government  is  so  evi- 
dent that  it  may  be  passed  over  with  but  a  word  of  com- 
ment. It  is  in  general  only  small  and  weak  nations,  or  those 
in  a  more  or  less  violent  state  of  transformation  of  govern- 
ment, that  are  prey  to  the  exploitation  of  war.  Portugal 
and  perhaps  Spain  have  happily  recovered  from  that  state 
within  the  past  and  present  generations,  but  there  is  no 


Ftundamental  Cawses  37 

immediate  hope  for  Mexico,  nor  for  the  new  Russian  states. 
The  present  alHed  intervention  will  bring  its  political  re- 
sults only  after  years.  The  military  object,  of  course,  may 
be  gained  soon  and  Russia  saved  from  Germany,  but,  after 
that,  it  will  take  her  generations  to  find  herself. 

The  desire  to  secure  natural  boundaries,  always  strong, 
but  more  so  if  those  boundaries  have  once  been  held,  is  one 
of  the  great  causes  for  several  countries  engaging  in  war, 
even  in  the  present  war — as  in  the  case  of  Italy,  Russia, 
Bulgaria,  Serbia  and  to  some  extent  others.  Not  that  this 
was  the  only  cause  with  any  of  them;  but  it  was  a  great,  if 
not  controlling,  motive.  After  France  was  plunged  into  the 
strife,  of  course  she  desired  Alsace-Lorraine,  as  a  better 
natural  barrier  against  Germany,  together  with  other  rea- 
sons which  are  well  known,  chief  among  them  being  the  race 
hatred,  national  feeling,  and  the  keenest  desire  for  revenge 
upon  Germany  for  taking  those  provinces  in  1871.  Many 
unnatural  boundaries  must  be  wiped  out  at  the  conclusion 
of  this  world  conflict,  and  a  new  map  of  the  Eastern  world 
made  in  the  adjustment. 

Wars  arising  from  trade  rivalry  in  their  essentials  have 
already  been  discussed  above,  and  may  be  passed  over  here. 

Wars  of  conquest  and  of  the  ambition  of  leaders  next 
claim  our  attention.  Facts  already  considered  make  it  ap- 
pear that  the  nations  in  the  past  have  lived  chiefly  on  the 
principle  that  might  makes  right.  The  study  of  wars  of 
conquest  makes  this  conviction  all  the  stronger.  By  this  we 
are  able  to  see  how  far  as  nations,  up  to  the  present  war 
at  least,  we  have  been  from  the  principle  of  peace  and  honor 
that  we  have  been  accustomed  so  much  to  talk  about.  With 
this  realization  many  illusions,  and  many  theories  and  fond 
hopes  vanish.  We  are  just  beginning  to  take  the  world  as 
it  is — to  understand  it  and  frame  our  future  plans  upon 
that  basis.  It  is  a  striking  thing  to  note  that,  until  recent 
times  the  right  of  conquest  was  never  brought  in  question. 
That  it  has  been  condemned  in  modem  times,  however,  is 


38  The  Causes  Of  War 

proof  of  the  value  of  our  civilization.  In  these  dark  hours 
of  trial  we  should  keep  this  fact  in  mind;  it  carries  a  mes- 
sage of  hope  for  mankind.  Until  recently,  the  act  of  con- 
quering was  appreciated  as  one  of  the  very  highest  of  human 
activities,  and  the  greatest  warriors  were  the  greatest  states- 
men. The  literature,  particularly  the  poetry,  of  the  middle 
ages,  was  replete  with  the  exploits  of  the  military  heroes. 
Force  was  desired  by  the  state,  with  very  few  exceptions 
among  the  ancient  and  medieval  peoples,  above  everything 
else.  Let  us  be  thankful  we  have  gotten  beyond  that  stage, 
and  that  the  disturbers  of  the  world's  peace,  notwithstand- 
ing their  frantic  efforts  to  justify  their  actions  and  to  shift 
responsibility,  nevertheless  stand  condemned  before  the 
judgment  bar  of  humanity !  The  ambition  of  a  leader  singly, 
can  never  again  bring  on  a  great  war,  nor  has  one  ruler 
alone  been  able  to,  for  a  hundred  years  past. 

Great  navies  and  standing  armies  are  contributing  causes 
only  when  other  causes  are  back  of  them.  Yet,  we  must  see, 
as  a  result  of  this  war,  that  great  standing  armies  are  abol- 
ished forever.  This  is  imperatively  necessary,  not  only  to 
guarantee  peace,  but  to  enable  the  nations  to  pay  off  their 
tremendous  war  debts.  At  the  rate  that  the  armies  and 
navies  were  building  in  Europe  previous  to  this  war,  the 
whole  continent  would  have  been  bankrupt  in  another  gen- 
eration, even  without  war.  How  necessary  it  is  then,  that 
those  expensive  and  crushing  burdens  upon  the  peoples  be 
done  away  with,  or  lowered  to  the  very  minimum — to  the 
extent  that  their  expense  shall  be  small,  as  compared  with 
the  arts  of  peace ! 

The  fourteenth  cause  listed  above,  namely,  the  suppression 
of  democratic  and  revolutionary  movements  of  the  peoples, 
which  has  been  a  leading  cause  in  the  past,  and  has  proven 
the  perfidy  of  princes,  is  bound  to  decrease  and  vanish,  as  the 
cause  of  democracy  grows  and  finally  triumphs  throughout 
the  world.  The  long  and  patient  struggle  of  the  people  is 
at  last  to  be  rewarded.     It  has  taken  thousands  of  years 


Fimdamental  Causes  39 

to  develop  democracy  on  earth,  but  now  she  is  coming  to 
her  own,  and  the  days  of  kingly  power  and  oppression  are 
numbered.  To  appreciate  this  fact,  and  to  remember  the 
principle  for  which  we  struggle — to  keep  our  patience  in  this 
generation,  it  is  necessary  that  we  see  events  in  terms  of 
centuries,  and  great  movements  in  terms  of  the  great  ages 
and  stages  of  evolution  of  man's  civilization,  in  eras  as  God 
counts  them,  in  their  true  perspective  and  as  they  are. 

The  desire  for  political  freedom  and  democracy  on  the 
part  of  the  people,  is  of  course  the  other  side  of  the  struggle 
represented  by  the  cause  given  immediately  above,  and  can- 
not be  considered  wholly  apart  from  it.  Suffice  it  to  say 
here  that  this  struggle  has  been  going  on  in  modern  times 
from  the  outbreak  of  the  English  revolution  of  1642  to  the 
present  time,  is  now  at  its  greatest  height,  and  will  continue 
for  ages  to  come,  though  unaccompanied  in  its  last  stages, 
we  fondly  hope,  by  the  maelstrom  of  war. 

The  last'  cause — to  uphold  the  principles  of  international 
law  and  justice  and  the  solemn  obligations  and  treaties  of 
nations — is,  with  the  last  above  named,  the  greatest  con- 
tribution of  the  United  States  of  America  to  the  world. 


CHAPTER  V 

PRETEXTS   AND   EXCUSES    FOR    WAR SOME   ILLUSIONS 

"XTATIONAL  honor  is  sometimes  made  a  pretext  for  war; 
-^  ▼  it  is  also  sometimes  a  real  cause.  The  civilized  world 
has  never  expected  a  nation  to  suffer  the  outrages  of  a  for- 
eign State, — especially  if  they  occur  repeatedly.  The 
United  States  has  only  followed  a  long-standing  precedent 
in  this  respect.  The  American  government  and  people 
showed  a  forbearance  that  was  remarkable  before  entering 
the  war  against  Germany.  Critics  of  our  government's  course 
would  do  well  to  remember  this  fact.  Several  other  nations 
would  have  refused  to  suffer  what  they  have  suffered,  and 
would  have  gone  to  war,  if  they  had  been  strong  enough. 
The  fate  of  Belgium,  Montenegro,  Serbia  and  Roumania  has 
terrorized  them  into  maintaining  a  technical  peace.  Noth- 
ing is  more  precious  to  a  State  than  the  respect  for  her 
personality,  her  honor,  her  sense  of  fair  play.  It  is  with 
nations  as  with  individuals  in  this  particular.  If  the  United 
States,  after  her  stand  for  the  right  of  neutrals  and  for 
humanity,  had  done  less  than  follow  up  her  professions  by 
war,  she  would  have  been  considered  the  world  over  as  vascil- 
lating  and  cowardly,  as  materialistic  and  selfish,  and  would 
have  hindered  rather  than  encouraged  the  cause  of  democ- 
racy throughout  the  world;  the  revolution  in  Russia  would 
not  have  had  her  powerful  aid,  and  democracy  would  he 
staggering  o'er  the  whole  earth.  Belgium  accepted  Ger- 
many's challenge,  rather  than  slavishly  submit,  because  of 
the  God-given  right  of  all  honorable  people  to  govern  them- 
selves and  maintain  their  national  integrity  and  honor.  Like 
all  free  peoples,  she  would  rather  die  than  submit  to  the 

40 


Pretexts  and  Excwses  for  War — Some  Illusions      41 

vassalage  of  the  inhuman  strutting  "lord  of  destiny" — she 
would  preserve  her  honor  before  the  world,  though  she  might 
lose  her  existence,  as  the  penalty.  For  this,  Belgium  has  an 
immortal  name  in  history,  as  has  many  an  individual  martyr, 
for  like  conduct. 

Despite  the  above,  and  numerous  other  instances,  however, 
national  honor  has  often  been  a  mere  pretext  of  ambitious 
States  and  covetous  princes  and  worldlings,  for  waging  war 
against  a  weaker  people. 

During  long  centuries,  up  to  the  present,  Europe  has  been 
rending  herself,  each  group  trying  to  make  itself  greater 
through  the  dependency  of  its  neighbors, — all  this  under 
the  pretext  of  succession  to  power,  political  equilibrium,  and 
sometimes,  "balance  of  power."  This  has  kept  alive  among 
the  nations  the  Machiavelian  principle  that  might  makes 
right.  But,  we  must  remember  that  of  the  many  wars  thus 
waged,  the  alleged  causes  were  only  pretexts^  the  real  causes 
being  deeper  and  more  selfish.  This  point  cannot  be  too 
strongly  emphasized.  Text  books  often  lead  us  astray  here, 
giving  these  excuses  as  the  causes,  rather  than  the  motives 
back  of  them.  On  such  pretexts  Rome  and  Carthage  con- 
tended for  no  less  stakes  than  the  "dominion  and  exploita- 
tion of  the  Mediterranean  world."  Later,  Genoa  and  Venice, 
of  the  Italian  city  States,  likewise  fought  for  predominance 
in  commerce  and  navigation;  then  Spain  and  Portugal,  for 
their  colonial  empires;  then  England,  Holland  and  France, 
following  the^  countries  of  the  Iberian  Peninsula.  The  real 
motive,  however,  was  chiefly  commercial,  as  the  nature  of 
these  contests  testifies. 

This  was  all  done  under  the  old-time  conviction  that,  in 
order  to  have  prosperity,  a  nation  must  gain  a  monopoly  on 
trade  and  treasure,  a  monopoly  of  exchange  and  exploita- 
tion. Consequently,  this  era  was  followed  up  and  completed 
by  the  conquests  and  wars  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries.  It  had  its  revival,  again,  in  the  wars  of  colonial 
expansion  in  the  past  century.    If  a  State  could  not  secure 


^\. 


42  The  Games  Of  War 

a  monopoly,  it  felt  that  it  must  at  least  "turn  the  balance 
>i  of  commercial  power"  in  its  favor.  Even  modern  and  pres- 
ent day  warfare  is  somewhat  of  a  commercial  enterprise  in 
this  sense.  This  is  an  astounding  fact,  once  we  come  to 
reflect  upon  it.  The  nations  still  are  jealous  rivals;  they 
desire  to  monopolize  certain  trade  zones,  and  they  still  do 
business  with  each  other  on  the  old  suspicious  competitive 
basis — an  economical  theory  of  capitalism  that  for  internal 
industry  in  the  various  countries  was  exploded  long  ago.  For 
instance:  the  railroads  of  this  country  went  through  (1), 
the  stage  of  competition  of  small  roads,  with  much  duplica- 
tion, extra  cost,  and  poor  service.  They  soon  learned  they 
were  violating  an  economic  principle — that  this  did  not  pay. 
So,  (2),  the  next  step  was  consolidation,  wherein  a  few  large 
corporations  came  to  own  and  control  all  the  former  small 
roads,  leaving  the  business  in  the  form  of  a  few  great  s2/s- 
tem^.  Next  (3),  came  the  period  of  cooperation,  when  pool- 
ing began.  The  rates  and  traffic  in  general  were  so  ma- 
nipulated for  the  benefit  of  the  railroads  as  a  result,  that 
the  States  and  the  national  government  were  constrained 
to  take  up  the  problem  of  the  regulation  of  the  railroads. 
But  the  point  is,  the  railroads  doing  business  with  one 
another,  or  former  rivals,  came  to  the  principle  of  coopera- 
tion as  the  best  and  most  satisfactory  and  feasible  plan. 
This  record  can  be  duplicated,  for  many  other  industries. 

Today,  as  the  war  problem  has  developed,  the  efficiency 
of  cooperation  is  manifest  in  every  industry,  and  in  all  the 
industries  of  our  whole  national  life,  as  they  aid  one  an- 
other, for  a  common  end.  The  world  war  has  made  co- 
operation and  efficiency  the  two  greatest  words  of  the  busi- 
ness world.  The  cooperation  of  the  allies  is  bringing  victory 
to  them,  while  without  it  they  were  floundering  in  defeat. 
On  no  important  undertaking  along  any  line  whatsoever,  do 
they  launch  forth  without  the  cooperation  of  all.  Interna- 
tional commerce  should  long  ago  have  been  put  upon  this 
same  basis, — should  have  been  operated  on  the  friendly  and 


Pretexts  and  Eoccwses  for  War — Some  Illusions      43 

cooperative  plan,  instead  of  the  suspicious  and  restrictive 
competition  that  still  prevails.  The  old  competitive  theory, 
with  first  the  "navigation  laws"  (as  those  of  Spain,  England, 
France  and  Holland),  now,  the  protective  tariff  restrictions 
— ignores  the  truth  that  the  well-being  of  one  State  is  not 
incompatible  with  that  of  its  neighbors,  but  almost  always, 
the  opposite.  It  has  an  interest  in  their  prosperity,  and 
their  well-being  contributes  to  its  own.  As  we  all  know  the 
"navigation  laws"  helped  to  cause  many  wars  between  na- 
tions or  peoples.  The  protective  tariff,  that  companion  in- 
strument of  the  privileged  classes,  has  likewise  caused  much 
trouble,  especially  internal,  for  all  the  great  nations.  Thus 
we  see,  it  is  privilegey  selfishness  and  greed  that  are  at  the 
bottom  and  back  of  the  usual  pretended  causes  of  war. 

Accordingly  all  European  States  have  actually  been  es- 
tablished and  consolidated  by  force.  If  one  condemns  this 
selfish  conquest  (as  the  world  is  condemning  it  today)  it 
can  no  longer  be  a  question  of  restoring  that  which  was  un- 
justly gained,  of  a  revision  and  general  transfer  of  titles. 
This  would  result  in  a  complete  overthrow  of  the  political 
chart,  and  would  return  without  profit  to  the  parceling  out 
of  nations  and  to  the  disorder  and  anarchy  of  the  middle 
ages.  The  present  condition  (previous  to  1914)  in  the  main 
has  been  confirmed  by  a  long  possession,  and  has  been  con- 
solidated by  general  consent  of  the  powers  of  the  world. 
As  all  nations,  somewhere  along  their  course,  have  proceeded 
in  much  the  same  manner,  no  one  can  criticise  and  condemn 
another  unsparingly  without  reflecting  discredit  upon  itself. 
This  truth  by  no  means  argues,  however,  that  there  should 
be  no  territorial  readjustments  to  right  wrongs  of  the  past, 
as  a  result  of  this  present  war.  It  is  to  help  us  to  see,  on 
the  other  hand,  that  many  pretended  arguments  for  free- 
dom of  peoples  and  restoration  of  former  conditions,  that 
are  advanced  by  Germany,  her  allies  and  sympathizers,  are 
besides  the  point,  and  not  at  all  parallel  cases  to  those  con- 
ditions of  subject  and  unfortunate  peoples  whom  she  and 


44  The  Causes  Of  War 

the  other  autocratic  governments  (including  Russia  in  the 
past)   have  criminally  oppressed,   rather  than  enhghtened 
politically   and  otherwise.     For  instance,   the   England   of 
1917   is    not    responsible    for   a   former   England's    crimes 
against  Ireland.    Since  1911  England  has  ofFered  her  "home 
rule,"  but  civil  differences  and  strife  in  Ireland  would  not 
have  it  so.     It  is  all  an  Irish  question  now,  not  an  English 
question,  and  the  factions  in  Ireland  are  wholly  responsible 
for  its  fall.     England  would  gladly  be  rid  of  the  thing  alto- 
gether.    It  is  what  it  has  always  largely  been, — a  religious 
question,  a  strife  between  Catholics  and  Protestants,  of  the 
Protestant  Ulster  counties  and  the  greater  Ireland,  which  is 
overwhelmingly  Catholic.     That  is  not  the  only  difficulty  at 
present,  but  it  is  by  far  the  most  important  one.     Ireland 
certainly  ought  to  accept  Home  Rule,  as  England  now  of- 
fers it,  rather  than  hold  out  for  independence,  as  the  radicals 
and  lawless  element  are  doing.     Ireland  alone  is  too  weak 
to  protect  herself.     She  has  not  the  wealth  nor  power  to 
maintain  an  army  and  a  navy,  to  guard  an  independent 
status,  and  without  these  she  would  be  a  prey  to  any  power 
that  might  seek  to  enthrall  her.     The  Germans  are  beside 
the  mark  when  they  demand  that  England  give  up  Ireland, 
India,  South  Africa  and  Egypt, — all  of  which  are  as  demo- 
cratically and  self-governed  as  their  people  will  accept — 
before  they  demand  that  Germany  restore  Belgium,  Poland, 
Alsace-Lorraine,  and  the  recently  ravished  Balkan  States 
and  Russia — all  of  which  were  exploited,  and  still  are,  sole- 
ly for  the  Teutonic  race's  benefit,  not  their  own.     Those 
nations  and  parts  of  nations,  however,  that  are  oppressed 
by  foreign   rulers   and  governments,  such   as   Poland,  Bo- 
hemia, Hungary  (largely),  the  various  Balkan  peoples  with- 
in the  Dual  Monarchy  and  the  Italians  in  the  Trentino  and 
Triest  regions — ^which  once  were  free  peoples,  or  joined  to 
their  own  nationalities,  must  be  restored,  to  work  out  the 
destiny  of  their  own  nationalities  under  democratic  forms 
of  government,  if  Europe  is  to  have  peace  in  the  future. 


Pretexts  and  Exctises  for  War — Some  Illusions      45 

Of  the  weaker  and  less  distinct  types,  such  as  Finland  and 
several  of  the  African  and  other  colonial  possessions,  per- 
haps autonomy,  or  a  gradual  growth  in  self-government  is 
best.  The  conditions  seem  to  warrant  this  solution,  even  in 
the  case  of  the  Philippine  islanders.  To  give  them  their  in- 
dependence in  the  very  near  future,  with  their  ignorance  of, 
and  inexperience  in  self-government,  is  mere  folly,  and  would 
leave  them  the  prey  of  the  ambitious  despoiler.  It  would 
be  more  charitable,  if  not  more  honorable,  to  sell  them  out- 
right, to  the  highest  bidder,  than  thus  to  cast  them  adrift. 

Again,  the  difference  we  would  point  out  is  this;  when 
subject  peoples  are  in  the  hands  of  liberal  democratic  gov- 
ernments they  are  relatively  safe;  but  wherever  they  are 
under  autocratic  rulers,  they  are  continually  in  danger. 
History  has  abundantly  proved  the  maxim,  "Put  not  your 
trust  in  kings." 

We  have  already  noted  that,  under  pretense  of  defend- 
ing its  flag,  its  interest  or  its  citizens,  many  a  nation  has 
taken  advantage  of  the  occasion  to  establish  itself  and  ex- 
tend its  power  gradually,  over  less  able  or  less  fortunate 
countries.  These  things  have  been  so  carried  out  at  times 
that  it  has  been  impossible  to  chastise  the  aggressor,  or  pre- 
vent them.  But  happily,  that  age  is  passing.  The  latest 
example  of  the  above  cause,  previous  to  the  present  war, 
was  Italy,  in  her  war  with  Turkey  for  North  African  pos- 
sessions, just  before  the  outbreak  of  the  first  Balkan  war, 
a  few  years  ago.  Yet,  there  are  those  who  justify  this  type 
of  war  on  the  ground  that  it  is  necessary,  as  in  the  case  of 
Hindus,  Africans,  etc.,  to  make  them  subjects  first,  in  order 
to  transform  them  for  the  better  afterwards.  But  at  best, 
this  is  a  very  doubtful  position  to  take,  and  is  a  mere  excuse 
for  war.     The  question  is,  does  the  end  justify  the  means? 

For  wars  they  have  waged  in  the  past  on  pretext  chiefly, 
and  not  for  sufficient  cause,  all  the  great  nations  of  Europe 
are  paying  dearly  today.  England,  for  example,  is  sufl^ering 
and  paying  the  penalty  in  this  war  for  troubles  she  engen- 


46  The  Causes  Of  War 

dered  and  wars  she  helped  to  promote  in  her  own  selfish  in- 
terests as  late  as  the  nineteenth  century.  The  toll  of  100,- 
000  brave  men  in  the  Dardanelles  campaign  was  (in  large 
part  at  least)  the  price  she  paid  for  upholding  Turkey,  "the 
Sick  Man  of  Europe,"  a  couple  of  generations  ago.  For 
less  than  fifty  years  ago  England  was  still  in  much  the  same 
position  that  Germany  was  in  1914,  with  motives  very  simi- 
lar (under  Disraeli)  both  with  regard  to  her  international 
policies  and  her  allies.  But  England's  democracyy  the  voice 
of  her  people,  has  saved  her  in  the  present  generation  from 
the  condemnation  that  the  world  heaps  upon  Germany. 
Likewise,  Germany  can  be  saved  from  this  condemnation 
in  the  future  only,  when  democracy  there,  as  in  England, 
comes  to  her  rescue.  Moreover,  one  of  the  certain  results 
of  this  war  for  Germany,  whether  it  come  soon,  before  the 
present  war  is  over,  or  after  years  of  internal  struggle,  will 
be  the  triumph  of  democracy  over  the  Kaiser,  the  haughty 
Crown  Prince  and  the  autocratic  princes  and  governments 
of  the  several  States  of  the  Empire.  We  should  not  be  sur- 
prised also,  to  see  Austria-Hungary  dismembered,  its  vari- 
ous peoples  reverting  to  the  nationalities  to  which  they  be- 
long. The  Czech  movement  in  Bohemia  shows  the  drift 
of  affairs  in  that  polyglot  empire. 

This  spirit  of  democracy, — of  individual  and  social  jus- 
tice— is  responsible  for  the  cooperation  among  the  liberal 
governments  that  is  to  win  the  fight  of  the  people  of  the 
earth  for  freedom.  As  we  said  in  our  introductory  article 
of  the  present  series,  this  is  the  culmination  of  the  Political 
Revolution,  and  is  the  greatest  and  most  glorious  develop- 
ment of  the  modem  age.  The  reactionary  powers  of  Eu- 
rope have  far  underrated  this  great  movement,  and  hence 
have  miscalculated  its  strength  and  effect,  all  through  the 
past  decade  and  the  present  war.  Similarly,  many  of  us 
have  little  realized  the  magnitude  and  meaning  of  this  great 
liberal  wave  in  the  present  generation.  On  this  fact  Mr. 
John  B.  Winslow,  chief  justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 


Pretexts  and  Excuses  for  War — Som£  Illusions      47 

Wisconsin,  has  the  following  to  say, — "The  future  historian 
will  find  many  things  of  surpassing  interest  when  he  comes  to 
review  the  opening  decades  of  tlie  twentieth  century,  but  he 
will  find  nothing  more  interesting  or  significant  than  the 
great  wave  of  democracy  which  is  now  sweeping  over  the 
earth.  .  .  .  This  remarkable  world  movement  must  be  ap- 
parent to  the  most  superficial  present  day  observer  of  the 
signs  of  the  times.  Let  any  such  observer  take  the  world's 
map  and  put  his  finger  where  he  will,  he  will  find  some  phase 
of  it.  In  Great  Britain  it  takes  the  form  of  nullifying  the 
powers  of  the  House  of  Lords  and  curbing  the  privileges 
of  birth ;  in  France  and  Germany  it  appears  in  the  garb  of 
socialism;  in  China  a  republic  supplants  the  rule  of  the 
Manchu  dynasty,  and  in  other  countries  it  appears  in  vari- 
ous movements,  all  directed  with  greater  or  less  wisdom  to 
the  wiping  out  of  one  form  or  another  of  privilege.  ...  In 
our  own  country  the  democratic  drift  is,  perhaps,  more 
marked  than  anywhere  else.  .  .  .  Unless  every  sign  fails, 
we  shall  have  democracies  .  .  .  before  many  years  such  as 
the  world  has  never  seen  on  any  scale  before;  at  least,  we 
shall  experiment  with  them."  Greater  weight  attaches  to 
this  statement  of  Judge  Winslow  from  the  fact  that  it  was 
made  before  democracy  over  the  world  made  itself  so  po- 
tently felt  in  the  present  conflict. 

We  can  better  understand  the  illusions  of  the  German 
people  and  their  ignorance  of  the  true  science  of  govern- 
ment (an  ignorance  or  incapacity  which  many  of  their  own 
statesmen  have  avowed)  when  we  note  the  character  of  their 
leaders,  no  matter  how  great  statesmen  they  may  have  been. 
The  people  of  the  whole  empire  practically  have  been  nur- 
tured politically  on  illusions,  false  principles  and  pretexts, 
not  on  principles  of  justice  in  State  and  world  affairs.  Fred- 
erick the  Great  furnishes  a  case  in  point.  In  his  memoirs  he 
makes  this  statement:  "My  troops  being  always  ready  to 
act,  my  treasury  well  filled,  the  vivacity  of  my  character, 
my  ambition,  the  desire  to  have  myself  spoken  of, — were  the 


48  The  Cames  Of  War 

reasons  that  I  went  to  war  with  Marie  Therese," — i.  e.,  when 
he  took  the  Austrian  province  of  Silesia  away  from  her  by 
force  and  involved  all  Europe  in  war.  Many  German  mili- 
tarists, both  in  the  army  and  the  navy,  several  great  Ger- 
man authors  of  political  science  texts,  as  well  as  responsible 
heads  of  the  great  commercial  concerns, — ^have  persistently 
held  forth  this  same  soulless  principle  to  the  German  nation. 
These  things  are  perhaps  too  well  known  to  need  specific 
instances  given  here.  It  is  true  that  other  European  gov- 
ernments acted  upon  quite  similar  theories  a  century  ago ; 
but  that  the  German  Kaiser  and  government  still  cling  to 
it, — is  their  peculiar  crime  in  our  day.  Napoleon  Bona- 
parte, after  his  campaign  of  1812,  made  this  remark  con- 
cerning his  own  aggressiveness:  "Alexander  (of  Russia) 
and  myself  were  like  two  cocks,  ready  to  go  into  battle  with- 
out knowing  why" — a  statement  which  was  false  as  to  Na- 
poleon's designs — ^but  which  nevertheless  acknowledges  that 
neither  sovereign  had  just  cause  for  precipitating  that  ter- 
rible year  of  conflict.  Amhition,  wholly  selfish,  was  the  real 
cause,  of  course.  Napoleon's  desire  was  that  all  kings  might 
assist  at  his  final  imperial  coronation.  He  took  the  world- 
conqueror,  Alexander  the  Great,  as  his  model.  And  today, 
the  German  Crown  Prince,  it  seems,  is  not  so  far  removed 
from  the  same  folly  as  we  were  content  to  believe  a  couple 
of  years  ago.  That  the  ambition  of  monarchs  and  leaders 
no  longer  plays  the  part  in  war  that  it  once  did,  however,  is 
a  distinct  step  in  the  progress  of  the  people's  rule. 

As  a  final  word  let  me  repeat:  the  important  (liff^erences 
between  fundamental  causes  of  war,  and  the  immediate  causes 
and  pretexts  cannot  be  too  strongly  emphasized.  The  writer 
doubts  if  the  present  generation  will  bring  elimination  of 
the  fundamental  causes.  A  great  deal,  on  the  other  hand, 
may  be  done  to  eradicate  the  immediate  causes  and  pretexts. 
Secretary  Bryan  did  a  noble  thing  along  this  line,  in  secur- 
ing the  twenty-odd  arbitration  treaties  between  the  United 
States  and  other  countries,  to  prevent  wars  until  at  least  a 


Pretexts  a/nd  Excuses  for  War — SoTne  lUtisioiu      49 

year's  consideration  is  made.  Another  instance  a  few  years 
ago  was  the  agreement  between  Argentine  and  Chili  that 
they  would  not  go  to  war  for  five  years  over  boundary  dis- 
putes that  were  about  to  lead  to  a  clash  of  arms.  They  kept 
their  agreement.  Eradication  of  the  vital  causes,  however, 
we  may  well  question  coming,  except  by  the  long,  gradual, 
but  sure  process  of  political  evolution.  Stricter  regulations 
may  be  made  and  enforced  through  international  law  and 
agreement,  backed  by  the  "League  to  Enforce  Peace."  But, 
like  the  "Balance  of  Power,"  to  which  it  is  similar,  this  can- 
not be  permanent,  in  itself — it  can  serve  only  for  a  time. 
Yet,  it  is  true  that  the  coming  peace  is  fraught  with  great 
possibilities  in  this  direction,  while  revulsion  at  the  present 
horrors  leads  many  to  "faintly  trust  the  larger  hope"  of 
permanent  peace  hereafter.  Do  not  such  persons  forget, 
however,  that  the  whole  process  of  civilization  has  been  a 
development  through  continuous  conflict  toward  compara- 
tive peace.?  This  condition  has  been  brought  about  by  a 
slow  process  of  education  of  the  minds  and  conscience  of 
men;  and  this  we  must  realize  in  its  final  consummation  be- 
fore there  can  be  lasting  peace  for  mankind.  That  the  pres- 
ent tragedy  of  nations  may  lend  impetus  to  and  hasten  the 
day  of  peace  is  the  reasonable  hope  of  most  men,  though 
many  doubt  its  realization  in  the  near  future. 

The  Europe  of  1920  will  little  resemble  that  of  1914,  just 
as  the  Europe  of  1914,  little  resembled  that  of  a  century 
earlier.  Greece  was  the  first  in  the  nineteenth  century  to 
recover  her  national  life ;  and  now  she  is  recovering  it  anew. 
Belgium  was  separated  in  1830  from  her  unnatural  incor- 
poration with  Holland ;  now,  she  must  be  resurrected  to  a 
newer,  greater  life,  and  guaranteed  a  free  existence  and  de- 
velopment. Hungary  received  a  constitution  of  her  own,  in 
the  dual  monarchy  in  1848,  if  she  did  not  gain  the  indepen- 
dence the  patriot  Kossuth  dreamed  for  her;  she  must  now. 
be  given  an  even  freer  hand,  if  not  complete  independence. 
Bohemia  at  that  time  struggled  for  self  government;  she 


60  The  Cautes  Of  War 

must  be  given  complete  "home  rule,'*  if  not  more  this  time. 
The  Bohemians  have  already  raised  their  voice  in  a  men- 
acing way  toward  German  Austria.  Poland  more  than  once 
rose  in  revolt  against  those  who  destroyed  her  independence. 
As  President  Wilson  so  timely  pointed  out  in  his  war  mes- 
sage, last  year,  the  Poles  must  once  more  breathe  as  an  in- 
dependent people.  The  great  crime  of  partitioning  in  the 
eighteenth  century  must  be  atoned  for,  and  the  penalty  paid 
and  loss  sustained,  by  her  despoilers.  The  peoples  of  the 
world, — with  friendly  help  and  oversight  in  some  instances 
of  course, — must  be  left  to  work  out  their  destinies  and 
"the  world  must  be  made  safe  for  democracy."  The  in- 
fluence of  the  Hohenzollems  and  the  Hapsburgs  must  be 
made  as  harmless  as  that  of  the  Hanovarians  in  England 
today,  or  like  them,  must  turn  their  influence  into  the  cur- 
rent of  democracy. 

War,  we  have  said,  assumes  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  the 
most  apt,  the  best.  But,  the  best  for  what?  The  fittest  for 
what?  That  is  the  capital  question  now.  It  is  not  easy  for 
one  people  to  modify  the  wish,  the  interests,  and  still  less 
the  national  characteristics  of  another.  The  failure  at  many 
efforts  at  it  has  helped  to  bring  on  this  colossal  war.  Once 
it  could  be  done  by  war  and  the  conqueror  after  the  war; 
but  in  so  far  as  this  transformation  is  possible  today, 
it  is  not  by  war  and  force  that  it  is  to  be  accomplished.  Free 
intercourse  between  nations,  social  and  commercial,  is  per- 
haps the  most  powerful  pacifying  influence.  When  nations 
and  races  come  to  mingle  with  each  other  more  vitally,  like 
individuals  they  will  come  to  understand  and  appreciate  one 
another  better,  and  will  at  last  learn  to  heed  that  most  cost- 
ly and  precious  lesson,  that  peacCy  and  not  war^  is  to  be  the 
true  and  only  rational  basis  of  civilized  human  society. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    IMMEDIATE    BACKGEOUND    OF    THE    WAR    IN    EUROPE 

TO  a  considerable  extent  the  conditions  that  brought 
about  the  great  European  conflict  in  1914,  of  the  pres- 
ent century,  can  be  traced  to  the  work  of  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  at  the  end  of  the  Napoleonic  era,  a  century  before. 
The  present  decade,  consequently,  has  often  been  compared 
and  contrasted  with  the  Napoleonic  period,  a  little  over  a 
century  ago.  And  in  no  other  respect,  perhaps,  has  the  con- 
trast been  so  sharply  drawn  as  in  the  difference  of  motive 
that  actuated  Prince  Metternich  and  his  autocratic  congress 
of  princes  and  their  minions,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  mo- 
tives which  have  been  the  impelling  force  in  the  liberal  na- 
tions in  the  World  War  of  1914-1918,  on  the  other;  and 
the  contrast  continues  in  the  spirit  and  work  of  the  peace 
conference  at  Versailles. 

Since  the  above  is  true,  in  our  brief  review  of  the  imme- 
diate background  of  the  great  World  War  we  cannot  stop 
short  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  (1814-1815)  and  its  imme- 
diate outgrowth,  the  Holy  Alliance,  a  hundred  years  agone. 
There  were  two  cardinal  principles  of  this  notorious  Vienna 
congress  that  were  responsible  in  so  large  a  degree  for  the 
terrible  woes  of  the  present  time,  namely  (1),  the  bargain- 
ing about  of  territories  and  nationalities  as  if  they  were 
"mere  chattels  and  pawns  in  a  game,"  and  (2),  the  restora- 
tion of  oppressive  and  autocratic  kings  upon  their  thrones, 
against  the  flame  of  democracy  enkindled  by  the  French 
Revolution,  and  the  repression  of  all  democratic  aspiration 
of  the  people  of  the  nations.  One  needs  but  to  examine  the 
history  of  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  recall 

51 


6£  The  Causes  Of  War 

the  origin  of  our  Monroe  Doctrine  to  satisfy  himself  as  to 
this  fact. 

Despite  the  strength  of  the  peoples'  revolutions  of  1830 
and  1848,  which  came  so  near  overthrowing  once  for  all  this 
medieval  tyranny,  enough  of  it  remained  on  the  continent 
of  Europe  to  make  possible  the  next  great  step  in  violation 
of  the  rights  of  man, — the  crime  of  Bismarck  and  the  Prus- 
sian war-lords  in  their  wars  for  the  union  of  the  German 
peoples  in  a  great  empire,  ^his  story  is  too  well  known  to 
warrant  its  repetition  here.  But  what  was  the  consequence 
of  this  type  of  unification.'^  That  is  what  is  all-pertinent  to 
our  subject  in  hand.  It  was  simply  this:  Bismarck's  im- 
perialistic and  "blood  and  iron"  policy  soon  arrayed  a 
group  of  nations  in  bitter,  distrustful  and  hostile  feeling 
against  himself,  his  sovereign  and  the  new  German  Empire. 
To  meet  this  menace  to  his  dream  of  a  "Deutschland  iiber 
Alles"  the  greater  part  of  the  remaining  years  of  his  hfe 
were  spent.  The  astute  Imperial  Chancellor  sought  con- 
stantly an  alliance  to  meet  this  growing  hostility  with  an- 
other threat,  or  application,  of  "blood  and  iron."  He 
would  sow  discord  (divide  et  impera), — as  has  frequently 
been  practiced  by  Germany  since, — and  bring  in  jealous 
rivalry,  if  possible,  his  threatening  opponents,  while  he  would 
seek  an  alliance  with  one  or  more  of  them.  And  this  alliance 
would  safeguard  the  interests  of  Germany  in  the  future. 
Thus  arose  the  Triple  Alliance,  Bismarck's  famous  "Drei- 
bund"  of  Germany,  Austria  and  Italy,  in  1881.  Italy,  con- 
trary to  her  natural  interests  and  past  experience,  was  in- 
duced to  join  in  this  "unholy"  alliance  with  the  Teutonic 
powers  because  of  France's  aggressive  movements  at  this 
time  in  Algeria,  northern  Africa, — which  territory  was 
coveted  by  Italy  and  was  adjacent  to  Tunis,  which  had 
already  been  appropriated  by  France  and  which  in  turn 
adjoined  Tripoli  which  the  Italians  in  1911  fought  with 
Turkey  for.  The  Italian  people,  however,  soon  became 
aware  that  their  age-long  enemies,  Austria  and  Germany, 


The  Immediate  Background  of  the  War  in  Europe     53 

were  more  of  a  menace  to  them  than  was  France.  Hence,  at 
an  early  date  Italy  showed  that  she  could  not  be  depended 
upon  in  an  offensive  war  as  a  partner  of  the  Teutonic 
countries, — as  many  German  writers  pointed  out  years  be-' 
fore  the  fateful  outbreak  of  war  in  1914. 

And  now,  to  go  back  for  another  thread  of  our  narrative. 
After  the  humiliation  of  France  in  1871  Bismarck  had  hoped 
that  his  neighbor  to  the  west  had  been  so  completely  crushed 
that  she  could  never  again  be  a  real  obstacle  to  the  ambi- 
tions of  Germany.  He  was  therefore  astonished,  and  not  a 
little  alarmed,  to  witness  the  rapid  recovery  of  France  from 
her  losses  in  this  war.  By  1875  he  was  planning  another 
war  with  France, — one  of  the  "sperlos  versenkt"  kind.  But 
he  had  already  sown  the  dragon's  teeth.  Great  Britain  and 
Russia  both  called  a  halt  upon  him.  He  was  constrained  to 
forego  this  war;  but  he  must  make  up  for  this  failure  in 
some  way.  Then  followed  his  constant  effort  untii-  he  se- 
cured the  Triple  Alliance  referred  to  above. 

But  before  the  "Dreibund"  was  accomplished  the  war- 
cloud  had  lowered  over  the  Balkans,  and  in  this  both  Ger- 
many and  Austria  were  deeply  interested.  The  Balkan 
provinces  (as  we  bring  out  in  Chapter  VII  of  this  work), 
stung  to  madness  by  the  "Bulgarian  Massacres"  and  other 
atrocities,  led  by  Bulgaria,  were  planning  a  revolution  and 
war  to  drive  the  abominable  Turk  out  of  Europe.  And  they 
looked  to  Russia  for  aid.  The  Czar  was  more  than  willing, 
since  he  had  his  heart  set  on  Constantinople  and  the  Medi- 
terranean trade.  Upon  the  pretext  of  interfering  in  be- 
half of  persecuted  Christians  he  joined  the  Balkans, 
marched  upon  the  Turk,  and  soon  won  a  complete  victory 
over  the  Sultan.  In  this  Russo-Turkish  war  of  1878  the 
Ottoman  rule  in  Europe  would  have  ended,  but  for  the  jeal- 
ous intervention  of  the  other  great  powers  of  Europe,  led 
by  Austria  and  Great  Britain,  This  time  they  feared  that 
Russia,  rather  than  Germany  (and  Germany  was  with  them, 
strongly  seconding  Austria)  would  break  the  "balance  of 


54  The  Causes  Of  War 

power"  and  threaten  their  expansion,  if  not  their  empires. 
Then,  upon  the  close  of  this  war,  which  only  partly  emanci- 
pated the  Balkans  from  the  Turk,  came  the  famous  Con- 
gress of  Berlin.  Bismarck  was  playing  a  grand  role  in 
securing  this  congress  for  Berlin,  and  he  was  the  domi- 
nating figure  in  it.  But  the  real  significance  of  this  Treaty 
of  Berlin  for  our  purposes  is,  that  Russia  considered  Ger- 
many as  one  of  the  chief  nations  that  had  robbed  her  of  her 
conquests  of  the  war,,  and  hence  Russia  was  later  willing  to 
listen  to  the  overtures  of  Germany's  most  watchful  adver- 
sary, France. 

After  the  movements  described  in  the  preceding  para- 
graphs had  culminated  for  Bismarck  and  Germany  in  the 
Triple  Alliance  of  1881,  France  was  the  first  to  sense  the 
larger  meaning  of  it  all,  and  sought  an  alliance  to  counter- 
act the  "Dreibund."  This  led  to  the  Dual  Alliance  between 
France  and  Russia;  for  Russia,  as  we  have  just  seen,  had 
had  a  forecast  of  Bismarckian  diplomacy  in  the  Congress  of 
Berlin,  and  next  to  France,  was  most  endangered  by  the  new 
militant  Germany. 

Great  Britain  so  far,  had  kept  aloof  from  both  alliances. 
Relying  upqyi  her  great  fleet  and  upon  her  isolation  by  water 
from  the  Continent,  she,  like  the  United  States  for  a  cen- 
tury, felt  for  a  time  that  she  could  steer  an  independent 
course.  Both  nations  have  since  been  disillusioned.  (This, 
by  the  way,  is  a  strong  argument  in  favor  of  some  sort  of 
a  league  of  nations,  to  take  the  place  for  a  time  at  least, 
if  not  to  develop  finally  into  a  permanent  one, — of  the  "Bal- 
ance of  Power,"  which  will  never  remain  "balanced").  It 
was  the  immense  increase  of  standing  armies  on  the  Conti- 
nent, as  against  Britain's  "contemptible  little  army"  of 
volunteers,  and  the  German  feverish  rush  to  build  a  great 
navy,  that  opened  the  eyes  of  Englishmen  and,  coupled  with 
the  reapproachment  efforts  of  King  Edward  VII,  led  Great 
Britain  about  1905  into  the  "friendly  understanding — En- 
tente Cordiale — ^with  France,  and  then  with  Russia.     This 


The  Immediate  Backgrou/nd  of  the  War  m  Europe      65 

Triple  Entente  amounted  to  a  three-ford  alliance  against  the 
Triple  Alliance  of  the  Teutonic  powers  and  Italy,  with  the 
distinct  advantage  that  England  was  able  secretly  to  culti- 
vate a  friendly  feeling  with  Italy,  for  reasons  that  we  have 
already  stated. 

It  is  significant  that  ^this  Triple  Entente  was  consum- 
mated in  spite  of  the  Fashoda  incident  of  1898,  which  had 
threatened  war  between  England  and  France,  and  in  spite 
of  some  conflicting  interests  of  these  two  nations  in  the 
Near  East.  Moreover,  this  Entente  was  maintained  through- 
out the  next  decade  (1905-1915)  despite  the  difficulties  that 
Great  Britain  and  Russia  encountered  over  "spheres  of  in- 
fluence" in  Persia  and  boundaries  in  the  Himalayas.  These 
facts  serve  to  show  that  Great  Britain,  France  and  Russia 
all  distrusted  the  bold  and  unscrupulous  policy  of  Germany, 
and  would  compromise  their  own  diff^erences  in  order  to  have 
each  other's  aid  against  this  common  danger,  whenever  the 
test  should  come.  This  explains  the  continuance  of  the 
Triple  Entente  to  the  very  hour  of  war  in  1914. 

Meanwhile  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  were  showing 
unmistakable  signs  of  a  determination  to  control  all  cen- 
tral Europe  and  also  the  Gateways  to  the  East,  by  their 
Mittel-Europa-Berlin  to  Bagdad  railway  scheme,  and  Aus- 
tria's aggressiveness  in  the  Balkans.  Let  us  not  forget  that 
Austria  had  been  instrumental  in  robbing  Russia  of  the 
Balkan  victories,  1878,  and  now  (1908),  while  Russia  as  a- 
result  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  and  internal  conflict  was 
powerless  to  aid  her  Balkan  kindred,  annexed  the  Serbian 
provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  This  she  did  without 
any  nations'  consent  except  her  own  (and  encouragement 
of  her  ally  Germany),  and  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  her 
own  inhabitants. 

The  German  Emperor  had  urged  Austria  to  proceed  with 
this  seizure  of  the  two  Balkan  provinces,  promising  her  that 
with  his  "shining  sword"  he  would  stand  by  her  side.  Thus 
had  Austria,  at  the  risk  of  a  great  war  in  Europe,  changed 


56  The  Causes  Of  War 

by  main  force  the  status  of  a  couple  of  Balkan  provinces 
that  had  been  assigned  to  her  for  protection  at  the  Congress 
of  Berlin,  from  a  weak  protectorate  for  administrative  pur- 
poses, into  a  part  and  parcel  of  her  empire.  This  is  one 
of  the  five  instances  in  which  Germany  and  Austria  in  the 
decade  1905-1915,  by  their  "brazen  aggressions"  threatened 
the  peace  of  Europe  and  the  world.  These  five  instances  the 
author  has  referred  to  in  another  chapter.  But  a  little  ex- 
planation is  in  place  here.  The  first  instance  was  when  the 
Kaiser,  after  announcing  that  no  changes  of  territory  must 
be  made  anywhere  in  the  world  without  his  consent,  in  the 
first  Moroccan  crisis  in  1905,  after  France,  backed  by  Great 
Britain  and  Spain  had  informed  the  sultan  of  that  country 
that  he  must  submit  to  order  and  decency,— made  a  per- 
sonal visit  to  this  sultan  and  informed  him  that  he  did  not 
have  to  do  anything  of  the  kind.  Although  the  Kaiser  was 
finally  obliged  to  retreat  from  this  position  through  the  in- 
ternational finding  of  the  Algeciras  conference,  the  French 
minister  Delcasse,  to  assuage  the  wrath  of  Germany  and  the 
Kaiser's  wounded  pride,  wa§^  forced  to  resign,  to  keep  the 
peace.  The,  second  instance  was  the  annexation  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina  by  Austria-Hungary  in  1908,  just  mentioned 
above.  The  third  crisis  was  precipitated  by  the  Kaiser  send- 
ing his  warship  the  Panther  to  the  Moroccan  port  of  Agidir, 
on  the  occasion  of  violent  disorder  breaking  out  there  and 
France's  sending  troops,  upon  the  advice  of  Spain  and  with 
the  backing  of  England  to  restore  order  in  that  country. 
France  was  now  upheld  by  the  powerful  assurance  of  Great 
Britain  and  Russia,  which  had  recovered  considerably  from 
the  results  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war.  Yet,  France  yielded 
sufficiently  to  grant  the  Kaiser  considerable  territory  on 
the  Congo,  as  a  counterpoise  for  what  she  was  getting  in 
Morocco,  and  thus  again  she  helped  to  avoid  a  war  with 
Germany.  It  was  with  very  ill  grace,  however,  that  Ger- 
many acceded  to  peace  at  all  on  this  occasion.  Her  great 
army  expansion  was  not  yet  completed,  else  she  would  not 


The  Immediate  Background  of  the  War  m  Europe      5*7 


have,  as  our  German  authorities  tell  us.  This  occurred  in 
1910-1911.  The  fourth  came  in  connection  with  the  Balkan 
wars,  1911-13,  when  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
governments  backed  the  Turks  (German  officers  had  been 
drilling  Turkish  troops  since  1888,  and  in  1896  Wilhelm  II 
hajid  visited  Turkey,  sealed  a  strong  bond  of  friendship  with 
the  Turkish  government,  and  joined  with  the  Turks  as  a 
promoter  of  their  "holy  religion,"  and  trade  with  Germany) 
and  were  upon  the  point  of  going  to  war  with  the  Balkan 
states.  Great  Britain  more  than  any  other  European  na- 
tion sought  to  prevent  this  threatened  general  European 
war,  and  should  be  given  credit  for  the  same.  Had  the  En- 
tente been  as  aggressive  as  Germany  and  Austria,  no  doubt 
the  World  War  would  have  broken  out  two  or  three  years 
sooner.  The  fifth  and/tast  instance  was  the  German  Imperial 
Government's  deliberately  launching  the  greatest  tragedy 
of  history,  in  1914.  Since  the  precipitation  of  this  fatal 
crisis  is  quite  extensively  treated  in  other  portions  of  this 
book  a  further  exposition  of  it  here  is  unnecessary.*  . 

» For  a  further  treatment  of  the  above  five  crises  the  reader  is  referred 
to  the  International  Year  Book,  1914  to  1918  numbers.      , 


CHAPTER  VII 

CAUSES    OF    THE    PRESENT    WAE 

THE  writer  has  been  encouraged  by  friends  to  make  a 
separate  statement  of  the  causes  of  the  present  World 
War,  before  concluding  the  series  of  articles  on  the  Causes 
of  War,  Such  a  statement  is  all  the  more  pertinent  at  this 
time,  since  teachers  and  students,  as  well  as  the  public  gen- 
erally, are  more  vitally  interested  in  the  conflict  so  recently 
raging  than  in  any  former  war, — as  is  natural  they  should 
be ;  moreover,  a  good  deal  of  the  opposition  in  this  country 
to  the  war  has  been  due  to  ignorance  of  its  causes, — of  why 
America  is  in  it, — and  of  the  issues  at  stake.  Still  another 
reason  for  the  following  treatise  is,  that  nowhere  have  we 
found  anything  that  approaches  a  complete  and  accurate 
statement  of  the  vital  causes  as  they  have  affected  all  the 
powers  engaged, — either  collectively  or  individually.  And 
finally  now  that  the  war  is  over,  if  we  are  to  be  of  service 
to  the  bringing  of  a  just  peace  that  we  have  been  in  waging 
a  just  war,  we  must  understand  the  causes  in  order  to  help 
intelligently  in  applying  the  remedy  for  war. 

Two  distinctions  made  in  a  former  chapter  I  wish  to  re- 
peat at  the  outset, — namely,  (1)  that  remote  and  funda- 
mental causes  must  he  carefully  distinguished  from  imme- 
diate causes  and  from  pretexts;  and  (2)  that  there  are  dif- 
ferent causes  for  different  nations,  or  groups  of  nations, 
and  usually  as  many  causes  at  least  as  there  are  peoples 
engaged  in  conflict.  In  this  connection  it  is  well  to  repeat 
that  it  is  difficult  to  classify  the  causes  fully  and  accurately, 
to  do  which  requires  great  pains,  as  well  as  familiarity  with 
every  important  detail  of  the  life,  government  and  ambitions 

58 


Caiuses  of  the  Present  War         ''  59 

of  each  State.     The  treatment  which  follows,  however,  the 
author  feels,  is  essentially  just  and  reasonably  accurate. 

We  need  spend  but  little  time  with  the  mere  pretexts  for 
this  war,  such  as  the  Austrian  forty-eight-hour  ultimatum 
to  Serbia  for  the  assassination  of  the  Austrian^  archduke 
and  wife, — the  twenty-four-hour  demands  and  the  ultima- 
tums of  Germany  to  France  and  England,  together  with  her 
demand  that  Russia  immediately  demobilize  her  vast  army; 
— or  Germany's  excuse  in  the  case  of  her  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium, that  England  or  France,  or  hothy  would  have  invaded 
that  country,  and  thus  broken  their  solemn  treaties,  as  Ger- 
many did,  if  the  Germans  had  not  gone  first.     Most  of  the 
above  excuses  were  premeditated  lies,  as  the  facts  have  since 
shown,  and  all  were  mystified,  presumptuous,  and  wholly  seli-^y^ 
ish  pretexts  for  war.   'It  is  worse  than  stupidity  for  a  per- 
son to  believe  that  England  or  France  would  have  invaved 
Belgium, — no   matter   what   irresponsible    individuals    may 
have  said  or  imagined, — in  order  to  break  through  into  Ger- 
many, when  England  had  only  50,000  troops  ready  in  those 
first  days,  as  against  the  vast  army  of  a  million  superbly 
equipped  men  which  Germany  had  ready  for  instant  action       ^ 
on  the  Belgian  frontier,  to  say  nothing  of  Belgium's  a.Ymyy^        ^'' 
of  defense,  also,  in  face  of  the  fact  that  it  took  England  two   \y  »^^^^ 
years  to  raise  an  army  large  enough  to  have  the  slightest  i^J^^^^^ff 
hope  of  striking  through  Belgium,  against  Germany,  had  ,<r  Stf 
the  British  even  desired  it.     It  is  equal  folly  to  claim  that    /^^ 
France  would  have  invaded  Belgium,  since  she  had  prac-     v^ 
tically  all  her  army  concentrated   on  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
border,  at  the  other  extremity  of  the  country,  a  fact  which 
proves    that    even    after    the    German    ultimatum    (which 
amounted  to  a  declaration  of  war) — France  did  not  expect 
such  dishonorable  conduct  by  Germany ;  and  without  the  aid 
of   England's   little   army,   she   would   not   have   been   able 
to  save  her  own  capital,  Paris,  in  the  battle  of  the  Mame, 
in  her  extremity,  throwing  in,  as  she  did,  tens  of  thousands 
of  young  men,  tjunarmed,  to  face  certain  death,  in  order  to 


4^ 


60  The  Causes  Of  War 

fill  up  the  lines  and  check  the  onrush  of  the  Germans.  These 
are  the  facts  of  history.  The  German  government's  per- 
sistent falsifymg  to  the  German  people  and  to  the  world 
constitutes  another  of  the  long  list  of  its  atrocities  and 
barbarous  crimes,  that  are  prolonging  the  suffering  and 
horrors  of  war,  even  now. 

We  shall  now  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  the  vital 
causes  of  the  conflict.  We  shall  take  (1)  those  of  the  Eti- 
tente  allies  and  (2)  those  of  the  Central  Powers,  This  gen- 
eral and  natural  separation  of  the  causes  into  two  groups  is 
necessary  because,  as  stated  above,  there  are  different  causes 
for  different  countries,  and  as  many  causes  (or  more),  as 
there  are  nations  engaged  in  combat.  Let  us  tfl.ke  the  indi- 
vidual States  of  the  allies  first.  / 

England's  Causes  for  Going  to  War 

(1)  Protection  of  her  colonial  possessions  and  main- 
tenance of  her  supremacy  on  the  sea  and  in  commerce. 

(2)  Democratic  principles  vs.  autocracy,  and  opposi- 
tion to  the  militarism  of  the  German  imperial  government. 

(3)  Germany* s  invasion  of  Belgium  and  England's 
treaty  obligation  in  guaranteeing  Belgium's  neutrality. 
(The  same  solemn  treaty  that  Germany  violated.) 

(4)  Maintenance  of  the  "balance  of  power"  in  Europe, 
threatened  by  the  rapid  development  and  the  ambitions  of 
Germany. 

France 

( 1 )  Maintenance  of  treaty  obligations  and  their  protec- 
tion (Russia  and  England  in  particular). 

(2)  Fear  of  Pan-German  dominance  and  conquests  in 
Europe,  with  their  dangers  to  France. 

(3)  Revenge,  for  Germany's  taking  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine in  1871,  with  race-hatred  engendered  by  that  act. 

(4)  Democracy  (France  a  republic)  vs.  mihtary  autoc- 
racy. 


Causes  of  the  Present  War  61 

(5)  Distrust  (as  in  England)  of  the  colonial  policy  and 
ambitions  of  Germany. 

(6)  German  invasion  compelled  France  to  fight,  in  self- 
defense. 

Russia 

(1)  Desire  for  control  in  Balkans  and  possession  of 
Constantinople,  with  access  to  the  Mediterranean,  as  against 
Austria-Hungary's  ambitions  in  the  same  region  (involving 
conquest). 

(2)  Racial  sympathy  with  Serbia  and  other  Slavic 
States. 

(3)  Distrust  and  hatred  of  Germany  (by  the  Russian 
people  especially). 

(4)  Democracy  vs.  power  of  kings  (recent  factor). 

Italy 

(1)  Hatred  of  Austria,  an  enemy  of  Italian  freedom 
and  unity.  -^ 

(2)  Spirit  of  nationality — completion  of  unification  of 
Italy,  by  securing  Italian  provinces  still  held  by  Austria. 

(3)  Fear  of  the  growing  power  and  ambition  of  Ger- 
many, i.  e.,  Italy  wished  to  maintain  the  "Balance  of  Power" 
in  Europe,  which  Germany  was  about  to  overthrow. 

(4)  Desire  for  more  Italian  influence  and  commercial 
advantages  in  the  Balkans. 

The  Balkan  States — Serbia^  Montenegro,  Roumaniaf  Greece 

(1)  Desire  to  work  out  their  own  destinies  (spirit  of 
nationality)  and  he  free  from  Turkish  and  Austro-Hun- 
garian  menaces — a  sequel  to  the  Balkan  wars  of  1912-13. 

(2)  Securing  of  natural  and  national  boundaries  (race 
cohesion)  as  fruits  of  their  conquests  of  1911-13,  which 
Austria  deprived  them  of  in  the  moment  of  victory. 

(3)  Growth  of  spirit  of  democracy  (resulting  in  recent 
action  of  Greece). 


62  The  Games  Of  War 

Japan 

(1)  Fear  of  commercial  power  of  Germany  in  the  far 
East  and  in  the  Pacific. 

(2)  Spirit  of  expansion  and  nationality. 

(3)  Economic  needs  arising  from  great  population  with 
little  room  to  expand. 

(4)  The  Japanese  "Monroe  Doctrine" — similar  to  posi- 
tion of  U.  S.  with  respect  to  Latin  America. 

Small  States  of  Europe,  Asia  and  America ,  siich  as  Portu- 
gal, Cuba,  Siam,  and  semi-beUigerent  attitude  of 
several  other  countries  in  Eastern 
and  Western  Worlds 

>^ 

(1)  Democracy  vs.  Autocracy. 

(2)  Violation  of  international  law  and  rights  of  neu- 
trality by  Germany  and  other  Central  powers. 

(3)  Treaty  obligations  with  larger  nations,  with  pro- 
tection they  afford  (as  in  Cuba  with  United  States,  Por- 
tugal with  England,  etc.). 

(4)  Sufferings  and  hardships  caused  by  the  German 
submarine  blockade  and  destruction  of  neutral  commerce 
(so  strong  as  to  warrant  separation  from  the  four  causes 
above — in  fact,  the  leading  cause  for  war  with  several  of  the 
small  States  referred  to). 

Belgium 

(1)     Invasion  by  Germany,  which  carries  with  it: 

(a)  Fight  for  national  honor  and  for  existence — purely 
a  case  of  self-defense. 

(b)  Maintenance  of  her  solemn  treaty  obligations  with 
England  and  France  (the  same  obligation  that  Germany 
had  with  these  same  countries  and  Belgium,  and  which  Ger- 
many so  contemptuously  broke,  as  "mere  scraps  of  paper"). 


Causes  of  the  Present  War  63 

THE  CENTRAL  POWERS 

Austria-Hungary 

(1)  Desire  for  control  of  the  Balkans  (conquest)  with 
Constantinople,  and  predominating  influence  in  the  near 
East,  particularly  the  Mediterranean  countries  and  com- 
merce. 

(2)  Growth  of  nationality  among  the  Slavic  and  other 
peoples  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  with  its  consequent  peril  to 
the  oppressive,  autocratic  government  of  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy— (well  may  she  fear  it!) 

(3)  Growth  of  democracy  among  the  several  peoples  of 
the  Empire  (the  companion  to  national  feeling  and  desire 
for  independence). 

(4)  Pan-Germanism — philosophy  of  imperialism. 

Germany 

(1)  Militarism, — the  doctrine  of  "blood  and  iron." 

(2)  Jealousy  of  England's  commercial  power  and  deter- 
mination to  wrest  from  her  the  supremacy  on  the  sea,  and 
in  colonial  commerce. 

(3)  Pan-Germanism — imperialism,  the  dream  of  a  Teu- 
tonic "Mittel-Europa,"  with  German  domination  on  the  con- 
tinent of  Europe.     (Berlin  to  Bagdad  Railroad  and  coun- 

try.) 

(4)  Autocracy's  struggle  with  the  growing  spirit  of  de- 
mocracy throughout  the  world — the  curse  of  "divine  right" 
kings. 

(5)  Domineering  German  diplomacy  (one  of  the  great- 
est immediate  causes), 

Turkey 

( 1 )  Hope  of  regaining  lost  provinces  in  Europe. 

(2)  Revenge  upon  the  Balkan  States  for  their  conquests 
of  Turkish  territory  in  the  Balkan  wars,  1912-13. 

(3)  German  influence  and  propaganda. 


64  The  Causes  Of  War 

Bulgaria     ^ 

(1)  Revenge  upon  the  other  Balkan  States  for  depriv- 
ing  her  of  much  of  her  conquests  in  the  First  Balkan  war, 
1912. 

(2)  Hope  of  regaining  her  conquests  of  1912. 

(3)  German  influences  and  sympathies,  particularly  of 
the  ruling  house  in  Bulgaria. 

U,  S.  REASONS  FOR  GOING  TO  WAR  WITH 
GERMANY 

(1)  To  uphbld  the  principles  of  international  law,  the 
sacred  obligations  of  treaties,  and  the  rights  of  neutrals, 
and  of  small  States. 

(2)  The  moral  ground  of  humanity,  in  the  scale  against 
barbarism. 

(3)  To  uphold  her  own  honor  and  respect  among  the 
powers  of  the  earth,  and  to  prove  the  sincerity  of  her  pro- 
fessed principles. 

(4)  To  cast  in  her  powerful  resources  with  the  liberal 
governments  of  the  world  with  the  cause  of  democracy  vs. 
autocracy, — to  help  make  the  world  "safe  for  democracy." 

Explanation  of  Causes 

And  now,  to  discuss  the  above  causes  briefly.  We  shall 
follow  the  order  given  in  our  outline,  and  take  England,  of 
the  allies  first. 

(1)  Protection  of  colonial  possessions  and  maintenance 
of  supremacy  on  the  sea  and  in  commerce.  It  has  been 
claimed  by  Germany  that  she  has  as  good  right  to  a  colonial 
empire  and  supremacy  on  the  sea  as  England  has,  which 
would  be  true  if  she  gave  her  colonies  the  same  freedom  and 
self-government  that  England  does  hers.  But  just  the  oppo- 
site  is  the  case,  as  Germany's  colonies  in  Africa  have  shown. 
True  enough  it  is  that  Great  Britain  got  many  of  her  cola- 


Causes  of  the  Present  War  65 

nial  possessions  and  much  of  her  consequent  commercial 
power  unjustly  and  by  methods  of  oppression  and  force. 
But  this  nearly  all  happened  before  England  became  the 
democracy  she  is  today;  and  she  has  done  as  much  as  any 
nation  on  earth  could  do  in  recent  years  to  right  those 
wrongs  of  "kings  and  aristocracies" — in  fact  so  much  that 
her  colonies  are  allowed  more  freedom  than  those  of  any 
other  country  (as  England  has  always  done  on  colonial  lib- 
erties among  the  powers  of  Europe)  ;  while  on  the  other 
hand,  Germany's  government  and  exploitation  of  her  col- 
onies has  been  so  oppressive  generally  speaking,  and  so 
feudalistic,  that  the  colonists  hate  her,  and  welcomed  the 
chance  of  war  to  remedy  their  condition.  Again,  Great  Brit- 
ain's fleet  and  commerce  threaten  the  world  in  no  such  man- 
ner as  Germany's  do,  but  have  repeatedly  been  a  protection 
to  other  countries  from  diabolical  intrigues  and  aggressions 
by  the  German  government  and  its  agents.  It  was  Germany 
above  all  others  that  worked  and  plotted  to  throw  China 
into  anarchy  and  disruption,  at  the  same  time  extorting 
concessions  from  that  helpless  government  that  were  most 
humiliating  and  embarrassing  to  the  Chinese,  as  though 
China  were  vassal  to  the  Kaiser, — all  through  a  process  that 
exhibited  a  deliberate  policy  of  atrocity  that  rivaled  in  every 
respect  the  more  recent  ravages  of  Belgium.  The  Kaiser 
set  these  crimes  afoot  with  the  injunction  to  his  agents  that 
they  should  make  the  power  of  Germany  felt  in  China,  that 
the  Chinese  should  be  impressed  by  it.  It  is  the  German  gov- 
ernment that  has  upheld  and  been  chiefly  responsible  for  the 
continuation  of  the  horrible,  ghastly  murders,  starvation 
and  practical  annihilation  of  the  Armenian  Christians  in 
Turkey.  By  his  mere  word  the  Kaiser  could  easily  have  put 
an  end  to  this  butchery,  any  time  in  these  recent  years ;  but 
instead,  a  few  months  ago,  after  one  of  the  greatest  mas- 
sacres of  wholly  innocent  people  was  perpetrated,  the  Kaiser 
sent  the  congratulation  to  the  Sultan,  "God  bless  you  for 
your  noble  victory,"  etc.,  etc. 


66  The  Causes  Of  War 

(2)  Democracy/  versus  autocracy.  We  have  already 
called  attention  to  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  as  a  whole 
is  a  democracy  practically  as  much  as  our  own.  In  fact  it 
is  more  so,  in  several  particulars  (though  not  in  others), 
especially,  since  1900.  On  the  other  hand,  we  need  only  to 
read  any  historical  account  of  the  form  and  workings  of  the 
Prussian  and  German  imperial  governments  to  realize  that 
they  were  practically  absolute  monarchies, — each  in  its 
sphere,  and  the  Kaiser  being  at  the  head  of  both — veiling  to 
the  people  their  feudalistic  character  (a  scheme  of  Bis- 
marck's, but  followed  more  extensively  since)  only  by  pa- 
ternalistic  reforms, 

(3)  Germany's  invasion  of  Belgium,  besides  breaking 
faith  with  England,  presented  a  direct  menace  to  that  coun- 
try, from  across  the  Channel,  greater  than  any  danger  that 
has  confronted  her  since  the  period  of  the  early  career  of 
Napoleon  Bonaparte,  before  the  battle  of  Trafalgar,  more 
than  a  century  ago.  Autocracy  so  near  a  growing  democ- 
racy was  not  to  be  tolerated. 

(4)  As  to  maintenance  of  the  "balance  of  potter**  in 
Europe,  we  may  say  that  the  development  of  Germany  in 
the  present  generation, — agriculturally,  commercially,  scien- 
tifically, financially  and  otherwise  industrially — has  been  phe- 
nomenalf  and  has  astonished  the  world!  Add  to  this  fact 
that  her  militarism  and  Machiavellianism  in  politics  have 
kept  pace  with  all  this  growth,  and  you  have  the  "Teutonic 
menace*'  to  Europe  and  to  the  world. 

Next  France,  with  her  causes.  France,  of  course,  was 
more  directly  menaced  than  England.  Although  France  had 
compulsory  and  universal  military  service  she  was  more  dem- 
ocratic and  therefore  less  prepared  for  immediate  action 
than  was  Germany,  and  was  a  year — a  fateful  year — ^behind 
Germany  in  her  military  program.  A  democracy  cannot 
mould  a  people  into  a  perfect  military  machine  so  quickly 
as  an  absolute  power  above  them  can  drive  them  into  it. 
Yet,  France  saw  that  once  more  she  must  fight  for  liberty. 


Causes  of  the  Present  War  67 

fraternity  and  equality  against  the  foe  that  would  crush 
these  foundation  principles  of  democracy.  This  considera- 
tion for  France  explains  both  (1)  her  course  for  mainte- 
nance of  treaty  obligations  with  her  allies  and,  (2),  her  fear 
of  Pan-Germanism  as  causes  of  war  for  her.  Her  democ- 
racy and  existence  were  both  at  stake. 

(3)  Revenge  for  the  exaction  of  Alsace-Lorraine  from 
her  by  Prussia  in  1871  was,  naturally,  a  strong  incentive 
for  war  on  France's  part.  She  has  since  that  fatal  year 
been  the  leading  power  in  Europe  to  warn  the  world  against 
the  ambitions  of  Germany  and  the  Hohenzollerns,  and  to 
counsel  preparedness  for  the  "inevitable  day." 

Third,  Russia,  Russia's  desire  for  control  of  the  Balkans 
and  possession  of  Constantinople,  with  access  to  the  Medi- 
terranean sea  was  due  chiefly  to  two  causes,  namely,  (1) 
Growth  of  a  national  consciousness  and  pride  among  the 
most  intelligent  and  influential  elements  in  the  State,  and 
(2)  the  ambition  of  the  Russian  monarchs  and  privileged 
nobility  to  expand  (east,  south  and  southwest — and  at  an 
early  time,  west  also,  and  north)  to  ice-free  and  unhampered 
ports  on  the  seas.  Constantinople  as  the  capital  of  a  new 
and  greater  Russia  had  been  the  dreams  of  her  czars  since 
the  time  of  Peter  the  Great.  In  this,  of  course,  the  Russia 
of  the  Czar  was  equally  guilty  with  Germany  and  Austria 
in  stirring  up  strife  and  precipitating  the  greatest  of  all 
conflicts.  Russia's  aggressions  in  Manchuria,  contrary  to 
her  solemn  pledges  to  Japan,  with  Port  Arthur  as  the  ter- 
minus of  her  great  Trans-Siberian  railroad  and  coveted  port 
on  the  Pacific,  it  is  well  known,  was  the  chief  cause  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  war  of  1904-05. 

Russia's  other  causes  are  so  similar  to  those  of  other 
countries  of  the  allies  that  they  may  be  passed  over  here. 

Fourthy  Italy.  Of  all  the  allies  so  far  considered — and 
perhaps  of  all  of  them,  without  exception — Italy  has  been 
most  guilty.  She  is  less  democratic  than  the  others — (ex- 
cept Russia  at  first),  though  far  more  so  than  either  Ger- 


68  The  Causes  Of  War 

many  or  Austria-Hungary — and  has  allowed  her  strong 
spirit  of  nationality  and  Italian  unity  to  lead  her  into  two 
wars  of  conquest  within  a  decade,  i.  e.,  her  war  with  Turkey 
in  1911,  and  the  present  war.  Yet,  Italy  at  heart  is  demo- 
cratic, her  local  government  being  patterned  after  that  of 
France  and  her  causes  for  war  are  most  natural  ones  and 
emanate  from  the  people  themselves. 

Fifth,  the  Balkan  States,  These  have  been  sufficiently 
commented  on  in  a  former  article,  and  need  not  be  sepa- 
rately treated  here.  The  above  outline  of  their  causes  will 
suffice. 

Sixth,  Japan,  Japan's  motives  are  also  sufficiently  clear- 
ly given  in  the  above  outline  of  her  causes,  as  are  also  those 
in  the  seventh  (g),  and  eighth  (h)  groups  of  the  outline, 
and  to  save  space  we  omit  further  consideration  of  them  at 
this  point. 

The  above  discussion  of  the  allies'  causes  with  the  rkther 
full  outline  of  the  causes  for  the  Central  Powers  will  per- 
haps give  the  situation  as  affecting  the  European  nations  in 
themselves  as  complete  consideration  as  is  needed.  It  re- 
mains for  us  to  go  somewhat  more  into  detail  concerning  our 
own  country's  causes  for  entering  the  conflict,  and  finally, 
to  make  a  brief  summary  of  causes  in  general,  so  as  to  fix 
the  great  weight  of  responsibility  for  the  world  tragedy 
where  it  rightfully  belongs. 

Keeping  in  mind  our  classification  of  America's  motives 
in  this  war,  as  a  concise  working  basis,  we  could  do  no  bet- 
ter in  elaboration  and  in  exposition  of  our  case  against  Ger- 
many, than  to  consider  thoughtfully  the  following  para- 
graphs from  President  Wilson's  noted  Flag  Day  Speech  of 
last  year. 

"It  is  plain  enough  how  we  were  forced  into  the  war.  The 
extraordinary  insults  and  aggressions  of  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man government  left  us  no  self-respecting  choice  but  to  take 
up  arms  in  defense  of  our  rights  as  a  free  people  and  of 
our  honor  as  a  sovereign  government.    The  military  masters 


Cannes  of  the  Present  War  69 

of  Germany  denied  us  the  right  to  be  neutral.  They  filled 
our  unsuspecting  communities  with  vicious  spies  and  con- 
spirators and  sought  to  corrupt  the  opinion  of  our  people 
in  their  own  behalf  .  .  .  their  agents  diligently  spread  sedi- 
tion amongst  us  and  sought  to  draw  our  own  citizens  from 
their  allegiance, — and  some  of  those  agents  were  men  con- 
nected with  the  official  embassy  of  the  German  government 
itself  here  in  our  own  capital.  They  sought  by  violence  to 
destroy  our  industries  and  arrest  our  commerce.  They  tried 
to  incite  Mexico  to  take  up  arms  against  us  and  to  draw 
Japan  into  a  hostile  alliance  with  her, — and  that  by  direct 
suggestion  from  the  foreign  office  in  Berlin,  .  .  .  They  re- 
peatedly executed  tlieir  threat  that  they  would  send  to  their 
death  any  of  our  people  who  ventured  to  approach  the 
coasts  of  Europe.  And  many  of  our  own  people  were  cor- 
rupted. Men  began  to  look  upon  their  own  neighbors  with 
suspicion  and  to  wonder  in  their  hot  resentment  and  surprise 
whether  there  was  any  community  in  which  hostile  intrigue 
did  not  lurk.  What  great  nation  in  such  circumstances 
would  not  have  taken  up  arms?  Much  as  we  had  desired 
peace,  it  was  denied  us,  and  not  of  our  own  choice.  This 
flag  under  which  we  serve  would  have  been  dishonored  had 
we  withheld  our  hand. 

"But  this  is  only  part  of  the  story.  .  .  .  The  war  was 
begun  by  the  military  masters  of  Germany,  who  proved  to 
be  also  the  masters  of  Austria-Hungary.  These  men  have 
never  regarded  nations  as  peoples,  men,  women  and  children 
of  like  blood  and  frame  as  themselves.  .  .  .  They  have  re- 
garded them  merely  as  serviceable  organizations  which  they 
could  by  force  or  intrigue  bend  or  corrupt  to  their  own  pur- 
pose. They  have  regarded  the  smaller  States  in  particu- 
lar, and  the  people  who  could  be  overwhelmed  by  force,  as 
their  natural  tools  and  instruments  of  domination.  Their 
purpose  has  long  been  avowed.  .  .  .  The  rulers  of  Germany 
themselves  knew  all  the  while  what  concrete  plans,  what  well 
advanced  intrigues  lay  back  of  what  the  professors  and  the 


70  The  Causes  Of  War 

writers  were  saying,  and  were  glad  to  go  forward  unmo- 
lested, filling  the  thrones  of  the  Balkan  States  with  German 
princes,  putting  German  officers  at  the  service  of  Turkey 
to  drill  her  armies  .  .  .  developing  plans  of  sedition  and 
rebellion  in  India  and  Egypt,  setting  their  fires  in  Persia. 
The  demands  made  by  Austria  upon  Servia  were  a  mere  sin- 
gle step  in  a  plan  that  compassed  Europe  and  Asia,  from 
Berlin  to  Bagdad.  They  hoped  that  their  demands  might 
not  arouse  Europe,  but  they  meant  to  press  them  whether 
they  did  or  not,  for  they  thought  themselves  ready  for  the 
final  issue  of  arms. 

"Their  plan  was  to  throw  a  broad  belt  of  German  military 
power  and  political  control  across  the  very  center  of  Eu- 
rope and  beyond  the  Mediterranean  into  the  heart  of  Asia. 
.  .  .  The  dream  had  its  heart  at  Berlin.  It  could  have  had 
a  heart  nowhere  else !  .  .  .  The  choice  of  peoples  played  no 
part  in  it  at  all.  It  contemplated  binding  together  racial 
and  political  units  which  could  be  kept  together  only  by 
force. 

"And  they  have  actually  carried  the  greater  part  of  that 
plan  into  execution!  .  .  .  The  so-called  Central  Powers  are 
in  fact  but  a  single  power.  .  .  .  The  Turkish  armies,  which 
Germans  trained,  are  serving  Germany,  certainly  not  them- 
selves, and  the  guns  of  German  warships  lying  in  the  har- 
bor of  Constantinople  remind  Turkish  statesmen  every  day 
that  they  have  no  choice  but  to  take  their  orders  from  Ber- 
lin.   From  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  gulf,  the  net  is  spread. 

"Is  it  not  easy  to  understand  the  eagerness  for  peace  that 
has  been  manifested  from  Berlin  ever  since  the  snare  was  set 
and  sprung?  ...  It  wishes  to  close  its  bargain  before  it  is 
too  late.  .  .  . 

"If  they  fail,  their  people  will  cast  them  aside;  a  gov- 
ernment accountable  to  the  people  themselves  will  be  set  up 
in  Germany  as  it  has  been  in  England,  in  the  United  States, 
in  France,  and  in  all  the  great  countries  of  the  modern  time 


Causes  of  the  Present  War  71 

except  Germany.  If  they  succeed,  America  will  fall  within 
the  menace.  We  and  all  the  rest  of  the  world  must  remain 
armed,  as  they  will  remain,  and  must  be  ready  for  the  next 
step  of  aggression.   .  .  . 

"Do  you  not  now  understand  the  new  intrigue,  the  in- 
trigue for  peace?  .  .  .  Their  present  particular  aim  is  to 
deceive  all  those  who  throughout  the  world  stand  for  the 
rights  of  peoples  and  the  self-government  of  nations ;  for 
they  see  what  immense  strength  the  forces  of  justice  and 
liberalism  are  gathering  out  of  this  war.  They  are  employ- 
ing liberals  in  their  enterprise.  They  are  using  men,  in  Ger- 
many and  without,  as  their  spokesmen  for  their  own  de- 
struction,— socialists,  the  leaders  of  laborers,  the  thinkers 
they  have  hitherto  sought  to  silence.  .  .  . 

"The  sinister  intrigue  is  being  no  less  actively  conducted 
in  this  country  than  in  Russia  and  in  every  country  in  Eu- 
rope to  which  the  agents  and  dupes  of  the  imperial  German 
government  each  gets  access.  .  .  .  They  proclaim  the  lib- 
eral purposes  of  their  masters ;  declare  this  a  foreign  war 
which  can  touch  America  with  no  danger  to  either  her  lands 
or  her  institutions;  set  England  at  the  center  of  the  stake 
and  talk  of  her  ambition  to  assert  economic  dominion 
throughout  the  world;  appeal  to  our  ancient  tradition  of 
isolation  in  the  politics  of  the  nations ;  and  seek  to  under- 
mine the  government  with  false  professions  of  loyalty  to  its 
principles.  .  .  . 

"The  great  fact  that  stands  out  above  all  the  rest  is  that 
this  is  a  great  people* s  war,  a  war  for  freedom  and  justice 
and  self-government  amongst  all  the  nations  of  the  world, 
a  war  to  make  the  world  safe  for  the  peoples  who  live  upon 
it  and  have  made  it  their  own,  the  German  people  themselves 
included;  and  with  us  rests  the  choice  to  break  through  all 
these  hypocrisies  .  .  .  and  help  set  the  world  free,  or  else 
stand  aside  and  let  it  be  dominated  as  long  ago,  by  ...  a 
power  to  which  the  world  has  afforded  no  parallel  and  in 


72  The  Causes  Of  War 

the  face  of  which  political  freedom  must  wither  and  perish. 
"For  us  there  is  but  one  choice,  we  have  made  it.  .  .  . 
We  are  ready  to  plead  at  the  bar  of  history."  .  .  . 

Summary  and  Conclusion 

A  brief  survey  of  the  causes  catalogued  and  discussed  in 
the  foregoing  articles  with  the  study  of  the  subject  they 
imply,  shows  the  following  clear  divisions  and  contrasts : 

(1)  All  the  Allied  powers  and  those  fighting  with  them 
have  democracy,  with  its  attendant  liberties  as  one  of  their 
leading  causes ;  while  noTW  of  the  "Central  Powers"  were 
democracies,  but  were  fighting  for  the  principles  ©f  despot- 
ism. This  is  so  universally  true  that  the  World  War  has 
become,  above  all  else  combined,  a  struggle  of  democracy 
with  despotic  power y  and  those  two  causes  are  truly  in  the 
balance.  This  fact  alone  brands  Germany — her  kaiser  and 
imperial  government,  who  have  been  the  soul  and  masters 
of  the  Central  States — as  the  chief  culprits  in  this  war  and 
the  arch-enemies  of  mankind. 

(2)  The  Central  Powers,  led  by  Germany,  have  been  in 
the  present  generation  (since  1905)  the  only  exponents  and 
defenders  of  the  principle  that  "might  makes  right,"  and 
have  since  that  time  been  in  the  grip  of  the  "war-lords"  Bem- 
hardi,  Treitschke,  "Herr"  Ballin,  and  such  like,  with  the 
whole  leadership  of  the  German  army  and  navy  to  preach 
that  doctrine,  a  doctrine  so  welcome  and  sweet  to  the  palate 
of  the  kaiser  and  imperial  government  of  Germany.  Here  I 
cannot  refrain  from  quoting  a  few  characteristic  statements 
of  Bernhardi :  "War  is  the  father  of  all  things ;  .  .  .  a  mor- 
al obligation,  an  indispensable  factor  in  civilization  .  .  .  Ger- 
many is  the  fittest  to  survive.  .  .  .  The  Germans  have  proved 
themselves  .  .  .  one  may  say,  the  civilized  nation.  .  .  .  Ab- 
solutely the  most  important  task  of  a  modern  State  consists 
in  making  its  armed  force  as  powerful  as  possible." 

(3)  In  the  decade  between  1905  and  1915  five  times  Eu- 


Causes  of  the  Present  War  78 

rope  was  brought  to  the  verge  of  a  general  war — every  tiTne 
by  the  brazen  aggressions  of  the  German  and  Austro-Hun- 
garian  governments.  Four  times  one  or  all  of  the  allied 
States  and  the  small  nations  they  were  protecting  yielded,  to 
save  Europe  from  the  devastation  of  war;  but  in  1914  they 
did  not  yield— TimY  COULD  NOT  YIELD  and  remain 
free  and  honorable,  treaty-abiding  nations. 

(4)  Finally,  with  respect  to  the  United  States'  particu- 
lar case  and  cause,  we  wish  it  to  be  borne  in  mind  that,  al- 
though for  two  years  England  violated  international  law  and 
our  right  to  be  neutral  through  her  seizing,  holding  as  con- 
traband and  disposing  of  our  cargoes,  as  well  as  rifling  our 
mail, — yet  she  appropriated  only  property,  and  did  not  de- 
stroy even  that;  while  on  the  other  hand  Germany  by  her 
submarine  warfare  utterly  destroyed  (and  Germany  set  her 
submarine  blockade  in  action  first)  not  only  our  ships  and 
cargoes,  but  also  human  lives,  the  lives  of  our  citizens  (who 
had  a  perfect  right  to  be  on  the  high  seas — never  before  in 
the  history  of  civilization  were  people  absolutely  denied  the 
use  of  the  open  sea) — then  boasted  of  her  achievement  and 
celebrated  these  murders  with  holidays  and  rejoicing!  Is 
not  the  case  sufficiently  plain?  The  Judge  of  all  has  told 
us  that  "Life  is  more  than  meat,  and  the  body  more  than 
raiment." 

We  have  omitted  treatment  of  some  of  the  lesser  and  im- 
mediate causes  of  this  war,  as  well  as  several  of  the  pretexts 
and  excuses,  but  we  feel  they  are  not  important  enough  to 
demand  further  space  and  consideration  in  this  work. 

In  our  next  month's  article  we  shall  begin  an  outline  and 
suggestions  by  which  the  war  may  be  studied  in  our  schools, 
— after  which  the  questions  of  peace  will  be  taken  up  and 
studied  carefuUy. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

CAUSES  OF  THE  BALKAN  WARS   (1911-1913) 

THE  Turko-Italian  war  of  1911,  in  which  the  Italians 
so  readily  overcame  the  Turks,  opened  the  eyes  of  the 
Balkan  nations,  and  convinced  them  that  the  time  was  oppor- 
tune for  a  concerted  movement  to  drive  the  "unspeakable 
Turk"  out  of  Europe,  and  especially,  out  of  Balkan  affairs. 
Turkey  had  proven  herself  much  weaker  than  was  generally 
anticipated,  and  her  once  tributary  states  in  Europe  were 
now  confident  of  victory  and  the  fruits  of  victory,  in  the 
rounding  out  of  their  own  nationalities  and  patriotic  as- 
pirations. Thus  did  the  Italians'  victory  over  the  Turks  in 
1911  lead  directly  and  immediately  to  the  greater  victory  of 
the  little  Balkan  states  the  next  year.  Tliey  knew  that  their 
triumph  would  eliminate  the  rule  of  the  Ottoman  entirely 
from  Europe,  if  only  the  great  European  powers  would  leave 
them  alone.  As  the  great  powers  had  a  number  of  times  in- 
tervened in  their  struggles  with  Turkey  previously,  however, 
they  knew  that  possibility  of  intervention  still  existed.  But 
their  chance  to  win  was  such  that  they  would  run  the  risk 
anyway,  in  the  hope  that  the  justice  of  their  cause  would 
stay  the  meddling  hand.    And  so  war  came. 

As  indicated  above,  the  First  Balkan  war  came  as  a  result 
of  the  universal  conviction  of  the  Balkan  states  that  the 
time  had  come  to  throw  off  the  last  remnants  of  Turkish 
tyranny,  and  drive  the  monster  out  of  Europe.  Their  strong 
national  feeling  and  ambition  to  rule  over  all  the  people  of 
their  own  blood  fed  the  flame. 

The  Second  Balkan  war  was  a  fight  over  the  division  of 
the  spoils  of  victory,  of  which  Bulgaria  had  hardly  received 

74 


Causes  of  the  Balkan  Wars  (1911-1913)  75 

her  just  share.  This  was  unfortunate,  but  it  was  natural, 
as  the  victors  had  come  to  no  previous  conclusion  as  to  their 
respective  claims  in  the  region  conquered.  This  trouble  was 
aggravated  by  Austria-Hungary's  intervention  at  the  close 
of  the  First  war,  backed  by  the  "shining  sword"  of  the 
German  Kaiser. 

Before  the  Balkan  wars  of  1911-13  historians  were  ac- 
customed to  include  in  the  Balkan  states  Serbia,  Montenegro, 
Roumania,  Bulgaria,  and  sometimes  Greece.  After  the  First 
Balkan  war  a  separate  state,  Albania,  was  set  up,  due  to  the 
jealous  intervention  of  Austria.  That  -made  six.  And 
since  Greece  received  part  of  the  region  fought  for  and  has 
also  played  an  important  role  in  the  Balkans  in  the  great 
World  War,  it  is  right  that  she  be  included  in  the  Balkan 
group,  as  she  is,  geographically,  in  the  peninsula.  Accord- 
ingly, the  writer,  whenever  referring  to  the  Balkan  states  as 
a  whole  will  include  Greece. 

The  Balkan  question  has  been  for  three  quarters  of  a  cen- 
tury, and  still  is,  a  most  complicated  and  intricate  one.  As 
already  observed  in  an  earlier  chapter  of  this  work,  the  wars 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  particularly  of  the  latter  part 
of  the  century,  have  been  mostly  wars  of  nationality.  It 
was  to  be  expected,  therefore,  that  this  spirit  would  mani- 
fest itself  strongly  in  the  Balkans  and  prove  a  strong  moral 
force  toward  victory.  Nevertheless,  all  the  world  was  sur- 
prised, and  little  less  than  astonished  at  the  swift  and  ter- 
rible defeats  that  these  little  states  inflicted  upon  the  country 
that  but  a  short  time  before  had  held  them  under  its  despotic 
sway  of  crime  and  massacre. 

The  story  of  the  unification  of  Italy  and  Germany  we 
need  not  recount  here,  although  they  had  their  remote  and 
indirect  bearings  on  the  recent  Balkan  troubles, — especially, 
since  they  paved  the  way  for  the  ambitions  of  Italy  along 
the  Adriatic,  and  the  mutual  jealousies  and  intrigues  of  the 
Teutonic  and  Russian  governments  in  the  Near  East.  And 
the  Crimean  war  (1853-56)  needs  little  more  than  passing 


76  The  Causes  Of  War 

mention.  This  war  meant  for  Turkey  (a),  the  abolition  of 
Russia's  protectorate  over  the  Danubian  Principalities  and 
of  the  Czar's  claim  to  special  right  of  intervention  in  behalf 
of  the  Christian  subjects  of  the  Sultan,  (b)  closing  of  the 
Straits  to  the  warships  of  all  nations,  and  (c),  the  formal 
admission  of  Turkey  into  the  family  of  European  powers. 
It  marked  also  a  distinct  step  on  the  part  of  several  of  the 
small  Balkan  principalities  toward  freedom  from  Turkish 
rule,  the  setting  up  of  independent  governments,  or  their 
protection,  control,  or  annexation  by  European  powers. 
The  chief  significance  of  this  all  is  that  these  small  states 
and  principalities  have  ever  since  remained  a  continual  men- 
ace to  the  "balance  of  power"  and  peace  of  Europe.  So  they 
will  continue  to  be  if  an  effective  League  of  Nations  is  not 
formed  as  an  immediate  outcome  of  the  World  war. 

Bulgaria  was  the  last  of  the  original  Balkan  states  to  ob- 
tain independence  of  Turkey.  The  Bulgarian  Exarchate  was 
established  as  a  separate  religious  community  March  10, 
1870.  This  struggle  resulted  in  a  movement  toward  nation- 
ality. Bulgarian  insurrections  against  Turkey  broke  out 
in  1875-6,  and  these  led  in  turn  to  the  Russo-Turkish  war 
and  the  virtual  loss  of  Bulgaria  to  Turkey,  in  1878.  Since 
that  time  the  Bulgarians  have  looked  to  Russia  repeatedly 
for  aid,  and  have  considered  her  their  best  friend  and  pro- 
tector, until  the  period  immediately  before  the  Balkan  wars, 
when  their  German  rulers  began  to  veer  them  toward  the 
Central  powers.  Bulgaria's  defeat  in  the  Second  Balkan 
war,  1913,  at  the  hands  of  the  other  Balkan  states  sealed 
her  alliance  with  the  Teutonic  powers  and  Turkey ;  and  that 
explains  her  line-up  in  the  World  War.  She  had  gained  her 
final  independence  from  Turkey  in  1908. 

By  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  concluded  in  July  1878,  at  the 
close  of  the  Russo-Turkish  war  alluded  to  above,  Bosnia, 
Herzegovina,  Bulgaria,  Eastern  Roumelia  and  Montenegro 
were  severed  from  direct  rule  by  the  Sultan.  Montenegro, 
Serbia  and  Roumania  achieved  their  complete  independence 


Cames  of  the  Balkan  Wars  (1911-1913)  7T 

at  this  time,  while  Bulgaria  was  a  Turkish  protectorate  in 
name  at  least,  until  1908,  as  stated  above. 

From  the  remote  past  the  different  peoples  of  the  Balkan 
peninsula  have  inherited  racial  animosities  and  political 
troubles  and  confusion.  The  Bulgarians  resented  the  "ty- 
ranny" of  the  Greeks  in  ecclesiastical  and  educational  mat- 
ters. The  Albanians  have  always  been  wild  and  ungovern- 
able and  unable  to  assimulate  the  benefits  of  ordered  govern- 
ment and  society.  The  Roumanians  prided  themselves  in 
their  Roman  stock  and  traditions  and  held  apart  from  the 
other  peoples  of  the  peninsula.  As  is  stated  in  the  Rand- 
McNally  Atlas  (p.42): 

For  1000  years  the  Balkan  Peninsula  has  suffered  from  political  con- 
fusion due  in  part  to  its  geographical  position,  which  made  it  the  meet- 
ing-ground of  conflicting  races  and  religions.  In  ancient  times  it  was 
occupied  by  various  branches  of  the  Arian  stock,  the  Thracians  in  the 
northeast,  the  Illyrians  in  the  northwest,  and  the  Greeks  in  the  south, 
whose  commingling  gave  rise  to  the  mixed  Macedonian  type  inhabiting 
the  northern  central  part  of  the  peninsula.  Under  Roman,  and  espe- 
cially under  Byzantine  rule,  it  attained  its  highest  development,  Con- 
stantinople becoming  the  chief  center  of  the  world's  civilization  and 
commerce.  In  the  seventh  century,  A.D.,  the  Servians  and  Bulgarians, 
of  Slavonic  stock,  pressed  southward  into  the  peninsula,  driving  the 
Greeks  before  them  to  the  south,  the  Illyrians  (ancestors  of  the  present 
Albanians)  to  the  southwest,  and  the  Romans  back  toward  the  north- 
west. The  introduction  of  Christianity  in  the  ninth  century  marked  the 
transition  from  barbarism  to  civilization.  For  a  time  the  Bulgarians 
were  masters  of  the  peninsula,  but  in  the  fourteenth  century  the  Servians 
established  a  short-lived  supremacy  which  by  the  defeat  of  their  army 
in  1389,  followed  by  the  fall  of  Constantinople  in  1453  gave  way  before 
the  irresistible  advance  of  the  Turk.  Four  centuries  of  retrogression 
ensued,  during  which  the  peninsula,  with  the  exception  of  Dalmatia  in 
the  northwest,  which  continued  under  Venetian  and  later  passed  under 
Austrian  rule,  was  abandoned  to  almost  hopeless  barbarity.  It  was  not 
until  the  nineteenth  century  that  the  almost  smothered  germs  of  national 
vitahty  were  quickened  again  under  Russian  influence,  and  that  the 
Balkan  peoples  were  aroused  to  struggle  for  freedom  from  the  yoke  of 
the  "unspeakable"  Turk. 

Coming  back  to  recent  years,  we  find  that  Bulgaria's  de- 
sire to  annex  neighboring  parts  of  European  Turkey  in- 
habited by  Slav,  especially  Macedonia,  was  widely  cherished, 
and  more  or  less  tension  existed  with  Serbia,  Greece  and 
Austria  even  before  the  first  Balkan  war.    It  was  also  realized 


78  The  Causes  Of  War 

that  strategically  Roumanians  position  was  one  of  command- 
ing importance.  This  can  easily  be  seen  by  a  glance  at  the 
map,  which  will  show  the  peculiar  shape  and  frontiers  of 
Roumania.  She  has  stood  in  the  pathway  of  both  Teuton 
and  Russian  advance  toward  the  regions  beyond  the  Black 
Sea,  and,  second  only  to  Serbia,  in  these  same  powers'  path 
to  the  eastern  Mediterranean,  Asia  Minor  and  the  Orient. 
Thus,  the  security  of  Roumania,  like  the  other  small  states 
of  this  region,  depended  upon  a  delicate  tension  of  inter- 
national relations  that  has  justly  been  called  the  "powder- 
box"  of  Europe.  And  even  now,  let  me  repeat,  only  a  strong 
League  of  Nations  can  guarantee  peace  in  this  troublesome 
region  in  the  future. 

As  Bulgaria  was  the  last  of  the  Balkan  states  (save  only 
Albania)  to  gain  her  complete  independence  of  Turkey,  so 
Serbia  was  the  first  (save  only  Greece).  But  that  did  not 
make  hers  a  stable  government.  She  virtually  gained  her  in- 
dependence in  1829,  immediately  after  Greece  became  free 
from  Turkey.  And  complete  independence  was  given  her  by 
the  treaty  of  Berlin,  1878.  Her  progress,  considering  her 
opportunity  has  been  disappointing, — the  most  so  of  all  the 
Balkan  states ;  and  this  has  made  her  all  the  more  a  prey  to 
Austrian  and  German  intrigues.  The  new  Jugo-Slav  state, 
however,  with  a  greater  Serbia  as  the  nucleus,  gives  promise 
of  better  things  for  the  future. 

It  was  a  general  conviction  of  the  students  of  the  Balkan 
affairs  just  previous  to  the  World  War  that,  in  case  of  a 
breakout  of  war  in  this  region,  the  Central  Powers  and 
Russia  would  each  attempt  to  seize  as  big  a  slice  of  the  Bal- 
kan regions  as  possible;  the  Russians  would  make  for  Con- 
stantinople, the  Austrians  for  Serbia,  Macedonia  and  the 
Saloniki  coast ;  the  English  would  make  for  the  Dardanelles, 
to  protect  their  Eastern  possessions ;  the  French  for  Rhodes, 
parts  of  Asia  Minor  and  Syria,  and  the  Italians  for  Albania 
and  the  entire  eastern  coast  of  the  Adriatic.  They  were  not 
very  far  wrong  when  the  World  War  came.  Said  M.  Berard : 


Causes  of  the  Balkan  Wars  (1911-1913)  79 

"The  outcome  cannot  be  anything  but  a  general  European 
war  of  the  most  terrible  kind."  (See  Victor  Berard,  "The 
Balkan  Question,"  Villari  volume,  with  Introduction  by 
James  Bryce.) 

Italy's  interest  and  part  in  the  Balkan  question  in  this 
period  was  summed  up  by  an  Italian  as  follows : — "Italy  has 
every  interest  in  preventing  the  influence  of  Austria  and 
Russia  in  Macedonia  from  extending  and  being  gradually 
converted  into  a  more  or  less  effective  dominion. "^(  By  an 
Italian  deputy.)  This  feeling  and  interest  explains  the 
tenacity  with  which  the  Italian  delegates  to  the  peace  con- 
ference cling  to  their  shadowy  claim  to  Albania  and  the 
southern  Adriatic  coast. 

While  studying  the  Balkan  situation  just  previous  to  the 
First  Balkan  war  in  1911  the  author  of  the  present  volume 
made  this  statement:  "The  idea  prevails  in  Europe  that 
the  time  has  come  for  the  solution  of  this  most  perplexing 
problem.  England  seems  most  anxious  that  this  be  speedily 
accomplished.  According  to  Mr.  Bryce  there  are  two  solu- 
tions. One  is  the  absorbing  of  the  existing  nationalities  into 
the  great  dominions  and  great  nations  which  border  upon 
Turkey.  The  other  is  the  growth  of  these  nationalities,  or 
some  of  them,  into  nations  and  states.  The  latter,  I  think  is 
the  more  satisfactory  solution,  and  will  prove  the  more  likely, 
providing  the  great  powers  do  not  injustly  intervene.  Mr. 
Bryce  concludes  his  chapter  ('Introduction  to  the  Eastern 
Question')  with  these  words:  'He  who,  looking  above  and 
beyond  the  dust  of  current  politics,  will  try  to  fix  his  eyes, 
as  Mr.  Gladstone  did,  upon  the  heights  of  a  more  distant 
landscape,  will  find  reason  to  think  that  the  development  of 
these  nationalities  has  in  it  more  promise  for  the  future  than 
the  extension  of  the  sway  of  one  or  two  huge  military  em- 
pires, and  will  believe  that  to  encourage  and  help  them  to 
grow  into  nations  is  an  aim  to  which  such  great  and  en- 
lightened peoples  as  those  of  England,  France  and  Italy 
may  fitly  direct  their  efforts.'  "    This  is  ample  evidence  to  the 


80  The  Comes  Of  War 

writer*s  mind,  of  Great  Britain's  more  liberal  policy  in  inter- 
national politics  in  recent  years,  under  the  wise  tutelage  and 
leadership  of  such  men  as  Gladstone  and  Lord  Bryce.  And 
as  a  sequel  to  this  statement  that  I  made  eight  years  ago, 
let  me  say  that  the  present  Jugo-Slav  movement  has  been 
made  acceptable  to  the  Allied  nations  through  such  earlier 
championship  as  that  mentioned  in  the  above  quotation.  It 
is  not  a  new  movement,  born  of  the  War,  but  is  now,  because 
of  the  World  War,  realizable  beyond  the  fondest  hopes  of 
its  early  champions. 

We  have  omitted  at  this  point  of  our  study  of  the  causes 
of  war  in  recent  years,  any  separate  treatment  of  the  causes 
of  the  Turko-Italian  war  of  1911,  because  we  gave  rather  a 
detailed  statement  of  the  underlying  cause  and  the  meaning 
of  this  war  in  our  chapter  in  which  we  treated  wars  of  nation- 
ality of  which  this  one  between  Italy  and  Turkey  is  (on 
Italy's  part)  the  most  prominent  one  of  the  twentieth  cen- 
tury, previous  to  the  World  War.  We  may  add  in  passing, 
however,  that  there  was  a  good  deal  of  sentiment,  the  vision 
and  memory  of  the  glories  of  ancient  Rome  and  her  sway  over 
the  land  of  the  Carthagenians, — in  the  zeal  with  which  the 
Italians  fought  the  Turks  and  their  subjects  in  northern  Af- 
rica. Then  too,  this  war  meant  one  of  the  final  steps  in  the 
unification  of  Italy,  as  the  Italians  conceived  a  united  Italy 
to  be, — the  same  thing  that  led  them  to  enter  the  World  War 
against  Austria,  for  the  provinces  of  the  Trentino  and 
Trieste. 


CHAPTER  IX 

CAUSES    OF    THE    RUSSO-JAPANESE    WAR    (1904) 

THE  cause  of  the  war  for  Japan  was  mostly  economic 
rather  than  political.^  It  goes  back  to  the  enormous 
increase  in  Japan's  population,  the  growth  of  her  industries 
and  commerce,  and  on  the  other  hand  to  the  inadequateness 
of  her  agriculture  to  supply  a  living  for  her  growing  popu- 
lation or  to  produce  sufficient  raw  material  for  her  manu- 
factures. For  these  very  reasons,  Japan  has  felt  that  she 
could  not  allow  any  other  nation  to  secure  a  controlling  in- 
fluence in  any  part  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  much  less  in 
Korea.2 

With  Russia,  the  cause  was  primarily  political  rather  than 
economic.  It  was  therefore  less  vital  than  that  of  Japan. 
Economically,  Russia  had  no  such  reason  for  bringing  on 
such  a  conflict  as  had  Japan.  She  is  able  to  take  care  of 
herself  for  a  long  time  to  come,  in  that  respect. 

Russia's  great  political  aim,  as  Professor  Hershey  states, 
was  to  gain  access  to  the  sea  in  four  directions,  viz. :  Black 
Sea  and  Mediterranean,  Baltic  Sea,  Persian  Gulf,  Pacific 
Ocean.^  This  has  been  her  vision  and  ambition  ever  since 
the  time  of  Peter  the  Great.  She  is  still  actively  striving 
for  all  but  the  northern  one  of  these.  (And  in  passing  it 
may  be  observed  that  this  desire  to  secure  such  outlets  helps 
to  explain,  to  a  considerable  degree,  many  of  the  nineteenth 
century  wars  in  these  regions  and  is  no  small  contributory 
cause  to  those  conflicts.) 

*  Hershey,  "Int.  Law  and  Diplomacy  of  Russo-Japanese  War,"  p.  2. 

*  "The  Japanese  people  have  grown  to  such  numbers  that  they  need  an 
outlet  beyond  the  sea  and  cannot  resign  into  strong  hands  their  nearest 
field  for  colonization  and  expansion";  Lawrence,  p.  2. 

•Hershey,  p.  3. 

81 


82  The  Causes  Of  War 

Expansion  in  the  direction  of  the  Pacific  has  seemed  to 
Russia  to  involve  the  least  resistance  as  well  as  being  of  im- 
mense importance  to  her  in  Oriental  politics  and  commer- 
cial influence. 

Her  great  efforts  of  recent  years  have  been  directed  toward 
securing  an  ice-free  port  on  the  Pacific.  This  was  directly 
her  reason  for  the  occupation  of  Korea. 

While  the  relations  of  Russia  with  the  Far  East  go  back 
to  the  conquest  of  Siberia  and  even  farther,  we  are  par- 
ticularly concerned  here  only  with  her  advances  in  the  latter 
part  of  the  19th  century .'* 

In  1867  Russia  got  a  strong  hold  on  the  island  of  Sag- 
halien.  She  exercised  joint  sovereignty  with  Japan  over  the 
island.  In  1875  she  found  means  to  oust  Japan  and  appro- 
priated the  whole  island  to  herself.  This  is  an  excellent  ex- 
ample of  Russian  unscruplousness  that  was  bound,  sooner  or 
later,  to  be  met  by  the  desperate  revenge  of  the  Japanese* 
Such  action  of  Russia  only  helped  on  the  Europeanizing  of 
Japan  to  meet  her  hated  rival  in  the  Far  East. 

The  events  which  finally  brought  Russia  and  Japan  into 
collision,  arose  from  Russia's  construction  of  the  Trans- 

*The  history  of  Russian  politics  in  Manchuria  may  be  divided  into 
four  periods: 

(1)  From  the  beginning  (three  centuries  back)  to  the  "Cassini  Con- 

vention," 1896,  which  conceded  to  her  first  privileges  in  the 
North  of  this  province, — principally  the  right  to  build  the 
Trans-Siberian  Railway  across  the  Chinese  territory  to  Vlad- 
ivostock. 

(2)  From  1896  to  the   Boxer   Uprising,   1900.    During  this  period 

Russia  obtained  the  cession  on  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  the 
right  to  prolong  the  Railroad  to  this  port  by  a  branch  which 
traverses  all  Manchuria. 

(3)  From  1900  to  the  agreement  for  the  evacuation  of  Manchuria, 

1902.  Boxer  uprising  gave  Russia  the  pretext  and  occasion 
to  conquer  Manchuria  and  establish  herself  there  firmly. 

(4)  From  1902  to  the  outbreak  of  War   (Feb.,  1904).     Convention 

signed  with  China  for  evacuation  of  Manchuria — followed  by 
period  of  negotiations — in  which  Japan  distinguishes  herself 
by  her  opposition  to  Russia  and  brings  on  the  War. — Ac- 
cording to  M.  Rey,  on  Causes  of  Russo-Japanese  War  in 
Revue  General  de  Droit  International  Public,  V,  XII,  215-if. 


Causes  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (190^,)         85 

Siberian  Railway  to  the  Pacific,  with  the  end  in  view  (her 
long  cherished  hope)  of  securing  an  ice-free  port  on  the 
Pacific. 

Railroads  in  the  Far  East  have  been  the  forerunners  and 
occasions  of  war.  Russia  was  trying  to  grasp  a  port  that 
was  not  hers.  She  under-estimated  the  fatal  consequences 
of  such  an  action. 

If  Russia  had  confined  her  aggressive  movements  to  Man- 
churia alone,  the  present  history  of  the  Far  East  would 
doubtless  have  been  far  different.  But,  to  secure  her  ends, 
she  made  similar  encroachments  in  Korea,  particularly  in 
interfering  in  this  peninsula  after  the  China-Japanese  War.*^ 

Korea  had  been  tributary  to  both  China  and  Japan  for 
centuries.  She  claimed  independence  at  various  times.  In 
1875,  the  Koreans  fired  upon  a  Japanese  man-of-war  and 
in  redress  were  forced  to  open  trade  with  Japan  and  re- 
ceive a  Japanese  minister  at  the  Korean  Court. 

China  unwillingly  gave  up  her  suzerainty  over  Korea, 
1875-85.  She  now  agreed  with  Japan  that  if  events  should 
necessitate  Chinese  or  Japanese  troops  in  Korea  and  either 
sent  troops,  the  other  should  be  notified.  In  1894  on  the 
abduction  and  assassination  of  a  Korean  rebel,  Chinese  and 
Japanese  troops  were  sent.  Reforms  in  the  Korean  govern- 
ment were  now  urged  by  Japan.^  China  refused  to  consent 
to  these  reforms.  Japan  gave  her  ultimatum,  following 
up  with  the  capture  of  the  Korean  capital  and  king.*^  Both 
empires  then  prepared  for  war  and  in  July,  1894,  the  con- 

•  See  Hershey,  "Int.  Law  &  Dip.  of  Rus.-Jap.  War,  p.  36. 

"In  1868  Japan,  making  up  from  feudalism  to  the  modern  type  of 
government  determined  to  reassert  her  former  claims  upon  Korea.  The 
Koreans  insolently  refused  this  vassalage.  Japan  recognized  Korea's 
independence  in  1876  but  new  ports  were  opened  to  Japanese  trade  in 
1880. 

'  It  was  Korea's  opposition  to  the  "open  door"  policy  which  led  to  the 
intervention  of  Japan  and  China  and  the  stationing  of  Chinese  and 
Japanese  troops  in  Korea.  Another  insurrection  in  Korea  in  1894, 
brought  Chinese  and  Japanese  troops  face  to  face  again  and  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  Chino-Jap.  War  in  1895. 


84  The  Causes  Of  War 

flict  began.^    Peace  was  made  in  March,  1895.    China  ceded 
Liaotung  Peninsula  and  Formosa  to  Japan. 

The  terms  of  peace  of  the  Chino-Japanese  War  having 
given  Japan  the  Liaotung  Peninsula  with  an  important  ice- 
free  port,  the  outcome  of  the  war  afforded  Russia  an  op- 
portunity to  administer  a  severe  blow  to  Japan  and  in- 
gratiate herself  with  China.  This  was  accomplished  by  Rus- 
sia leading  in  a  Russo-French-German  "recommendation"^ 
to  Japan  not  to  take  possession  of  the  Liaotung  Peninsula. 
Backed  by  France  and  Germany,  she  intervened  with  a 
threat,  saying  that  Japan's  possession  of  the  peninsula 
would  he  a  "perpetual  obstacle  to  the  permanent  peace  of  the 
Far  East."  -^^  Japan,  under  this  pressure,  gave  up  the 
peninsula  to  China.  She  relinquished  all  her  claim  Novem- 
ber 8,  1895,  for  a  consideration  of  30,000,000  taels.  This 
was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War — It  was 
another  wound  to  Japanese  pride  that  was  to  be  avenged 
later  at  the  expense  of  Russia.  It  simply  hastened  the 
struggle,  however,  for  war,  sooner  or  later,  was  inevitable. 

"As  Hazen  gives  it,  "The  immediate  cause  was  the  relations  of  the 
two  powers  to  Korea." 

"The  Recommendation  is  as  follows:  "The  imperial  Russian  Govern- 
ment having  examined  the  terms  of  peace  demanded  by  Japan  of  China, 
consider  the  contemplated  possession  of  the  Liaotung  peninsula  by- 
Japan  will  not  only  constitute  a  constant  menace  to  the  capital  of  China, 
but  will  also  render  the  independence  of  Korea  illusory,  and  thus  jeop- 
ardize the  permanent  peace  of  the  Far  East.  Accordingly,  the  Imperial 
Government,  in  a  spirit  of  cordial  friendship  for  Japan,  hereby  counsel 
the  Government  of  the  Emperor  of  Japan  to  renounce  the  definitive 
possession  of  the  Liaotung  peninsula.     Lawrence,  p.  11. 

"  "The  insincerity  of  the  powers  in  talking  about  the  integrity  of 
China  and  the  peace  of  the  East  was  not  long  in  manifesting  itself. 
The  intervening  powers  immediately  set  about  reaping  their  reward. 
Russia  secured  the  right  to  run  the  eastern  end  of  the  Trans-Siberian 
railroad  across  Manchuria,  a  province  of  China,  to  Vladivostock,  and 
to  construct  a  branch  line  south  from  Harbin  into  the  Liaotung  penin- 
sula, with  a  terminus  at  Talienwan.  At  the  end  of  a  certain  time,  and 
under  certain  conditions  this  railroad  was  to  pass  into  the  possession 
of  China,  but  meanwhile  Russia  was  given  the  right  to  send  her  own 
soldiers  into  Manchuria  to  guard  it.  This  was  the  beginning  of  Russian 
control  of  Manchuria.  She  poured  tens  of  thousands  of  troops  into  that 
Chinese  province  and  gradually  acted  as  if  it  were  Russian.  She  also 
acquired  extensive  mineral  and  timber  rights  in  the  province.  Hazen, 
"Europe  Since  1815,"  p.  697. 


Ccuiises  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (1904)         85 

The  establishment  of  the  Russo-Chinese  bank  was  another 
event  which  offended  Japan.  The  treaty  of  1896  between 
China  and  Russia  opened  up  all  the  harbors  of  China  to 
Russia. 

In  January,  1898,  she  got  control  of  the  Liaotung  Penin- 
sula for  twenty-five  years  through  pressure  and  a  threat  of 
war  on  England  if  England  refused  it.  In  the  words  of  Mr. 
Rose,  "Port  Arthur  was  to  become  the  Gibraltar  of  the  Far 
East."  11  What  did  this  mean?  ^^  It  meant  that  the  Czar 
of  Russia  had  compelled  China  to  cede  to  his  already  enor- 
mous empire  the  very  peninsula  whose  acquisition  by  "little 
Japan,"  had  been  pronounced  by  the  European  powers  to 
be  an  unwarrantable  disturbance  of  the  balance  of  power  in 
the  East.  No  greater  insult  could  have  been  given  the 
Japanese  government  and  people. ^^  There  is  no  questioning 
the  fact  that  mis-government  in  Korea  was  a  real  menace  to 
the  peace  of  the  East.  By  the  natural  course  of  events  it 
would  offer  a  ready  prey  to  Russia  whenever  she  should 
choose  to  lay  hands  on  it. 

For  a  long  time  in  Japan  there  had  been  a  strong  waf 
party  in  favor  of  overrunning  Korea  and  repeatedly  with 
difficulty  it  was  kept  down. 

The  Queen  of  Korea,  in  1895,  believed  that  the  welfare 
of  her  country  depended  on  continued  association  with  China 
and  the  preservation  of  Chinese  standards  of  civilization. 

The  Japanese  became  complicated  in  her  murder,  October, 
1895.     The  king  took  refuge  in  Russian  legation  at  Seol 

"  Rose,  II,  p.  317. 

""That  Russia  did  not  look  upon  her  possession  as  merely  a  short 
lease,  but  as  a  permanent  one,  was  unmistakably  shown  by  her  conduct. 
She  constructed  a  railroad  south  from  Harbin,  connecting  with  the 
Trans-Siberian.  She  threw  thousands  of  troops  into  Manchuria;  she 
set  about  immensely  strengthening  Port  Arthur  as  a  fortress,  and  a 
considerable  fleet  was  stationed  there.  To  the  Japanese  all  this  seemed 
to  prove  that  she  supposed  ultimately  to  annex  the  immense  province  of 
Manchuria,  and  later  probably  Korea,  which  would  give  her  a  large 
number  of  ice-free  harbors  and  place  her  in  a  dominant  position  on  the 
Pacific,  menacing,  the  Japanese  felt,  the  very  existence  of  Japan." — Rose. 

"Rose,  II,  p.  317. 


86  The  Causes  Of  War 

and  Japan  had  a  terrible  indemnity  to  pay,  for  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war  had  this  murder  as  a  remote  cause.  Russian 
influence  had  taken  the  place  of  the  Japanese  and  all  that 
Japan  had  done  in  the  past  was  undone.  Korea  was  rapidly 
becoming  a  Russian  possession  when  the  Russo-Japanese  war 
broke  out  and  Japan  thus  recovered  her  control  over 
Korea.^* 

Japan  now  realized,  if  never  before,  the  ultimate  object 
of  Russia  and  that  war  was  the  only  recourse  left  to  the 
island  nation,  if  she  was  to  be  an  important  factor  in  Oriental 
aff^airs.^^ 


"In  1898  an  agreement  was  signed  by  Russia  and  Japan  which  put 
Japan  on  an  equal  footing  with  Russia  and  Korea.  But  rivalry  between 
the  two  nations,  Russia  and  Japan,  continued  and  Russia  undoubtedly 
was  the  aggressor.  Russia  pressed  continually  for  further  leases  in  the 
country.  This  was  a  source  of  great  anxiety  to  Japan.  Russian  soldiers 
were  actually  occupying  the  country,  not  simply  protecting  Russian 
interests.  "The  unconditional  and  permanent  occupation  of  Manchuria 
by  Russia  would  create  a  state  of  things  prejudicial  to  the  security  and 
interests  of  Japan.  If  Russia  was  established  on  the  flank  of  Korea  it 
would  be  a  constant  menace  to  the  separate  existence  of  that  empire. 
Korea  is  an  important  outpost  of  Japan's  line  of  defense,  and  Japan 
considers  her  independence  absolutely  essential  to  her  own  repose  and 
safety."  Hershey,  pp.  52-3,  quoting  from  correspondence  between  Japan 
and  Russia,  translated  by  Asakawa,  p.  29. 

"  As  Lawrence  remarks,  "It  is  a  matter  of  life  and  death  for  Japan 
to  keep  Korea  out  of  the  hands  of  any  strong  and  aggressive  state. 
F.  J.  Lawrence,  "War  and  Neutrality  in  the  Far  East,"  p.  1. 

Russia  was  disposed  to  maintain  that  the  question  of  negotiation 
between  her  and  China  concerning  Manchuria  and  Korea  were  not  of  a 
nature  to  be  submitted  to  other  nations.  In  fairness  to  her  it  must  be 
conceded  that  there  was  some  ground  for  Russian  position  and  attitude 
in  the  Far  East,  and  for  her  delay  in  withdrawing  her  troops  from 
Manchuria.  This,  however,  does  not  excuse  her  for  repeated  breaches 
of  trust  with  China  and  the  other  powers  concerned.  The  Russian  posi- 
tion is  perhaps  nowhere  better  stated  than  by  Count  Lansdorff  (on  27th 
of  January,  1902),  Sec.  Foreign  Relations,  1902,  p.  929.  He  says:  "The 
imperial  government  of  Russia  has  no  intention  of  dealing  a  blow  to 
the  principle  of  the  'open  door'  as  she  imderstands  it,  and  Russia  has 
not  the  least  intention,  at  this  moment  to  modify  her  political  stand  on 
this  point.  If  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  should  obtain  concessions  in 
China,  the  agreement  of  a  private  character  relative  to  those  concessions 
would  not  l^  different  from  those  concluded  at  other  times  by  many 
other  foreign  corporations.  But,  would  it  not  be  truly  strange  if  the 
Door  which  is  opened  to  certain  nations  were  closed  to  Russia,  whose 


Causes  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (1904)         ST 

Articles  were  now  prepared  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment as  the  basis  of  understanding.  The  essential  features 
were: 

1.  A  mutual  engagement  to  respect  the  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Chinese  and  Korean  empires, 
and  to  maintain  the  "open  door"  in  these  countries,  and  2,  a 
reciprocal  recognition  of  Japan's  preponderating  interests  in 
Korea  and  of  Russia's  special  interests  in  Manchuria. 

Russia's  reply  after  eight  weeks  was  substantially  as  fol- 
lows: 

1.  The  mutual  engagement  to  respect  the  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Korean  Empire. 

2.  Recognition  by  Russia  of  Japan's  preponderating 
interest  in  Korea. 

3.  Recognition  of  the  right  of  Japan  to  send  troops  to 
Korea. 

4.  Mutual  engagement  to  consider  that  part  of  the  ter- 

f rentiers  join  those  of  Manchuria,  when  she  has  been  forced  by  recent 
events  to  send  her  troops  into  this  province  to  reestablish  order  in  the 
evident  and  common  interest  of  all  nations?  It  is  true  that  Russia  has 
conquered  Manchuria,  but  she  maintains  her  firm  determination  to 
restore  it  to  China  and  to  recall  her  troops  as  soon  as  the  necessary 
measures  are  taken  to  avoid  an  outbreak  of  trouble  in  the  neighboring 
territories.  It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  an  independent  state  has  the 
right  to  accord  to  others  such  concessions,  and  I  have  some  reason  to 
believe  that  the  demands  of  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  do  not  exceed — 
those  which  have  been  so  often  formulated  by  other  foreign  Societies. 
I  judge  that,  in  these  circumstances,  it  would  not  be  easy  for  the  im- 
perial government  to  refuse  to  Russian  societies — that  which  is  given 
by  other  governments  to  Societies  and  syndicates  of  their  own  nation- 
ality."— M.  Rey,  in  Causes  of  Russo-Japanese  War  in  Revue  General 
De  Droit  International  Public,  XII,  267. 

"Russia  was  not  disposed  to  abandon  Manchuria  and  it  was  manifest 
that  she  was  seeking  only  pretexts  for  putting  off  the  date  of  evacua- 
tion."—Rey,  p.  276. 

La  Russe  h'a  pas  le  droit  d'abandonner  ses  interests  en  Manchourie 
et  ne  pent  soitir  de  la  voie  qu'elle  s'est  trac'ee.  Elle  ne  pourra  retirer 
ses  troupes  de  Manchourie  que  lorsqu  elle  sera  convaincue  qu'il  n'existe 
plus  de  danger  pour  ses  possessions  et  commencera  le  peuplement  de  la 
zone  de  son  cheinen  de  fer  guand  elle  le  jugera  a  propor. — Rey,  p.  276, 
French  translation  of  one  of  the  many  official  Russian  statements  on 
this  affair. 


88  The  Causes  Of  War 

ritory  of  Korea  lying  to  the  north  of  the  thirty-ninth  parallel 
as  a  neutral  zone  into  which  neither  of  the  contracting 
parties  shall  introduce  troops. 

6.  Recognition  by  Japan  of  Manchuria  and  its  littoral 
as  in  all  respects  outside  her  sphere  of  interests. 

In  the  meantime,  Russia's  aggression,  both  in  Manchuria 
and  Korea,  was  increasing  daily. 

The  Boxer  uprising  in  China  in  1900  "added  fresh  causes 
of  quarrel  to  those  already  in  existence."  The  Chinese 
authorities  in  Manchuria  attacked  the  "foreign"  Russian 
officials  and  settlers  there.  In  a  very  short  time  the  whole 
province  was  in  Russian  military  occupation. 

"It  will  thus  be  seen  that  in  these  counter-proposals  Rus- 
sia not  only  reduced  Japan's  demands  regarding  Korea,  but 
imposed  new  conditions  upon  Japan  in  that  country.  But — 
most  significant  of  all — she  quietly  ignored  the  most  im- 
portant part  of  Article  I  of  the  Japanese  proposals,  viz., 
that  part  which  stipulated  for  a  mutual  agreement  to  re- 
spect the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  the 
Chinese  Empire  and  to  maintain  the  'open  door'  in  China  and 
Korea,"  ^^  .  .  .  "if  not  indeed  to  preserve  her  status  as  an 
independent  state  for  the  future. 

"It  became  to  her  as  clear  as  daylight  that  the  new  po- 
sition she  had  acquired  in  the  Orient  by  her  victory  over 
China  could  be  maintained  and  even  her  independence  must 
be  guarded  only  by  an  armament  powerful  enough  to  give 
her  a  voice  among  the  first  powers  of  the  world."^'' 

Russia's  methods  were  practically  without  scruple.  Neither 
the  Russian  Court  nor  the  officials  and  army  in  Manchuria 
and  Korea  could  be  relied  on  for  the  fulfillment  of  their 
promises  to  China,  Japan,  Korea  or  any  of  the  European 
nations.  She  withdrew  her  troops  from  the  southwest  of 
Mukden  province  by  October  8,  190S.     On  the  date  set  for 

"  Hershey,  International  Law  and  Diplomacy  of  Russo-Japanese  War, 
p.  56. 

^^  Idem,  p.  9.  Quoted  from  Asakana's  "The  Russo-Jap.  Conflict,"  pp. 
79-80. 


Causes  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  (lOOJt,)  89 

her  withdrawal  from  the  remainder  of  the  province,  how- 
ever, April  8,  1903,  she  was  still  in  fuU  occupancy  and  it 
was  evident  that  not  even  a  nominal  withdrawal  was  in- 
tended.^i« 

Russia's  persistent  failure  in  the  face  of  repeated  promises 
to  withdraw  her  troops  from  China  after  the  Boxer  upris- 
ing led  directly,  we  may  say,  to  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
with  Japan. ^^ 

"The  inspiring  force  which  moved  some  40,000  men  gladly 
to  lay  down  their  lives  on  the  hills  around  Port  Arthur  was 
the  feeling  that  they  were  helping  to  hurl  back  in  the  face 
of  Russia,  the  gauntlet  which  she  had  there  so  insolently 
flung  down  as  to  an  inferior  race."^^ 

Russia's  demands  of  China  in  1903,  among  other  things, 
included  the  closing  of  Manchuria  against  the  economic  en- 
terprises of  all  foreigners  except  Russians  and  the  opening 
of  no  new  treaty-ports  without  Russia's  consent.^^ 

The  final  year  of  negotiation  (1904)  had  come.  After 
three  successive  overtures  of  the  Japanese  government  to 
Russia,  the  views  of  the  two  governments  were  apparently 
as  irreconcilable  as  ever.  Japan  made  still  a  fourth  at- 
tempt to  obtain  a  favorable  reply  from  Russia,  and  its  pro- 
visions were  as  follows: 

1.  Suppression  of  the  clause  (in  Article  5)  requiring 
Japan  not  to  use  any  part  of  Korea  for  strategical  pur- 
poses. 

2.  Suppression  of  the  whole  Article  (6)  concerning  the 
establishment  of  a  neutral  zone. 

3.  Recognition  by  Japan  of  Manchuria  and  its  littoral 
as  being  outside  her  sphere  of  interest,  provided  that  Rus- 
sia will  engage  (a)  to  respect  the  territorial  integrity  of 
China  and  Manchuria,  (b)  to  recognize  the  treaty  rights, 
including  those  of  the  settlement  of  Japan  and  other  Powers 

"Hershey,  Int.  Law  &  Dip.  of  Russo-Jap.  War,  pp.  33-4. 
"See  Rose,  pp.  318-19. 
»«Rose,  p.  319. 
*^  Idem,  p.  35. 


90  The  Causes  Of  War 

in  Manchuria,  (c)  to  recognize  Korea  and  its  littoral  as  be- 
ing outside  her  sphere  of  interest. 

4.  Recognition  bj  Japan  of  Russia's  special  interests  in 
Manchuria,  and  of  the  right  of  Russia  to  take  measures 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  those  interests. 

The  Russian  reply  to  this  last  proposal  of  Japan  was  not 
returned  until  Feb.  7,  1904,  the  day  after  diplomatic  rela- 
tions between  the  two  countries  had  ceased.  Thus  we  see 
that  Russia's  persistent  delay  in  withdrawing  her  troops 
from  Chinese  territory  in  the  year  after  the  Boxer  uprising 
led  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war, 

Japan  "had  expended  much  blood  and  treasure  in  order  to 
secure  a  predominating  interest  in  the  Korean  peninsula. 
.  .  .  The  rapid  growth  of  Russian  power  in  the  Pacific 
coasts,  the  enforced  cession  of  Saghalien  in  1875,  and  of  the 
Liaotung  Peninsula  with  the  hard-won  Port  Arthur  20 
years  later,  had  aroused  profound  distrust  of  Russian  poli- 
cies in  the  minds  of  Japanese  statesmen."  ^^ 

Without  attempting  to  give  all  the  factors  that  bore  upon 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities  between  Russia  and  Japan,  we 
may  reduce  the  fundamental  causes  of  the  war  to  two,  viz. : 
(1)  Russia's  determination  to  secure  if  possible,  an  ice-free 
port  on  the  Pacific,  with  Russian  control  of  Manchuria  and 
Korea — mainly  a  political  interest;  (2)  Japan's  equal  de- 
termination that  this  should  not  be  accomplished — mainly 
an  economic  interest  and  question  of  ultimate  self-preserva- 
tion. 

«C.  M.  Hist.,  XII,  p.  577. 


CHAPTER  X 

CAUSES  OF  THE  BRITISH-BOER  WAR 

THE  American   press  and  people  in  general  have  been 
inclined  to  lay  the  blame  of  this  war  almost  entirely  on 
the  British.^     They  have  done  this  more  or  less  blindly, 

*  British  occupation  of  South  Africa  began  in  1806,  when  Cape  Town 
was  surrendered  to  the  English.  In  the  London  Convention  of  1814,  the 
Dutch  surrendered  to  the  English  Crown  their  claims  to  Cape  Colony 
and  some  other  adjacent  territory,  for  a  consideration  of  £6,000,000  ster- 
ling. British  immigration  to  South  Africa  began  about  the  year  1819. 
In  1825  an  Executive  Council  was  appointed  to  assist  the  Governor  of 
the  colony.  In  1828  the  Hottentots  received  equal  rights  in  the  law 
(courts)  with  the  Europeans.  In  the  years  1833-5  the  abolition  of 
slavery  was  accomplished.  This  was  accompanied  by  disturbances  that 
assumed  serious  proportions.  Discontent  with  the  British  rule  had  not 
been  wholly  lacking  before;  as  a  result  of  the  liberties  given  them  in 
1828,  the  Hottentots  had  broken  loose  from  several  restraints  imposed 
upon  them  formerly,  by  the  English  administration;  there  had  been 
considerable  friction  before  the  Dutch  were  ready  to  surrender  Cape 
Colony,  in  1814;  but  these  were  as  nothing  compared  with  the  storm  that 
arose  in  1834.  "The  great  wrong  which  stirred  the  Dutch  to  the  depths 
was  the  abolition  of  slavery  by  Great  Britain  in  1834."  Green:  **Causes 
of  South  African  War,"  p.  5.  And  Doyle,  who  has  written  perhaps  the 
best  account  of  the  causes  and  events  leading  up  to  the  final  war,  says: 
"The  emancipation  of  slaves  in  1834  fanned  the  smouldering  discontents 
into  a  flame."     Doyle:    "The  War  in  South  Africa,"  p.  5. 

There  were  two  reasons  for  this  outburst,  (1)  A  very  inadequate  sum 
was  appropriated  for  the  slave-owners  in  return  for  the  loss  of  their 
slaves.  (2)  The  money  was  paid  over  in  London,  and  because  of  this 
fact,  the  colonists  received  but  little  of  it.  This  worked  a  real  hardship 
to  the  Boer  farmers.  It  meant  beggary  to  a  number  of  them.  The  war 
of  1834-5,  waged  by  the  British  against  the  Kaffirs,  was  very  unjust  to 
the  latter,  and  they  were  almost  immediately  restored  to  their  former 
homes.  Many  of  the  Boer  farmers  now  determined  to  leave  the  colony, 
and  migrate  farther  inland,  away  from  the  domination  of  the  British. 
The  first  trek  was  in  1836.  The  long  journey,  with  its  perils  and  hard- 
ships, broke  up  all  local  self-government  and  the  science  of  cooking,  etc., 
and  put  these  Boers  back  into  their  medieval  ancestral  type  of  govern- 
ment and  individual  liberty.  This  backward  step  in  civilization  is  no 
small  factor  in  explaining  the  failure  of  the  British  to  conciliate  the 
Boers,  and  the  gradual  growth  of  a  hostile  spirit  that  was  to  culminate 
in  war  of  the  two  races. 

In  1848  Sir  Harry  Smith  was  sent  out  as  Governor  of  the  Colony.    He 

91 


92  The  Causes  Of  War 

through  prejudice,  or  without  a  sufficient  knowledge  of  the 
facts.  There  are  not  lacking,  however,  in  this  country  as  well 
as  in  England,  eminent  authorities  who  justify  for  the  most 
part,  if  not  altogether,  England's  action  and  policy  in  South 
Africa.  Indeed,  opinion  seems  to  be  pretty  evenly  divided, 
among  those  who  are  in  a  position  to  judge  wisely  and  im- 
partially. Green,  in  his  "Causes  of  the  War  in  South 
Africa,"  is  decidedly  favorable  to  Great  Britain.  He  con- 
tends and  rightly,  that  the  rule  of  Great  Britain  was  a 
distinct  advance  and  uplift  for  the  Boers  as  weU  as  the 
natives;  that  the  Boer  and  not  the  English  administration 
was  the  oppressor  of  the  natives,  and  that  it  was  liberty  only 
for  himself  that  the  Boer  sought ;  Doyle,^  who  can  hardly  be 
denied  the  merit  of  making  a  studied  attempt  to  be  fair  and 
unprejudiced  in  his  account,  feels  that  it  is  his  duty  as 
well  as  his  right,  to  defend  his  country  against  much  of  the 
abuse  that  has  been  heaped  upon  it,  and  to  vindicate  for  the 
most  part,  her  policy.  Among  other  things  he  says :  "That 
to  no  one  of  the  British  states  has  she  ever  had  a  more 

declared  the  area  between  the  Orange  and  Vaal  rivers  British  Territory. 
This  led  to  war.  England  was  victorious,  but  had  to  give  up  the  Orange 
River  Sovereignty,  because  the  Home  government  did  not  sufficiently 
support  the  Governor.  Sir  Geo.  Grey  was  the  next  governor,  1854-9. 
His  was  a  wise  rule.  The  franchise  was  made  liberal  and  representative 
government  was  established.  Meanwhile,  the  Boer  government  in  the 
Transvaal  had  become  very  chaotic.  Finances  were  in  a  deplorable 
condition.  The  people  were  oppressively  taxed.  However,  in  1857  the 
Transvaal  Republic  was  launched.  This  was  followed  by  civil  war, 
which  dragged  on  for  some  time.  In  1871  the  discovery  of  diamonds 
and  the  foundation  of  Kimberly  opened  a  new  era  for  this  troublesome 
and  disputed  territory.  The  year  1872  marks  the  beginning  of  respon- 
sible government  in  the  original  Cape  Colony  of  South  Africa.  Cecil 
Rhodes  came  over  in  1871. 

Diamond  region  (around  Kimberly)  was  claimed  by  (1)  Orange  Free 
State;  (2)  Transvaal  Republic;  (3)  an  individual,  named  Waterboer. 
Waterboer  placed  himself  under  the  British  government,  which  pres- 
ently erected  the  country  into  a  crown  colony  (in  1871).  Later  investi- 
gations found  that  Waterboer  had  never  enjoyed  any  right  to  the  terri- 
tory. The  British  government,  claiming  that  a  strong  power  was  neces- 
sary to  preserve  the  peace  and  govern  the  people  offered  the  Free  State 
£90,000  sterling  for  its  claim  to  the  colony.  This  was  accepted,  and 
the  controversy  was  closed,  although  a  sense  of  unjustice  continued  to 
rankle  in  the  breasts  of  many  of  its  citizens.     Bryce,  pp.  148-49. 

'Doyle,  A.  C:    "The  War  in  South  Africa." 


Causes  of  the  British-Boer  War  93 

incontestible  right/'  than  to  this,  both  by  the  right  of  con- 
quest and  the  right  of  purchase ;  that  England  had  the  same 
kind  of  a  problem  the  United  States  would  have  had  if  the 
Dutch  of  Pennsylvania  had  moved  West  and  set  up  a  differ- 
ent form  of  government  from  that  of  the  United  States,  and 
United  States  had  come  in  contact  with  this  foreign  govern- 
ment in  her  westward  expansion.  Mr.  James  Bryce,  whose 
opinion  always  carries  weight  and  merits  the  greatest  con- 
sideration, while  admitting  on  the  one  hand  evils  of  the  Eng- 
lish rule,  her  many  mistakes  and  blunders,  on  the  other  hand 
in  the  general  policy  and  administration  of  the  English 
rule,  justifies  his  government.  He  states  that  the  Boers  had 
gone  backward  in  civilization;  were  separated  for  two  cen- 
turies from  European  culture  and  political  systems;  that 
they  would  not  work  the  gold  when  they  found  it,  had  an 
aversion  for  commerce,  industrial  pursuits,  and  finance,  and 
absolute  incapacity  for  such  pursuits ;  that  into  this  con- 
dition it  was  that  there  came  the  swarm  of  gold-seekers  after 
1884.  Sanderson,  another  English  author,  while  excusing  his 
country  still  less  than  Bryce,  still  cannot  lay  the  blame  of 
the  war  upon  his  government,  although  he  does  hold  Cecil 
Rhodes  somewhat  responsible. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  both  moderate  and  violent 
partisans  of  the  Boers'  cause  and  actions.  Of  the  former 
class  the  French  author  Despagnet  is  a  good  example.  He 
dismisses  from  the  very  first  any  of  the  alleged  grievances 
of  the  British  as  real  causes  of  the  war.  On  what  he  con- 
siders as  the  fundamental  cause,  he  comments  as  follows : 

"It  is  in  the  general  schemes  of  English  politics  for  several 
years  that  we  are  to  seek  the  true  motives  of  the  war  and 
this  war  itself  is  only  one  manifestation,  the  most  grave  it  is 
true,  of  the  end  pursued  by  Great  Britain  since  she  has 
become  dominated  by  aspirations  of  quasi-universal  sia- 
premacy  disguised  under  the  name  of  imperialism.*'  T\m 
very  expression  is  used  by  another  Frenchman  (Peyronnard) 
in  his  "Des  Causes  de  la  Ghaeire,  quoted  fr.  R.  G.   C  I, 


94  The  Causes  Of  War 

VII,  p.  85.  It  is  his  opinion  that  the  war  was  not 
only  not  justified  by  any  of  the  alleged  grievances,  but  not 
even  explained  by  them.  Continuing,  he  says :  "Is  it,  then, 
a  war  of  races : — that  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  against  the  Dutch 
in  South  Africa?"  "No!"  answers  Mr.  Westlake:  "It  is  a 
war  for  an  ideal."  That  ideal  is  the  English  policy  of  lib- 
eral government,  of  equality  of  rights  to  all  as  against  the 
Boer  regime  of  domination  and  privilege.^  (The  author 
[Despagnet]  gives  it  as  his  view  that  it  can  hardly  be  be- 
lieved that  England  would  go  into  such  a  war  merely  for  an 
ideal.) 

Another  claim  of  some  English  authors  is — according  to 
Despagnet^ — that.  Great  Britain,  having  once  acquired  au- 
thority in  certain  regions,  finds  herself  obligated  to  de- 
fend the  interests  which  she  has  developed  there,  and  it  is 
natural  and  just  that  the  neighboring  districts  become  tribu- 
tary to  her,  because  they  will  grow  normally  or  naturally 
into  the  sphere  of  her  influence. 

The  real  policy  he  insists  is  found  in  the  triumph  of  the 
imperialistic  idea  in  England  and  the  principal  cause  of  the 
war  is  the  pressure  of  financiers  and  speculators  engaged  in 
the  gold  mines.  He  holds  D'Israeli  chiefly  responsible  for  the 
imperialism-political  evolution  as  he  designates  it,  of  Eng- 
land, that  brought  on  her  conquests  in  South  Africa. 

The  German  press  and  people,  as  we  would  naturally  ex- 
pect, were  rather  violently  opposed  to  Great  Britain  in  this 
war.  The  extreme  sentiment  is  voiced  by  the  historian,  Theo- 
dore Monsen,  in  giving  what  he  considers  as  the  feeling  in 
Germany  toward  England,  and  particularly  on  the  British- 
Boer  War.     Among  other  things  he  says: 

"The  radical  defects  of  the  English  system,  the  trampling 
on  nations  subjugated  and  despised,  and  the  prevalence  of 
money  interests  .  .  .  has  become  too  evident ....  As  far 
as  I  know,  every  German  is  at  heart  with  the  Boers,  and 
that  not  because  their  cousinship  is  a  little  closer  than  the 
»See  Westlake,  The  Transvaal  War,  pp.  1  to  5. 


Causes  of  tJie  British-Boer  War  95 

English,  but  partly  because  the  hate  against  your  country- 
men has  reached  fearful  .  .  .  dimensions;  partly  because 
this  war  is  not  only  a  calamity  .  .  .  but  an  infamy."  What 
a  joke  this  statement  is,  considering  Germany's  treatment 
of  her  colonies ! 

In  our  study  of  the  motives  and  immediate  and  remote 
causes  of  this  war,  we  find  that  there  is  quite  a  complexity 
of  interests  and  provocations,  some  quite  vague  and  flimsy 
and  others  more  clearly  manifest  and  certain. 

It  is  Mr.  Doyle's  opinion  that  it  was  a  dangerous  ven- 
ture for  Great  Britain  to  change  the  habits  of  this  most 
conservative  Teutonic  stock  of  people.  If  she  had  not 
tried  this,  conciliation  might  have  succeeded  (beginning  with 
1814.)  He  holds  England  responsible  for  the  war  in  the 
following  respects : 

1.  Severe  and  injudicious  punishment  of  Dutch  farmers. 
Dutch  could  not  forget  it. 

2.  Emancipation  of  slaves,  1834,  "fanned  the  smolder- 
ing discontents  into  a  flame." 

3.  The  Boers  moved  into  Natal  to  get  away  from  the 
British,  but  when  they  got  there,  they  found  that  the  English 
had  preceded  them  in  occupation — by  sea.  An  unwelcome 
information  indeed.  (In  leaving  Natal,  the  Boers  left  what 
they  had  fought  the  fierce  Zulus  to  gain  and  could  not  leave 
it  but  with  a  sense  of  deep  injury  to  themselves.) 

4.  Delay  in  promised  reforms  after  the  annexation  (in 
1877)  and  an  unsuitable  governor,^ — Sir  Owen  Lanyon. 

Montague  White,  former  Consul  General  of  South  Afri- 
can Republic  in  London,  classifies  the  causes  of  the  English- 
Boer  War  substantially  as  follows: 

1.  Discontented  and  irreconcilable  element  in  Johannes- 
burg— one  of  the  most  important  factors. 

2.  Conservative  Dutch  farmers  intensified  in  their  re- 

*  On  the  conduct  of  the  Boers  as  a  republic,  he  says:  "Can  it  be  won- 
dered at,  that  South  Africa  has  been  in  a  ferment  ever  since,  and  that 
tine  Britkh  Africander  has  yearned  with  an  intensity  of  feeling  unknown 
in  England  for  the  hour  of  revenge?" 


96  The  Causes  Of  War 

sistance  by  65  years  of  bitter  experience  with  Great  Britain. 

3.  Sudden  inrush  of  a  mining,  commercial  and  speculative 
community. 

4.  Clumsy  diplomacy. 

5.  Greed  for  gold-capitalism. 

6.  Lust  for  empire  (yellow  press  of  London  its  mouth- 
piece). 

7.  Thirst  of  revenge — remembering  defeats  and  outrages 
upon  Englishmen.— N.  A.  Rev.  170 :  225-fF. 

Captain  Mahan,  U.  S.  N.  (N.  A.  Rev.  170,  pp.  313-4), 
in  discussing  the  causes  of  the  English-Boer  War,  holds  Eng- 
land responsible  in  two  respects,  viz. : 

1.  Her  insistence  that  a  large  alien  population  in  the 
Transvaal  be  relieved  from  grievous  political  and  social 
wrongs. 

2.  England^s  claim  of  the  right  of  suzerainty  in  this 
matter. 

Causes  of  the  war  in  South  Africa  are  classified  by  Mr. 
Green  as  follows: 

British  rulers  in  various  ways  annoyed  the  old  inhabitants, 
as  for  example — 

1.  The  injudicious  introducing  of  English  language 
prematurely  into  the  courts  and  public  offices  before  the 
people  were  able  to  understand  it. 

2.  Their  early  military  rule  was  sometimes  arbitrary. 

3.  Missionaries  were  a  constant  source  of  trouble  to 
the  Boers  because  they  taught  the  natives  the  equality  of 
all  men  before  the  law,  and  since  they  were  the  only  friends 
the  poor  blacks  had,  they  made  it  a  point  of  conscience  to 
report  to  London  every  act  of  injustice  which  came  to  their 
knowledge. 

4.  The  gteat  wrong  which  stirred  the  Dutch  to  the 
depths  was  the  abolition  of  slavery  by  Great  Britain  in 
1834— 

a.  Insufficient  compensation  for  them. 

b.  Paid  over  in  London  so  that  colonists  received 


Comes  of  the  BritishrBoer  War  97 

but  little  of  it  and  this  meant  beggary  to  many  of  the 
colonists. 

The  Boers  held  that  emancipation  was  the  crowning 
wrong,  that  slavery  was  sanctioned  by  the  Old  Testament 
and  that  people  might  as  well  take  away  their  oxen  as  their 
slaves.  This  emancipation  and  squandering  of  the  slave- 
holders money  in  London  led  to  the  "Great  Trek"  in  1836. 

5.  Lack  of  tact  of  Great  Britain  in  annexing  Transvaal 
republics  in  1877.  Great  Britain  was  too  hasty  in  her  ac- 
tion. 

6.  Finally  the  indiscretion  of  Britain  with  regard  to 
Transvaal  independence.  Krugar  had  been  in  England  and 
had  heard  Gladstone  condemn  the  high-handed  annexation 
of  the  Transvaal.  When  Gladstone  came  into  power,  how- 
ever, he  allowed  the  annexation  to  remain  as  an  accomplished 
act.  The  Boers  were  bitterly  disappointed  in  his  action  and 
an  insurrection  followed,  in  which  the  Boers  won  many  noted 
victories.^  On  the  other  hand  we  have  the  Boer  injus- 
tices. .  .  . 

7.  Their  denial  of  fundamental  and  necessary  rights  and 
privileges  to  outlanders  such  as  water-supply,  sewerage, 
street  lights,  pavements  and  proper  police;  independent 
courts  of  justice ;  rights  to  plead  in  English ;  English  schools, 
etc.  These  Outlanders,  already  a  majority  ruled  by  a  tyran- 
nical and  ignorant  minority  of  Boers,  thus  led  to  the  for- 
mation of  the  Transvaal  National  Union,  the  object  of  which 
was  to  agitate  reform  in  1892. 

8.  The  Jameson  raid  in  1895  was  a  capital  blunder.  This 

'Internal  independence  was  restored  to  the  people  of  the  Transvaal 
in  1881  and  reaffirmed  in  1884.  The  British  in  South  Africa  were  indig- 
nant at  this  action  which  they  called  surrender  to  the  Boers.  They 
urged  complete  conquest  and  control  to  all  South  Africa  by  England. 
This  the  mother  country  had  scruples  against  doing,  and  seemed  in  the 
ever-increasing  probability  of  a  European  war,  to  be  unwilling  to  do. 
The  Boers  saw  nothing  in  this  action  but  cowardice  and  from  this  time 
on  they  treated  the  British  government  as  infamous,  planned  to  be 
wholly  independent  of  them  and  to  drive  them  and  their  language  out 
of  all  South  Africa. 


98  The  Games  Of  War 

gave  Kniger  the  pretext  to  say  that  the  Union  and  even 
the  British  Cabinet  sought  to  gain  its  end  by  force  and 
not  by  reason.  It  alienated  the  sympathies  of  all  Dutch 
descent  throughout  South  Africa. 

9.  Green  is  very  emphatic  in  stating  that  this  was  a 
war  of  race  opposition  and  the  clash  of  the  two  civilizations. 
He  says,  "It  was  as  if  two  centuries  had  run  against  each 
other."  The  African  Dutchman  lived  a  different  life  from 
the  Europeans — and  as  a  consequence  there  was  no  fusion 
in  the  Transvaal. 

Professor  Naville  of  Geneva  considers  the  corrupting  ef- 
fect of  a  flood  of  wealth  that  came  without  labor  to  be  the 
chief  cause  of  the  war.  It  was,  at  least,  the  final  cause, 
though  not  the  greatest.  If  the  cause  just  mentioned  might 
have  been  eliminated,  there  would  not  have  been  the  two 
bitter  contending  forces  to  fly  at  each  other.  There  might 
have  been  a  blending  of  German  and  English,  as  there  was 
in  New  York. 

The  Causes  of  the  Final  Quarrel 

After  the  discovery  of  gold  in  abundance  in  1886,  there 
was  "not  a  wrong  which  had  driven  the  Boer  from  Cape 
Colony  which  he  did  not  now  practice  upon  the  Uitlanders. 
The  Pretoria  government,  for  example,  became  a  most  cor- 
rupt oligarchy. 

The  wrongs  of  the  Uitlanders  he  sums  up  as  follows : 

1.  Heavily  taxed,  they  provided  seven-eighths  of  the 
revenue  of  the  country. 

2.  Despite  this  prosperity  they  had  brought,  they  were 
deprived  of  the  right  to  vote  and  could  by  no  means  influ- 
ence the  disposal  of  the  great  sums  which  they  were  pro- 
viding. 

3.  Had  no  voice  in  choice  or  payment  of  officials.  Men 
of  the  worst  private  character  might  be  placed  with  com- 
plete authority  over  valuable  interests. 


Causes  of  the  British-Boer  War  99 

4.  Had  no  control  over  education — though  paid  the 
taxes. 

6.  No  power  of  municipal  government — very  unsanitary 
and  corrupt  cities. 

6.  Despotic  government  in  the  matter  of  the  press  and 
the  right  of  public  meetings. 

7.  Disability  from  service  upon  a  jury. 

8.  Continual  harassing  of  the  mining  interests  by  vexa- 
tious legislation. 

(a)  Dynamite  monopoly. 

(b)  Liquor  laws — Kaffirs  habitually  drunk. 

(c)  Incompetence   and  extortions   of   State-owned 
railroads. 

(d)  Surrounding    Johannesburg    with    tolls    from 
which  the  towns  had  no  profits,  etc.® 

Distinct  from  all  the  former  definite  wrongs,  it  was  a  con- 
stant irritation  to  freeborn  and  progressive  men,  accus- 
tomed to  liberal  institutions  that  they  should  be  despotically 
ruled  by  corrupt,  narrow-minded  bigots  and  buifoons,  as 
eighty  per  cent  of  their  rulers  were. 

In  defense  of  the  Boers  it  may  be  said  that  if  they  had 
allowed  the  Uitlanders  privileges  and  citizenship  they  would 
soon  have  usurped  the  government  and  they  themselves  would 
again  have  been  obliged  to  leave  their  homes  or  become  mere 
dependents. 

The  argument  of  the  Boers  would  be  more  valid  if  they 
had  received  no  benefit  from  the  incomers.  The  foreigners' 
thrift  made  the  Boers,  themselves,  rich.  "Had  President 
Kruger  given  the  franchise  generously  to  the  Uitlander,  his 
pyramid  would  have  been  firm  upon  its  base  and  not  balanced 
upon  its  apex." 

It  was  a  settled  animosity  of  Kruger  and  the  leading  Boers 
against  the  Uitlanders  and  the  British  in  general  that  pre- 

"The  salary  list  had  become  twenty-four  times  what  it  was  when  Uit- 
landers arrived,  and  five  times  the  total  revenue  then  in  1899. 


100  The  Causes  Of  War 

vented  any  compromise  or  understanding  with  them.  No 
little  part  of  this  was  due  moreover  to  sheer  ignorance  on 
the  part  of  the  Boers. 

Everyone  must  admit  that  Cecil  Rhodes,  in  his  zeal  for 
the  growth  of  the  British  power  in  South  Africa,  was  some- 
what unscrupulous  in  the  use  of  means  to  gain  that  power. 
"He  would  rather  carry  a  strong  position  by  storm  than 
trust  to  the  slower  and  safer  methods  of  investing  and  starv- 
ing out  the  foe."  "^  He  was  responsible  for  the  Jameson  Raid, 
in  1895,  which  is  the  blackest  spot  on  English  rule  in  South 
Africa,  and  did  more  than  anything  else  to  turn  all  the 
Dutch  descent  against  the  British  and  determine  to  drive 
them  out  of  Africa.  While  no  doubt  Jameson  went  in  (at 
that  moment)  without  his  authority,  Jameson's  work  was  a 
part  of  Rhodes'  larger  plan. 

Dr.  Jameson  took  matters  into  his  own  hands,  it  is  true. 
This  action,  however,  only  revealed  Rhodes'  deeper  scheme 
of  taking  away  the  independence  of  the  Transvaal  Republic. 
This  incident  "stopped  all  prospects  of  voluntary  reform  in 
Transvaal,  led  Orange  Free  State  into  active  sympathy  with 
her  and  plunged  all  South  Africa  into  a  turmoil  of  race 
hostility  which  culminated  finally  in  the  British-Boer  War. 

The  grievances  of  the  Uitlanders  became  heavier  than  ever 
after  the  Jameson  raid. 

A  petition  to  the  Queen  of  England,  signed  by  21,000  Uit- 
landers, was  now  gotten  up.  The  petition  was  answered 
and  the  war  and  final  crisis  came.  This  petition  reads  as 
follows : 

"The  condition  of  your  Majesty's  subjects  in  this  State 
has  indeed  become  well-nigh  intolerable. 

"The  acknowledged  and  admitted  grievances  of  which  your 
Majesty's  subjects  complained  prior  to  1895,  not  only  are 
not  redressed,  but  exists  today  in  an  aggravated  form.  They 
are  still  deprived  of  all  political  rights,  they  are  denied  any 
voice  in  the  government  of  the  country,  they  are  taxed  far 
^Sanderson,  p.  284. 


Catises  of  the  British'-'Boi^r  ]Wur/,^'\\]i  \\^^i:. 

above  the  requirements  of  the  country,  the  revenue  of  which 
is  misapplied  and  devoted  to  objects  which  keep  alive  a  con- 
tinuous and  well-founded  feeling  of  irritation,  without  in 
any  way  advancing  the  general  interest  of  the  State.  Mal- 
administration and  peculation  of  public  moneys  go  hand-in- 
hand,  without  any  vigorous  measures  being  adopted  to  put  a 
stop  to  the  scandal.  The  education  of  Uitlander  children  is 
made  subject  to  impossible  conditions.  The  police  afford  no 
adequate  protection  to  the  lives  and  property  of  the  in- 
habitants of  Johannesburg;  they  are  rather  a  source  of 
danger  to  the  peace  and  safety  of  the  Uitlander  population. 

"A  further  grievance  has  become  prominent  since  the  be- 
ginning of  the  year.  The  power  vested  in  the  Government  by 
means  of  the  Public  Meetings  Act  has  been  a  menace  to 
Your  Majesty's  subjects  since  the  enactment  of  the  Act  in 
1894.  This  power  has  now  been  applied  in  order  to  deliver 
a  blow  that  strikes  at  the  inherent  and  inalienable  birth- 
right of  every  British  subject  in,  namely,  his  right  to  peti- 
tion his  Sovereign.  Straining  to  the  utmost  the  language 
and  intention  of  the  law,  the  Government  has  arrested  two 
British  subjects  who  assisted  in  presenting  a  petition  to 
Your  Majesty  on  behalf  of  four  thousand  fellow-subjects. 
Not  content  with  this,  the  Government,  when  Your  Majesty's 
loyal  subjects  again  attempted  to  lay  their  grievances  be- 
fore Your  Majesty,  permitted  their  meeting  to  be  broken 
up,  and  the  objects  of  it  to  be  defeated,  by  a  body  of  Boers, 
organized  by  Government  officials  and  acting  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  police.  By  reason,  therefore,  of  the  direct  as 
well  as  the  indirect  act  of  the  Government,  Your  Majesty's 
loyal  subjects  have  been  prevented  from  publicly  ventilating 
their  grievances,  and  from  laying  them  before  Your  Ma- 
jesty. 

"Wherefore  Your  Majesty's  humble  petitioners  humbly  be- 
seech Your  Most  Gracious  Majesty  to  extend  Your  Ma- 
jesty's protection  to  Your  Majesty's  loyal  subjects,  resident 
in  this  State,  and  to  cause  an  inquiry  to  be  made  into 


i(^.  TJw  Causes  Of  War 

grievances  and  complaints  enumerated  and  set  forth  in  this 
humble  petition  and  to  direct  Your  Majesty's  representative 
in  South  Africa  to  take  measures  which  will  insure  the  speedy 
reform  of  the  abuses  complained  of,  and  to  obtain  substantial 
guarantees  from  the  Government  of  this  State  for  the  rec- 
ognition of  their  rights  as  British  subjects."  ^ 

With  regard  to  the  government  of  South  Africa  by  the 
British,  it  is  a  fair  statement  of  the  situation  to  say  that 
while  a  few  of  the  governors  were  arbitrary  and  narrow  and 
bigoted,  most  of  them  were  not.  The  local  administration  on 
the  whole  was  quite  efficient.  In  1877,  the  South  African  Re- 
public was  annexed  to  the  British  Crown  by  Sir  Theophilus 
Shepstone.  The  majority  of  the  Boers  were  against  this,  but 
seeing  its  advantages,  would  have  become  reconciled,  had  not 
the  English  government  followed  it  up,  as  Mr.  Bryce  says, 
with  three  "capital  blunders":  (1)  Failure  to  grant  the 
local  autonomy  Shepstone  had  promised.  (The  Volksraad 
was  never  convoked,  the  constitution  was  never  promul- 
gated.) (2)  The  selection  of  a  successor  to  Shepstone, — a 
military  officer  who  was  personally  very  unpopular,  would 
not  "mix"  with  the  Boers,  and  was  wholly  incapable  of 
dealing  with  the  delicate  political  work  at  hand.  (3)  Re- 
moval of  the  two  native  dangers  the  Boers  had  feared:  (a) 
Extinguishing  of  the  Zulu  Kingdom;  (b)  Reduction  of 
Sikuhum's  strongholds  and  establishment  of  peace  in  the 
northeast, 

*A11  over  South  Africa  was  heard  the  one  cry  of  oppression  by  the 
Boer  government,  and  that  those  who  would  be  free  must  themselves 
strike  the  first  blow.  That  war  was  at  hand,  that  arms  were  stored  away 
for  that  purpose  and  the  visitor  invited  to  see  them  was  a  matter  of 
common  knowledge.  The  Marquis  of  Loure  in  an  article  in  the  North 
American  Review,  March,  1900,  rather  sides  with  the  British.  While  ad- 
mitting that  the  thirst  for  gold  will  lead  any  people  to  extremes,  he 
says  that  the  Boers  had  an  ancient  and  narrow  form  of  government 
with  a  hateful  intolerance  of  all  free  institutions  of  the  Anglo-Saxon 
type.  The  conflict  is  only  the  inevitable  one  between  progress  and  stag- 
nation. He  says,  "We  who  are  sowers  of  freedom  have  a  right  to  reap 
the  harvest  and  we  prefer  to  have  the  envy  and  malice  rather  than  the 
contempt  of  those  who  have  not  plowed  the  straight  furrows  we  have 
made."    P.  311. 


Causes  of  the  British-Boer  War  103 

"Against  the  wish  of  every  wise  Boer,  against  the  wish 
of  every  loyal  colonist,  in  spite  of  addresses,  in  spite  even 
of  deputies  sent  to  London,  the  English  government  insisted 
wantonly  and  wilfully  in  1852-4  on  founding  two  independent 
Boer  States  to  mar  the  unity  of  one  African  dominion  and 
built  up  with  deliberate  carefulness  all  the  pain,  anxiety  and 
danger  that  we  have  to  face  today;  such  was  the  beginning 
of  our  trouble  in  South  Africa/'  ^ 

This  is  only  one  example  of  the  numerous  administrative 
blunders  that  the  English  government  made  in  South  Africa, 
Mr.  Curt  (quoted  above)  further  remarks:  "Democratic  in 
principle  the  Boer  republics  are,  in  fact,  limited  oligarchies" 
— and  says  that  today  (1900)  it  is  "the  clash  between  that 
most  modem  of  all  communities,  a  gold-field  population  and 
the  most  antique  and  intolerant  government  in  the  world." 

Now,  after  considering  these  different  views  and  opinions, 
some  of  them,  indeed,  aU  but  absurd,  what  conclusion  are  we 
to  come  to !  It  is  evident,  to  begin  with,  that  we  cannot  ac- 
cept without  modification  the  statements  of  either  the  Eng- 
lish on  the  one  hand,  or  of  the  Germans  on  the  other.  The 
Germans  and  French  charge  the  whole  trouble  to  English  im- 
perialism and  greed  for  gold.  The  British  insist  that  they 
had  to  protect  the  rights  of  their  subjects  in  South  Africa, 
and  that  the  discovery  of  gold,  and  the  consequent  inrush  of 
immigrants,  an  event  which  could  not  be  foretold,  was  respon- 
sible for  the  war.  Now,  laying  aside  all  the  little  events,  pre- 
texts, and  grievances,  and  admitting  that  the  Boer  control  in 
South  Africa  in  the  period  1877-1900  was  mediaeval,  tyranni- 
cal, and  wholly  uncalled  for  and  unjust,  the  real  causes  of 
the  war,  it  seems  to  us,  may  be  summed  up  as  follows : 

(1)  Colonial  expansion  policy  of  Great  Britain.  (And 
she  has  more  of  an  excuse  for  this  policy  than  any  other 
nation  except  possibly  Japan,  because  it  has  been,  and  its 
maintenance  is,  vital  to  her  existence  as  a  great  world 
power. ) 

*  Henry  Curt,  in  North  American  Review,  170,  p.  205. 


104  The  Causes  Of  War 

(2)  The  incompatibility  of  the  English  liberal  political 
system  with  the  oligarchical  government  and  rude,  unpro- 
gressive  social  life  and  customs  of  the  Boers.  (This  seems  to 
me  the  great  fundamental  cause  of  the  whole  struggle.  But 
for  this,  a  great  South  African  nationality  might  have  de- 
veloped, blending  together  all  the  discordant  elements,  with- 
out war,  and  without  the  race  antagonism  that  prevailed.) 

(3)  The  discovery  of  gold,  and  the  consequent  exploita- 
tion of  the  mines  by  English  capitalists  and  financiers.  This, 
however,  was  more  the  nature  of  a  mere  event,  than  an  under- 
lying cause. 


CHAPTER  XI 

CAUSES    OF   THE    SPANISH-AMEEICAN    WAR    (1898) 

THE  causes  of  the  Spanish- American  War,  like  those  of 
all  other  wars  between  different  races  or  systems  of 
government,  can  be  understood  and  explained  only  by  a 
study  of  the  diplomatic  relations  of  the  two  countries  along 
with  their  political  and  economic  (especially  commercial) 
systems,  as  well  as  the  essential  inherent  characteristics  and 
peculiarities  of  each  people. 

Admiral  Chadwick,  in  his  excellent  volume,  "Relations  of 
United  States  and  Spain-Diplomacy,"  characterizes  these 
relations  as  "the  story  of  more  than  a  hundred  years  of 
what  has  been  really  a  racial  strife.'*  He  says,  "The  chief 
cause  was  in  the  absolute  racial  unlikeness  itself,  and  this 
racial  temperament  still  has  an  influence  over  the  relations 
of  men — more  potent — than  any  other  force  in  humanity."  ^ 
The  war  was  but  a  final  episode  in  a  century  of  diplomatic 
ill  feeling.^  There  was  a  great  difference  in  the  civilizations 
and  the  political  traditions  of  the  two  countries;  but,  "it 
was  more  than  antiquity,  more  than  an  old  civilization,  which 
produced  the  differences  which  made  it  impossible  for  the 
North- American  Anglo-Saxon  to  live  near  his  Spanish  neigh- 
bors without  friction."  ^ 

The  author's  hypothesis  that  this  hundred  years  of  diplo- 
matic struggle  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  "was 
really  a  racial  strife"  is  not  altogether  correct.  It  does  not 
explain  all.  It  is  unquestionably  true  that  lack  of  mutual 
sympathy  and  understandinfir  contributed  in  "no  slight  de- 

*  Introduction,  p.  4f. 
"  Ibid.,  p.  3. 

•  Introduction,  p.  3. 

105 


106  Th€  Causes  Of  War 

gree"  to  the  outcome,  but  economic  considerations  are  also 
very  important  (e.  g.,  the  struggle  over  the  right  to  navi- 
gate the  Mississippi  River  and  the  "greed  of  American 
and  Spanish  protectionists"  which  was  at  one  time  at  the 
bottom  of  the  Cuban  revolt)  in  1895. 

Professor  Hershey,  in  his  review  of  Mr.  Chadwick's  book, 
observes  that  it  is  justly  pointed  out  (in  Mr.  Chadwick's 
volume)  .  .  .  that  at  the  time  this  message  (McKinley's 
final  war  message  to  Congress)  was  sent  in,  Spain  had  prac- 
tically yielded  to  all  the  American  demands  which  were  offi- 
cially presented  to  her.  She  had  revoked  the  order  of  re- 
concentration,  and  had,  at  the  eleventh  hour,  granted  the 
required  armistice  to  the  Cuban  insurgents.  In  short.  Presi- 
dent McKinley  surrendered  to  the  war  advocates  at  the 
very  moment  he  had  won  an  apparent  victory  for  peace.  Mc- 
Kinley's weakness  was  not  in  his  failure  to  yield  to  those 
demanding  peace,  but  in  not  insisting  on  "the  absolute  inde- 
pendence of  Cuba  as  the  sine  qua  non  of  peace."  *  Mr. 
Chadwick  deals  with  the  causes  of  the  war,  as  we  would  ex- 
pect, from  the  standpoint  of  diplomatic  relations.  But  the 
reviewer  observes  that  "diplomatic  relations  do  not  tell  the 
whole  story  of  the  causes  of  any  war."  ^  He  indicates  that 
a  study  must  also  be  made  of  the  "economic,  social  and  gen- 
eral political  relations  between  the  two  peoples  or  races."  ^ 

The  reviewer  agrees  with  Chadwick  that  it  was  a  good 
and  wise  thing  "to  cut  this  Gordian  knot"  with  the  sword; 
and  adds — "what  misery  and  bloodshed  might  have  been 
avoided  if  it  had  been  cut  by  General  Grant  in  1873,  or,  per- 
haps better  still,  by  Sec.  Webster  in  1850." 

Why  did  not  Cuba  gain  her  liberty  from  Spain  in  1825, 
along  with  the  continental  Latin- American  states  ?  The  an- 
swer is,  the  United  States  prevented  her.  That  the  United 
States  interfered  in  the  Latin-American  attempt  to  help 
Cuba  to  independence  in  1825  and  prevented  that  action,  is 

*Hershey  in  N.  A.  Review,  16;  pp.  148-50. 
•Hershey  in  Review  of  Chadwick's  Book. 


C anises  of  the  Spanish-American  War  (1898)     107 

explained  by  the  fact  that  there  was  in  this  country  the  fear 
that  the  freedom  of  slaves  in  Cuba,  following  her  inde- 
pendence from  Spain,  would  set  the  South  on  fire; — ^which, 
indeed  it  would  have  done.  To  quote  Berrien,  of  Georgia,  in  a 
debate  in  Congress  at  this  time :  "When  we  look  to  the  situa- 
tion of  those  islands,  to  the  commanding  position  they  oc- 
cupy with  reference  to  the  commerce  of  the  West  Indies,  we 
cannot  be  indifferent  to  a  change  in  their  condition.  But 
when  we  reflect  that  they  are  in  juxtaposition  to  a  portion  of 
the  Union  where  slavery  exists — that  the  principle  of  uni- 
versal emancipation  must  march  in  the  van  of  the  invading 
force,  and  that  all  the  horrors  of  a  servile  war  will  too 
surely  follow  in  its  train — these  merely  commercial  consid- 
erations sink  into  insignificance.  .  .  .  We  cannot  allow 
their  (European)  principle  of  universal  emancipation  to  be 
called  into  activity  in  a  situation  where  its  contagion  from 
our  neighborhood  would  be  dangerous  to  our  quiet  and 
safety."  ^  And  Chadwick  sums  up  the  situation  in  these 
words:  "American  slavery  was  thus  the  bulwark  of  what 
remained  of  Spanish  dominion  in  the  Americas."  "^  Henry 
Cabot  Lodge  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  "the  War  of  1898 
was  the  price  the  United  States  paid  for  having  kept  Cuba 
in  bondage  at  the  dictates  of  our  own  slave  power."  ^ 

Far  be  it  from  us  to  underestimate  the  high  and  noble 
purposes  of  the  people  of  this  country,  and  their  sympathy 
for  the  suffering  Cubans;  yet,  it  is  not  altogether  without 
justice  that  Europeans  look  upon  this  war  as  one  of  aggres- 
sion on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  with  the  ultimate 
end  in  view  of  annexing  Cuba,  or  at  least,  of  so  controlHng 
her  government  and  destiny  as  to  best  secure  the  interests  of 
the  United  States.  We  are  not  prepared  to  say  nor  do  we 
believe,  that  the  action  of  our  government  and  people  was 
due  mainly  to  a  motive  of  self-interest.     But  let  us  re- 

•  See  Benton,  Abridgement  of  Debates,  VIII,  421  &  flf. 

'Qiftdwrck,  p.  — . 

•Lodge,  '^War  with  Spain,"  p.  6. 


108  The  Causes  Of  War 

count  a  bit  of  American  history,  with  the  opinions  of  some 
noted  Americans  on  this  subject,  and  let  them  speak  for 
themselves.  J.  Q.  Adams,  than  whose  opinions  on  such  sub- 
jects no  American's  are  more  important,  once  said:  "There 
are  laws  of  political  as  well  as  physical  gravitation  and  if 
an  apple,  severed  by  the  tempest  from  its  native  tree  cannot 
choose  but  fall  to  the  ground,  Cuba,  forcibly  disjoined  from 
its  own  unnatural  connection  with  Spain  and  incapable  of 
self-support,  can  gravitate  only  toward  the  North  American 
Union,  which,  by  the  same  law  of  nature,  cannot  cart  her  off 
from  its  bosom."  The  View  of  Jefferson  in  his  time  is  very 
interesting:  "Do  we  wish  to  acquire  to  our  own  confederacy 
any  one  or  more  of  the  Spanish  provinces .?  I  candidly  con- 
fess that  I  have  ever  looked  on  Cuba  as  the  most  interest- 
ing addition  which  could  ever  be  made  to  our  system  of  states 
.  .  .  yet,  as  I  am  sensible  that  this  can  never  be  obtained, 
but  by  war,  ...  I  have  no  hesitation  in  abandoning  my  first 
wish  to  future  chances."  ^ 

Buchanan,  Secretary  of  State,  made  this  statement  in 
1848 :  "If  Cuba  were  annexed  to  the  United  States,  we  should 
be  relieved  from  the  apprehensions  which  we  can  never  cease 
to  feel  for  our  own  safety  and  the  security  of  our  commerce. 
.  .  .  Human  foresight  cannot  anticipate  the  beneficial  conse- 
quences which  would  result  to  every  portion  of  the  Union."  ^^ 
This  was  in  the  administration  of  Polk.  "Successive  later 
administrations  pushed  the  project  of  purchase  to  the  very 
eve  of  the  Civil  War."  Buchanan  was  the  chief  advocate.^^ 
In  1875  (President  Grant)  the  situation  was  similar  to  that 
of  1898.  Had  Grant  yielded  to  Congress,  there  would  have 
been  war  ^^  (due  largely  to  Spanish  outrages  such  as  Vir- 
ginius  affair).  And  in  1876:  "The  President  .  .  .  desires 
...  to  express  the  desire  of  the  United  States  to  maintain  a 
firm,  solid  and  enduring  peace  with  Spain  and  to  remove 

"Jefferson's  writings,  X,  315. 
"See  Chadwick,  p.  221. 
"Chadwick,  p.  233. 
"See  Chadwick,  p.  80. 


Causes  of  the  Spamsh- American  War  (1898)     109 

every  disturbing  question  .  .  .  desires  to  disabuse  the  mind 
of  the  Government  and  people  of  Spain  of  the  existence  of 
any  desire  on  the  part  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States  for  the  acquisition  of  Cuba."  ^^ 

Several  wrote  that  the  United  States  "have  constantly  in- 
dulged in  the  belief  that  they  might  hope  some  day  to  acquire 
those  Islands  (Cuba  and  Porto  Rico)  by  just  and  lawful 
means,  with  the  consent  of  their  sovereign."  Thus  we  see 
that  the  annexation  of  Cuba  to  the  United  States  has  been 
looked  upon  as  an  ultimate  probability  by  most  prominent 
American  statesmen ;  but  they  have  been  content  to  wait  for 
its  realization.  Jefferson  believed  Cuba  would  finally  "give 
herself  to  us."  Popular  disapproval  of  the  "Ostend  Mani- 
festo," however,  proved  that  Cuba  was  not  to  be  taken  by 
force  of  arms  with  the  will  and  consent  of  the  American  peo- 
ple as  a  whole.^* 

The  incapable  administration  of  the  government  by  the 
Spanish  officials  in  Cuba  was  the  cause  of  most  of  the  fric- 
tion between  the  United  States  and  Spain  with  regard  to 
Cuba.  If  Spain  had  granted  Cuba  a  liberal  government,  all 
the  moral  support  that  the  Cubans  got  from  the  United 
States  would  have  been  much  more  difficult,  if  not  impossible 
to  secure.  The  Spanish  government,  at  home,  however,  came 
at  least  to  see  the  futility  of  the  officials'  arbitrary  means 
of  punishment.  But  the  officials  in  Cuba  could  never  be 
brought  to  that  realization.  "It  was  their  tenacious  hold- 
ing to  this  view  of  sudden  and  severe  vengeance  ^^  which  .  .  . 
more  than  all  else — the  effects  of  reconcentration  excepted, 
finally  brought  on  war  in  1898."  ^®     The  Spanish  govern- 

"See  Chadwick,  p.  389. 

"The  United  States  government,  in  the  course  of  the  19th  century, 
repeatedly  made  it  understood  that  this  nation  would  intervene  to  pre- 
vent Spain  transferring  Cuba  to  any  other  European  power.  See  Moores 
Digest  of  Int.  Law,  VI,  p.  450.  Also  p.  464,  on  the  American  opinion 
on  annexation  of  Cuba  to  U.  S.  and  p.  83,  Vol.  VI,  on  unselfish  motives 
of  U.  S. 

"  An  immediate  cause. 

"Chadwick,  p.  473. 


110  The  Causes  Of  War 

ment  could  not  control  these  officials.  Conditions  were  in 
quite  as  deplorable  a  state  at  home  as  in  Cuba.  In  the  in- 
competence of  Spain  to  deal  with  revolted  Cuba  and  her  own 
officials  there  undoubtedly  was  one  of  the  causes  of  the  war. 
The  distracted  and  anarchical  condition  of  Spain  for  sixty 
years  made  efficient  government  in  Cuba  impossible.  The 
United  States  had  been  on  the  point  of  intervention  in  1875, 
as  we  have  seen.  The  Spanish  character,  however,  had  much 
to  do  with  this.  It  is  characteristic  of  the  Spaniard  to  pro- 
ceed to  immediate  and  summary  punishment  without  a  resort 
to  trial  or  jury.^^ 

We  aU  know  the  story  of  the  blowing  up  of  the  Maine,  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  this  incident  was  one  of  the  immediate 
causes  of  the  war,  and  that  the  American  people  were  in- 
flamed against  Spain  as  never  before.  But  it  cannot  justly 
be  claimed  that  the  Spanish  government  was  responsible  for 
or  connived  at,  this  deed  of  horror.  It  is  more  likely  that  it 
was  the  work  of  irresponsible  Spanish  individuals  incited  per- 
haps, by  Spanish  officials  in  Cuba.^^  The  Spanish  govern- 
ment expressed  deep  sympathy  for  this  disaster,  as  also  did 
the  Spanish  navy  department.  We  have  no  valid  reason  to 
question  the  sincerity  of  this  action. 

There  was  unquestionably  an  uncontrollable  desire  for 
war  in  the  United  States.  (But  it  was  Congress  which  really 
forced  the  country  into  war.)  ^^     The  Spanish  government 

"Admiral  Chadwick  takes  the  position  that  the  suffering  in  Cuba 
(1896-8)  was  due  as  much  to  the  insurgents  themselves  as  to  the  Span- 
iards. He  says  that  especially  was  unemployment  due  to  the  Cubans 
themselves;  that  the  great  error  of  the  Spanish  government  in  connection 
with  the  reconcentration  was  its  "disregarding  precautions  which  should 
have  been  taken  to  feed  the  people  thus  herded  together,"  that  it  was 
this  that  caused  the  rapid  growth  in  the  United  States  of  a  hostile  feel- 
ing to  Spain.  That,  "there  is  no  denying  the  force  of  the  Spanish  argu- 
ment" (charging  responsibility  for  the  suffering  mainly  to  the  insurgents) 
—and  adds,  "nor  could  mere  injury  to  commerce  be  made  a  just  ground 
for  intervention."  Dr.  Hershey,  in  his  review  of  this  book,  takes  excep- 
tion to  this  statement,  and  says  that  there  is  no  question  but  that  the 
Spanish  were  far  more  to  blame  for  these  sufferings  than  were  the 
insurgent  forces  of  the  island. 

"  See  Benton,  Int.  Law  &  Diplomacy.  Spanish-American  War,  p.  76, 
and  Chadwick's  "Diplomacy"  on  this. 

"  Benton,  pp.  92-3  for  the  stated  causes  for  going  to  war. 


C anises  of  the  Spanish- American  War  (1898)     111 

was  slowly  but  surely  receding  from  her  hostile  position  and 
war  would  have  been  averted  but  for  the  Maine  disaster  and 
the  publication  of  the  letter  of  the  Spanish  minister. 

Woodford,  the  United  States  minister  in  Spain,  was  con- 
fident that  we  could  have  peace  if  the  United  States  would 
wait  a  little,  that  all  her  and  Cuba's  demands  would  be 
granted.  Every  reason  leads  to  the  belief  that  all  just  claims 
could  have  been  readily  adjusted  .  .  .  yet  "this  (blowing 
up  of  the  Maine)  was  without  doubt  the  very  event  which 
was  regarded  by  the  masses  of  the  Americans  as  justifying  a 
resort  to  war  out  of  pure  revenge."  ^^ 

The  United  States'  grounds  for  intervention  were: 

1.  In  the  cause  of  humanity. 

2.  For  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  property  of  Ameri- 
can citizens  in  Cuba. 

3.  In  defense  of  commercial  and  financial  interests  in- 
volved. 

4.  For  self-preservation. 

5.  For  the  Maine  disaster. 

The  movement  of  the  American  squadron  gave  the  Spanish 
government  much  concern.  "The  display  and  concentration 
of  naval  forces  near  Havana  in  the  waters  of  the  Peninsula 
(Spain)  and  the  persistency  with  which  the  Maine  and  the 
Montgomery  remained  in  the  Greater  Antilles  are  causing 
increasing  anxiety  and  might,  through  some  mischance,  bring 
about  a  conflict,"  are  the  words  of  Senor  Gullon  of  the 
Spanish  government,  to  Senor  Duprey  de  Leme,  Spanish 
Minister  to  the  United  States.     (Feb.  8,  1898 ).2i 

The  more  distant  and  remote  causes  are  summed  up  by 
Lebrand  as  follows  :^^ 

1.  Cuban's  desire  for  freedom,  autonomy,  like  the  other 
Latin-American  countries. 

^.  The  desire  of  the  United  States  to  own  or  control 
Cuba — a  natural  desire. 


*»  Benton,  p.  106. 

*^See  Chadwick,  p.  538. 

^  Le  Brand's  "Spanish- American  War  and  the  Law  of  Nations,"  p.  19. 


112  The  Causes  Of  War 

3.  The  nature  of  the  Spanish  government  of  Cuba  and 
the  Cuban  insurrections. 

4.  Geographical  situation  of  Cuba,  including  her  com- 
mand of  the  Carribean  and  Gulf  Sea-coasts. 

Spanish  statesmen  felt  that  Spain  could  not  renounce 
Cuba — Cuba  and  the  Philippines,  the  last  of  her  great  colo- 
nial empire  (in  the  Occident  and  in  the  Orient).  Without 
these  they  felt  that  Spain  could  not  long  exist — they  said  as 
much.^^ 

Mr.  Lodge  notes  the  following  causes : — 

1.  Sympathy  for  the  oppressed  and  suffering  Cubans. 

2.  American  resentment  against  dominion  of  Europe  in 
the  New  World. 

3.  Case  of  the  Virginius  (1873).  An  American  yessel 
captured  in  high  seas,  taken  to  a  Cuban  port  and  about  fifty 
of  her  crew  shot.  The  United  States  accepted  money  and 
war  was  avoided,  but  the  question  of  moral  insult  was  un- 
settled. 

Captain  Mahan  asserts  that  "the  avowed  purpose  and 
cause"  of  the  United  States'  action  was  not  primarily  for 
"redress  of  grievances  (such  as  blowing  up  of  Maine  and  exe- 
cutions of  American  citizens)  against  Spain,  but  to  enforce 
the  departure  of  the  latter  from  Cuba.  But,  we  may  well  ask, 
what  motives  led  us  to  wish  to  drive  Spain  from  the  Western 
world  .f^  Was  not  the  United  States,  after  all,  looking  largely 
to  her  own  ultimate  interests  ?  Did  we  not  need  the  control, 
if  not  the  actual  possession,  of  Cuba  in  order  to  make  com- 
plete the  chain  of  United  States  predominance  (in  command- 
ing the  key  to  the  Carribean  Sea  and  Gulf  region)  in  the 
New  World?" 

Mr.  Lodge's  opinion  coincides  almost  exactly  with  Cap- 
tain Mahan's,  on  the  purpose  of  the  war.  He  says  that  what 
the  United  States  desired  above  everything  else — her  purpose 
in  going  to  war,  was  to  drive  Spain  out  of  Cuba,  and  Con- 
gress was  very  careful  to  frame  its  resolution  so  as  to  make 
that  point  explicit. 

"  See  Le  Brand,  p.  19. 


I 


Ccmses  of  the  Spanish- American  War  (1898)     113 

Summing  up,  then,  we  may  say  that  the  causes  of  the 
Spanish-American  war  in  1898  were: 

1.  Remote  and  fundamental. 

2.  Immediate  (which  approached  from  some  points  of 
view  but  not  in  all  respects,  mere  pretexts). 

(a)  The  remote  and  one  of  the  two  fundamental  or 
underlying  causes  was  unquestionably  the  incompatibility  of 
the  Spanish  and  American  race  temperaments,  and  political 
institutions  and  ideals.  It  was  impossible  that  the  two  ever 
should  become  blended  or  reconciled.  Other  considerations 
and  events,  such  as  the  United  States  intervention  in  Cuba, 
with  the  slave  problem  of  that  time,  the  grievances  the  United 
States  had  against  Spain  on  account  of  the  outrages  on 
Americans  by  the  Spanish  officials  in  Cuba,  particularly  the 
Virginius  affair,  were  only  occasions  for  bringing  to  the 
front  this  incompatibility  of  the  two  races,  or  were  of  the 
nature  of  mere  pretexts  for  hostility.  All  these  differences 
and  difficulties  could  ultimately  have  been  settled  by  peace- 
ful means,  and  would  have  been,  had  the  United  States  been 
dealing  with  another  such  nation  as  England  or  Germany. 

(b)  The  economic  situation  in  Cuba  undoubtedly  con- 
tributed its  share  in  causing  this  war;  but  important  as  it 
was,  it  was  by  no  means  the  fundamental  cause.  It  cannot 
be  separated  from  the  other  causes. 

(c)  The  incompetence  and  inability  of  the  home  gov- 
ernment in  Spain  made  possible  the  abuses  of  her  officials 
in  Cuba,  and  these  two  things  together  were  important  fac- 
tors in  the  United  States'  intervention.  This  cause  is  more 
or  less  blended,  however,  with  the  first,  or  fundamental  cause 
above  mentioned. 

(d)  The  sympathy  of  the  American  people  for  the  suf- 
fering Cubans — the  cause  of  humanity.  This  was  indeed  an 
important  cause — it  swept  away  the  whole  American  people 
in  a  great  flood  of  enthusiasm  for  the  war,  and  was  indeed,  a 
fundamental  as  well  as  an  immediate  cause  of  the  war. 

(e)  The  attitude  of  the  McKinley  administration  (not  at 
first  as  Secretary  Alger  observes,  but  after  the  pulse  of  the 


114  The  Causes  Of  War 

nation  had  been  felt,  and  the  war  fever  detected)  with  its 
almost  utter  disregard  of  genuine  diplomacy. 

(f )  The  blowing  up  of  the  Maine,  after  all  has  been  said, 
can  be  taken  as  little  more  than  an  occasion  or  mere  pre- 
text. 

(g)  The  long  desire  of  at  least  a  portion  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  to  see  Cuba  become  a  part  of  the  United  States 
no  doubt  added  no  inconsiderable  momentum  to  the  rising 
tide  of  war  spirit  in  the  United  States.  Nor  can  we  say  that 
the  United  States  was  greatly  to  blame  for  this.  It  was 
(1)  a  natural  self-interest;  (2)  it  was  seen  that  Cuba  would 
be  better  off  under  our  flag. 

(h)  In  connection  with  the  necessary  interests  of  the 
United  States  in  Cuba  as  Lebrand  observes,  there  is,  of 
course,  the  geographical  cause.  Cuba  is  "only  a  few  hours 
sail  from  the  United  States,  but  several  days  from  Spain; 
it  is  to  the  interest  of  the  United  States  to  possess  or  at 
least  control  an  island  which  is  so  prominent  at  the  entrance 
to  the  enclosed  waters  of  the  Gulf."  This  interest  was  soon- 
er or  later  bound  to  clash  with  that  of  Spain. 


CHAPTER  XII 

CAUSES   OF   THE   FRANCO-PRUSSIAN   WAR    (1870) 

SHELDON  AMOS   (in  his  book  on  Remedies  for  War) 
sums  up  the  causes  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  as 
follows  : 

1.  Growth  of  Prussia  and  Germany  with  Bismark's  de- 
termination to  secure  a  United  Germany. 

2.  Alleged  intervention  of  France  in  nominating  Hohen- 
zollern  as  successor  to  the  Spanish  crown. 

3.  Political  schemes  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III. 

4.  Antipathy  existing  between  French  and  German 
people. 

5.  Territorial  acquisition  on  both  sides. 

6.  Enormously  developed  military  institutions. 

7.  Alleged  ill-treatment  of  the  French  Ambassador  of 
Berlin.^ 

Among  these,  however,  he  recognizes  only  three  important 
causes:  "In  some  cases,  as  in  the  Franco-German  War  of 
1870,  it  is  difficult  even  for  contemporaries  to  decide  to 
which  of  the  three  causes — that  is,  (1)  natural  efforts  after 
increased  liberty  and  security  proportioned  to  the  growth 
and  the  consolidation  of  the  internal  resources  of  one  of  the 
Belligerent  States,  or  resistance,  by  anticipation,  to  future 
aggressions  or  direct  ambition  and  political  acquisitiveness — 
the  war  is  to  be  attributed."  ^ 

Writers  differ  materially  in  giving  the  causes  and  ex- 

*  This  certainly  is  as  complete  a  list  of  causes  for  this  war  as  could 
be  found  by  anyone,  no  matter  how  much  study  he  should  put  on  an 
investigation  of  the  causes;  but  it  is  true  and  sound  despite  its  com- 
plexity. 

"Amos,  pp.  70-71. 

115 


116  The  Causes  Of  War 

planations  of  this  war.  Saliers,  a  French  author,  claims 
that  France  had  been  "caught  in  1870  in  the  dream  of  uni- 
versal peace,"  and  that  that  explains  her  being  wholly  unpre- 
pared for  the  war  with  Germany.^  The  English  historian, 
Rose,  on  the  other  hand,  says  that  French  feeling  against 
Prussia  had  been  growing  for  years  before  1870,  and  that 
France's  counting  on  Austria  as  an  ally  against  Prussia 
(in  revenge  for  the  events  of  1866)  explains,  in  part  at  least, 
the  Franco-Prussian  War.^  Signobos  avers  that  for  such 
"unforeseen"  facts  (as  war  of  1870)  no  general  cause  can  be 
discerned  in  the  intellectual,  economic,  or  political  condition 
of  the  continent  of  Europe."  ^  Another  historian  gives  these 
causes : 

1.  Bismark's  policy  of  a  United  Germany — made  this 
war  necessary — naturally  raised  the  apprehensions  of  Na- 
poleon III,  and  caused  the  French  to  prepare  for  and  ex- 
pect war. 

2.  Question  of  succession  to  the  throne  of  Spain  stirred 
France  into  a  ferment  rapidly  as  news  could  fly.  A  Hohen- 
zollern  (Leopold  von  Hohenzollern)  had  been  elected,  and 
had  given  his  consent.  France  could  not  possibly  allow  the 
government  of  Spain  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  Prussia,  which 
her  acceptance  of  this  telection  would  mean.^ 

We  will  here  give  the  causes  the  historian,  Rose,  assigns 
for  this  war: 

1.  France  counting  on  Austria  as  an  ally  against  Prus- 
sia. 

2.  Bismark  realized  that  it  would  take  war  to  solve  the 
problems  of  reunion,  which  was  impossible  in  time  of  peace. 

3.  The  question  of  the  Spanish  succession  now  furnished 
this  casus  belli, 

Mr.  Rose  here  gives  Gramont's  (the  French  Minister) 
statement  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  which  is  as  follows: 
"We  do  not  think  that  respect  for  the  rights  of  a  neighbor- 

8  Saliers,  pp.  V  and  VI  in  Preface,  "La  Guerre." 
*  See  Rose,  I,  Chap.  I. 
"  Signobos,  p.  847. 
•C.  M.  H.,  XI. 


Causes  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  (1870)      117 

ing  people  (Spain)  obliges  us  to  allow  an  alien  Power  (Prus- 
sia) by  placing  one  of  its  princes  on  the  throne  of  Charles 
V  to  succeed  in  upsetting  to  our  disadvantage  the  present 
equilibrium  of  forces  in  Europe,  andiimperil  the  interests  and 
honor  of  France.  We  have  the  firm  hope  that  eventually  it 
will  not  be  realized.  To  hinder  it,  we  count  both  on  the 
wisdom  of  the  German  people  and  on  the  friendship  of  the 
Spanish  people.  If  that  should  not  be  so,  strong  in  your 
support  and  in  that  of  the  nation,  we  shall  know  how  to 
fulfill  our  duty  without  hesitation  and  without  weakness."  '^ 

The  statements  of  various  prominent  men  on  this  war 
are  significant  and  throw  light  on  the  different  views : 

"The  war  of  1870  was  the  personal  work  of  Bismark,  pre- 
pared by  Napoleon  Ill's  personal  policy."  ^ 

"The  responsibility  rests  for  the  most  part  on  one  man — 
Bismarck  himself.  The  nation  was  not  back  of  such  aggres- 
siveness, though,  when  once  committed  to  war,  it  could  be 
depended  on  to  carry  it  through.^  At  least,  he  caused  these 
wars  (1866-71)  to  occur  when  they  did." -^^ 

"The  occasion  was  the  purchase  of  the  Belgian  railroads 
by  the  French  Eastern  Company  in  February,  1869.  The 
Belgian  government  forbade  the  sale.  The  French  govern- 
ment attriuted  this  check  to  Bismark."  -^^ 

The  proposition  made  to  the  Reichstag,  Feb.  24,  1870,  to 
admit  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden  into  the  northern  Confed- 
eration, renewed  the  agitation  against  Prussian  and  German 
unity. 

"The  story  of  the  Franco-German  dispute  is  one  of  na- 
tional jealousy,  carefully  fanned  for  four  years  by  news- 
paper editors  and  popular  speakers  until  a  spark  sufficient 
to  set  Western  Europe  ablaze.  This  was  true  alike  on  the 
part  of  Germany  and  France."  ^^ 

'Rose,  "The  Devel.  of  the  European  Nations,  1870-1900,"  p.  46. 
•Signobos,  "Political  History  of  Europe  Since  1814,"  p.  847. 
»C.  M.  Hist.,  XI,  p.  432. 
^"Ihid.,  p.  434. 
**  Signobos,  p.  806. 
"Rose,  I.  56. 


118  The  Causes  Of  War 

The  immediate  cause,  however,  all  must  agree,  was  due 
to  Prince  Bismarck.  The  French  Minister  Daree,  who 
favored  peace,  was  replaced  early  in  1870  by  Gramont,  an 
enemy  of  Prussia.  Napoleon's  plan  for  the  invasion  of 
Southern  Germany  which  had  been  discussed  with  Archduke 
of  Austria,  fell  through  and  peace  seemed  assured,  when 
Bismarck's  publishing  of  the  telegram  from  King  William 
set  everything  on  fire  and  caused  France  to  declare  war  on 
Prussia. 

A  note  had  been  addressed  from  Paris  to  the  Prussian 
government  saying  that  the  coming  of  Hohenzollern  to 
Spain  was  regarded  by  France  as  a  provocation  and  menace 
from  Prussia  and  that  France  could  not  "suffer  the  empire 
of  Charles  V  to  be  restored."  ^^  The  French  minister  at 
Berlin  was  ordered  to  press  for  an  immediate  renunciation 
of  Prince  Leopold's  claims.  He  was  informed  that  the 
matter  was  one  for  Prince  Leopold  and  the  Spanish  people, 
but  that  the  King  would  communicate  with  Leopold's  father 
on  the  subject.  An  explicit  order  from  King  William  to 
Prince  Leopold  was  demanded  by  France;  in  the  meantime, 
it  was  announced  from  Madrid  that  Leopold  had  withdrawn 
his  candidature.  The  matter  seemed  again  settled,  but 
this  did  not  satisfy  Napoleon.  He  demanded  that  Prussia 
promise  to  guarantee  that  no  such  attempt  in  favor  of  a 
Hohenzollern  should  ever  again  be  made.  King  William  ab- 
solutely refused  to  so  bind  himself.  The  French  ambassador 
was  finally  informed  that  he  could  not  be  received  by  the 
King. 

The  telegram  published  by  Bismarck,  shortened  by  him 
for  the  purpose,  conveying  the  impression  that  King  William 
had  treated  the  French  ambassador  with  disrespect,  aroused 
all  France.  This  led  immediately  to  the  French  declaration 
of  war  against  Prussia.  The  telegram  cut  down  was  as  fol- 
lows: 

"After  the  news  of  the  renunciation  of  the  hereditary 

*»See  Signobos,  p.  807-11. 


Causes  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  (1870)      119 

Prince  of  HohenzoUern  had  been  officially  communicated  to 
the  Imperial  Government  of  France  by  the  Royal  Govern- 
ment of  Spain,  the  French  ambassador  at  Ems  further  de- 
manded of  his  Majesty  the  King  that  he  would  authorize 
him  to  telegraph  to  Paris  that  his  Majesty  the  King  bound 
himself  for  all  future  time  never  again  to  give  his  consent  if 
the  Hohenzollerns  should  renew  their  candidature.  His  Ma- 
jesty the  King  thereupon  decided  not  to  receive  the  French 
ambassador  again,  and  sent  to  tell  him  through  the  aide-de- 
camp on  duty  that  his  Majesty  had  nothing  further  to  com- 
municate to  the  ambassador." 

The  French  people  could  see  in  this  action  of  Bismarck 
nothing  but  the  basest  insult,  notwithstanding  that  historians 
who  have  carefully  examined  the  dispatch  and  compared  it 
with  the  original  telegram  of  King  William  of  Prussia  have 
claimed  that  it  was  not  at  all  such — that  the  abbreviated 
form  had  not  the  incendiary  language  in  it  that  the  original 
had.-*^*  A  perusal  of  the  two  shows  that  there  is  some  basis 
for  this  claim. ■'^  There  is  no  qjuestion,  however,  that 
Bismarck  wanted  war,  and  that  the  French  government 
were  almost  as  eager.    Both  the  German  and  French  people, 

"See  Rose,  p.  49-50. 

"The  original  telegram  is  as  follows:  "His  Majesty  writes  to  me: 
'Count  Benedetti  spoke  to  me  on  the  promenade,  in  order  to  demand 
from  me,  finally  in  a  very  importunate  manner,  that  I  should  authorize 
him  to  telegraph  at  once  that  I  bound  myself  for  all  future  time  never 
again  to  give  my  consent  if  the  Hohenzollerns  should  renew  their  candi- 
dature. I  refused  at  last  somewhat  sternly,  as  it  is  neither  right  nor 
possible  to  undertake  engagements  of  this  kind  a  tout  jamais. 

"  'Naturally  I  told  him  that  I  had  as  yet  received  no  news,  and  as  he 
was  earlier  informed  about  Paris  and  Madrid  than  myself  he  could  see 
clearly  that  my  Government  once  more  had  no  hand  in  the  matter.'  His 
Majesty  has  since  received  a  letter  from  the  Prince.  His  Majesty,  hav- 
ing told  Count  Benedetti  that  he  was  awaiting  news  from  the  Prince,  has 
decided,  with  reference  to  the  above  demand,  upon  the  representation  of 
Count  Eulenburg  and  myself,  not  to  receive  Count  Benedetti  again,  but 
only  to  let  him  be  informed  through  an  aide-de-camp:  'That  his  Majesty 
had  now  received  from  the  Prince  confirmation  of  the  news  which  Bene- 
detti had  already  received  from  Paris,  and  had  nothing  further  to  say 
to  the  ambassador.'  His  Majesty  leaves  it  to  your  Excellency  whether 
Benedetti's  fresh  demand  and  its  rejection  should  not  be  at  once  com- 
municated both  to  our  ambassadors  and  to  the  press." 


1£0  The  Causes  Of  War 

on  the  other  hand,  shuddered  to  think  of  the  horrors  of  such 
a  war  between  the  two  great  powers. 

Prussia's  monster  crime,  however,  was  not  the  war, — it 
was  the  stealing  of  the  French  provinces  of  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  UNITED  STATES 

Fundamental  and  Immediate  Causes  of  Our  Conflict  with 

Germany 

IN  our  series  "The  Causes  of  War,"  we  have  dealt  with 
man's  motives  for  war  in  the  past;  the  European  back- 
ground of  the  great  conflict  just  closed;  the  causes  of  this 
war  for  each  of  the  individual  nations  involved; — in  the 
meantime  showing  the  nature  of  recent  German  diplomacy; 
the  autocratic  government  and  military  caste  that  were  re- 
sponsible, in  the  Kaiser's  dominions,  for  the  universal  devas- 
tation and  bloodshed;  and  finally,  in  a  general  way,  with 
America's  reasons  for  entering  the  cause  of  the  free  nations 
in  the  supreme  struggle  of  democracy  and  right  against  au- 
tocracy and  might.  Now,  in  our  series  of  articles  on  the 
"Outline  and  Study  of  the  World  War,"  we  shall  state  our 
own  cause  more  specifically,  and  follow  up  with  the  study  of 
the  military  and  other  events  of  the  war,  the  preliminary 
peace  problems  of  the  peace  conference — all  with  the  view 
to  making  this  material  most  available  and  suitable  to  the 
needs  of  our  readers,  as  they  deal  with  the  war  and  current 
history. 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  lively  interest  in  the  reading  and 
study  of  current  history  which  has  been  stimulated  by  the 
war  will  continue  in  these  equally  critical  and  unsettled  times 
of  world  reaction  and  reconstruction,  and  that  the  great 
services  of  the  leading  weekly  and  monthly  magazines  and 
periodicals  will  not  be  forgotten. 

Following  is  an  outline  on  the  United  States  and  her  causes 

121 


122  The  Causes  Of  War 

and  interests  in  the  world  war.  This  outline  has  been  used 
throughout  the  schools  of  Fort  Smith  as  a  basis  for  the  study 
of  this  war,  as  our  government  urges  upon  our  schools  today, 
— and  is  recommended  by  teachers  and  school  officials  in  a 
good  many  systems.  Practically  all  references  are  available 
in  any  community. 

WAR  STUDY  OUTLINE  FOR  SCHOOLS 

7.     Whi/  We  Were  At  War  With  Gerrmmi/ 

A.  Fundamental  Causes. 

1.  Democracy  versus   autocratic   power.      (This   world 

cannot  remain  permanently  half  free  and  half  en- 
slaved by  autocratic  power.) 

2.  The  moral  ground  of  humanity  versus  the  principle 

that  "might  makes  right"  with  Germany's  conse- 
quent cruelties  and  barbarous  warfare. 

3.  U.  S.  championship  of  international  law,  the  sacred 

obligations  of  treaties,  the  rights  of  neutrals,  and 
of  small  states. 

4.  U.  S.  has  also  gone  to  war  to  uphold  her  own  honor 

and  respect  among  the  powers  of  the  earth,  and  to 
prove  the  sincerity  of  her  professed  principles. 

B.  Immediate  Causes. 

1.     Germany's     domineering     diplomacy     and     attitude 
toward  our  Monroe  Doctrine. 

a.  Admiral  Diederich  and  Admiral  Dewey  in  Ma- 

nila harbor  in   1898.      (See  World's   Work, 
June,  1916.) 

b.  The    Samoan   incident.      (See   World's   Work, 

June,  1916.) 

c.  The  Kaiser,  Roosevelt,  and  Venezuela,  1902. 

d.  Utterances  of  the  Crown  Prince  and  others  with 

regard  to  U.  S.  and  Monroe  Doctrine.     (See 
"Out  of  Their  Own  Mouths.") 


The  United  States  123 

e.  German  spy  system  in  America.    (Pres.  Wilson's 

Speeches.) 

f.  Germany's  aggressions  in  South  America  and 

Mexico. 

g.  Von    Zimmerman's    proposal    to    Mexico    and 

Japan  for  partitioning  U.  S.  among  them. 

2.  German  submarine  blockade. 

a.  Interference    with    legitimate    American    com- 

merce. 

b.  Destruction  of  American  lives  and  property. 

c.  Shameless  violation  of  our  rights  as  neutrals, 

(rights  she  had  solemnly  promised  to  respect, 
but  whose  violation  she  now  celebrated  pub- 
licly in  numerous  places). 

d.  Great  loss  of  food  needed  for  suffering  peoples. 

3.  Atrocities  in  Belgium,  Poland,  Northern  France,  Ser- 

bia,   Roumania — showing    Germany's     deliberate 
policy  toward  her  helpless,  innocent  victims. 

4.  Similar  effect  on  American  opinion  was  caused  by  the 

Zeppelin  raids  on  the  unprotected  and  innocent  in 
London  and  other  English  towns. 
6.  Nefarious  plotting  of  German  agents  in  the  U.  S.  with 
working  men,  banks,  anarchists,  bombs,  traitors, 
pan-Germans,  etc.  (Hundreds  of  cases  unearthed 
by  U.  S.  secret  service,  showing  millions  of  dollars 
spent  in  this  country  by  Germany  to  foment  strife 
and  influence  our  neutrality  while  Germany  was 
still  professing  friendship  and  peaceful  relations 
with  the  U.  S.) 

II.  Danger  of  Failure  to  This  Coimtrt/ 

1.  Germany  threatene'd  to  make  us  pay  for  all  the  cost 
of  the  war  to  her.  (A  staggering  indemnity,  just 
as  she  had  already  collected  from  every  country 
she  had  conquered.) 


124  The  Causes  Of  War 

%  The  Kaiser,  Crown  Prince  and  Princes  of  Germany 
have  scoffed  at  the  idea  of  democracy  (have 
boasted  of  the  submarine  as  the  "argument  of 
kings"  against  democracy). 

3.  The  Kaiser  claims  to  be  king  by  divine  right,  and  to 

be  God's  agent  on  earth.  (Read  from  his  addresses 
to  soldiers,  history  teachers, — in  Munich,  etc.,  etc., 
1891,  1897,  1900,  1909,  1914,  1916,  1917.  See 
Teacher's  Journal,  June,  1917,  World's  Work, 
June,  1917.  Review  of  Reviews'  December,  1917. 
"Out  of  Their  Own  Mouths,"  etc.) 

4.  The  German  police  system  was  more  severe  than  ever 

were  the  quartering  of  the  British  soldiers  of  King 
George  on  the  American  colonies.  (We  did  not 
stand  it  then,  we  must  not  run  the  risk  of  it  now.) 
See  West's  Modern  World. 

6.  Germany  curbed  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press, 
and  suppressed  the  individual,  and  made  him  just 
a  link  in  the  machinery  of  the  government,  which 
was  controlled  by  a  privileged  autocratic  class 
above  him.  In  Prussia,  men  voted  according  to 
wealth,  not  universal  suffrage.  In  one  district  in 
Berlin  three  men  paid  one-third  of  the  taxes,  had 
one-third  the  vote  of  all  the  district  of  the  city. 

6.  If  we  had  lost  this  war,  we  should  have  lost  the  guar- 
antee of  everything  that  Washington  and  his  com- 
patriots fought  for,  and  "government  of  the 
people,  by  the  people,  for  the  people,"  would  have 
perished  "from  the  earth,"  for  generations  to  come, 
if  not  for  centuries. 

ni.  The  Duty  of  Every  American  to  Support  the  War 

1.  It  is  our  duty  to  know,  first  of  all,  the  justice  of  our 

country's  cause. 

2.  We  should  have  the  courage  to  hold  up  that  cause 

wherever  it  is  assailed  for — 


The  United  States  126 

3.  Sedition    and    treason    are    continually    being   sown 

throughout  our  land,  and  must  be  met  and  put 
down. — This  is  still  true. 

4.  To  be  worthy  of  the  country  that  has  given  us  the 

blessing  of  liberty,  we  must  support  with  a  will  all 
the  movements  among  the  people  to  aid  in  this 
work,  such  as — 
.     a.  The  War  Y.  M.  C.  A.  work. 

b.  The  Red  Cross  Work. 

c.  The  food  production  conservation  campaigns, 

d.  The  Liberty  Loans. 

e.  Every  other  war  agency  with  which  we  come  in 

contact. 
An  equal  duty  now  devolves  upon  us  to  support  with  all 
our  power  the  principles  for  a  just  and  lasting  peace,  that 
our  peace  delegates  are  striving  for  at  Versailles. 

IV.  Some  Reliable  References  On  the  War  and  Its  Issues 

A.  Magazines  and  Periodicals. 

a.  World's  Work,  June,  1917.    "Germany's  Long 

Road  to  Democracy." 

b.  World's  Work,  June,  1916.     "The  Mailed  Fist 

in  American  History." 

c.  Review  of  Reviews,  December,  1918.    Editorials. 

d.  Everybody's    (continuing    throughout    1918). 

Brand  Whitlock's  Story  of  Belgium. 

e.  World's  Work  (continuing  throughout  1918). 

Mr.  Rathom's  exposals  of  the  working  of  the 
German  spy  system  in  U.  S.  French  Strothier 
on  same. 

f.  Independent,  October  W,  1918.     "Peace  with 

Victory."    Ex-President  Taft. 

g.  History  Teachers'  Magazine,  January,   1918. 

Critical  outline,  notes  and  references  on  the 
causes,  issues  and  events  of  the  Great  War,  by 
Professor  Harding,  of  Indiana  University. 


126  The  Causes  Of  War 

B.  Books. 

a.  "Evidence  in  the  Case,"  J.  W.  Beck,  Assistant 

Attorney  General,  U.  S. 

b.  "Ambassador    Morganthau's    Story,"   in   book 

form. 

c.  "Out  of  Their  Own  Mouths."     From  German 

sources. 

d.  "The  German  Terror  in  France." 

e.  "My   Four   Years   in   Germany,"   Ambassador 

Gerard. 

f.  "With    the    Turks    in    Palestine,"    Alexander 

Aaronsohn. 

g.  "England  and  Germany,"  by  Cramb,  written  be- 

fore the  war. 
h.  "Germany  and  the  Next  War" — Bernhardi. 

C.  Library  Pamphlets  and  Booklets. 

a.  "Plain  Words  From  America,"  Prof.  Johnson, 

of  Columbia  University. 

b.  Speeches  of  General  Smuts,  formerly  Boer  Gen- 

eral against  England. 

c.  "Why  the  War  Must  Go  On." 

d.  "List  of  Neutral  Ships  Sunk  by  Germans." 

e.  "Deportation  of  Belgian  Women." 

f.  "The  New  German  Empire." 

g.  "The  Red,  White  and  Blue  Book,"  U.  S.  Official 

Documents. 

h.  The  U.  S.  Official  Bulletin. 

i.  "Sixteen  Causes  of  War,"  Prof.  A.  C.  McLaugh- 
lin, University  of  Chicago. 

j.  "The  Great  War." 

k.  "Democracy  Today,"  Lake  Classic  Series,  Scott 
Foresman  Co. 

1.  "Ireland  and  Poland." 

m.  "When  the  Prussians  Came  to  Poland,"  by  an 
American  woman  who  lived  at  the  time  of  the 
German  invasion.     (Good  sized  volume.) 


The  United  States  1£7 

n.   "Their  Crimes." 

a.  "Microbe-Cultures  in  Bukharest." 

p.  "Why  Italy  is  with  the  Allies." 

q.  "Character  of  the  British  Empire." 

r.  French,  English,  Russian  and  Italian  "Official 

Books." 
s.  "The  Union  of  Two   Great  Peoples,"  W.   H. 

Page,  U.  S.  Minister  to  England. 

The  above  references  are  not  meant  to  be  complete,  nor 
the  only  reliable  ones,  but  they  form  a  working  basis  for  the 
proper  study  of  the  war,  and  for  that  reason  were  selected. 
The  military  events  will  be  outlined  and  commented  on  later. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

GERMAN   DIPLOMACY  AND   STEATEGY 

THE  foregoing  outline  is  not  exhaustive, — it  is  not  in- 
tended to  give  all  the  good  material  that  may  be  found 
and  read  with  profit ;  but  it  is  intended  as  a  brief  guide  and 
course  for  the  ordinary  student  and  the  busy  teacher  who 
may  not  have  time  for  a  more  extensive  study.  For  the 
person  who  wishes  to  supplement  this  reading  by  a  further 
study,  there  is  an  excellent  collection  of  noteworthy  and 
authentic  volumes  to  be  found  in  the  average  public  library, 
or  the  library  of  any  first  rate  college  or  university.  For 
a  list  of  these  books  see  Prof.  Harding's  outline  and  bibli- 
ography in  the  January  (1918)  numb«r  of  the  History 
Teachers'  Magazine, — the  article  that  we  have  referred  to 
once  or  twice  previously.  This  article  is  also  one  of  the 
"War  Information  Series,"  published  by  the  Committee  on 
Public  Information. 

Let  us  now  take  up  the  Imperial  German  government's 
policy  and  plan  of  conquest  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  as 
shown  by  our  previous  study  of  the  causes  of  the  war.  The 
first  acts  of  the  Imperial  German  government,  in  conjunction 
with  the  prearranged  plan  of  her  military  general  staff,  were 
in  accord  in  every  particular  with  her  policy  as  instigator  of 
the  war.  (Here  again  I  would  refer  the  readers  to  Mr. 
Beck's  excellent  volume,  "The  Evidence  in  the  Case.")  A 
new  verification  of  this  fact  is  found  in  the  recent  publication 
of  the  German  Prince  Lichnowsky's  arraignment  of  the  Ger- 
man government  in  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  war, 
and  particularly,  the  Kaiser's  responsibility  for  the  catas- 
trophe.   (Prince  Lichnowsky's  complete  diary  may  be  found 

128 


German  Diplomacy  and  Strategy  129 

in  "Current  History"  magazine,  published  by  the  New  York 
Times;  also  in  U.  S.  "War  Information  Series"  is  similar 
positive  proof.  See  "Conquest  and  Kultur,"  January,  1918, 
pp.  133-35.1 

Apparently  the  German  government's  original  plan  was 
to  localize  the  war,  if  possible,  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Serbia,  if  by  threats  it  could  prevent  Russia — before  Rus- 
sia's great  army  expansion  was  completed — from  coming  to 
the  aid  of  her  Serbian  fellow-Slavs.  Greater  importance  at- 
taches to  this  demonstration  of  militant  Pan-Germanism  at 
this  particular  time,  from  the  fact  that  Russia  was  still 
staggering  from  the  effects  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War  and 
the  seething  revolution  in  her  empire.  If  not  successful  in 
localizing  the  conflict,  then  the  Kaiser  and  his  lords  would 
proceed  to  bring  on  a  general  European  conflict, — which 
they  knew  was  most  likely  in  any  event — for  every  one  knew 
that  a  general  conflagration  would  then  be  inevitable.  Really, 
however,  the  Kaiser  and  his  government  desired  a  war  with 
Russia,  and  that  speedily,  in  order  that  they  might  forever 
crush  the  eastern  empire's  military  strength  and  threat  to 
German  expansion.  Thus  would  the  Teuton  war  lords  rea- 
lize their  dream  of  near-Eastern  supremacy.  So,  in  spite  of 
the  Czar's  earnest  and  sincere  attempt  to  avoid  war,  and  his 
unbroken  pledge  not  to  be  the  aggressor,  Germany  forced 
war  upon  Russia.  And  if  Russia,  then  France  would  be  in- 
volved, as  a  matter  of  course,  because  of  her  treaty  obliga- 
tions. The  military  plan  was  to  crush  France  in  the  very 
first  weeks  of  the  war,  then  turn  upon  Russia  and  prostrate 
her  before  her  great,  unwieldly  army  and  empire  could  be 
harnessed  for  effective  combat.  In  order  to  be  doubly  sure 
of  speedy  success  in  the  west,  the  Kaiser  would  take  France 
by  surprise  by  striking  through  Belgium — this  to  be  a  wholly 
unexpected  movement,  because  of  the  French,  German  and 

*  Reference  to  the  Prince's  revelations  is  also  found  in  April  4,  1918, 
number  of  the  Nation.  All  who  have  not  should  read  this  amazing  rev- 
elation from  a  German  source. 


130  The  Causes  Of  War 

English  solemn  agreement  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium. And  that  France  was  wholly  surprised  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  her  army  was  concentrating  on  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
front,  where  alone  a  German  attack  might  be  anticipated. 
Then,  with  their  initial  success,  perhaps  the  Germans  could 
frighten  off  unready  England  for  a  while,  and  dictate  the 
terms  of  a  victorious  Teuton  peace  before  Great  Britain 
should  be  ready  to  fight.  England's  honorable  entry  into  the 
war,  however,  was  a  disappointment  to  Germany,  and  her 
"contemptible  little  army,"  like  Belgium's  resistance  to  tyr- 
anny, helped  in  the  delay  to  German  arms  that  made  the 
first  battle  of  the  Marne  a  defensive  victory,  and  a  victory 
for  democratic  civilization.  Despite  German  protests  of  sur- 
prise, however,  even  the  British  nation's  entry  into  the  con- 
flict was  not  altogether  unexpected,  for  the  Kaiser's  plans 
had  deep  roots,  and  had  provided  for  England's  entry — so 
confidently  in  fact,  and  in  so  many  ways, — that  William  II 
with  his  military  lords  had  counted,  in  that  event,  upon 
crushing  his  traditional  enemy  of  the  seas,  and  becoming 
master  of  Europe  just  that  much  sooner.  To  assure  our- 
selves of  this  let  us  recall  the  constant  German  toasts  to  the 
"inevitable  day" — the  day  when  the  German  navy  should 
dominate  the  seven  seas,  instead  of  the  Union  Jack.  Al- 
though this  general  plan  was  kept  from  the  German  people 
it  was  universally  known  and  its  execution  awaited  by  the 
army  and  navy  officials. 

These  new  enemies  might  prolong  the  war  for  six  months 
or  even  a  year,  to  be  sure,  but  what  of  that?  So  much  sooner 
would  "Kultur,"  by  force  of  arms,  be  realized  as  the  guid- 
ing force  of  mankind.  Welcome,  even,  if  the  net  of  war 
should  be  spread  beyond  the  seas,  as  well  as  involving  other 
European  nations.  The  German  army  was  invincible  and 
the  German  people  disciplined,  ready  and  unconquerable,  in 
the  eyes  of  the  military  masters.  Let  us  not  forget  the  Teu- 
ton slogan :  "In  Paris  within  three  weeks,  in  London  within 
three  months,  and  in  New  York  within  three  years !"    There 


German  Diflomacy  cmd  Strategy  131 

are  varying  versions  of  the  dates  set  by  the  military  authori- 
ties of  the  Kaiser  for  the  above  victories,  but  these  state- 
ments come  too  directly,  and  from  too  many  sources  for  it 
to  be  doubted  that  such  expressions  were  common  among  the 
officers  of  the  German  army  and  navy  and  high,  responsible 
government  officials.  This  plan,  with  the  policy  and  doctrine 
it  involved,  therefore,  comprehended  even  the  United  States 
of  America,  should  we  champion  international  law  against 
the  lawless  submarine,  or  dare  uphold  the  rights  of  humanity, 
of  small  states  or  even  uphold  our  own  honor  or  dignity  as  a 
nation.  German  victory  was  a  necessity,  and  "necessity 
knows  no  law!"  Or,  again,  as  one  official  put  it,  "The  Ger- 
man people  are  right  because  they  number  87,000,000  souls !" 
Yet  William  II  of  Germany  thought  he  understood  President 
Wilson  and  the  peace-loving  American  people  well  enough  to 
be  safe  in  acting  on  the  presumption  that  we  would  never 
be  counted  among  his  active  enemies  in  war.  Our  entry  into 
the  struggle  was  his  greatest  surprise  and  disappointment. 
Uncle  Sam  did  not  give  him  his  chance  to  demonstrate  that 
(in  his  own  words)  "I  will  stand  no  nonsense  from  Uncle  Sam 
after  this  war,"  or  that,  with  a  stronger  fleet  he  "would  take 
Uncle  Sam  by  the  scruff  of  the  neck,"  as  he  once  told  a  mem- 
ber of  the  American  embassy  in  Berlin. 

One  other  major  part  of  the  Teuton  plan  must  not  be  over- 
looked, and  that  is,  the  "Hun  policy  of  frightfulness."  That 
this  policy  was  a  part  of  the  German  military  doctrine  even 
before  the  war  has  been  abundantly  proven.  With  a  con- 
stantly increasing  ferocity  it  had  been  developing  since  before 
1900.  The  first  exhibition  to  the  world  on  a  large  scale  was 
in  the  Boxer  uprising  incident  (1900),  wherein  the  Kaiser 
charged  his  troops  to  make  the  German  name  feared  and  the 
German  sword  felt,  as  was  that  of  Atilla  and  the  Huns  1,500 
years  ago.  The  following  statement  from  that  speech  might 
well  have  made  the  whole  world  shudder  with  apprehension: 
"Quarter  will  not  be  given,  no  prisoners  will  be  taken.  Use 
your  weapons  in  such  a  way  that  for  a  thousand  years  no 


132  The  Causes  Of  War 

Chinese  shall  dare  to  look  upon  a  German  askance!  Be  as 
terrible  as  the  Huns !" — William  II,  to  the  German  Chinese 
expeditionary  force,  July  27,  1900. 

The  Kaiser  and  the  German  people  instead  of  resenting 
this  characterization  "Hun"  by  the  allied  world,  should  ac- 
cept and  love  it,  for  their  "beloved  majesty"  himself  invented 
the  phrase  and  applied  it  literally  to  his  own  troops ;  and  we 
may  be  sure,  it  will  last  with  them  a  thousand  years,  as  the 
Kaiser  predicted ! 

With  the  ordinary  "Hun"  practice  of  frightfulness  the 
reader  is  too  familiar  to  warrant  us  in  an  exposition  of  them 
here.    I  will  merely  mention  them  in  passing. 

1.  Submarines, 

(a)  Firing  upon  helpless  survivors  in  the  water. 

(b)  Sinking  neutral  merchant  and  passenger  ships, 
with  their  crews,  without  warning. 

(c)  Shelling  undefended  town  (larger  ships  also 
did  so). 

(d)  Sinking  hospital  and  Red  Cross  ships,  with 
wounded,  etc. 

2.  Airships  and  Airplanes, 

(a)  Bombing  undefended  towns  and  cities,  and 
murdering  non-combatants — innocent  women, 
old  men  and  children. 

(b)  Bombing  Red  Cross  hospitals,  Y.  M.  C.  A. 
huts,  etc.,  back  of  the  lines — contrary  to  all 
former  practices  in  war. 

3.  Artillery, 

(a)  Utter  destruction  of  churches,  cathedrals  and 
other  buildings  of  non-military  character  ex- 
empt by  the  usages  of  war  from  mutilation 
and  destruction.  These  contain  many  of  the 
most  priceless  treasures  of  civilization. 

(b)  The  long-range  guns  firing  on  Paris — of  no 
military    advantage    to    Germany,    but    the 


German  Diplomacy  and  Strategy  133 

frightfulest  suffering,  grief  and  apprehension 
on  civilians  in  their  defenseless  condition.    (75 
deaths  at  Easter  worship,  etc.) 
4.  Infantry. 

(a)  Treachery  in  the  ordinary  practices  of  war- 
fare. 

(b)  Driving  women  and  children  in  front  of  them 
in  advance  upon  enemy,  so  that  enemy  must 
fire  upon  its  own  people,  if  it  would  check  Ger- 
man onrushes. 

(c)  Wearing  Red  Cross  insignia,  to  obtain  ad- 
vantage of  unstispecting  foe — concealing  ma- 
chine guns,  etc.,  on  army  stretchers. 

6.  Army  in  Retreat. 

(a)  Utter  destruction  of  everything — desolation, 
and  poisoning  wells,  etc. 

All  the  above,  however,  are  small  and  merciful  in  compari- 
son with  the  Hun  policy  of  starvation.  Few  American  citi- 
zens realize  to  what  extent,  and  with  appalling  results,  this 
terrible  weapon  has  been  wielded  by  the  German  military 
command  in  the  occupied  region  of  the  countries  overrun  by 
the  Teuton  armies.  I  shall  not  attempt  to  describe  this  mon- 
ster crime  upon  humanity,  but  merely  mention  the  facts  that, 
( 1 )  in  the  past  four  years  Germany  has  starved  to  death,  in 
conjunction  with  her  allies,  more  enemies  than  they  all  have 
killed  in  war;  (2)  the  greater  percentage  of  these  victims 
are  women  and  children,  the  hope  of  the  future  generation; 
(3)  after  thus  bringing  these  peoples  face  to  face  with  star- 
vation, she  has  used  this  extremity  as  an  excuse  before  the 
world  for  deporting  the  ablebodied,  men  and  women,  into 
Germany,  there  to  be  forced  to  work  in  support  of  the  Hun 
armies  against  their  own  people;  (4)  The  German  officers 
and  troops  deliberately  took  the  food  out  of  the  mouths  of 
these  starving  people,  and  used  it  to  their  own  hearts*  con- 
tent; (5)  it  was  himgery  starvation^  that  forced  Roumania 


134  The  Causes  Of  War 

to  make  peace  with  the  Central  Powers;  (6)  most  of  the 
factories  of  the  occupied  districts  were  stripped  of  their  ma- 
chinery, in  order  to  force  starvation  and  non-resistance  upon 
the  industrial  classes,  the  best  citizens;  (7)  this  all  has  vir- 
tually crushed  most  of  the  small  nations  of  Europe;  (8)  this 
devitalization  is  bound  to  affect  the  off-spring  of  the  sur- 
vivors for  generations  to  come;  and  (9)  there  are  30,000,000 
of  these  innocent  victims  of  Teuton  greed  and  lust  for  power, 
— think  of  it,  30,000,000 !  This  is  the  greatest  suffering  the 
world  has  ever  known,  and  may  justly  be  considered  the 
"darkest  page  in  human  history  .  .  .  wrought  deliberately 
by  a  single  nation  to  further  its  own  ends  !"^ 

*For  a  more  detailed  statement  of  this  "food  war"  of  "Kultur"  against 
humanity,  see  the  article  "Forerunners  of  Famine,"  by  Frederick  C. 
Walcott,  of  the  United  States  Food  Administration,  in  the  April  (1918) 
number  of  the  National  Geographic  Magazine. 


i 


CHAPTER  XV 

OUTLINE   OP   THE  WAR  AND   ARMISTICE   TERMS 

fXUTLINE  of  the  World  War  19H-1918 
^    L     The  Year  19U  m  the  War. 

A.  Declarations  of  war  and  beginnings  of  hostilities. 

1.  After    assassination    of    Archduke    Franz-Ferdinand, 

heir-apparent  to  the  Austrian  throne  (June  28, 
1914),  and  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Serbia  (July 
28),  Austria  declares  war  on  Serbia  (July  28). 

2.  Germany,  in  support  of  Austria,  declares  war  on  Russia 

(Aug.  1). 

3.  Germany  begins  war  on  France  (Aug.  3). 

4.  Germany  invades  Belgium  (Aug.  4). 

6.  Following  German  violation  of  Belgian  territory,  Great 
Britain  declares  war  on  Germany  (Aug.  4). 

6.  Montenegro    joins    Serbia    against    Austria-Hungary 

(Aug.  8). 

7.  Japan  declares  war  on  Germany  (Aug.  23). 

8.  Turkey  declares  war  on  Russia  (Oct.  30). 

9.  France  and  Great  Britain  declare  wax  on  Turkey  (Nov. 

5). 

B.  Military  events. 

1.  In  the  Balkans. 

(a)  Austro-Hungarian  invasion  of  Serbia — suc- 
cessfully resisted  by  Serbians  (Aug. -Dec, 
1914). 

2.  In  the  West. 

(a)  Invasion  of  Belgium,  Luxemburg  and  Lorraine 
by  Germany   (mentioned  above),  with  Paris 
as  the  immediate  objective  (Aug.  3-Sept.  5). 
135 


136  The  Causes  Of  War 

(b)  First  Battle  of  the  Mame  (Sept.  6-10),  saves 
Paris,  Joffre  and  Foch  gaining  a  defensive 
victory,  and  hurling  the  right  wing  of  the 
German  army  back  from  the  Mame  to  the 
Aisne  (with  aid  of  Gen.  French's  English 
army). 

(c)  Entrenchments,  followed  by  first  battle  of  the 
Aisne  (Sept.  15-28),  and  the  first  battle  of 
Ypres,  for  the  Channel  ports  (Oct.-Nov.). 

3.  In  the  East. 

(a)  Russian  invasion  of  Austrian  Galicia  (success- 
ful) and  German  East  Prussia  (the  latter 
shattered  by  Hindenburg's  victory  at  Tannen- 
burg,  Aug.  25-31). 

(b)  German-Austrian  invasion  of  Russian  Poland. 

(c)  Turkish  expeditions  against  Russians  in  Black 
Sea  regions  and  against  Great  Britain  in 
Egypt  (Nov.-Dec.^,  the  latter  a  complete  fail- 
ure. 

4.  In  the  Orient. 

(a)  Japanese    siege   and    capture    of   Tsing-Tau 
(Sept.   1-Nov.   6).      German  isles  in   Pacific 
taken  by  Japanese  and  British  fleets. 
6.  In  Africa. 

(a)  Togoland  and  Kamerun  occupied  by  English 
and  French  troops  (fall  and  early  winter  of 
1914). 

(b)  German  Southwest  Africa  invaded,  and  Ger- 
man East  Africa  attacked,  by  British  and 
other  colonial  troops. 

C.  Naval  engagements. 

1.  German  Cruisers  seek  safety  in  Dardanelles  (Goeben 

and  Bresleau).     Turks  forjed  to  buy  them — Ger- 
many leads  Turkey  into  war. 

2.  Battle  of  Heligoland  (really  a  British  victory). 

3.  Battle  off  Chile,  S.  A. — Admiral  von  Spee  (Ger.)  sinks 

Admiral  Craddock's  (Eng.)  little  fleet  (Nov.  1). 


Outline  of  the  War  and  Armistice  Terms         137 

4.  Battle  ofF  Falkland  Islands— Admiral  Sturdee  (Eng.) 
sinks  Von  Spec's  fleet  (Dec.  8).^ 

//.     The  Year  1915  m  the  War, 

A.  Declarations  of  War. 

1.  Italy  breaking  away  from  triple  alliance  with  Austria 

and  Germany,  declares  war  on  Austria  (May  23). 

2.  Bulgaria   (entering  on  Germany's  side)  declares  war 

on  Serbia  (Oct.  14). 

3.  England  declares  war  on  Bulgaria  (Oct.  14),  as  result 

of  Bulgaria's  move  against  Serbia. 

4.  Russia  and  Italy  declare  war  on  Bulgaria  (Oct.  19). 

B.  Military  campaigns. 

1.  In  West. 

(a)  Allied  offensive  in  France  (Jan.-April)  dead- 
lock, unbroken  by  battles  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
Champagne,  the  Labyrinth,  and  Lens,  in 
Artois. 

(b)  German  offensive — second  battle  of  Ypres: — 
in  the  Argonne — (May- July) — deadlock  un- 
broken. 

2.  In  the  East. 

(a)  Austro-German  invasion  of  Poland  checked 
before  Warsaw  by  Russians  (Feb.). 

(b)  After  reaching  Carpathians  Russians  expelled 
from  Galicia  by  Von  Mackensen;  Germans 
having  come  to  the  aid  of  worsted  Austrians 
(May- June). 

(c)  Von  Hindenburg's  drive  through  Poland  and 
northern  Russia,  to  swamps  before  Riga — 
Russian  ammunition  and  other  supplies  give 
out   (Aug.-Sept.). 

8.  In  the  Balkans. 

(a)  Austro-Bulgarian  invasion  of  Serbia — Serbia 
crushed,  overrun,  and  occupied  (Oct.-Nov.). 

*Long  before  this  time  German  commerce  had  been  driven  from  the 
ocean. 


188  The  Causes  Of  War 

(b)  Allies  fail  at  Gallipoli,  and  establish  base  at 
Saloniki,  in  Greece  (Feb.-Dec). 
4,  In  Asia. 

(a)  Turks  invade  Persia — opposed  by  Russians — 
German  plan  of  "Mittel  Europa,"  Berlin  to 
Bagdad  control  clearly  revealed. 

(b)  British  expedition  in  Mesopotamia  frustrates 
the  realization  of  this  plan. 

6.  In  Africa. 

(a)  All  Germany's  colonies  in  Africa  taken  by 
Allies,  except  part  of  German  East  Africa. 

(b)  Egypt  and  Suez  canal  safe  from  capture  by 
Turks  or  Germans. 

C.  Naval  Engagements. 

1.  Dogger   Bank    (Jan.    S4),    German    squadron    badly 

crippled,  in  attempt  to  surprise  British  fleet. 

2,  British  and  French  naval  attack  on  Dardanelles  (Mar. 

18-May  27),  in  conjunction  with  AlHed  army,  fails. 
This  failure  was  a  surprise  to  the  Germans  and 
Turks  as  well  as  to  the  Allies,  and  Ambassador 
Morganthau  tells  us,  could  have  succeeded,  if  the 
Allies  had  only  known  the  condition  of  defense  at 
this  early  stage.  Later,  when  their  armies  tried 
so  hard,  it  was  impregnable,  due  to  guns,  fortifica- 
tions and  other  supplies  that  had  come  from  Ger- 
many. 

8.  Small  Russian  victories  on  Baltic  and  Black  seas. 

4.  Internment  (in  neutral  ports)  or  destruction  of  Ger- 
man commerce  destroyers.  (The  Emden  and  other 
commerce  destroyers  had  wrought  great  havoc 
with  neutral  and  Allied  shipping.) 

fi.  German  submarine  sinkings  become  a  menace  to  Allies. 

Ill,  The  Year  1916  in  the  War, 
A.  Declarations  of  War. 

1.  Germany  declares  war  on  Portugal  (Mar.  9). 


Outline  of  the  War  arid  Armistice  Terms        139 

2.  Austria  declares  war  on  Portugal  (Mar.  15). 

3.  Italy  declares  war  on  Germany  (Aug.  27). 

4.  Roumania   declares   war   on   Austria-Hungary    (Aug. 

27) — thus  coming  in  finally  with  the  Allies. 

5.  Germany,  Turkey,  Bulgaria,  declare  war  on  Roumania 

(Aug.-Sept.). 
B.   Military  Operations. 

1.  In  the  Balkans. 

(  a )  Montenegro  and  northern  Albania  overrun  by 
Bulgarian  and  Austrian  armies  ( Jan.-Feb.). 

(b)  Allied  army  at  Saloniki,  Greece,  takes  offensive 

and  captures  Monastir,  in  Southern  Serbia, 
from  Bulgarians  (Nov.) — checked  from  fur- 
ther advance  by  subsequent  downfall  of  Rou- 
mania and  Russia.  (Italian,  French,  Serbian, 
Albanian,  English  all  in  this  army.) 

(c)  Roumania  (after  espousing  cause  of  Allies) 
rashly  attempts  to  overrun  Transylvania- 
Austrian  territory  claimed  by  Roumania — is 
invaded  and  crushed  by  the  combined  drives 
of  Von  Mackensen  and  Von  Falkenhayn 
(Aug.-Dec).  Her  complete  prostration,  how- 
ever, would  not  have  occured  but  for  the 
treacherous  betrayal  by  the  Russian  pro-Ger- 
man war  minister  Sturmer.  This,  indeed,  was 
the  major  cause  of  Roumanians  downfall. 

2.  In  the  East. 

(a)  Russian  (Grand  Duke  Nicholas)  attack  upon 
Turks  in  Armenia,  and  capture  of  Erzerum, 
Trebizond  and  Erzingan  (Jan.- July). 

(b)  Second  Russian  invasion  of  Galicia  (June  4- 
Aug.  15) — after  capture  of  350,000  Teutons 
Russians  are  halted  before  Halicz,  having  ex- 
hausted their  ammunition  and  other  supplies. 

3.  On  Italian  front. 

(a)  Austrian  invasion  of  Italy  (May- June) — ^Aus- 


140  The  Causes  Of  War 

trian  territory  in  Trentino  recovered,  and 
230  sq.  mi.  of  Italian  territory  captured,  but 
Austrians  fail  to  gain  Venetian  plain. 
(b)  Italian  counter-offensive  (June-Aug.) — re- 
gains most  of  territory  just  captured  by  Teu- 
tons and  reaches  Gorizia,  only  a  few  miles 
from  Trieste;  but  is  definitely  checked  on 
Carso  plateau. 

4.  In  Asia. 

(a)  After  an  expedition  undertaken  without  suf- 
ficient support,  Gen.  Townshend's  (Br.)  army 
surrenders  to  Turks  at  Kut-el-Amera,  al- 
though it  had  advanced  to  within  18  miles  of 
Bagdad  (April  28). 

(b)  Three  separate  Russian  expeditions  against 
Bagdad  routed  by  Turks  (Jan.-May,  July 
and  Aug.). 

5.  In  the  West. 

(a)  First  battle  of  Verdun  (Feb.- July) — German 
Crown  Prince  sacrifices  500,000  men,  but  fails 
to  take  Verdun.     "Ills  Tie  passerent  pasT' 

(b)  Anglo-French  offensive  on  the  Somme  (July- 
Nov.).  Only  slight  gains  of  territory  by 
Allies. 

(c)  French  counter-offensive  at  Verdun  (Oct.- 
Dec).  Recapture  in  a  few  days,  territory 
that  the  Crown  Prince  had  fought  desperately 
for  months  to  obtain. 

6.  In  Africa. 

(a)  All  but  a  small  mountainous  part  of  German 
East  Africa,  the  last  German  colony  in  Africay 
overrun    by    British    and    Belgian    colonial 
troops. 
C.  Naval  Operations. 

1.  Battle  of  Jutland  (May  31) — German  attempt  at  sur- 
prise of  British  fleet  fails,  but  both  sides  lose  sev- 


Outline  of  the  War  and  Arrmstice  Terms        141 

eral  vessels.  Germany  more  cautious  with  her  fleet 
after  this. 
^.  German  submarines  and  commerce  raiders  inflict  great 
damage  on  British,  French  and  neutral  shipping, 
and  involve  Germany  in  trouble  with  U.  S.  Ger- 
many promises  (with  some  reservations)  not  to 
sink  American  ships  without  warning  (a  hollow 
promise,  as  afterward  shown). 

IV,  The  Year  1917  in  the  War. 

A.  Entry  of  United  States  into  the  war  (April  6,  1917). 

1.  Causes  (see  Chapters  VII  and  XIII). 

2.  Vast  Preparations  by  United  States. 

(a)  Army  and  navy  programs. 

(b)  Selective  draft  (June  5), 

(c)  Airplane  program. 

(d)  Merchant  shipping  program. 

3.  Financing  the  War. 

(a)  Liberty  loans — ^Loans  to  the  Allies. 

(b)  Taxes. 

(c)  War  Savings  Stamp  campaigns,  prepared  for 
the  year  1918. 

4.  President  Wilson's  leadership  and  War  messages. 

6.  The  President's  fight  for  unrestricted  powers  of  ad- 
ministration, 

6.  Efi^ect  on  Allies  of  United  States'  entry  into  the  War. 

7.  Fighting   German   propaganda   and   spies    in   United 

States. 

B.  Other  declarations  of  war. 

1.  United  States  declares  war  on  Austria-Hungary  (Dec. 

7). 
9>,  Cuba  declares  war  on  Germany  (April  7). 

3.  Panama  virtually  enters  war  against  Germany  (April 

7). 

4.  Brazil  declares  war  on  Germany  (Oct.  26). 

5.  China  declares  war  on  Germany  and  Austria  (Aug.  14). 


142  The  Causes  Of  War 

6.  Greece,  after  deposition  of  King  Constantine,  declares 

war  on  Germany  and  Bulgaria  (July  2). 

7.  The  following  nations,  in  addition  to  all  the  Allied  and 

associated  states,  either  broke  off  diplomatic  rela- 
tionship with  Germany  or  declared  war  on  her: 
Argentina  (Pres.  of  Argentina  refused  to  sign  the 
break  voted  by  the  national  legislature),  Bolivia, 
Guatemala,  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  Peru,  Uru- 
guay, Ecquador. 
C.  Military  Operations, 
1.  In  the  West. 

(a)  Second  battle  of  the  Somme.  (British  ad- 
vance to  within  range  of  Bapaume  (Jan.- 
March),  followed  by  German  withdrawal  to 
"Hindenburg  line,"  from  Somme  to  Rheims, 
the  French  joining  with  British  in  driving  the 
Germans  back  to  this  line.  Teutons  had  thus 
abandoned  one-fourth  of  the  territory  they 
had  held  in  France).^ 

(b)  Battle  of  Arras  (April- June)  British  threaten^ 
the  coal  city  of  Lens,  but  fail  to  capture  it. 
Only  a  few  sq.  mi.  of  territory  won. 

(c)  Battle  of  the  Aisne — ^French  offensive — Sois- 
sons  to  Rheims  (April-Nov.) — drives  the  Ger- 
mans back  beyond  Chemm-de-Dames,  with 
about  35,000  prisoners. 

Most  wanton  destruction  marked  the  path  of  the  Germans 
in  retreat.  Much  as  had  been  heard  before,  and  witnesses, 
in  Belgium  and  France,  of  the  German  atrocities,  this  fiendish 
desolation  was  a  shock  to  the  civilized  world. 

(d)  Messlnes   ridge,  blown   up   and   occupied  by 

British,  in  Belgium,  near  Ypres  (June), 

'  This  reversal  taught  the  Allies  the  absolute  necessity  of  unity  of  com- 
mand and  unity  of  counsel  among  the  Allies,  and  led  directly  to  the 
Inter-Allied  Council  at  Paris  and  to  the  appointment  of  Gen.  Foch  as 
Generalissimo  of  all  the  Allied  armies  on  the  West  and  Italian  fronts. 


Outlme  of  the  War  and  Armistice  Terms        143 

(e)  German  attack  on  Ypres  (July) — captured 
only  about  1,200  prisoners. 

(f)  Battle  of  Flanders — around  Ypres — (July- 
Dec).  English  and  French  take  all  the  high 
ground  beyond  Ypres. 

(g)  French  second  counter-thrust  at  Verdun 
(Aug.-Sept.) — gains  back  remainder  of  ter- 
ritory German  Crown  Prince  had  taken  at 
such  cost  the  year  before. 

(h)  Battle  of  Cambrai  (Nov.-Dec). 

(1)  General  Byng  (Br.),  without  artillery 
preparation,  advances  on  35  miles  front, 
capturing  many  villages,  and  advancing 
from  10  to  20  miles. 

(^)   German  similar  counter-stroke  gains  back 
half  the  territory  Gen.  Byng  had  just 
captured. 
(i)  American    expeditionary    -force,    under    Gen. 

Pershing — 

(•1)  First  United  States  troops  land  June 
26-27. 

(2)  First  American  troops  in  action,  October. 

(3)  No  heavy  fighting  in  1917  on  American 
sectors. 

2.  In  the  East. 

(a)  Russian  winter  offensive — checked  by  Germans 
(Jan.). 

(b)  Russian  summer  offensive — under  Kerensky 
and  the  new  Russian  republic.  Captures 
Halicz  and  threatens  Lemburg,  when  part  of 
Russian  forces  mutiny,  and  break  the  power  of 
the  Russian  drive.  Followed  by  Russian  de- 
mobilization and  rule  of  the  Bolsheviki. 

3.  In  Italy. 

(a)  Italian  campaign  (July-Oct.).  Progressing 
successfully,  if  slowly,  when  abruptly  stopped 
by- 


144  The  Causes  Of  War 

(b)  Austro-German  counter  campaign  (Oct.-Dec). 
By  tactics  similar  to  those  used  against  Ser- 
bia and  Roumania,  with  the  additional  vicious 
campaign  of  "propaganda"  which  disconcert- 
ed one  of  the  Italian  armies,  the  Teutons  were 
able  to  drive  the  Italians  back  to  the  Piave 
river  and  take  nearly  300,000  prisoners.  But 
with  speedy  help  from  the  British  and  French, 
with  Gen.  Foch  in  command,  Italy  was  saved 
from  threatened  disaster. 
4.  In  Asia. 

(a)  British  Mesopotamian  campaign  (Feb.-Oct.). 
British    recapture   Kutel-Amera    (Feb.)    and 

'capture  Bagdad  (March). 

(b)  Russian  aid  to  British  in  this  sector  stopped 
by  Russian  revolution. 

(c)  Hejaz  revolts,  and  declares  independence  of 
Turkey. 

(d)  General  Allenby  (Br.)  captures  Jerusalem 
(Dec.  10). 

6.  In  the  Balkans. 

(a)  Complete  collapse  of  Roumania  (Jan.-Feb.), 
due  to  betrayal  of  Roumanians  by  Russia's 
Pro-German  war  minister  Sturmer. 

(b)  Saloniki  armies  of  Allies  powerless  because 
of  Russian  revolution  in  hands  of  Bolsheviki ; 
but  an  army  of  300,000  Greeks  being  trained 
to  aid  Allies  in  1918. 

6.  In  Africa. 

(a)  German  East  Africa,  last  German  colony  com- 
pletely overrun  by  Allies. 

7.  Naval  Operations. 

(a)  Battles  in  Gulf  of  Riga — inconclusive. 

(b)  Submarines — German  renewal  of  unrestricted 
submarine  warfare  (Feb.  1)  brings  United 
States  into  the  War,  while  it  threatens  in  the 


Outline  of  the  War  and  Armistice  Terms        145 

spring  and  early  summer  months   to   starve 
England  and  France  into  surrender. 

r.    The  Year  1918  in  the  War. 
A.  Military  operations. 

1.  In  the  East. 

(a)  While  Brest-Litovsk  peace  treaty  is  being 
made  by  Germany  and  the  Bolsheviki,  German 
invasion  of  Russia  in  violation  of  the  treaty 
continues.     (  Jan.-March. ) 

(b)  Finland,  after  declaring  independence  of  Rus- 
sia, fights  Bolsheviki  "Reds,'*  to  gain  it. 
Later  Fins  helped  by  German  troops. 

(c)  At  least  five  civil  wars  going  on  in  Russia: 
Fins  vs.  Bolsheviki;  Ukraine  vs.  Bolsheviki; 
Bolsheviki  and  nobility  of  Esthonia ;  Cossacks 
and  Bolsheviki  on  the  Don;  Bolsheviki  and 
Tartar  on  the  Volga.    (Feb.-March.) 

2.  On  Italian  front. 

(a)  Italians  hold  against  repeated  assaults  of 
Austro-Germans  (Jan.-Feb.),  on  Piave.  Aid 
is  given  Italians  by  British  and  French,  and 
finally,  by  American  troops. 

3.  On  Western  front. 

(a)  Great  German  offensive  (made  possible  by  sur- 
render of  Russia  and  release  of  half  a  mil- 
lion German  troops  from  the  Eastern  front) 
begins  against  British  in  the  West.  (March 
21.)  In  10  days  Germans  advance  on  an  aver- 
age of  15  miles  and  reach  a  point  within  12 
miles  of  Amiens — Battle  front  from  Arras  to 
La  Fere.  In  last  days  of  battle  French  come 
to  aid  of  British.  Germans  had  advanced  to 
within  60  miles  of  Paris,  and  captured  about 
1,000  sq.  mi.  of  territory.  Disaster  to  Brit- 
ish fifth  army. 


146  The  Causes  Of  War 

German  long  range   gun  bombards   Paris 
(March  23,  for  week). 

(b)  Second  phase  of  German  drive. 

(1)  Battle  of  Amiens.  With  reenforcements 
of  men  and  guns  Germans  renew  drive 
upon  Amiens.  Allies  drenched  with  poi- 
son gas  from  new,  more  deadly  German 
shell.  Americans  (probably  100,000) — 
'participate  in  this  fight,  and  save  Amiens 
(April  30). 

(c)  Third  phase  of  German  offensive. 

(1)  Battle  line  shifts  further  north,  and  Ger- 
mans advance  and  occupy  Armentieres  in 
Belgium  and  Messines  ridge,  near  Ypres. 
(Broke  Portugese  line  here.)  Mt.  Kem- 
mel  falls  to  Germans. 

(d)  Fourth  phase  (on  the  Aisne),  (May  27- June 

1). 

(1)  Germans  cross  Aisne,  May  27. 

(2)  Germans  cross  Vesle,  May  28. 

(3)  Germans  reach  Soissons,  May  29. 

(4)  Germans  reach  the  Marne,  May  30. 

(5)  Americans  halt  Germans  at  Marne  (June 
1 ) — Cross  Marne  and  bring  back  German 

prisoners  (June  19). 

(e)  Fifth  phase — (between  Montdidier  and  Noy- 
on  (June  9). 

(1)  Germans  achieve  only  slight  gains  on  60 
mile  front. 

(f)  Final  German  drive  (Soissons  to  Rheims,  July 
15-18). 

(1)   Germans   definitely   halted   within   three 
days. 
4.  Great  Allied  counter-off ensi've  (started  by  Americans 
July  15).     Americans  captured  Chateau-Thierry 
ftnd  drove  Germans  back  across  Marne. 


Outline  of  the  War  and  Armistice  Terms        147 

(a)  Americans  strike  apex  of  German  Rheims- 
Soissons  pocket. 

(b)  French  and  Americans  drive  in  sides  of 
German  pocket  (July  18  through  month  of 
August),  until  the  whole  salient  is  obliterated. 
Fought  Germans  back  continuously  for  seven 
weeks. 

(c)  French,  British  and  Americans  launch  ter- 
rific offenses  in  quick  succession,  all  the  way 
from  Rheims  to  the  North  Sea  (Aug.-Sept. 
10).  A  few  of  the  details  of  their  speedy  suc- 
cesses are: 

(1)  Australians  occupy  Perronne  (Sept.  1). 

(2)  British  and  French  advance  on  90  mile 
front,  from  Cambrai  to  Soissons,  cap- 
turing Ham,  Guiscard,  Chauny,  as  some 
of  leading  objectives.^ 

(3)  The  first  ail-American  army  under  ex- 
clusive American  command  in  a  dashing, 
brilliantly  executed  offensive  completely 
wipes  out  the  St,  Mihiel  salient  (which 
the  Germans  had  held  for  four  years)  in 
twenty-seven  hours  (Sept.  12-13). 

(d)  British  and  French  drive  forward  on  both 
sides  of  St.  Quentin  and  capture  10,000  pris- 
oners Sept.  18. — French  take  St.  Quentin  Oct. 
1. 

(e)  American  army  assigned  the  difficult  Argorme 
region  begins  (Sept.  26)  the  great  final  battle 
of  the  Argonne  forest  and  country — advance 
continually  until  the  very  last  hour  of  the 
war,  on  Nov.  11. 

(f)  Similar  Allied   and   American   successes   are 

•Allied  armies  capture  112,000  Germans  in  July  and  August.  For 
complete  account  of  the  American  participation  in  the  war,  July  15  to 
Nov.  11,  see  General  Pershing's  report  to  the  Secretary  of  War  in  Jem,, 
1919,  number  of  Review  of  Reviews. 


148  The  Causes  Of  War 

achieved  all  way  north  to  region  of  the  Bel- 
gian coast.     (Oct.) 

(Here  things  were  happening  so  rapidly  over  the  various 
fields  of  conflict  and  in  so  many  different  departments  of 
activity  that  we  leave  the  Western  front  for  a  short  time, 
to  chronicle  some  of  the  major  events  in  these  other  fields.) 

6.  On  the  Eastern  Front. 

(a)  Germans  advance  toward  Petrograd   (Feb.). 

(b)  Turks  take  Trebizond  (Feb.  25). 

(c)  Germans  complete  their  conquest  in  Finland 
(May  3). 

6.  In  the  Balkans, — Greeks  attack  Turks  in  Macedonia, 

(May  30)  ;  1,700  prisoners. 

7.  On  Italian  front, — Italians  begin  beating  back  Austro- 

Germans  beyond  Piave  (Jan.),  soon  followed  by 
Austrian  offensive  1,000,000  strong  which  crossed 
the  Piave,  but  is  soon  driven  back  (June- July), 

8.  In  Asia. 

(a)  British  take  Jerico  (Feb.  22),  Damascus, 
and  destroy  Turk  army  (Sept. -Oct.). 

(b)  Japanese,  British  and  American  (marines) 
troops  land  at  Vladivostok  (April  5-7),  to 
oppose  Germans  and  Bolsheviki. 

(c)  British,  in  700  mile  march  from  Bagdad  take 
Baku  (oil  fields.) 

B.  Naval  Operations. 

(a)  British  bombard  and  sink  Goehen  and  Bres- 
leau  in  Dardanelles  (Jan.  20). 

(b)  British  attack  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend  sub- 
bases  (April  23),  effectively  dam  up  one  and 
all  but  destroy  the  other. 

C.  In  northern  Europe   (Russia),  Allied  and  American 

troops  land  at  Archangel,  against  Germans  and 
Bolsheviki. 

D.  In  the  Orient — ^American  troops  from  Philippines  land 


Outline  of  the  War  and  Armistice  Terms         149 

at  Vladivostok  (Aug.  15),  to  cooperate  with  Jap- 
anese and  other  AlHes. 
E.  Serbian  (reorganized  army)  drive  in  Balkans  defeats 
Bulgars  and  advances  60-70  miles — other  Allies  co- 
operate, and  straighten  line  (Sept.-Oct.). 

WAR    AND    PEACE 

I.  (1918)  Concluded.  (We  shall  go  back  to  the  first  week 
in  October,  so  as  to  connect  up  the  last  allied  movements  in 
the  field  better  than  we  were  able  to  the  last  month,  before 
hostiUties  ceased.) 

A.  The  Crushing  allied  Drive  (Oct.-Nov.  11). 

1.  Germans  evacuate  Lens  (coal  center  in  France)  (Oct. 

3.     Austrian  naval  base  at  Durazzo  destroyed  by 
Italian,  British  and  American  ships  (Oct.  3). 

2.  French  fleet  take  Bierut,  Syria  (Oct.  7). 

3.  Cambrai  falls  (Oct.  7)  to  British. 

4.  Americans  clear  Argonne  forest  of  enemy  (Oct.  11). 

Serbs  occupy  Nish  same  day. 
6.  French  take  Laon  and  La  Fere  (Oct.  12). 

6.  Belgians  take  Roulers  (Oct.  13). 

7.  Italians  enter  Durazzo,  Albania  (Oct.  14). 

8.  Germans  evacuating  Brussels   (Oct.  15)  ;  Bohemia  in 

hands  of  revolutionists. 

9.  Americans  take  Grand  Pre.     British  enter  Lille  (last 

important    stronghold    of    Germans    in    northern 
French  except  Valenciennes)  (Oct.  16). 

10.  Ostend,  Zeebrugge  and  Thiult  (sub-bases  of  Germans) 

occupied  by  Allies  (Oct.  17). 

11.  German  army  driven  to  border  of  Holland, — 15,000 

Germans  cut  off  are  interned  in  Holland  (Oct.  21). 

12.  British  take  Valenciennes  (Oct.  22). 

13.  Italian  drive  on  Piave  started — one  of  the  greatest 

offensives  of  the  war.    Continues  for  only  ten  days, 
when  500,000  Austrians  are  taken  prisoners  and 


150  The  Causes  Of  War 

850,000  horses  and  $1,000,000,000  fall  into  hands 
of  Italians.  Italians  had  only  one  regiment  of 
Americans  and  five  divisions  of  British  and  French, 
to  help  them;  so  the  Italians  must  be  given  the 
credit  for  the  biggest  single  military  victory  of  the 
war.  Half  the  Austrian  forces  of  1,000,000  men, 
were  captured.  This  overwhelming  disaster  ex- 
plains Austria-Hungary's  immediate  suit  for  an 
armistice  and  speedy  surrender  (Nov.  4). 

14.  British  take  Aleppo  (in  Turkey)  and  U.  S.  first  army 
completes  capture  of  20,000  Germans  (Oct.  26). 

16.  British  take  Kerkuk  (155  miles  northwest  of  Bag- 
dad) (Oct.  27). 

16.  Turks  evacuate  Baku  (Oct.  29). 

17.  French   and   Serbian   cavalry   reach  Belgrade,   thus 

freeing  Serbia  of  Teutons  (Nov.  1). 

18.  Revolt  of  German  sailors  and  soldiers  at  Kiel  (Nov. 

6)  presages  revolution  in  Germany. 

19.  U.  S.  troops  take  Sedan  (Nov.  7), — ^where  the  Prus- 

sian army  took  prisoner  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
III,  with  200,000  troops,  in  1870,  and  sealed  their 
triumph  of  that  year  over  France. 

20.  Belgians  reach  Ghent;  British,  Mons;  French  reach 

Belgium  (Nov.  11.)  * 

B.  We  shall  now  take  up  the  armistice  terms  as  imposed  upon 
the  chief  Central  Powers,  Austro-Hungary  and  Germany, 
with  a  brief  prelude  of  the  political  events  that  followed  in 
rapid  succession  in  the  Central  Powers  during  October  and 
the  first  days  of  November. 

1.   (a)  Czar  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria  abdicates  (Oct.  4), 

after  Bulgaria's  collapse  in  Macedonia.    His 

son  Boris  takes  throne, 

*The  allied  advances  continued  everywhere  along  the  Western  front, 
with  increasing  speed,  until  the  hour  of  11:00  a.  m.,  November  11,  when 
the  German  military  command  had  agreed  to  accept  the  Allied  terms 
for  an  armistice  as  finally  directed  by  the  authority  of  Marshal  Foch. 
Practically  all  of  France  and  western  Belgium  was  cleared  before  hos- 
tilities ceased. 


Outlirw  of  the  War  and  Armistice  Terms         151 

(b)  Bulgaria  in  revolution — King  Boris  quits 
(Nov.  2). 

(c)  Turkish  (War)  cabinet  resigns  (Oct.  8). 

(d)  Emperor  Charles  attempts  reforms  in  Austria- 
Hungary,  to  save  his  empire  (Oct,  18),  but 
is  too  late.  (Collapse  of  Austria-Hungary 
comes  as  result  of  Italian  successes  in  last 
week  of  October.)     Abdicates  Nov.  11. 

(e)  Von  Hertling,  last  war  chancellor  of  Germany, 
falls  from  Power  (Oct.  3),  and  is  replaced  by 
Prince  Maximilian,  a  man  of  peace  (Oct.  4). 

(f)  Kaiser  consents  to  electoral  reform  (Sept, 
30),  but  too  late, 

(g)  During  October  German  states  carry  out 
sweeping  refoirms,  weakening  Kaiser's  war 
powers,  granting  suffrage  reform,  etc.,  hut  all 
too  late. 

(a)  New  German  Chancellor  (Maximilian  of  Ba- 
den) asks  for  armistice  and  peace  negotia- 
tions (Oct.  4), 

(b)  President  Wilson  replies  to  German  note  of 
Oct,  4,  on  Oct,  7,  refusing  peace  by  negotia- 
tion. 

(c)  Karl  Liebnecht  (anti-war  Socialist),  pardoned 
by  Kaiser  (Oct.  9). 

(d)  Wilson  calls  for  independence  of  Czechs  and 
Jugo-Slavs  from  Austria-Hungary,  as  reply 
to  Austria's  plea  for  peace  (Oct.  19). 

(e)  German  note  accepts  Wilson's  terms  of  peace 
(Oct.  21). 

(f)  Wilson  refers  German  note  of  Oct.  21  to 
Allies  (Oct.  28). 

(g)  Turkey  signs  armistice  (Oct.  31)  ;  Allied  fleet 
sails  for  Constantinople. 

(h)   Armistice  with  Austria-Hungary  signed  (Nov. 

3); 
(i)  Kaiser  refuses  to  abdicate  (Nov.  8),  but  is 


152  The  Causes  Of  War 

shown  he  must,  and  renounces  Imperial  and 
Prussian  crowns  (Nov.  9). 
(j)  Germany  (under  Socialist  ministry)  accepts 
Allied  terms  of  armistice,  and  hostilities  cease 
(Nov.  11).  By  this  date  all  four  of  the 
Central  Powers  had  surrendered  to  Allies,  on 
Allied  terms. 

AEMISTICE   TEEMS 

II.     Armistice  Terms. 

1.  Bulgaria,     Surrenders  to  Allies  on  Sept.  30. 

(a)  Bulgarian  army  to  demobilize  immedi- 
ately. 

(b)  Arms,  ammunition  and  supplies  to  be 
turned  over  to  Allies. 

(c)  All  Greek  and  Serbian  territory  to  be 
evacuated  by  Bulgarian  troops. 

(d)  All  means  of  transportation,  including 
the  Danube,  be  opened  to  Allies  for  op- 
erations against  Austria  and  Germany. 
(By  this  action  Turkey  was  completely 
cut  oif  from  her  two  remaining  allies, 
Austria  and  Germany,  and  with  con- 
tinued defeats,  was  soon  upon  her  knees 
begging  for  peace.) 

2.  Turkey  surrenders  to  Allies  (Nov.  1).  Terms 
similar  to  those  imposed  on  Bulgaria. 

3.  Austria-Hung ar 2/  surrenders  to  Allies  (Nov. 

(a)  Demobilize  her  armies  and  call  home  all 
Austria's  troops  helping  Germany. 

(b)  Withdraw  all  Austrian  forces  from  in- 
vaded territories,  leaving  all  war  sup- 
plies, and  even  coal,  to  be  disposed  of  by 
Allies. 

'  Because  of  their  importance,  and  the  relation  they  are  certain  to  bear 
to  the  final  peace  terras  we  give  the  conditions  that  were  imposed  upon 
Austria-Hungary  and  upon  Germany  more  in  detail. 


Outline  of  the  War  cmd  Armistice  Terms    .     153 

(c)  Virtually  one-half  Austrian  artillery  and 
equipment  on  Austrian  soil  to  be  sur- 
rendered. 

(d)  All  Germans  in  Austria  to  leave  within 
fifteen  days  or  he  interned.  (Bulgaria 
had  acted  similarly  with  Germans  and 
Austrians  at  earlier  date.) 

(e)  Allied  and  U.  S.  forces  to  take  possession 
of  all  military  points  which  they  consid- 
ered needful. 

(f)  Allies  to  have  use  of  Austrian  railroads 
to  operate  against  Germany. 

(g)  Austria  surrendered  all  German  submar- 
ines in  Austrian  waters,  together  with 
fifteen  best  Austrian  submarines,  three 
Austrian  battleships,  three  cruisers,  nine 
destroyers,  twelve  torpedo  boats,  and 
other  naval  vessels  to  be  selected  by  the 
Allies. 

(h)  All  war  vessels  not  surrendered  to  Allies 
to  be  concentrated  and  disarmed  under 
Allied  direction. 

(i)  Austria-Hungary  returns  all  Allied  pris- 
oners of  war,  but  Allies  not  to  return 
Austrian  prisoners. 

( j  )  Austria  must  not  destroy  property  in  her 
retreat. 

(k)  Allied  war  and  merchant  vessels  to  have 
free  navigation  of  all  Austrian  waters, 
including  Danube  (Allies  to  take  pos- 
session of  Danube  fortresses,  to  guaran- 
tee its  free  navigation),  for  use  against 
Germany. 

(1)  Allied  blockade  of  Austria  and  her  allies 
subject  to  will  of  Allies. 

(m)   All  aircraft  of  Austria  and  her  allies 


164i  The  Causes  Of  War 

left  in  Austria  to  be  put  out  of  commis- 
sion, and  kept  by  Allies  until  after  war 
ends  with  Germany. 

(n)  All  Austrian  naval  bases  to  be  occupied 
by  Allies,  and  all  naval  supplies  or  craft 
of  Allies  held  by  Austria  to  be  sur- 
rendered. 

(o)  Austria-Hungary  to  keep  no  army  except 
as  a  police  force  to  maintain  order. 

(p)  ItaHan  claims  (that  which  Italy  went  to 
war  to  gain)  provinces  held  by  Austria- 
Hungary  before  the  war  to  be  returned 
to  Italy.  Here  the  exact  boundary  was 
laid  out,  with  great  precision,  evidently, 
to  mark  out  the  boundary  settlement  m 
the  final  peace  terms. 

(q)  Local  government  (civil)  to  be  reinstated 
in  Austrian  countries,  but  under  Allied 
oversight  and  control.^ 
4.  Germany* s  Terms  of  Armistice,     (Surrendered 

to  Allies,  November  11.) 
I.     Military  clauses  on  Western  Front, 

1.  Immediate  evacuation  by  Germany  of  in- 
vaded countries — Belgium,  France,  Al- 
sace-Lorraine, Luxemburg — to  be  com- 
pleted within  fifteen  days  days  from  sig- 
nature of  armistice.  German  troops  not 
out  by  that  time  become  prisoners  of  war. 
Allies  to  occupy  territory  as  Germans  re- 
treat. 

9>.  Repatriation,  to  be  completed  within  four- 
teen days,   of  all  inhabitants   of  above 

•The  seventeen  armistice  points  given  above  show  how  complete  was 
the  surrender  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  government.  These  armistice 
terms,  which  are  not  yet  a  peace,  are  more  complete  and  humiliating  than 
the  "unconditional  surrender"  of  any  previous  sovereign  nation  in  mod- 
ern times. 


Outline  of  the  War  and  Armistice  Terms         155 

mentioned  countries,  including  hostages 
and  persons  under  trial  or  convicted. 

3.  Surrender  of  5,000  guns ;  30,000  machine 

guns;  3,000  minen-werfers ;  2,000  aero- 
planes. 

4.  Evacuation  by  German  armies  of  all  terri- 

tory on  left  bank  of  Rhine — these  coun- 
tries to  be  administered  by  local  authori- 
ties under  Allied  and  U.  S.  control,  or 
armies  of  occupation.  A  neutral  zone 
east  of  Rhine  to  an  average  of  about  35 
kilometers,  from  borders  of  Holland  all 
the  way  to  Switzerland,  to  be  reserved, 
as  safeguard,  until  peace.  Germans  have 
19  days  from  Nov.  11,  to  evacuate  Rhine 
territory. 

5.  Civilians  in  above  territory  to  be  left  un- 

disturbed, with  no  damage  to  property  or 
persons.  Military  establishments  of  all 
kinds  to  be  turned  over  to  Allies  intact. 
Stores  of  food,  etc.,  to  be  left  for 
civilians. 

6.  Five  thousand  locomotives,  50,000  wagons, 

10,000  motor  lorries  to  be  delivered  to  Al- 
lies, together  with  all  railways  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  All  barges  taken  from  Allies 
to  be  restored  to  them. 

7.  Allied  and  U.  S.  armies  to  have  right  of 

requisition  in  aU  occupied  territory.  Up- 
keep of  troops  of  occupation  in 
Rhineland  (excluding  Alsace-Lorraine) 
charged  to  Germany. 

8.  German   command  must   reveal  all  mines, 

fuses,  etc.,  and  assist  in  finding  and 
destroying  them ;  also  all  poisoned  wells, 
etc. 


166  The  Causes  Of  War 

9.  Immediate  return  of  all  allied  and  U.  S. 

prisoners  of  war  without  reciprocity  on 
Allies'  part. 

10.  Sick  and  wounded  who  cannot  be  removed 

from    evacuated   territory    to    be    cared 
for  by  Germans,  who  will  be  given  medical 
material  required  for  same. 
XL  Eastern  German  Front, 

1.  Immediate  evacuation  by  all  German  troops 

and  German  agents,  of  any  territory 
mhich  before  the  war  belonged  to  Russia, 
Roumania  or  Turkey,  and  withdrawal 
within  borders  of  Germany. 

2.  German   troops    to    cease    all   requisitions 

and  seizures  for  German  use,  from  said 
territories. 

S.  Abandonment  of  treaties  of  Brest-Litovsk 
and  Bucharest  and  supplementary  treat- 
ies. 

4.  Allies  to  have  free  access  to  territories 
evacuated  by  Germans  on  eastern  front, 
in  order  to  convey  supplies  of  food,  etc., 
to  population,  or  for  any  other  purpose. 

III.  Unconditional   Capitulation  in   East   Africa 
within  one  month. 

IV.  General  Clauses, 

1.  Repatriation  of  all  allied  and  U.  S.  citi- 
zens whatsoever,  not  included  in  clause  9 
above. 

%  Reparation  for  all  damages  done.  Imme- 
diate restitution  of  the  cash  deposit  of  the 
National  Bank  of  Belgium,  restitution 
of  Russian  and  Roumanian  gold  taken  by 
Germany,  same  to  be  held  in  trust  by 
AlHes  until  final  peace. 

V.  Naval  Conditions. 

1.  Notification  to  neutrals  by  Germany  that 


OwtUne  of  the  War  and  Armistice  Terms         157 

freedom  of  navigation  in  all  territorial 
waters  is  given  to  naval  and  mercantile 
marines  of  allied  powers. 

%  All  naval  and  marine  prisoners  of  war  of 
Allied  and  associated  powers  to  be  re- 
turned, without  reciprocity. 

8.  Surrender  to  Allies  and  U.  S.  of  160  sub- 
marines. All  other  submarines  to  be 
paid  off,  disarmed  and  placed  under  su- 
pervision of  U.  S.  and  Allies. 

4.  The  following  surface  vessels  to  be  surren- 
dered: six  battle  cruisers,  ten  battleships, 
eight  light  cruisers,  fifty  destroyers  of 
most  modern  type.  All  other  surface 
warships  to  be  concentrated  in  German 
naval  bases  designated  by  Allies,  and 
placed  under  supervision  of  Allies  and  U. 
S.  All  vessels  of  auxiliary  fleet  to  be 
disarmed. 

6.  All  mines  and  obstructions  laid  by  Ger- 
mans outside  German  territorial  waters 
(this  means  the  German  war  zone)  to  be 
swept  away  by  help  of  Germans. 

6.  Freedom  of  access  to  Baltic  sea  to  be  given 

to  naval  and  merchantile  marine  of  Allies 
and  U.  S.,  with  their  right  to  occupy 
German  fortifications  to  guarantee  same, 
and  right  to  sweep  all  German  territorial 
waters,  with  German  aid. 

7.  Allied   blockade   of   Germany   to   continue 

and  all  German  ships  at  sea  liable  to  cap- 
ture. 

8.  All  naval  aircraft  to  be  concentrated  and 

immobilized  in  German  bases  specified  by 
Allies  and  U.  S. 

9.  In  evacuating  Belgian  coast  and  ports  Ger- 

many shall  abandon  all  merchant  ships, 


158  The  Causes  Of  War 

tugs,  lighters,  cranes  and  harbor  ma- 
terials, and  inland  navigation  materials, 
stores  and  supplies  of  all  kinds. 

10.  All  Black  Sea  ports  to  be  evacuated  by 

Germany,  all  Russian  war  vessels  seized 
by  Germany  to  be  handed  over  to  Allies 
and  U.  S. 

11.  All  Allied  merchant  vessels  to  be  restored 

No  destruction  of  ships  or  materials  be- 
fore evacuation,  surrender  or  restoration. 

12.  German  notification  to  world  (especially 

Norway,  Sweden,  Denmark  and  Holland) 
that  all  restrictions  on  trading  with  Al- 
lies and  associated  countries,  are  re- 
moved. 

13.  No  transfer  of  German  shipping  to  any 

neutral  after  signature  to  armistice. 

VI.  Duration  of  armistice,  30  days,  with  option 

to  extend. 

VII.  Limit  for  German  reply  to  armistice  terms 
— 72  hours.*^ 

The  above,  therefore,  were  the  conditions  that  Germany 
accepted  to  gain  an  armistice, — a  mere  cessation  of  hostili- 
ties— not  peace. 

A  brief  perusal  of  the  above,  «<nd  a  comparison  of  the 
armistice  terms  imposed  upon  the  Central  Powers  indi- 
vidually will  reveal  the  fact  that  those  Germany  was  obliged 
to  meet  were  the  most  drastic  of  all,  as  indeed  they  should 
be.  Moreover,  they  were  the  most  specific  and  humiliating 
in  all  history ;  and  came  only  four  Tiwnths  after  the  Kaiser 
boasted  last  July  of  German  victory  and  the  "shining  Ger- 
man sword,"  as  he  was  sacrificing  500,000  more  of  his  sub- 

^  Slight  changes  were  made  in  several  of  these  armistice  conditions 
before  they  were  finally  signed  by  the  oflBcial  German  delegates,  but  were 
of  a  technical  and  very  minor  character,  and  did  not  at  all  alter  the 
nature  or  severity  of  their  application. 


Outline  of  the  War  and  Armistice  Terms         159 

jects  in  a  struggle  that  every  people  but  his  own  by  that 
time  realized  was  a  hopeless  one  for  him  and  all  he  stood  for. 
Thus  ends  the  "divine  right"  rule  of  the  Hohenzollems,  and 
the  "divinity  that  doth  hedge  about  a  king." 

The  peace  problem  is  quite  a  different  issue.  We  shall 
take  it  up  in  our  next  chapter,  and  continue,  as  the 
peace  conference  sits.  Yet,  there  are  several  clauses  in  the 
armistice  terms  that  are  meant  to  be  permanent,  such  for 
example,  as  the  giving  up  of  Alsace-Lorraine  by  Germany, 
the  boundary  marked  out  between  Italy  and  the  former 
States  of  the  Austrian  empire,  the  renunciation  of  Cofistan- 
tinople  by  Turkey,  reparation  for  damages  done,  abandon- 
ment of  all  German  official  propaganda  in  Russia  and  the 
Brest-Litovsk  treaty,  etc.  The  exactness  of  the  armistice 
terms  and  the  permanent  character  of  several  of  them,  as 
well  as  the  promptness  with  which  they  were  submitted  to  the 
German  commissioners  after  their  application  for  them  on 
November  7,  shows  that  the  men  who  framed  them  and  the 
responsible  statesmen  back  of  them,  had  been  shaping  them 
for  some  time  before  hostilities  ceased.  Their  effect  there- 
fore was  instant. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

OFPICIAIi  PEACE  DISCUSSIONS   AND   NEGOTIATIONS 

WHILE  we  are  awaiting  the  final  consummation  of  the 
armistice  conditions  and  the  preHminaries  of  peace, 
we  may  well  give  our  attention  at  this  time  to  the  study  of 
the  movements  for  peace  up  to  the  present.  Accordingly,  we 
shall  take  up  these  developments,  as  shown  by  the  statements 
of  war  aims  of  the  belligerents  by  the  official  representatives 
of  those  belligerents,  or  from  semi-official  sources.  This  will 
also  include  peace  proposals  from  neutrals,  as  well  as  the 
principles  of  peace  and  peace  terms,  set  forth  from  time  to 
time  by  the  United  States  and  the  allied  nations,  and  by  the 
Central  Powers. 

Aside  from  the  above  movements  there  have  been  various 
efforts  at  peace,  it  is  true,  such  as  the  peace  propaganda  by 
the  Socialists,  certain  German-Americans,  the  Pan-German 
peace  campaign,  the  "peace  at  any  price"  clique,  etc. ;  but 
these  latter  have  all  been  so  ill-advised,  so  absurd,  or  so  un- 
American  and  abortive,  that  we  need  not  consider  them  in  this 
connection.  Moreover,  the  crises  in  which  they  figured  have 
all  parsed,  and  we  may  let  that  phase  of  the  subject  rest  in 
oblivion.  There  is  one  outgrowth  of  these  factors  that  will 
not  rest,  however,  but  has  constantly  become  more  menacing, 
— and  that  is,  the  Bolshevik  movement  in  Europe  and  the 
principles  of  the  I.  W.  W.  in  America.  This  condition 
among  a  considerable  portion  of  the  earth's  people  today  is 
nothing  less  than  a  mental  state  and  the  philosophy  of  an- 
archly  and  as  such  it  must  be  met  and  put  down.  This  state 
of  anarchy  is  the  other  extreme  from  autocracy,  and  because 
it  is  actually  being  accomplished  in  governmental  affairs  in 

160 


Official  Peace  Discussions  and  Negotiations        161 

Russia  and  threatening  the  other  nations,  must  be  met,  if 
necessary,  by  force,  and  speedily  suppressed.  We  shall  have 
more  to  say  of^this  lawless  element  later,  but  at  present,  let 
us  return  to  our  subject  in  hand. 

We  are  all  rejoicing  beyond  our  fondest  hopes,  at  the 
happy  termination  of  the  war,  the  armistice  conditions,  and 
the  political  revolution  in  Germany  since  November  11,  as  it 
is  natural  and  right  we  should  be.  But  a  word  of  warning 
is  still  in  place,  and  indeed  necessary,  from  the  very  fact 
that  the  war  was  over  before  many  of  us  had  fully  grasped 
what  it  meant.  There  are  still  so  many  of  us  who  have  not 
realized  the  true  nature  of  this  war,  and  the  significance  of 
the  issues  involved,  and  the  character  of  the  government  and 
political  ideals  of  our  chief  adversary,  that  there  is  still 
danger  of  this  country  settling  back  into  pre-war  condi- 
tions and  habits  of  thinking,  and  yielding  up  important  in- 
ternational prestige  and  guarantees  that  alone  can  safe- 
guard the  principles  of  democracy  in  the  future.  The  war 
for  democracy  as  intelligent  Americans  understand  it,  is 
not  yet  won,  despite  the  defeat  of  the  military  masters  of 
Germany.  No  greater  mistake  could  be  made  than  to  think 
so.  The  real  fight  that  affords  the  opportunity  for  the 
demonstration  of  democracy  to  the  world,  has  just  begun. 

We  can,  we  must,  make  our  final  peace  only  with  the  legally 
and  justly  constituted  representatives  of  the  German  people, 
not  with  any  temporary  revolutionary  faction.  We  must 
know  that  these  representatives  have  the  unquestioned  right 
and  the  unquestioned  power  to  speak  for  the  German  nation 
as  a  whole,  whatever  that  may  prove  to  be.  And  the  only 
way  to  be  sure  of  that,  is  to  act  for  final  peace  when,  and  not 
untilwhen,theGermanpeople,in  a  legal  and  democratic  man- 
ner, have  elected  and  established  a  democratic  government 
with  duly  chosen  delegates  to  speak  for  them  in  the  peace 
conference  of  the  nations.  This  demand  is  not  vengeance  on 
a  defeated  foe,  it  is  simply  justice  and  common  sense.  Ger- 
many has  done  much  since  the  close  of  hostilities  to  further 


162  The  Causes  Of  War 

the  settlement  of  peace,  but  what  she  does  with  herself  in 
the  next  few  months  will  determine  very  largely  the  period 
and  nature  of  peace  deliberations  at  Versailles. 

It  shall  be  our  plan  in  this  article  to  discuss  the  peace  ad- 
vances and  proposals  in  connection  with  our  own  govern- 
ment's part  in  them,  and  with  President  Wilson's  speeches 
and  diplomatic  notes  as  a  basis;  for  in  studying  his  com- 
munications directly  or  indirectly,  with  the  various  belliger- 
ents, and  their  answers,  and  vice  versa,  we  are  taking  note  of 
all  the  important  official  action  in  the  direction  of  peace 
on  either  side  of  the  conflict. 

The  President's  first  public  utterance  on  the  subject  of 
peace  after  this  war,  is  found  in  his  address  "America  First," 
delivered  before  the  Daughters  of  American  Revolution,  at 
Washington,  D.  C,  October  11,  1915,  and  is  as  follows: 
"Peace  can  be  rebuilt  only  upon  the  ancient  and  accepted 
principles  of  international  law,  only  upon  those  things  which 
remind  nations  of  their  duties  to  each  other  and  deeper  than 
that,  of  their  duties  to  mankind  and  to  humanity."  This 
was  said  a  year  and  a  half  before  the  United  States  entered 
the  war.  Thus  early  did  the  president  speak  out  for  a  peace 
that  would  guarantee  justice  and  the  principles  of  humanity. 
From  the  first  he  was  far  more  certain  and  consistent  in  his 
conception  of  the  part  America  should  take  in  the  peace 
problems  than  he  was  as  to  the  stand  we  were  to  take  in  the 
war;  and  that  but  proves  that  he  was  more  a  man  of  peace 
than  he  was  of  war, — as  the  average  American  was, — until 
the  very  last  minute  of  neutrality. 

His  first  approach  to  a  detailed  statement  of  peace  terms 
is  found  in  his  address  before  the  United  States  Senate  (Jan. 
22,  1917),  on  "A  World  League  for  Peace,"  still  two  months 
and  a  half  before  our  entry  into  the  war.  After  stating 
that  "in  every  discussion  of  the  peace  that  must  end  this 
war  it  must  be  taken  for  granted  that  a  world  league  to 
enforce  peace  shall  be  formed,  making  impossible  such  a 


Official  Peace  Discussions  and  Negotiations       163 

world  catastrophe  again,"  he  continues.  "It  is  inconceiv- 
able that  the  people  of  the  United  States  should  play  no  part 
in  that  great  enterprise  (peace)  ....  To  take  part  in  such 
a  service  will  be  the  opportunity  for  which  they  have  sought 
to  prepare  themselves  by  the  very  principles  and  purposes  of 
their  policy  and  the  approved  practices  of  their  government 
ever  since  the  days  when  they  set  up  a  new  nation  in  the  high 
and  honorable  hope  that  it  might  .  .  .  show  mankind  the 
way  to  liberty  ...  to  add  their  power  to  the  authority 
and  force  of  other  nations  to  guarantee  peace  and  justice 
throughout  the  world. 

"The  treaties  and  agreements  which  bring  it  (the  war)  to 
an  end  must  embody  terms  which  will  create  a  peace  .... 
that  will  win  the  approval  of  mankind,  not  merely  a  peace 
that  will  serve  the  several  interests  and  immediate  aims  of 
the  nations  engaged. 

"If  the  peace  presently  to  be  made  is  to  endure  it  must  be 
a  peace  made  secure  by  the  organized  major  force  of  manr 
hind, 

"No  peace  can  last,  or  ought  to  last,  which  does  not  recog- 
nize and  accept  the  principle  that  Governments  derive  their 
just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed,  and  that  no 
right  anywhere  exists  to  hand  people  about  from  one  sov- 
ereignty to  another  as  if  they  were  property. 

"...  There  should  be  a  united,  independent  and  au- 
tonomous Poland.  .  .  . 

"So  far  as  practicable,  moreover,  every  great  people  now 
struggling  toward  a  full  development  of  its  resources  and 
powers  should  be  assured  a  direct  outlet  to  the  great  high- 
ways of  the  sea.  .  .  .  No  nation  need  be  shut  away  from  free 
access  to  the  open  paths  of  the  world's  commerce. 

"And  the  paths  of  the  sea  must  alike  in  law  and  in  fact  be 
free.  The  freedom  of  the  seas  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  peace, 
equality  and  cooperation. 

"...  And   the   question   of   limiting   naval    armaments 


164  The  Causes  Of  War 

.  .  .  opens  up  the  question  of  the  limitation  of  armies  and 
of  all  programs  of  military  preparation.  .  .  .  There  can 
be  no  sense  of  safety  and  equality  among  the  nations  if  great 
preponderating  armies  are  henceforth  to  continue  here  and 
there  to  be  built  up  and  maintained." 

By  an  analysis  of  the  above  statements  we  find  that  Presi- 
dent Wilson  before  the  United  States  entered  the  war  de- 
clared indispensable  the  following  conditions  of  peace: 

1.  A  peace  must  be  built  up  on  the  principles  of  interna- 

tional law  and  of  humanity. 

2.  There  must  be  a  World  League  to  enforce  peace. 

3.  The  United  States  must  play  a  part  in  this  peace. 

4.  The  peace  must  not  be  in  the  interest  of  any  particular 

nation  or  group  of  nations,  but  must  win  the  ap- 
proval of  mankind. 

5.  This  peace  must  be  built  upon  the  principle  that  gov- 

ernments derive  their  jast  powers  from  the  consent 
of  the  governed — a  democratic  peace. 

6.  Poland  must  be  reunited  and  given  independence. 

7.  There  must  be  freedom  of  the  seas  for  all  nations. 

8.  There   must   be    a   limitation    of   military    and   naval 

preparations  and  "all  programs  of  military  prepa- 
ration." 

Let  us  keep  these  points  in  mind,  and  see,  as  we  proceed, 
how  President  Wilson  has  explained,  enlarged  upon  and  sup- 
plemented them,  since  January,  1917.  We  should  ako  note 
whether  he  has  remained  consistent  in  all  essentials  with  his 
first  utterances  on  this  subject. 

On  the  occasion  of  his  first  war  message  to  Congress 
(April  2,  1917),  the  President  made  it  clear  that  he  still 
had  the  same  ideas  as  to  our  part  in  and  demands  concern- 
ing the  terms  of  peace  and  agreements  of  the  nations  in 
their  league  to  enforce  peace  after  the  war.  These  are  his 
words:  "My  own  thought  has  not  been  driven  from  its 
habitual  and  normal  course  by  the  unhappy  events  of  the 


Official  Peace  Discussions  and  Negotiations        165 

last  two  months  (February  and  March,  1917),  and  I  do 
not  believe  that  the  thought  of  the  nation  has  been  altered 
or  clouded  by  them.  I  have  exactly  the  same  thing  in  mind 
now  that  I  had  in  mind  when  I  addressed  the  Senate  on  the 
22nd  of  January,  last." 

He  throws  further  light  upon  his  idea  of  the  League  to 
Enforce  Peace,  however,  by  this  further  statement:  "A 
steadfast  concert  for  peace  can  never  be  maintained  except 
by  a  partnership  of  democratic  nations.  No  autocratic  gov- 
ernment could  be  trusted  to  keep  faith  within  it  or  observe 
its  covenants." 

Thus  he  adds  one  more  condition  to  the  eight  listed  above, 
namely; 

9.  It  must  be  a  league  of  democratic  nations. 

This  of  course  implies  that  if  the  Central  Powers  are  to 
join  this  league  they  must  be  genuinely  transformed  into 
democratic  nations  and  governments. 

In  his  Flag  Day  address  (June  14,  1917),  the  President 
makes  this  statement  concerning  the  nature  and  purpose  of 
the  war  and  the  peace  that  is  to  follow:  "The  great  fact 
that  stands  out  above  all  the  rest  is  that  this  is  a  People's 
War,  a  war  for  freedom  and  justice  and  self-government 
amongst  all  the  nations  of  the  world  .  .  .  the  German  peo- 
ple included."  This  is  abundant  proof  that  if  the  President 
abides  by  his  former  conviction  we  shall  never  make  a  final 
peace  with  Germany  until  we  are  certain  it  is  a  democratic 
Germany  with  which  we  deal.  And  that,  let  me  repeat,  and 
no  less  the  American  people  must  demand,  if  this  war  is  not 
to  be  in  vain. 

We  shall  next  give  our  attention  to  President  Wilson's 
reply  to  the  Pope's  peace  proposals  (Aug.  27,  1917).  The 
Pope's  proposals  as  the  President  summarizes,  are  substan- 
tially as  follows : 

1.  That  the  nations  "return  to  the  status  quo  ante  belium" 
— (political  condition  before  the  war). 


166  The  Causes  Of  War 

2.  That  there  be  a  "general  condonation,  disarmament, 
and  a  concert  of  nations  based  upon  an  acceptance  of  the 
principle  of  arbitration." 

3.  That  by  a  similar  concert  freedom  of  the  seas  be  es- 
tablished. 

4.  That  the  territorial  claims  of  France  and  Italy,  prob- 
lems of  the  Balkan  States,  restitution  of  Poland,  etc.,  "be 
left  to  such  conciliatory  adjustments  as  may  be  possible," 
after  the  war. 

The  President  then  proceeds  with  convincing  force  to 
point  out  that : 

(1)  It  is  manifest  that  no  part  of  this  (Pope's)  program 
can  be  successfully  carried  out  unless  the  restitution  of  the 
status  quo  ante  furnishes  a  firm  and  satisfactory  basis  for  it ; 

(2)  The  status  quo  ante  is  not  a  basis  upon  which  a  firm 
and  just  peace  can  be  established,  for: 

(a)  The  object  of  this  war  is  to  deliver  the  free  people 
of  the  world  from  the  condition  it  was  put  in  by  the  status 
quo  ante  of  Germany  before  the  war.  The  scathing  indict- 
ment of  Germany  follows:  "a  vast  military  establishment 
controlled  by  an  irresponsible  Government  which,  having 
secretly  planned  to  dominate  the  world,  .  .  .  delivered  its 
blow  fiercely  and  suddenly;  stopped  at  no  barrier  either  of 
law  or  of  mercy ;  swept  a  whole  continent  within  the  tide  of 
blood,  not  the  blood  of  soldiers  only,  but  the  blood  of  inno- 
cent women  and  children  also  and  of  the  helpless  poor;  and 
now  stands   .  .   .  the  enemy  of  four-fifths  of  the  world." 

(b)  To  deal  with  such  a  power  according  to  the  Pope's 
plan  would  "involve  a  recuperation  of  its  (the  German  gov- 
ernment and  military  system)  strength  and  a  renewal  of  its 
policy,"  and  compel  a  permanent  hostile  combination  of  na- 
tions against  it. 

These  were  plain,  blunt  words,  but  they  were  as  true  and 
convincing  as  they  were  plain,  and  they  have  helped  much  to 
revivify  the  Allies  and  to  defeat  Germany,  and  make  the  vic- 
torious peace  of  freedom's  cause  triumphant. 


Official  Peace  Discussions  and  Negotiations        167 

In  this  speech  there  is  just  one  more  condition  of  peace 
that  President  Wilson  contends  for, — and  it  is  the  tenth 
one  we  have,  before  the  great  official  peace  communications 
and  notes  came  to  the  United  States  from  the  Central  Pow- 
ers after  the  United  States  entered  the  war.     It  is  this : 
10.  There  should  be  no  exclusive  economic  leagues  against, 
or  in  favor  of,  any  nation  or  group  of  nations  after 
the  war.     There  must  be  eqiuil  economic  opportune 
ity  for  all  nations. 
Next,  we  shall  take  up  the  "peace  drives'*  of  1917,  by 
the  Central  Powers,  the  Bolsheviki,  and  certain  elements  in 
some  of  the  Allied  countries. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

PEACE  NEGOTIATIONS  {Continued) 

nnHE  German  ambassador  informed  me  that  a  confer^ 
-^  ence  had  been  held  in  Berlin  vn  the  early  part  of 
July,  (191 4-),  at  which  the  date  of  the  war  was  fixed.  This 
conference  was  presided  over  by  the  Kaiser;  the  Baron  Wanr 
genheim  was  present  to  report  on  conditions  in  Turkey. 
Molthe,  the  Chief  of  Staff,  was  there,  and  so  was  Grand  Ad- 
miral Von  Tirpitz.  With  them  were  the  leaders  of  German 
finance,  the  directors  of  the  railroads,  and  the  captains  of 
industry.  .  .  .  Each  was  asked  if  he  were  ready  for  the 
war.  AU  replied  in  the  affirmative,  except  the  financiers,  who 
insisted  that  they  mU'St  have  two  weeks  in  which  to  sell  for- 
eign securities  and  arrange  their  loans.  (Two  weeks  more 
would  make  it  the  last  of  July,  as  actually  happened.) 

"The  Italian  Ajnibassador  at  Constantinople  announced 
that  Baron  Wangenhevm  said  the  same  thing  to  him,  Italy, 
at  that  time  being  a  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  .  .  . 
AU  the  details  of  the  meeting  were  still  (Aug.  26,  1914)  fresh 
in  Baron  Wangenheim^s  mind.** — Henry  Morgenthau,  for- 
mer American  Ambassador  to  Turkey,  in  the  New  York 
World,  Oct.  14,  1917. 

The  above  quotation  from  an  official  source  is  worth  read- 
ing again  and  again,  and  fixing  definitely  in  mind.  Once 
more  let  me  repeat,  most  assuredly  we  cannot  admit  Ger- 
many into  the  League  of  Nations  until  she  has  a  genuine  con- 
stitutional government  and  has  repudiated  everything  that 
her  former  imperial  and  militaristic  government  has  stood 
for — until  she  repents  in  sackcloth  and  ashes  for  the  colossal 
weight  of  crime  that  she  has  heaped  upon  suffering  humanity, 

168 


Peace  Negotiations  (Continued)  169 

under  the  leadership  of  her  war  lords  and  lords  of  trade  and 
industry,  who,  as  above  shown  in  1914,  are  still  the  real 
masters  of  Germany. 

There  is  as  much,  reason  to  study  the  causes  and  nature 
of  the  war  now  as  there  has  been  at  any  time  during  its 
progress,  for  the  simple  reason,  as  we  pointed  out  once  be- 
fore, that  we  must  know  the  cause  of  a  disease  in  order  to 
apply  the  remedy.  And  now,  as  the  Supreme  Council  of  the 
Nations  is  preparing  the  remedy,  it  is  incumbent  upon  them 
and  upon  the  peoples  to  whom  they  are  responsible  and  whom 
they  represent,  to  have  the  causes  clearly  and  constantly  in 
mind,  if  broken  humanity  is  to  be  healed  of  its  wounds  in  the 
future.  At  one  and  the  same  time  we  are  face  to  face  with  the 
world's  greatest  opportunity  and  its  greatest  danger.  That  is 
why  today  witnesses  the  world's  greatest  crisis,  and  a  great 
forward  or  great  backward  step  is  inevitable.  Because  of 
these  facts  the  writer  is  adding  a  number  of  additional  war 
study  pamphlets  to  the  list  given  a  few  months  ago.  Some 
have  been  referred  to  before,  others  have  not,  but  none  as 
definitely  as  they  are  now. 

Published  by  the  Committee  on  Public  Information : 

I.     War  Information  Series 

No.  21  "America's  War  Aims  and  Peace  Program." — > 
Carl  L.  Becker,  Cornell  University.^ 

No.  14.  "The  War  for  Peace."— Arthur  D.  Call,  Secre- 
tary American  Peace  Society. 

No.  13.  "German  Militarism  and  Allied  Ideals." — Stuart 
P.  Sherman,  University  of  Illinois. 

No.  13.  "The  War  Message  and  Facts  Behind  It."— 
Annotated  text  of  President  Wilson's  War  Message,  April 
2,  1917. 

No.  14.  "Why  America  Fights  Germany." — John  S.  P. 
Tatlock,  Stanford  University. 

*A11  quotations  in  this  article  without  names  of  authors  mentioned  are 
taken  from  "America's  War  Aims  and  Peace  Program." 


170  The  Causes  Of  War 

No.  2.  "The  Nation  in  Arms," — Secretaries  Lane  and 
Baker. 

No.  16.  "Study  of  the  Great  War."— Topical  Outhne, 
Samuel  B.  Harding,  Indiana  University. 

II.     Th€  ''Red,   White  and  Blue''  Series 

January,  1918.  "Conquest  and  Kulture." — Notestein 
and  StoU. 

March,  1918.  "German  Treatment  of  Conquered  Terri- 
tory." 

January,  1918.     "German  War  Practices." 

March,  1918.  "War,  Labor  and  Peace,'* — President 
Wilson. 

September,  1917.     "The  President's  Flag  Day  Address." 

,  1917.     "The  Battle  Line  of  Democracy."— Prose 

and  Poetry  of  the  World  War. 

,  1918.     "War  Cyclopedia."— Reference  Hand-book 

on  the  War. 

Germani/'s  First  Peace  Proposal 

At  the  close  of  our  last  chapter  we  were  dealing  with  the 
Pope's  peace  message  of  the  summer  of  1917  and  President 
Wilson's  answer,  rejecting  the  papal  terms.  The  reader 
will  recall  that  we  proposed  a  consideration  of  the  peace 
moves  of  the  Central  Powers  next,  and  United  States  official 
negotiations  with  them. 

"The  first  official  proposal  for  peace  came  from  Germany, 
at  the  close  of  the  year  1916,  at  a  time  when,  in  Germany's 
eyes,  victory  for  her  army  was  already  at  hand.  In  the  west 
the  Allies  had  no  more  than  held  the  German  line;  while  in 
the  east  the  Central  Powers  had  gained  the  aid  of  Turkey 
and  Bulgaria,  had  overrun  Poland,  Serbia,  Roumania,  and 
had  inflicted  serious  reverses  upon  the  British  in  Mesopo- 
tamia. .  .  .  During  the  first  two  years  then  closing,  the 
fortunes  of  war  were  decidedly  with  Germany  and  her  allies. 


Peace  Negotiations  (Continued)  171 

Under  these  circumstances  the  German  government  offered  to 
discuss  peace,  confident  that  if  the  Allies  accepted  the  offer 
she  could  get  what  she  wished;  while  if  they  refused  it,  it 
could  be  made  to  appear  that  they  were  responsible  for  pro- 
longing the  conflict."  This  was  the  offer  contained  in  the 
German  note  of  Dec.  12,  1916,  and  forwarded  to  the  belliger- 
ents through  the  neutral  powers.  The  substance  of  Ger- 
many's proposals  at  this  time  was  as  follows: 

(1)  Though  ready  to  continue  the  war  (forced  upon 
them),  yet  "prompted  by  the  desire  to  avoid  further  blood- 
shed and  make  an  end  to  the  atrocities  of  war,"  all  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  "propose  to  enter  forthwith  into  peace  nego- 
tiations." 

(2)  These  propositions  "have  for  their  object  a  guaran- 
tee of  the  existence,  honor  and  freedom  of  the  development" 
of  the  Central  Powers  and  are  "appropriate  terms  for  the 
establishment  of  a  lasting  peace." 

(3)  Germany  is  carrying  on  a  war  of  defense  against  her 
enemies,  which  aim  at  her  destruction. 

It  was  not  an  offer  of  terms,  but  an  offer  to  stop  the  war 
if  the  Allies  would  agree  to  Germany's  terms,  whatever  they 
might  be.  For  the  Allies  to  have  accepted  this  proposal  and 
a  peace  conference  at  that  time  would  have  been  nothing 
less  than  an  unconditional  surrender  to  Germany. 

Reply  of  the  Entente  Governments 

The  French  denounced  the  proposal  as  a  trap,  and  Lloyd 
George,  speaking  for  Great  Britain,  stated  that  it  would 
be  nothing  less  than  "putting  our  heads  into  a  noose  with  the 
rope  end  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans."  Quoting  Lincoln's 
words,  he  further  stated,  "We  accepted  the  war  for  an  ob- 
ject, a  worthy  object.  The  war  will  end  when  that  object  is 
attained.  Under  God  I  hope  it  will  never  end  until  that 
time."  In  his  speech  Lloyd  George  also  spoke  of  "complete 
restitution,  fuU  reparation  and  effective  guarantees,"  and 


172  The  Causes  Of  War 

that  the  Allies  "refuse  to  consider  a  proposal  which  is  empty 
and  insincere." 

The  Allied  answer  amounted  to  this: 

(1)  "Reparation  for  violated  rights  and  liberties.'* 

(2)  "Recognition  of  the  rights  of  nationality.** 

(3)  "Free  existence  of  small  states." 

In  this  it  will  be  seen  that  Great  Britain  and  France  were 
championing  the  rights  of  nationality  and  of  small  states 
as  early  as  1916  in  the  war,  as  sine  qua  non  of  peace. 

It  was  about  this  time  (December  18,  1916,  to  be  exact) 
that  President  Wilson  addressed  his  first  feeler  and  peace 
note  to  the  belligerent  powers.  The  main  features  of  this 
communication  are: 

(1)  Each  side  professes  to  be  fighting  defensive  war. 

(2)  Each  side  professes  to  be  the  champion  of  small  na- 

tions, and — 

(3)  Each  side  professes  to  be  "ready  to  consider  the  for- 

mation of  a  League  of  Nations  to  insure  peace  and 
justice  throughout  the  world;"  and  therefore, 

(4)  "The  objects  for  which  both  sides  are  fighting,  stated 

in  general  terms,  seem  to  be  the  same";  therefore, 

(5)  Each  side  might  state  in  definite  terms  what  would 

satisfy  them  and  their  people,  or  in  other  words, 
what  they  are  fighting  for. 

(6)  The  President  is  justified  in  making  this  request  be- 

cause the  United  States  is  "as  vitally  interested  as 
the  Governments  now  at  war,"  in  the  "mecwiares  to 
be  taken  to  secure  the  future  peace  of  the  world." 
So,  we  see,  in  his  first  general  communication  to  the  war- 
ring countries   President  Wilson  declared  that  the  United 
States  must  have  a  part  in  the  settlement  of  world  peace. 
This,  we  must  remember  was  four  months  before  our  entry 
into  the  war.     But  the  emphasis  the  President  put  upon  the 
part  United  States  must  play  in  the  determination  of  peace 
was  lost  sight  of  in  the  violent  criticism  that  mas  voiced  vn 
Great  Britain  and  France^  as  well  as  in  some  portions  of  our 
own  country,  from  the  fact  that  he  did  not  distinguish  in 


Peace  Negotiations  (Continued)  Ytd 

this  note  between  the  different  aims  and  states  of  the  Allied 
and  Central  Powers  in  the  war.  And  many  still  believe  that 
in  stating  that  in  general  terms  the  objects  of  both  sides 
seem  to  be  the  same.  President  Wilson  was  justly  offending 
the  Allied  powers  and  stretching  the  attitude  of  neutrality  to 
wholly  unjustifiable  bounds.  However  that  be,  this  note  of 
inquiry  elicited  answers  from  the  Allies  that  were  far  more 
definite  terms  than  had  ever  been  stated  before. 

The  Central  Powers  in  their  united  reply  merely  stated 
that  they  were  "ready  to  meet  their  antagonists  in  confer- 
ence to  discuss  terms  of  peace."  This  was  conclusive  proof 
that  the  Central  Powers  did  not  desire  the  world  arid  much 
less  their  own  people  to  know  for  what  aims  of  conquest  and 
domination^  their  autocratic  governments  were  sacrificing 
them  by  the  millions.  Such  always  is  the  secret  diplomacy 
of  irresponsible  kings  and  greedy,  unscrupulous  militarists. 

The  Entente  (Allied)  Powers,  as  President  Wilson  pointed 
out,  "have  replied  much  more  definitely,  and  have  stated,  in 
general  terms  indeed,  but  with  sufficient  definiteness  to  imply 
details,  the  arrangements,  guarantees,  and  acts  of  repara- 
tion which  they  deem  to  be  indispensable  conditions  of  a 
satisfactory  settlement."  To  quote  further  from  this  ad- 
dress to  the  Senate  (January  22,  1917),  "We  are  that  much 
nearer  a  definite  discussion  of  the  peace  which  shall  end  the 
present  war.  We  are  that  much  nearer  the  discussion  of  the 
international  concert  which  must  hereafter  hold  the  world 
at  peace.*^  And  as  the  President  here  stated,  he  had  brought 
the  peace  settlement  just  that  much  nearer,  by  revealing  to 
the  world  the  essential  democracy  of  the  Allies'  cause  as 
against  the  sinister,  secret,  Machiavellianism  of  the  Central 
Powers.  And  just  to  that  extent,  also,  he  was  preparing 
the  United  States  for  the  day  soon  to  come,  when  she  must 
vindicate  her  right  to  be  called  a  democracy  by  throwing 
in  her  powerful  aid  with  the  other  liberal  governments  of  the 
world  to  save  to  the  world  the  cardinal  American  principle  of 
"government  by  the  consent  of  the  governed." 

This  speech  of  President  Wilson  (Jan.  22,  1917),  as  well 


174  The  Causes  Of  War 

as  his  reply  to  the  Pope  (Aug.,  1917),  was  treated  in  last 
month's  article,  and  therefore  will  not  be  further  analyzed 
here. 

"The  general  effect  of  these  events  was  to  bring  into 
clearer  light  the  fundamental  issues  of  the  war,"  especially, 
after  the  Russian  revolution  which  overthrew  the  Czar 
(March,  1917),  and  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the 
war  (April  6,  1917).  Sixteen  more  states  now  declared 
war  on  Germany  or  severed  diplomatic  relations  with  her. 
This  all  brought  on  an  internal  crisis  in  Germany,  with  the 
upshot  that  the  Reichstag  on  July  11  refused  to  vote  war 
credits  for  the  time  being,  and  repudiated  the  annexationist 
scheme  of  the  war  party  (which  was  in  power).  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  resigned  the  imperial  chancellorship,  and  the  Reichs- 
tag resolutions  were  published  to  the  world.  They  are 
worth  noting  in  this  connection: 

(1)  Germany  fights  in  self-defence,  to  preserve  her  ter- 

ritories. 

(2)  The  Reichstag  is  for  peace  and  "lasting  reconcilia- 

tion among  the  nations." 

(3)  It  is  against  "forced  acquisitions  of  territory,  and 

political,  economies  and  financial  violations." 
(4j)   It  rejects  all  plans  for  an  economic  blockade  and 
the  stirring  up  of  enmity  among  the  peoples  after 
the  war. 

(5)  The  freedom  of  the  seas  must  be  assured. 

(6)  The  Reichstag  will  work  for  international  arbitration 

— "jurisdictional  organizations." 
From  the  above  points  it  is  easily  seen  that  the  Reichs- 
tag was  moving  for  peace;  it  was  answering  to  the  world 
what  the  Kaiser  and  his  government  and  army  disdained  to 
answer.  It  was  the  voice  of  the  German  people  that  the 
Reichstag  had  heard, — their  reaction  to  the  democratic 
peace  terms  that  President  Wilson  and  the  peoples  and  gov- 
ernments of  the  Allies  had  forced  upon  their  attention.  But 
what  did  the  voice  of  the  German  people  or  the  resolutions 


Peace  Negotiations  (Continued)  176 

of  the  Reichstag  amount  to,  at  that  stage  of  the  war? 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  with  his  war  lords  rode  rough-shod  and 
defiantly  over  the  German  people  and  their  representatives, 
brandished  again  his  "shining  sword,"  and  with  God*s  help, 
promised  a  German  junker's  peace.  And  the  people  and  the 
Reichstag  were  not  again  heard  from  until  the  last  days  of 
the  war.  The  "shining  sword"  had  so  dazzled  them  that 
they  were  again  ready  to  follow  their  "God's  anointed"; 
and  the  collapse  of  Russia  confirmed  their  belief  in  victory. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

OFFICIAL   PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS    (Concludcd) 

IN  our  last  chapter  we  gave  some  space  to  a  consideration 
of  the  German-Bolshevik  peace  developments  and  their 
effects  on  peace  negotiations  throughout  the  world.  A  fur- 
ther examination  of  this  conspiracy  is  necessary  to  a  proper 
conception  of  its  nature  and  results,  especially,  upon  Russia 
and  upon  German  honor  before  the  world. 

Brest-Lit ovsk  Conference  and  Peace  Treaty 

Winning  support,  as  it  did,  among  Socialists  and  certain 
labor  and  pacifist  elements  everywhere,  this  abortive  peace 
off'ensive  of  the  Bolshevists  and  Germans  constituted  for 
months  a  distinct  danger  and  threat  to  the  Allies  and  the 
cause  of  democracy.  Tremendous  pressure  was  brought  to 
bear  upon  the  Allied  governments  to  "negotiate  peace" 
with  their  enemies.  But  the  defiant  refusal  of  the  heads  of 
the  Allied  and  American  governments  to  surrender  the 
principles  for  which  they  fought  soon  brought  all  effective 
opposition  to  an  end,  as  their  peoples  became  aware  of  the 
nature  of  these  German- Anarchist  schemes. 

The  exact  nature  of  the  Russian  surrender  to  the  German 
government  is  revealed  in  the  following  statement  in  the 
introduction  to  "War  Information  Series"  No.  20,  (Oct., 
1918):  "The  documents  show  that  the  Bolshevik  revolu- 
tion was  arranged  for  by  the  German  Great  General  Staff 
and  financed  by  the  German  Imperial  Bank  and  other  Ger- 
man financial  insitutions. 

"They  show  that  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  was  a  be- 

176 


Official  Peace  Negotiations  (Concluded)  177 

trajaJ  of  the  Russian  people  by  the  Grerman  agents,  Lenine 
and  Trotsky;  that  a  German-picked  commander  was  chosen 
to  *defend'  Petrograd  against  the  Germans;  that  German 
officers  have  been  secretly  received  by  the  Bolshevik  govern- 
ment as  military  advisers,  as  spies  upon  the  embassies  of 
Russia's  allies,  as  officers  in  the  Russian  army  and  direc- 
tors of  the  Bolshevik  military,  foreign  and  domestic  policy. 
They  show,  in  short,  that  the  present  Bolshevik  government 
is  not  a  Russian  government  at  all,  but  a  German  govern- 
ment acting  solely  in  the  interests  of  Germany  and  betray- 
ing the  Russian  people,  as  it  betrays  Russia's  natural  al- 
lies, for  the  benefit  of  the  Imperial  German  government 
alone." 

Not  only  did  the  Allied  countries  and  United  States  sus- 
pect all  this  treachery  and  later  find  it  out  for  a  fact,  but 
there  were  even  Germans  who  admitted  it.  "A  German 
politician,  writing  in  the  Vienna  Arbeiter-Zeitung  of  Aug. 
27,  1918,  stated:  *We  have  brought  about  treaties  of  peace 
at  Brest  and  Bucharest  (with  Roumania)  which  correspond 
to  our  interest,  but  not  to  our  principles  as  we  presented 
them  in  the  peace  offer.'' — War  Information  Series  21,  p.  26. 

The  Final  Developments  Before  the  Armistice 

On  July  4,  1918,  President  Wilson  reiterated  his  state- 
ment that  there  could  be  no  peace  while  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Government,  which  was  responsible  for  the  war,  re- 
mained in  power.  And  he  laid  down  the  "ends  for  which  the 
associated  peoples  of  the  world  are  fighting  and  which  must 
be  conceded  them  before  there  can  be  peace : 

(1)  "The  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power  anywhere 
that  can  separately,  secretly,  and  of  its  single  choice  dis- 
turb the  peace  of  the  world;  or,  if  it  cannot  be  presently 
destroyed,  at  least  its  reduction  to  a  virtual  impotence. 

(2)  "The  settlement  of  every  question,  whether  of  terri- 
tory, of  sovereignty,  of  economic  arrangement,  or  of  politi- 


178  The  Causes  Of  War 

cal  relationship,  upon  the  basis  of  the  free  acceptance  of  that 
settlement  by  the  people  immediately  concerned,  and  not 
upon  the  basis  of  material  interest  or  advantage  of  any 
other  nation  or  people  which  may  desire  a  different  settle- 
ment for  the  sake  of  its  own  exterior  influence  or  mastery. 

(3)  "The  consent  of  all  nations  to  he  governed  in  their 
conduct  toward  each  other  by  the  same  principles  of  honor 
and  respect  for  the  common  law  of  civilized  society  that 
governs  the  individual  citizens  of  all  modern  states  in  their 
dealings  with  one  another;  to  the  end  that  all  promises  and 
covenants  may  be  sacredly  observed,  no  private  plots  or 
conspiracies  hatched,  no  selfish  injuries  wrought  with  impun- 
ity, and  a  mutual  trust  established  upon  the  handsome  foun- 
dation of  a  mutual  respect  for  right, 

(4)  "The  establishment  of  a  League  of  Nations  that  will 
check  every  invasion  of  right — affording  a  tribunal — to 
which  all  must  submit,  and  by  which  every  international  re- 
adjustment that  cannot  be  amicably  agreed  upon  by  the 
peoples  directly  concerned,  shall  be  sanctioned." 

In  his  New  York  address  of  Sept.  27  (1918),  the  Presi- 
dent once  more  declared  that  he  could  not  make  peace  with 
the  governments  of  the  Central  Empires  on  any  sort  of 
bargain  or  compromise  whatsoever,  since  we  cannot  accept 
their  word  for  anything.  In  this  address  he  speaks  more 
definitely  and  in  detail  on  the  matter  of  a  League  of  Nations. 
Without  reserve  he  declares  that  the  League  must  be  formed 
— not  before  nor  after  the  peace  is  made,  but  in  the  peace 
council  itself;  also,  that  the  League  is  the  "most  essential 
part  of  the  peace  settlement  itself."  And,  as  we  all  know, 
he  won  his  point  in  the  Peace  Council  at  Versailles  by  hav- 
ing the  constitution  of  the  League  drawn  up  as  the  very  first 
permanent  work  of  the  Conference.  Whether  the  necessary 
two-thirds  majority  of  the  United  States  Senate  ratifies 
this  constitution  or  not,  the  evidence  throughout  the  world 
at  present  is,  that  the  peoples  of  the  nations  are  looking 


Official  Peace  Negotiations  (Concluded)  179 

forward  with  confidence  that  the  League  of  Nations  will  be 
established  as  a  remedy  for  war  in  the  future. 

The  President  throws  still  further  light  upon  his  concep- 
tion of  the  League  of  Nations  by  the  following  "particulars" 
which  he  states  in  this  same  (Sept.  27)   speech: 

(1)  "The  impartial  justice  meeted  out  must  involve  no 
discrimination  between  those  to  whom  we  wish  to  be  just  and 
those  to  whom  we  do  not  wish  to  be  just.  It  must  be  a  jus- 
tice that  plays  no  favorites 

(S)  "No  separate  or  special  interest  of  any  single  nation 
or  group  of  nations"  can  be  made  if  such  "is  not  consistent 
with  the  common  interest  of  all. 

(3)  "There  can  be  no  leagues  or  alliances  or  special  cove- 
nants and  understandings  within  the  general  and  common 
family  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

(4)  "  .  .  .  No  special,  selfish,  economic  combinations 
within  the  League  and  no  employment  of  any  form  of  boycott 
or  exclusion  except  as  the  power  of  economic  penalty  by  ex- 
clusion from  the  markets  of  the  world  may  be  vested  in  the 
League  of  Nations  itself  as  a  means  of  discipline  and  con- 
trol. 

(5)  "All  international  agreements  and  treaties  of  every 
kind  must  be  made  known  to  the  rest  of  the  world." 

As  has  been  pointed  out  by  several  students  of  President 
Wilson's  speeches,  his  program  for  the  peace  of  the  world  is 
found  in  his  fourteen  points  of  January  8,  1918,  his  four 
points  of  July  4,  and  his  five  points  of  September  27,  1918, 
(just  noted  above).  These  three  pronouncements,  taken 
together,  are  known  as  his  twenty-three  peace  points, 

Anauysis  of  President  Wilson^ s  Program 

We  shall  now  make  a  brief  analysis  of  the  above  twenty- 
three  points,  as  enunciated  by  President  Wilson.  Some  he 
has  repeated,  expounded,  or  enlarged  upon  a  number  of 


180  The  Causes  Of  War 

times.  Others  he  has  modified  somewhat,  due  to  fundamental 
political  changes  in  the  governments  or  political  condi- 
tions in  the  Central  Powers ;  but,  in  their  spirit  and  in  their 
essentials  these  points  remain  the  same.  We  may  state 
their  essence  as  follows : 

1.  A  peace  must  be  built  up  on  the  principles  of  interna- 

tional law  and  of  humanity. 

2.  There  must  be  a  World  League  to  enforce  peace. 

2.  The  peace  must  not  be  in  the  interest  of  any  particu- 
lar nation  or  group  of  nations,  but  must  be  in 
the  common  interest  of  all,  large  and  small  states 
alike. 

4.  This  peace  must  win  the  approval  of  the  people  of  the 

nations — of  the  major  force  of  mankind. 

5.  It  must  be  built  upon  the  principle  that  governments 

derive  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed — a  democratic  peace. 

6.  There  must  be  freedom  of  the  seas  for  all  nations,  great 

and  small. 

7.  There  must  be  a  limitation  of  military  and  naval  arma- 

ments, "of  all  kinds  of  military  preparation.'' 

8.  There  must  be  a  reunited  and  independent  Poland — 

along  the  line  of  nationality. 

9.  Alsace-Lorraine  must  be  returned  to  France.     (His 

statements  amount  to  this.) 

10.  Italy  must  receive  Italian  provinces  of  the  Trentino 

and  Trieste  (Italia  Irredenta),  in  so  far  as  these 
regions  are  unquestionably  Italian. 

11.  All  German  occupation  and  political  domination  in 

any  part  of  former  Russia  must  cease  (i.  e.  as 
Russia  was  in  1914). 

IS.  There  should  be  no  exclusive  economic  leagues  in 
favor  of,  or  against,  any  nation  or  group  of  na- 
tions, after  the  war. 

13.  There  must  be  absolutely  no  secret  treaties,  covenants 


Official  Peace  Negotiations  (Concluded)  181 

or  international  agreements  between  any  nations 
or  group  of  nations,  but  all  treaties,  etc.,  must 
be  published  to  aU  the  world. 

14.  Open  minded  and  impartial  adjustment  of  all  colonial 

claims  must  be  secured,  with  the  interests  of  the 
peoples  concerned  uppermost  in  mind.  (This  de- 
veloped into  a  mandatory  for  the  German  colonies, 
and  perhaps  others,  in  the  League  of  Nations.) 

15.  Restoration  of  Belgium,  with  full  sovereignty,  and 

reparation,  by  Germany. 

16.  Peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  must  be  given  autonomy 

— self-government.  (This  was  changed  later  to 
complete  independence  for  Czecho-Slavs  and  Jugo- 
slavs, after  President  Wilson  recognized  their  in- 
dependence ;  and  he  made  the  acceptance  of  this 
change  a  condition  of  acceptance  of  an  armistice 
with  Austria-Hungary.) 

17.  Roumania,  Serbia  and  Montenegro  must  be  left  to 

determine  their  own  future,  and  Serbia  must  be  ac- 
corded "free  and  secure  access"  to  the  Adriatic. 
All  the  Balkan  states'  differences  must  be  settled 
along  "historically  established  lines  of  allegiance 
and  nationality." 

18.  Turkish  portions  of  the  Ottoman  empire  should  be 

left  for  the  Turks,  unmolested ;  but  in  parts  where 
non-Turkish  populations  predominate  such  peo- 
ples should  be  given  complete  self-government 
within  their  provinces. 

19.  Specifically,  there  must  be  no  bargaining  of  nations 

at  the  peace  table, — one  nation  granting  another 
some  such  advantage  in  order  to  secure  a  corres- 
ponding advantage  for  itself,  etc.,  but  each  part 
of  final  settlement  based  on  the  "essential  justice  of 
that  particular  case** 

20.  That  all  well-defined  national  aspirations  be  accorded 

the  utmost  satisfaction  possible  without  adding  new 


182  The  Causes  Of  War 

elements  of  discord,  as  well  as  (in  19  above)  "abso- 
lutely no  handing  about  or  division  of  peoples  as 
if  they  were  mere  chattels  and  pawns  in  a  game'* 
(such  as  in  division  of  Poland  in  eighteenth  cen- 
tury). 
21.  The  relationship  of  nations  with  one  another  to  be 
governed  by  exactly  the  same  code  of  morals  and 
principles  of  conduct  as  that  which  obtains  between 
individuals  in  all  modern  civilized  society.  (Just 
the  opposite  to  Gen.  Von  Bernhardi's  German  doc- 
trine in  his  "Germany  and  the  Next  War.") 

A  consideration  of  the  above  twenty-one  more  or  less 
separate  propositions  will  show  that  President  Wilson  has 
set  forth  (notwithstanding  the  many  criticisms  of  their  "in- 
definiteness,"  valid  criticisms  to  a  degree)  the  most  complete, 
definite  and  comprehensive  peace  program  that  has  come 
from  any  source,  despite  the  fact  that  the  details  in  many 
respects  are  lacking.  Moreover,  since  all  the  Central  Pow- 
ers accepted  President  Wilson's  peace  program  as  a  basis 
for  an  armistice  and  peace  negotiations,  it  was  certainly 
imperative  that  the  author  of  this  program,  above  all  others, 
be  present  at  the  Congress  of  Versailles,  to  interpret  his  own 
propositions.  Such  a  consideration  should  silence  once  for 
all  the  opposition  to  and  criticism  of,  his  leaving  the  United 
States  in  the  interest  of  humanity  and  peace — for  his  own 
country  and  the  world  alike.  Opposition  to  some  of  his 
principles  is  valid,  and  the  inalifenable  right  of  his  fellow- 
citizens;  but  opposition  to  the  part  he  is  playing  in  the 
peace  negotiations  is  a  totally  different  thing,  and  is  in- 
excusable, from  every  point  of  view.  It  is  right,  and  it  is 
to  be  hoped  that  such  action  may  react  disastrously  upon 
these  critics. 

There  are  three  of  the  abo\e  propositions,  however,  that 
the  writer  would  call  the  reader's  attention  to,  in  particular. 
One  is  the  demand  for  "absolute  freedom  of  the  seas."     No 


Official  Peace  Negotmtions  (Concliided)  183 

one  knows  just  what  that  means,  and  there  are  conflicting 
opinions  as  to  what  it  might  mean  in  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. An  able  statement  of  the  difficulties  involved  in  this 
point — as  well  as  others — is  given  by  Joseph  H.  Odell,  in 
Nov.  6, 1918,  issue  of  the  Outlook.  ("The  President's  Four- 
teen Points.") 

The  second  point  is  the  President's  plan  for  the  disposal 
of  Turkey.  In  an  early  chapter  of  the  series  on  the  Causes 
of  War  the  writer  made  this  statement  (in  1917)  :  "Turkey 
must  leave  Europe,  where  she  has  never  had  a  right  to  be. 
Turkey  is  not  a  nation  in  the  true  sense,  anyway,  and  never 
has  been.  She  has  always  existed  unnaturally,  by  a  criminal 
subjection  of  peoples  who  otherwise  would  long  since  have 
been  free,  and  arbiters  of  their  own  destinies.  If  there  ever 
was  a  chimerical  state,  it  has  been  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
Her  whole  history  has  been  one  of  cruelty,  rapine  and  mur- 
der." All  evidence  and  disclosures  of  her  action  during  the 
war,  which  have  recently  been  thoroughly  exposed,  serve  only 
to  justify  this  demand  and  make  it  doubly  insistent.  The 
writer  would  refer  the  reader  especially  to  Ambassador  Mor- 
ganthau's  story,  just  published  in  book  form — the  part  deal- 
ing with  Armenia,  Syrian  and  Greek  massacres  and  cruel- 
ties, as  well  as  the  nature  of  the  Turkish  Government. 

The  third  point  is  concerning  the  "breaking  down  of 
economic  barriers."  What  shall  this  "breaking  down  of  all 
economic  barriers"  between  nations  include?  Does  it  in- 
volve the  doing  away  with  all  protective  tariff  between  na- 
tions? If  so  what  about  war  materials?  The  present 
League  of  Nations  Constitution  urges  government  owner- 
ship or  control  of  all  war  materials  or  their  production. 
Certainly,  unless  the  League  of  Nations  becomes  a  permanent 
preventive  of  war,  the  United  States  cannot  be  dependent 
upon  any  foreign  power  for  war  materials  and  manufactures. 
It  must  protect  these  industries  sufficiently  to  build  them 
up  to  a  safe  war  basis,  in  readiness  for  any  time  of  danger. 
Tremendous  difficulty  will  also  be  experienced  in  bringing 


184  The  Causes  Of  War 

all  the  protective  tariff  nations  to  the  point  of  giving  up  this 
commercial  privilege  in  favor  of  their  own  industries.  This 
point  presents  a  veritable  Chinese  puzzle ;  and  it  may  prove 
to  be  a  puzzle  that  is  unsolvable.  Yet,  something  along 
this  line  should  by  all  means  be  done,  to  prevent  the  benefits 
of  a  great  portion  of  the  world's  commerce  going  to  certain 
great  commercial  nations  and  privileged  classes  in  those  na- 
tions, to  the  detriment  of  all  others — small,  non-commercial 
nations  in  particular.  Part  of  the  difficulty  may  be  over- 
come by  a  free  commercial  rivalry  among  the  nations;  but 
great  international  "trusts"  and  monopolies  must  also  be 
regulated.  Something  toward  a  solution  might  be  obtained 
by  government  ownership  of  those  industries  that  might  need 
protection.  Certainly  this  last  is  one  possible  solution,  since 
government  ownership  is  one  of  the  biggest  industrial  issues 
the  world  over,  to-day. 

The  above  situation,  while  presenting  difficulties  for  the 
League  of  Nations,  on  the  other  hand  is  only  one  of  the 
many  instances  that  demand  this  effective  League  as  the  only 
alternative  to  a  virtual  race-suicide  through  war  in  the  fu- 
ture. It  is  scarcely  worth  while  discussing  an  international 
court  of  arbitration  if  there  is  to  be  no  League  of  Nations 
behind  it.  The  present  League  may  not  be  permanent,  may 
not  include  all  the  world — and  may  not  be  satisfactory  in  a 
number  of  respects — so  much  can  scarcely  be  expected  from 
it — hut  it  must  lead  finally  to  a  permanent  league  of  the 
nations  of  the  earth.  No  other  outcome  is  thinkable.  This 
final  League  may  not  be  realized  in  our  day,  but  our  day 
must  make  it  possible  and  start  it  on  its  way.  This  is  the 
supreme  duty  and  privilege  of  the  present  generation.  I 
shall  have  more  to  say  of  this  League  in  a  later  chapter. 

There  is  one  feature  of  the  final  negotiations  between  the 
German  Government  and  President  Wilson,  leading  directly 
to  the  Armistice  and  German  surrender  of  Nov.  11  that  is 
very  significant — in  the  light  of  political  development  in 
Germany  since.     And  that  is,  that  President  Wilson  by  his 


Official  Peace  Negotiations  (Concluded)  186 

unshakable  demand  that  the  German  people  must  speak  for 
peace  rather  than  the  Imperial  German  Government  alone, 
whose  word  he  could  never  take  for  sincerity — that  the 
President  himself  in  this  demand  in  Germany's  hour  of  disas- 
ter, drove  the  Kaiser  from  his  throne,  and  the  German 
princes  from  theirs.  In  other  words,  it  was  President  Wil- 
son, together  with  the  overwhelming  victories  of  Allied  arms 
in  the  last  days  of  the  war,  and  not  the  German  people  as  a 
democracy,  that  drove  the  HohenzoUerns  from  power.  And 
for  that  very  reason  the  German  nation  cannot  yet  he  ac- 
cepted as  a  true  democracy.  Nations  do  not  change  their 
fundamental  ways  of  thinking  so  soon,  and  never  primarily 
by  force.  Germany  has  a  splendid  chance  to  develop  a  great 
democracy ;  but  let  us  not  be  too  hasty  in  receiving  her  with 
open  arms,  as  a  regenerated  criminal. 


CHAPTER  XIX 


THE    LEAGUE    OF    NATIONS 


AFTER  SO  much  has  been  written  and  said  on  the  sub- 
ject of  the  ^'League  of  Nations,"  and  especially,  as  it 
is  being  so  widely  discussed  pro  and  con,  at  present,  the 
writer  would  hardly  feel  justified  in  adding  a  chapter  on  this 
question  to  the  present  treatise  on  the  War,  were  it  not  for 
two  phases  of  the  momentous  peace  problem  which  have  not 
been  so  widely  discussed,  and  which  have  been  more  or  less 
neglected  or  ignored.  These  two  phases  are:  (1)  the  Ger- 
man attitude  and  point  of  view  on  the  matter  of  a  League 
of  Nations  or  International  Arbitration,  and  (2)  the 
progress  of  this  League  idea  among  the  Allied  Powers  in  the 
years  just  preceding  the  War. 

And  now,  to  take  up  the  German  attitude  first.  Few  per- 
sons, among  those  who  have  not  given  the  matter  close  study, 
realize  how  thoroughly  the  great  German  teachers  and  writ- 
ers, political  and  military,  dominated  the  thought  and  molded 
the  convictions  of  the  German  nation.  True,  we  have  been 
told  in  our  War  Information  campaign,  that  the  German 
people  had  no  will  of  their  own,  followed  blindly  their  leaders, 
because  they  had  been  taught  and  felt  that  they  had  to  fol- 
low them,  etc.  But,  not  until  we  begin  to  investigate  this 
phenomenon  for  ourselves  do  we  realize  how  the  leaders, 
as  those  mentioned  above,  furnished  the  very  moral,  political 
and  military  gospel  for  the  nation — and  that  not  alone 
because  they  molded  the  thought  of  the  people,  but  because 
they  worked  and  thought  along  with  the  nation,  and  in  some 
instances  took  counsel  of  the  people  and  their  temper.  That 
there  was  a  very  strong  undercurrent  of  the  common  people 

186 


The  League  of  Nations  187 

against  all  this  new  militant  doctrine,  is  true;  but  such  an 
undercurrent  did  not  and  could  not  mold  the  character  of  the 
German  nation. 

Because  of  the  almost  unlimited  influence  of  these  literary 
and  political  "lights,"  therefore,  we  shall  examine  briefly 
their  teachings  and  attitude  toward  peace  and  a  "society 
of  nations"  as  the  best  means  of  answering  our  first  question 
above.     Note  these  quotations: 

"They  (Governments)  usually  employ  the  need  of  peace 
as  a  cloak  under  which  to  promote  their  own  political  aims. 
This  was  the  position  of  affairs  at  the  Hague  Congresses, 
and  this  is  also  the  meaning  of  the  action  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  who  in  recent  times  have  earnestly  tried 
to  conclude  treaties  for  the  establishment  of  arbitration." — 
(von  Bernhardi,  "Germany  and  the  Next  War.") 

"Theorists  and  fanatics  imagine  that  they  see  in  the  ef- 
forts of  President  Taft  a  great  step  forward  in  the  path  to 
perpetual  peace."     (Idem.  p.  17.) 

"This  desire  for  peace  has  rendered  most  civilized  nations 
anemic,  and  marks  a  decay  of  spirit  and  political  courage. 
...  It  has  always  been  the  weary,  spiritless,  and  exhausted 
ages  that  have  played  with  the  dream  of  perpetual  peace." 
— (H.  von  Treitschke,  greatest  German  historian.) 

Frederick  the  Great,  who  is  very  much  quoted  in  recent 
years  in  Germany  and  considered  as  the  greatest  of  the  Ger- 
man rulers,  and  is  idolized  as  no  other  among  his  people, 
once  said:  "In  matters  of  state,  when  a  man  stops  to  con- 
sider he  is  a  Christian,  he  is  lost." 

"War  is  a  biological  necessity  of  the  first  order." — (Von 
Bernhardi.) 

"So  long  as  there  are  men  who  have  human  feelings  and 
aspirations,  so  long  as  there  are  nations  who  strive  for  an 
enlarged  sphere  of  activity,  so  long  will  conflicting  interests 
come  into  being,  and  occasions  for  making  war  arise." — 
(Bernhardi.) 

"The  extra-social  and  super-social  structure  which  guides 


188  The  Games  Of  War 

the  eternal  development  of  societies,  nations  and  races,  is 
war.'* — (Claus  Wagner.) 

"War  is  as  necessary  as  the  struggle  of  the  elements  in 
nature."— (A.  W.  Von  Schlegel.) 

"Between  states  the  only  check  upon  injustice  is  force^  and 
in  morality  and  civilization  each  people  must  play  its  own 
part  and  promote  its  own  ends  and  ideals.  No  power  exists 
which  can  jvdge  between  states  and  make  its  judgment  pre- 
vail."— (Bernhardi.) 

"Since  almost  every  part  of  the  globe  is  inhabited,  new 
territory  must,  as  a  rule,  be  obtained  at  the  cost  of  its  pos- 
sessors— that  is  to  say,  bt/  conquest,  which  thus  becomes  a 
law  of  necessity. — (Ibid.) 

"Might  is  at  once  the  supreme  right,  and  the  dispute  as 
to  what  is  right  is  decided  by  the  arbitrament  of  war.  War 
gives  a  biologically  just  decision,  since  its  decisions  rest  on 
the  very  nature  of  things." — {Ibid.  p.  23.) 

"The  knowledge  therefore,  that  war  depends  on  biological 
laws  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  every  attempt  to  exclude  it 
from  international  relatione  must  be  demonstrably  wnten- 
abW—{Ibid,  p.  M.) 

"To  expand  the  idea  of  the  State  into  that  of  humanity, 
and  thus  to  entrust  apparently  higher  duties  to  the  individ- 
ual leads  to  error,  since  in  a  human  race  conceived  as  a 
whole,  struggle,  the  most  essential  vital  principle,  would 
be  ruled  out.  Any  action  in  favor  of  collective  humanity 
outside  the  limits  of  the  State  and  Nationality  is  impossi- 
ble. Such  conceptions  belong  to  the  wide  domain  of  Uto- 
pias."— (From  Schleiermacher,  quoted  by  Bernhardi.) 

"Wars  are  terrible,  but  necessary,  for  they  save  the  State 
from  social  petref action  and  stagnation." — (Kuno  Fischer.) 

"War  is  elevating,  because  the  individual  disappears  be- 
fore the  great  conception  of  the  State What  a  per- 
version of  morality  to  wish  to  abolish  heroism  among  meni*' 
— (Treitsche.  Trietsche  is  referred  to  by  scores  of  German 
writers  and  speakers  as  their  great  historian-philosopher.) 


The  League  of  Nations  189 

''States  which  from  various  considerations  are  always  ac- 
tive in  this  direction  (peace)  are  sapping  the  roots  of  their 
own  strength.  The  United  States  of  America  in  June, 
1911,  championed  the  ideas  of  universal  peace  in  order 
to  he  able  to  devote  their  undisputed  attention  to  money- 
making  and  the  enjoyment  of  wealthy  and  to  save  the  three 
hundred  million  dollars  which  they  spend  on  their  navy;  they 
thus  incur  a  great  danger,  the  loss  of  all  chance  of  contest 
with  opponents  of  their  own  strength,  ,  .  ,  If  they  ad- 
vance farther  on  this  road,  they  mill  one  day  pay  dearly  for 
such  a  policy.^* — (Bernhardi.) 

"This  law  (the  law  of  Christian  love)  can  claim  no  sig- 
nificance for  the  relations  of  one  country  to  another,  since 
its  application  to  politics  would  lead  to  a  conflict  of  duties. 
.  .  .  Christian  morality  is  personal  and  social,  and  in  its 
nature  cannot  be  political." — (Ibid.) 

"Proposals  are  made  from  time  to  time — to  settle  the  dis- 
putes which  arise  between  the  various  countries  by  Arbitra- 
tion Courts,  and  to  render  war  impossible.  The  politician 
who — honestly  believes  in  their  practihility  must  be  a/maz- 
i/ngly  short-sighted.  ,  .  .  Where  does  the  power  reside 
which  insures  the  execution  of  this  judgment  when  pro- 
nounced .f"' — (Bernhardi. ) 

"In  America,  Elihu  Root,  formerly  Secretary  of  State, 
declared  in  1908  that  the  High  Court  of  International  Jus- 
tice established  by  the  Second  Hague  Conference  would  be 
able  to  pronounce  definite  and  binding  decisions  by  virtue  of 
the  pressure  brought  to  bear  by  public  opinion.  The  pres- 
ent leaders  of  the  American  peace  movement  seem  to  share 
this  idea.  A  general  arbitration  treaty  between  two  coun- 
tries affords  no  guarantee  of  permanent  peace.  .  ,  .  If  these 
relations  change  ,  .  .  tJien  every  arbtriation  treaty  will  burn 
like  tinder  and  end  in  smoke.** — (Chancellor  von  Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  in  a  speech  to  the  Reichstag,  March  30,  1911.) 

*^The  efforts  directed  toward  the  abolition  of  war  Tnust 
not  only  be  termed  foolish,  but  absolutely  immoral,  and  must 


190  The  Causes  Of  War 

he  stigmatized  as  wnmortliy  of  the  human  race,^^ — (Bern- 
hardi,  "Germany  and  the  Next  War,"  p.  34.) 

"By  Courts  of  Arbitration  .  .  .  the  weak  nation  has  the 
same  right  to  live  as  the  powerful  and  vigorous  nation.  The 
whole  idea  represents  a  presumptuous  encroachment  on  the 
natural  law  of  development,  which  can  lead  ordy  to  the  most 
disastrous  consequences  for  humtardty  generally,^^ — (Ibid.)' 

"A  people  can  only  hope  to  take  up  a  firm  position  in  the 
political  world  when  national  character  and  military  tradi- 
tion act  and  react  upon  each,"  says  Bernhardi.  "These  are 
the  words  of  Clauswitz,  the  great  philosopher  of  war,  and  he 
is  incontestably  right" — (Ibid.) 

"God  will  always  see  to  it  that  wars  recur  as  a  drastic  rerrif- 
edy  for  the  human  race,'*  says  Treitschke;  and  like  him, 
Bernhardi  declares,  ^'Our  people  must  learn  to  see  that  the 
mmntenance  of  peace  never  cam,  or  may  he  the  goal  of  a 
policy.'^ 

"The  Great  Elector  laid  the  foundations  of  Prussians 
power  by  successful  and  deliberately  planned  wars,"  says 
Bernhardi ;  and  with  regard  to  Frederick  the  Great  the  same 
author,  agreeing  with  Treitschke,  declares  that  "None  of  the 
wars  which  he  fought  had  been  forced  upon  him;  none  of 
them  did  he  postpone  as  long  as  possible.  He  had  always 
determined  to  be  the  aggressor." 

"The  appropriate  and  conscious  employment  of  war  as  a 
political  means  has  always  led  to  happy  results.  .  .  .  The 
lessons  of  history  thus  confirm  the  view  that  wars  which 
have  been  deliberately  provoked  by  far-seeing  statesmen  have 
had  the  happiest  results." — (Bernhardi,  p.  43.) 

^'The  end-all  and  he-aU  of  a  State  is  power, — and  he  who 
is  not  man  enough  to  look  this  truth  in  the  face  shovld  not 
meddle  with  politics." — (Treitschke.) 

Kaiser  Wilhelm  II  repeatedly  remarked  that  his  army 
and  navy,  and  not  parliamentary  bodies  and  negotiations 
with  other  countries,  were  his  main  reliance  and  the  hope  of 
Germany;  and  when  he  made  the  historic  statement  that  "Ger- 


Tfie  League  of  Nations  191 

many's  future  Iks  upon  the  water,"  he  was  counting  the  years 
until  the  "inevitable  day"  that  was  the  toast  of  many  a  Ger- 
man drink  in  high  naval,  military,  and  governmental  circles. 
What  faith  could  such  characters  have  in  a  true  "freedom  of 
the  seas"? 

"The  State  is  itself  the  highest  conception  vn  the  wider 
commiunitp  of  man  .  .  .  for  there  is  nothing  higher  than 
it  in  the  world's  history.  .  .  .  The  verdict  of  history  will 
condemn  the  statesman  who  was  unable  to  take  the  responsi- 
bility of  a  bold  decision,  and  sacrifice  the  hopes  of  the  future 
to  the  present  need  of  peace." — (Bernhardi,  referring  es- 
pecially to  the  German  reverses  in  the  Moroccan  crisis,  1909- 
1911.) 

"While  on  the  one  side  she  (United  States)  insists  on  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  on  the  other  she  stretches  out  her  own 
arms  toward  Asia  and  Africa,  in  order  to  find  bases  for  her 
fleets.  .  .  .  The  United  States'  aim  at  the  economic,  and 
where  possible,  the  political  command  of  the  American  conti- 
nent, and  at  the  naval  supremacy  in  the  Pacific.  Their 
interests,  both  political  and  economic,  notwithstanding  all 
commercial  and  other  treaties,  clash  emphatically  with  those 
of  Japan  and  England,  No  arbitration  treaties  could  alter 
this.  .  .  .  Again,  the  principle  that  no  State  can  ever 
interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  another  State  is  repugnant 
to  the  highest  rights  of  the  State.  .  .  .  No  one  stands  above 
the  State ;  it  is  sovereign.  .  .  ,  In  no  case,  therefore,  may  a 
sovereign  State  renownce  the  right  of  interfering  in  the 
affairs  of  other  States" — (Bernhardi.)  (How,  then,  can  it 
enter  into  a  League  of  Nations,  to  enforce  peace  or  justice?) 

In  hinting  at  the  turn  of  affairs  of  "the  next  war,"  Gen- 
eral Bernhardi  made  the  following  comment  on  Germany's 
justification  should  she  break  her  treaty  and  violate  Belgian 
neutrality:  "This  argument  (in  favor  of  breaking  the  neu- 
trality treaty)  is  the  more  justifiable  because  it  may  safely 
be  assumed  that,  in  event  of  a  war  of  Germany  (notice  he 
puts  Germany  first)  against  France  and  England,  the  two 


192  The  Causes  Of  War 

last  mentioned  States  would  try  to  unite  their  forces  in  Bel- 
gium" (a  thing  which  they  did  not  do,  but  which  Germany 
did  do,  in  violation  of  her  pledged  word). — (Bernhardi.)  It 
is  highly  significant  that  this  suggestion  was  published  to  the 
German  nation  three  years  before  the  deed  actually  happened 
in  August,  1914.  It  is  easy  from  this  evidence  of  purpose 
to  trace  whence  originated  that  German  fiction  that  England 
and  France  both  had  attacked,  or  would  immediately,  attack 
Germany  through  Belgium,  on  the  1st  of  August,  1914. 
(The  German  versions  of  the  story  varied  from  day  to  day, 
you  will  recall.)  We  have  always  heard  that  an  evil-minded 
person  thinks  evil  of  others. 

And  again,  "That  England  would  pay  much  attention  to 
the  neutrality  of  weaker  nations  when  such  a  stake  (a  general 
naval  and  continental  war  was  at  issue  is  hardly  credible." 
— (Bernhardi,  Ibid,  p.  158.) 

"It  is  therefore  an  erroneous  idea  that  our  fleet  exists 
merely  for  defense." — (Ibid,  p.  228.) 

"We  must  also  devote  our  full  attention  to  submarines, 
and  endeavor  to  Timke  them  more  effective  in  attack.*' — 
(Ibid,  p.  234.) 

"We  Germans  have  a  far  greater  and  more  urgent  duty 
towards  civilization  than  the  Great  Asiatic  power  (Japan). 
We,  like  the  Japanese,  can  fulfil  it  only  by  the  sword." — 
(Ibid.) 

"In  one  way  or  another  we  must  square  our  account  with 
France,  if  we  wish  for  a  free  hand  in  our  international  policy. 
.  .  .  This  is  the  first  and  foremost  condition  of  a  sound 
German  policy,  and  since  the  hostility  of  France  once  for  all 
cannot  be  removed  by  peaceful  overtures,  the  matter  mtist  be 
settled  by  force  of  arms.  France  must  be  so  completely 
crushed  that  she  can  never  again  come  across  our  path!" — 
(Bernhardi,  "Germany  and  the  Next  War,"  p.  106.)  Pray, 
reader,  does  this  not  explain  the  terrible  German  terror  in 
France  during  the  War? — in  Belgium,  and  in  all  sections 
that  might  be  of  any  strength  against  Germany  should  they 
not  "be  so  completely  crushed".? 


The  League  of  Nations  193 

The  above  quotations  are  but  a  fraction  of  the  declara^ 
tions  among  leading  Germans  that  serve  to  show  their  atti- 
tude toward  a  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  and  toward  inter- 
national conciliation  by  means  of  Arbitration  Courts.  The 
temper  of  the  whole  German  policy,  up  to  the  very  hour  of 
their  final  defeat  last  November,  is  strongly  opposed  to  a 
League  of  Nations,  whose  fundamental  purpose  is  to  estab- 
lish lasting  peace  for  mankind.  They, — and  the  leaders  of 
the  German  Government  at  the  time  of  the  armistice  are  the 
same  as  its  leaders  today, — gave  sanction  to  the  League  of 
Nations  idea  in  President  Wilson's  fourteen  points  only  be- 
cause of  military  and  political  necessity.  The  German  peo- 
ple I  dare  say  had  hardly  entertained  the  idea  of  a  League  to 
enforce  peace  until  it  was  forced  upon  them  in  the  last  days 
of  the  war.  Just  another  incident  to  illustrate  the  spirit 
that  was  abroad  among  the  people  in  Germany  in  the  years 
before  and  leading  up  to  the  War,  which  unmistakably  shows 
the  effect  of  such  teaching  as  we  have  noted  above.  The 
writer  has  an  intimate  friend,  an  English  professor  of  music. 
His  family  had  friends  in  Germany,  whom  they  were  visiting 
a  few  years  ago,  i.  e.,  German  friends.  Although  on  very 
intimate  and  friendly  terms,  the  matron  of  the  German  house- 
hold remarked  to  the  English  Professor's  sister-in-law  one 
day  in  casual  conversation :  "Germany  and  England  are  go- 
ing to  have  a  war  one  of  these  days,  because  we  hate  your 
people,  and  England  had  better  look  out !'' 

The  preceding  examples  are  given  simply  because  they 
readily  come  to  mind,  and  because  Gen.  Von  Berhardi's 
book  is  on  my  desk  at  the  present  moment.  Among  other 
high  German  authorities  who  have  given  like  utterances  are 
the  ex-Crown  Prince  of  Germany,  Maximilian  Harden,  the 
famous  Tannenburg,  Admiral  Kirclihoff,  Werner  Sombat, 
Ernest  Jackh,  Ernest  Hasse,  Gen.  von  Schellendorf,  Fried- 
erick  Lange,  A.  Sprenger,  Paul  Rohrbach,  Rudolph  Theuden, 
and  a  great  number  of  the  now  notorious  group  of  German 
professors.  The  book,  "Out  of  Their  Own  Mouths,"  also 
contains  a  number  of  quotations  from  Germans  that  have 


194j  The  Causes  Of  War 

a  bearing  on  this  subject.  Now,  what  shall  we  say  of  all 
this?  Can  the  authors  of  such  statements  be  at  heart  in 
accord  with  the  principles  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace? 
And  there  is  no  evidence  as  yet  that  any  fundamentally  dif- 
ferent voice  than  theirs  is  the  voice  of  Germany  today.  We 
are  therefore  forced  to  conclude  that  Germany  has  been,  and 
to  all  intents  and  purposes  still  is,  the  arch-enemy  to  the 
peace  movement,  as  well  as  foremost  in  her  war-mindedness 
and  militarism.  Else  why  does  she  not  confess  her  wrongs? 
Why  does  she  not  repudiate  her  methods?  Why  does  she 
not  cast  aside  her  war-lords  ?  Why  does  she  not  voluntarUi/ 
return  many  of  the  precious  relics  of  Europe's  best  civiliza- 
tion that  her  Vandal  hands  seized  upon  ?  Why  does  she  not 
fall  on  her  knees  and  in  contrition  beg  forgiveness  for  the 
crimes  of  Rheims,  Louvain,  Dinant, — of  her  Zeppelins,  her 
submarines,  her  "super-gun,"  her  murderous  raids  over  the 
unprotected  English  and  French  towns,  her  deportations  of 
workmen  and  women  into  slavery,  her  deliberate  and  syste- 
matic starvation  of  peoples  in  portions  of  her  occupied  dis- 
tricts?— and  a  hundred  other  questions  we  might  ask. 

Now,  let  us  give  our  attention  briefly  to  the  second  phase 
listed  in  the  opening  of  this  chapter — the  attitude  of  the 
Allied  countries  on  the  same  subject.  We  shall  begin  with 
Great  Britain,  because  there,  next  to  our  own  country,  we 
find  the  leadership  in  the  peace  movement.  Not  least  sig- 
nificant among  the  Grerman  remarks  above  are  the  specific 
references  to  the  efforts  of  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  toward  international  peace  and  arbitration  in  the 
last  two  decades  before  the  War.  These  references  help  to 
bring  into  relief,  as  I  have  just  stated,  the  fact  that  despite 
the  British-Boer  war  of  1899-1901  and  the  still  more  recent 
Persian  incident  with  Russia,  Great  Britain,  both  as  a  gov- 
ernment and  as  a  people,  has  been,  among  the  nations  of 
the  earth,  the  greatest,  most  hopeful  and  sincere  champion 
of  universal  peace,  saxfe  only  the  United  States  of  America, 
The  utterances  of  such  statesmen  as  Gladstone  and  James 


The  League  of  Nations  195 

Bryce,  and  the  readiness  of  her  foreign  ministers  to  enter 
into  arbitration  treaties  for  the  settlement  of  international 
difficulties,  and  even  the  limitation  of  armaments,  as  well  as 
the  remarkable  backing  by  the  English  people  of  the  League 
of  Nations  at  the  present  hour, — attest  to  this  fact.  Also, 
history, — Gen.  Bemhardi's  statements  to  the  contrary  not- 
withstanding,— will  be  glad  to  acknowledge  that  Foreign 
Minister  Gray,  with  the  aid  of  other  British  statesmen, 
fought  for  peace  and  not  for  war;  that  months  before  the 
war,  if  not  years  before,  he  publicly  championed  the  idea  of 
a  League  of  Nations;  that  he  held  out  against  hope,  for 
peace,  in  the  days  just  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  up 
to  the  very  last  moment,  indeed, — and  had  the  ear  of  every 
great  Government  of  Europe  (even  that  of  the  German  Am- 
bassador to  England)  save  only  the  war-bent,  blood-thirsty 
German  Imperial  Government.  Even  after  the  Great  War 
had  been  raging  for  more  than  a  year,  Mr.  Gray  remarked 
what  a  pity  it  was  that  the  League,  which  was  so  near  to 
realization,  could  not  have  been  made  a  fact  before  the  ca- 
tastrophe came. 

Of  what  virtue  is  it  that  Kaiser  Wilhelm  II,  as  Mr.  Arthur 
Bullard  tries  to  make  the  deduction,  was  not  converted  to  the 
War  Party's  plan  until  after  the  Moroccan  crisis  in  1911? 
It  was  with  him  merely  a  matter  of  expediency  and  not  of 
principle,  that  he  opposed  war  before  that  time.  It  was 
simply  that  the  Kaiser  felt  the  time  had  not  yet  come.  So 
many  times  in  his  speeches  in  the  two  decades  between  1888 
and  1909  did  he  refer  to  this  subject,  that  there  can  be  no 
doubt  of  his  constant  anticipation  of  this  war  and  the  glori- 
ous part  he,  as  the  emulator  of  Frederick  the  Great,  was  to 
play  in  it. 

France  also  was  listening  attentively  to  the  idea  of  the 
League,  though  naturally  more  distrustful  than  England,  on 
account  of  the  direct  German  menace.  Still,  she  was  hope- 
ful that  war  would  not  come,  even  though  she  felt  that  she 
must  increase  her  period  of  military  service  in  1916  from  two 


196  The  Causes  Of  War 

to  three  years,  because  of  the  alarming  military  program 
and  unmistakable  threat  of  Germany. 

The  United  States  of  America  can  well  be  proud  of  the 
fact  that  she  has  led  in  all  this  movement  for  Arbitration  as 
a  check  upon  war  (though  not  at  all  proud  of  what  many 
of  her  pacifists,  before  and  during  the  war,  have  done; 
and  it  is  but  natural,  therefore,  that  she  should  occupy  the 
leading  position  in  the  present  supreme  fight, — for  fight  it 
is, — for  peace.  Whether  the  constitution  of  the  League  as 
now  drawn  up  is  accepted  in  its  entirety  or  not,  those  Ameri- 
can statesmen  and  would-be  statesmen, — whether  from  con- 
viction or  for  political  reasons — mho  oppose  the  principle  of 
the  League  of  Nations  to  Enforce  Peace,  not  only  are  com- 
mitting an  illogical  act  in  the  light  of  America's  position  so 
far,  but  will  also  find  themselves  running  counter  to  the  great 
statesmanship  of  the  world  by  their  wilfulness  (as  did  the 
"wilful  twelve"  in  the  beginning  of  the  war)  and  at  the  same 
time  lowering  the  confidence  of  the  great  common  peoples  of 
the  world  in  the  unselfish  charity  and  utter  svncerity  of  the 
people  of  the  United  States  of  America,  A  great  spectacle 
indeed,  will  it  present  to  the  world,  should  the  United  States, 
the  chief  champion  of  the  League,  and  without  whom  it  could 
never  have  been  formed,  cast  off  her  own  product,  and  with 
it  the  present  hope  of  the  world  for  the  solution  of  its  great- 
est problem ! 

It  boots  but  little  that  men  may  argue  that  this  League 
cannot  abolish  war.  Most  thinking  men  perhaps  do  not 
claim  so  much  for  it  in  the  immediate  future.  But  it  can 
prevent  another  world  struggle  such  as  the  one  we  have  just 
passed  through,  or  put  it  off  until  the  coming  governments 
of  the  people  make  war  a  thing  of  the  past.  Nor  is  there 
any  more  strength  to  the  argument  that  the  League  consti- 
tution would  conflict  fundamentally  with  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States.  Personally,  I  do  not  believe  the  February 
draft  does,  or  that  another  one  adopted  by  the  Peace  Con- 
ference would.     But  if  it  did,  by  implication,  on  some  one 


The  League  of  Nations  19*7 

or  more  minor  points  (in  a  major  sense  it  cannot,  as  now 
drawn  up,  or  possible  to  be  drawn  up,  or  passed  upon  by  the 
democracies  of  the  nations)  there  are  two  sufficient  reasons, 
to  the  writer's  mind,  why  we  need  not  be  alarmed  over  the 
prospect,  namely:  (1),  Enough  democratic  nations  with  con- 
stitutions or  fundamental  laws  similar  to  ours  will  be  mem- 
bers of  the  League,  having  the  same  problem  to  face,  that 
amendments  to  remedy  such  defects  will  he  forthcoming^ 
and  (2),  No  great  constitution  was  ever  entered  into  without 
compromise  and  sacrifice  of  some  degree  or  sort,  real  or 
imaginary,  by  all  parties  to  the  compact.  Trusting  to  its 
future  (and  often  a  very  few  years  of  experience  sufficed) 
and  in  its  fundamental  justices,  each  party  has  looked  for- 
ward to  the  future  to  remedy  the  defects  and  guarantee  that 
party's  liberties  or  rights.  We  should  apply  the  lesson  of 
our  own  early  national  history  in  this  respect.  The  Consti- 
tution of  the  United  States  did  not  prevent  trouble,  it  is  true ; 
it  did  not  even  prevent  a  civil  conflict ;  but  it  did  survive  all 
conflict,  and  has  made  a  great  civil  war  again  impossible. 
Likewise  will  the  constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations  have 
to  be  tested;  but  its  fundamental  democracy  and  justice  will 
prove  its  salvation.  Likewise  also,  its  democratic  principles 
will  save  its  various  members  from  participation  in  a  for- 
eign conflict  unless  they  see,  as  in  the  case  of  the  war  just 
closed,  that  it  is  a  life  and  death  struggle  between  right  and 
wrong, — in  which  case  any  people  would  he  proud  to  fight. 
How  very  true  was  this  in  the  case  of  our  own  Constitu- 
tion of  1787,  the  greatest  written  governmental  document  on 
the  face  of  the  earth.  So  will  time  and  the  spirit  of  fairness 
and  justice  to  all  remedy  by  amendment  all  really  objection- 
able features  of  the  constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Certainly  today  the  world  as  a  whole  is  more  democratically 
minded  than  were  the  people  of  the  United  States  in  1787; 
and  if  the  people  could  be  trusted  then,  with  the  United 
States'  Constitution  in  their  hands,  verily  the  peoples  of  the 
world,  who  have  just  concluded  a  mighty  war  to  prove  that 


198  The  Causes  Of  War 

there  is  no  master  above  them,  can  be  depended  upon  to  suc- 
cessfully administer  the  international  relationship  of  the  na- 
tions in  the  future.  If  not,  then  as  well  admit  that  de- 
mocracy throughout  the  earth  is  doomed,  and  Lincoln^s  idea 
but  a  dream. 

It  is  not  in  fine  legal  and  constitutional  distinctions  that 
mankind's  security  in  the  future  is  to  rest,  but  in  the  good- 
will and  fairmindedness  of  its  peoples,  one  toward  another. 
Let  us  see  to  it  that  no  vain  quibblings  and  obstructions  of 
words  is  put  in  their  way.  It  is  not  so  much  the  letter  as 
the  spirit  of  the  law,  as  expressed  in  the  League  of  Nations 
that  is  to  guarantee  peace  in  the  future.  Away  with  that 
type  of  politician  and  statesman  who  still  thinks  the  world 
is  so  small  and  isolated  that  he  need  not  look  beyond  the 
boundaries  of  his  own  country,  and  has  no  vital  concern  out- 
side of  it !  Such  persons  helped  to  make  this  war  possible. 
Henceforth  America's  final  safety  is  the  safety  of  the  world, 
and  vice  versa. 

In  1911  (repeated  in  an  early  chapter  of  this  book)  the 
writer  made  this  statement:  "One  nation,  in  its  philan- 
thropic enthusiasm,  cannot  bring  peace  to  the  world ;  it  can- 
not adopt  a  policy  of  peace  and  say  it  will  have  it,  whether 
others  will  or  no."  We  all  realize  this  now,  though  so  many 
of  us  doubted  it  at  that  time  that  we  were  unprepared  for  war 
when  it  came.  Now,  if  one  nation  cannot  adopt  such  a 
policy,  then  there  is  only  one  way  under  heaven  that  peace 
can  come,  and  that  is  by  its  joint  adoption  by  the  govern- 
ments representing  the  overwhelming  majority  of  mankind. 
What  other  than  this  is  the  League  of  Nations?  The  for- 
mer isolation  and  peace  is  forever  impossible;  the  latter, 
then,  must  come,  else  Bernhardi  is  right;  might  is  right  in 
the  political  and  moral  world,  as  well  as  in  the  realm  of  na- 
ture, and  the  War-god  rules  forever  and  aye. 

Summing  up  then,  we  may  say  that  the  governments  of  the 
Allied  nations,  and  their  peoples,  led  by  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain,  through  their  program  of  Arbitration 


The  Lea^gue  of  Nations  199 

treaties  and  good-will  were  rapidly  preparing  the  way  for  an 
initial  hopeful  experiment  of  a  League  of  Nations  or  "Fed- 
eration of  the  World,"  when  the  Machiavellian  Teutonic  gov- 
ernments launched  the  world  suddenly  upon  the  greatest  of 
all  wars.  This  was  because  these  selfsame  Teutonic  govern- 
ments were  rapidly  drifting  in  the  opposite  direction  to  the 
Allied  or  democratic  countries,  and  more  and  more  were  con- 
sidering war  as  their  birthright  and  the  manna  of  their 
future  existence. 

What,  therefore,  is  our  conclusion.'^  Does  our  champion- 
ship of  the  League  of  Nations  contradict  our  earlier  stand  to 
the  effect  that  a  League  of  Nations  could  not  be  the  final 
remedy  for  war.?  If  the  reader  will  examine  carefully  the 
author's  whole  treatment  in  this  work  he  will  find  that  no- 
where have  we  objected  to  a  League  of  Nations,  or  hinted 
that  we  would  not  support  it ;  we  have  only  doubted  its  abil- 
ity to  "abolish  war  in  the  near  future."  We  have  said  that 
such  a  league,  if  formed  at  the  time  we  were  writing,  "could 
last  only  for  a  time,"  and  we  believe  that  probably  is  still 
true,  even  though  two  momentous  years  have  passed  since 
the  above  statement  was  made.  Does  our  (and  by  "our"  I 
mean  a  considerable  number  of  men  everywhere)  recent  claim 
that  "it  is  only  the  spirit  of  Christ"  in  the  "hearts  and  con- 
sciences of  men"  that  can  "save  us  from  our  animal  instincts 
and  from  war,"  and  that  peace  for  weary  mankind  cannot 
come  until  the  "beast  in  nations"  is  conquered,  and  until 
governments  must  abide  by  the  same  principles  of  conduct 
and  honor  as  obtain  between  individuals, — does  this  all  con- 
flict with  our  present  stand  on  the  League  of  Nations?  I 
think  not.  Certainly,  the  spirit  of  Christ  has  advanced  far 
into  the  council  chambers  of  the  great  nations  of  the  world 
within  the  past  two  years ;  certainly  the  "beast  in  nations" 
is  not  the  ruling  power  today,  the  "beasts"  being  for  the 
most  part  removed, — interned  in  neutral  countries,  or  in 
ignominious  hiding  (except  the  Bolsheviki,  another  type  of 
beast,  that  is  even  worse)  ;  certainly  the  world  on  the  eve  of 


200  The  Causes  Of  War 

the  adoption  of  the  League  is  much  nearer  to  the  "same 
principles  of  conduct  and  honor  as  obtain  between  individ- 
uals"— since  this  code  forms  one  of  the  articles  of  the  League 
constitution.  In  looking  upon  the  whole  matter  of  war  and 
peace  in  the  historical,  biological,  or  evolutionary  light,  such 
as  we  have  consistently  followed  in  this  work,  we  have  come 
to  an  intelligent  and  intelligible  interpretation  of  the  present 
world  status.  We  have  been  obliged  at  times  to  recognize 
accelerating  and  reactionary  currents,  as  we  pointed  out  in 
the  beginning.  The  terrible,  the  astounding,  the  wonderful 
and  glorious  events  of  the  years  1914-1919  have  lent  an  un- 
foreseen and  tremendous  impetus  to  the  onward  sweep  of 
democracy  and  to  the  idea  of  a  world  society  as  a  remedy  for 
war.  We  have  stated  more  than  once  in  our  earlier  treat- 
ment of  the  War  and  its  issues,  that  "the  coming  Peace 
Conference"  possesses  momentous  and  almost  unlimited  possi- 
bilities along  this  line ;  but  no  one  could  foresee  what  magni- 
tude these  possibilities  should  actually  assume  at  the  end 
of  hostilities,  and  what  gigantic  political  changes  were  im- 
mediately in  store  for  the  world.  (We  could,  we  did, 
prophesy  some  of  them.)  The  World  War  has  simply  has- 
tened for  generations  the  slow  transformation  which  we  were 
justified  in  feeling  was  coming  surely,  if  slowly,  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  race. 

Moreover,  there  were  those  among  us  who  felt  already, 
before  the  fateful  year  of  1914,  that  we  had  come  to  the 
parting  of  the  way,  and  the  old  order  no  longer  sufficed.  On 
this  point  the  author  made  the  following  statement  (found 
in  an  earlier  chapter  of  this  book) :  "War,  we  have  said, 
assumes  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  the  best.  But,  the  best  for 
what?  The  fittest  for  what.?  That  is  the  capital  question 
now.  It  is  not  easy  for  one  people  to  modify  the  wish,  the 
interests  and,  still  less,  the  national  characteristics  of  an- 
other. The  failure  of  many  efforts  as  it  has  helped  to  bring 
on  this  colossal  war.  (Here  I  was  thinking  especially 
of  Germany's  attempts  to  Germanize  Alsace-Lorraine  and 


The  League  of  Nations  201 

Poland,  Russia's  similar  attempts  at  times,  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary's race  problems  in  her  polyglot  Empire.)  Once  it 
could  be  done  by  war,  and  the  conqueror  after  the  war ;  but 
in  so  far  as  this  transformation  is  possible  today,  it  is  not 
by  war  and  force  that  it  is  to  be  accomplished.  Free  in- 
tercourse between  nations  (another  principle  of  the  League 
of  Nations),  social  and  commercial,  is  perhaps  the  most 
powerful  pacifying  influence.  When  nations  come  to  mingle 
with  each  other  more  vitally,  like  individuals  they  will  come 
to  understand  and  appreciate  one  anotlier  better,  and  will  at 
last  learn  to  heed  that  most  costly  and  precious  lesson,  that 
peace,  and  not  war  is  to  be  the  true  and  only  rational  basis 
of  civilized  human  society."     (Chapter  5.) 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE    CONSTITUTION    OF    THE    LEAGUE    OF   NATIONS 

As  read  by  President  Wilson  before  the  Peace  Conference  at 
Paris,  France,  February  14,  1919. 

PREAMBLE 

TN  order  to  promote  mter national  cooperation  and  to  se- 
-*  cwre  international  peace  and  security  hy  the  acceptance 
of  obligations  not  to  resort  to  war,  hy  the  prescription  of 
open,  just  and  honorable  relations  between  nations,  by  the 
firm  establishment  of  the  understandings  of  international  law 
as  the  actual  rule  of  conduct  among  governments  and  by  the 
maintenance  of  justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for  all 
treaty  obligations  in  the  dealings  of  organized  peoples  with 
one  another,  the  Powers  signatory  to  this  covenant  adopt 
this  constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations: 

AETICLE  I 

The  action  of  the  high  contracting  parties  under  the  terms 
of  this  covenant  shall  be  effected  through  the  instrumental- 
ity of  a  meeting  of  a  body  of  delegates  representing  the  high 
contracting  parties,  of  meetings  at  more  frequent  intervals 
of  an  executive  council  and  of  a  permanent  international 
secretariat  to  be  established  at  the  seat  of  the  league. 

ABTICLE  n 

Meetings  of  the  body  of  delegates  shall  be  held  at  stated  in- 
tervals and  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require  for 

202 


The  Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations        SOS 

the  purpose  of  dealing  with  matters  within  the  sphere  of 
action  of  the  league.  Meetings  of  the  body  of  delegates  shall 
be  held  at  the  seat  of  the  league  or  at  such  other  places 
as  may  be  found  convenient,  and  shall  consist  of  representa- 
tives of  the  high  contracting  parties.  Each  of  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  shall  have  one  vote,  but  may  have  not  more 
than  three  representatives. 

ARTICLE   m 

The  executive  council  shall  consist  of  representatives  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  the  British  Empire,  France, 
Italy  and  Japan,  together  with  representatives  of  four  other 
States,  members  of  the  league.  The  selection  of  these  four 
States  shall  be  made  by  the  body  of  delegates  on  such  prin- 
ciples and  in  such  manner  as  they  think  fit.  Pending  the 
appointment  of  these  representatives  of  other  States  repre- 
sentatives of  (blank  left  for  names)  shall  be  members  of 
the  executive  council. 

Meetings  of  the  council  shall  be  held  from  time  to  time 
as  occasion  may  be  required  and  at  least  once  a  year,  at 
whatever  place  may  be  decided  on,  or,  failing  any  such  de- 
cision, at  the  seat  of  the  league,  and  any  matter  within  the 
sphere  of  action  of  the  league  or  affecting  the  peace  of  the 
world  may  be  dealt  with  at  such  meetings. 

Invitations  shall  be  sent  to  any  Power  to  attend  a  meet- 
ing of  the  council  at  which  such  matters  directly  affecting 
its  interests  are  to  be  discussed,  and  no  decision  taken  at  any 
meeting  will  be  binding  on  such  Powers  unless  so  invited. 

ARTICLE    IV 

All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of  the  body  of  dele- 
gates or  the  executive  council,  including  the  appointment  of 
committees  to  investigate  particular  matters,  shall  be  regu- 
lated by  the  body  of  delegates   or  the  executive  council, 


204  The  Causes  Of  War 

and  may  he  decided  by  a  majority  of  the  States  represented 
at  the  meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  body  of  delegates  and  of  the 
executive  council  shall  be  summoned  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

AETICLE  V 

The  permanent  secretariat  of  the  league  shall  be  estab- 
lished  at  ,   which   shall   constitute   the   seat   of  the 

league.  The  secretariat  shall  comprise  such  secretaries 
and  staff  as  may  be  required,  under  the  general  direction  and 
control  of  a  scretary-general  of  the  league,  who  shall  be 
chosen  by  the  executive  council ;  the  secretariat  shall  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  secretary-general  subject  to  confirmation  by 
the  executive  council. 

The  secretary-general  shall  act  in  that  capacity  at  all 
meetings  of  the  body  of  delegates  or  of  the  executive  coun- 
cil. 

The  expenses  of  the  secretariat  shall  be  borne  by  the 
States  members  of  the  league  in  accordance  with  the  ap- 
portionment of  the  expenses  of  the  international  bureau  of 
the  Universal  Postal  Union. 

ARTICLE    VI 

Representatives  of  the  high  contracting  parties  and  of- 
ficials of  the  league  when  engaged  in  the  business  of  the 
league  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and  immunities,  and 
the  buildings  occupied  by  the  league  or  its  officials  or  by 
representatives  attending  its  meetings  shall  enjoy  the  bene- 
fits of  extraterritoriality. 

ARTICLE    VII 

Admission  to  the  league  of  States  not  signatories  to  the 
covenant  and  not  named  in  the  protocol  hereto  as  States 
to  be  invited  to  adhere  to  the  covenant  requires  the  assent  of 


The  Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations        205 

not  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  States  represented  in  the 
body  of  delegates,  and  shall  be  limited  to  fully  self-govern- 
ing countries,  including  dominions  and  colonies. 

No  state  shall  be  admitted  to  the  league  unless  it  is  able 
to  give  effective  guarantees  of  its  sincere  intention  to  ob- 
serve its  international  obligations  and  unless  it  shall  con- 
form to  such  principles  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  league 
in  regard  to  its  naval  and  military  forces  and  armaments. 

ARTICLE  vra 

The  high  contracting  parties  recognize  the  principle  that 
the  maintenance  of  peace  will  require  the  reduction  of  na- 
tional armaments  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  national 
safety  and  the  enforcement  by  common  action  of  interna- 
tional obligations,  having  special  regard  to  the  geographical 
situation  and  circumstances  of  each  State,  and  the  executive 
council  shall  formulate  plans  for  effecting  such  reduction. 

The  executive  council  shall  also  determine  for  the  consid- 
eration and  action  of  the  several  governments  what  military 
equipment  and  armament  is  fair  and  reasonable  in  propor- 
tion to  the  scale  of  forces  laid  down  in  the  program  of  dis- 
armament, and  these  limits,  when  adopted,  shall  not  be  ex- 
ceeded without  the  permission  of  the  executive  council. 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  the  manufacture 
by  private  enterprise  of  munitions  and  implements  of  war 
lends  itself  to  grave  objections,  and  direct  the  executive 
council  to  advise  how  the  evil  effects  attendant  upon  such 
manufacture  can  be  prevented,  due  regard  being  had  to  the 
necessities  of  those  countries  which  are  not  able  to  manufac- 
ture for  themselves  the  munitions  and  implements  of  war 
necessary  for  their  safety. 

The  high  contracting  parties  undertake  in  no  way  to  con- 
ceal from  each  other  the  conditions  of  such  of  their  indus- 
tries as  are  capable  of  being  adapted  to  warlike  purposes 
or  the  scale  of  their  armaments,  and  agree  that  there  shall  be 


206  The  Causes  Of  War 

full  and  frank  interchange  of  information  as  to  their  mili- 
tary and  naval  programs. 

AETICLE    IX 

A  permanent  commission  shall  be  constituted  to  advise 
the  league  on  the  execution  of  the  provisions  of  Article 
VIII,  and  on  military  and  naval  questions  generally. 

AETICLE    X 

The  high  contracting  parties  shall  undertake  to  respect 
and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the  territorial 
integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of  all  States 
members  of  the  league.  In  case  of  any  such  aggression  or 
in  case  of  any  threat  or  danger  of  such  aggression  the  ex- 
ecutive council  shall  advise  upon  the  means  by  which  the 
obligation  shall  be  fulfilled. 

ARTICLE    XI 

Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immediately  affecting 
any  of  the  high  contracting  parties  or  not,  is  hereby  de- 
clared a  matter  of  concern  to  the  league  and  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  reserve  the  right  to  take  any  action  that 
may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of 
nations. 

It  is  hereby  also  declared  and  agreed  to  be  the  friendly 
right  of  each  of  the  high  contracting  parties  to  draw  the  at- 
tention of  the  body  of  delegates  or  of  the  executive  council 
to  any  circumstance  affecting  international  intercourse  which 
threatens  to  disturb  international  peace  or  the  good  under- 
standing between  nations  upon  which  peace  depends. 

ARTICLE  xn 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  should  disputes 
arise  between  th^n  which  cannot  be  adjusted  by  the  ordincu^ 


The  Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations       207 

processes  of  diplomacy  they  will  in  no  case  resort  to  war 
without  previously  submitting  the  questions  and  matters  in- 
volved either  to  arbitration  or  to  inquiry  by  the  executive 
council  and  until  three  months  after  the  award  by  the  ar- 
bitrators, or  a  recommendation  by  the  executive  council, 
and  that  they  will  not  even  then  resort  to  war  as  against  a 
member  of  the  league  which  complies  with  the  award  of 
the  arbitrators  or  the  recommendation  of  the  executive 
council. 

In  any  case  under  this  article  the  award  of  the  arbitra- 
tors shall  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  executive  council  shall  be  made  within  six 
months   after  the   submission   of   the  dispute. 

ARTICLE  xin 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  whenever  any 
dispute  or  difficulty  shall  arise  between  them  which  they 
recognize  to  be  suitable  for  submission  to  arbitration  and 
which  cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled  by  diplomacy  they 
will  submit  the  whole  matter  to  arbitration.  For  this  pur- 
pose the  Court  of  Arbitration  to  which  the  case  is  referred 
shall  be  the  Court  agreed  on  by  the  parties  or  stipulated  in 
any  convention  existing  between  them.  The  high  contracting 
parties  agree  that  they  will  carry  out  in  full  good  faith 
any  award  that  may  be  rendered.  In  the  event  of  any  fail- 
ure to  carry  out  the  award  the  executive  council  shall  pro- 
pose what  steps  can  best  be  taken  to  give  effect  thereto. 

ARTICLE   XIV 

The  executive  council  shall  formulate  plans  for  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  permanent  court  of  international  justice 
and  this  court  shall,  when  established,  be  competent  to  hear 
and  determine  any  matter  which  the  parties  recognize  aa 
suitable  for  submission  to  it  for  arbitration  under  the  fore- 
going article. 


208  The  Causes  Of  War 


AETICLE  XV 

If  there  should  arise  between  States'  members  of  the 
league,  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  rupture,  which  is  not 
submitted  to  arbitration  as  above,  the  high  contracting 
parties  agree  that  they  will  refer  the  matter  to  the  executive 
council;  either  party  to  the  dispute  may  give  notice  of  the 
existence  of  the  dispute  to  the  Secretary-General,  who  will 
make  all  necessary  arrangements  for  a  full  investigation  and 
consideration  thereof.  For  this  purpose  the  parties  agee  to 
communicate  to  the  Secretary-General  as  promptly  as  pos- 
sible statements  of  their  case  with  all  the  relevant  facts  and 
papers,  and  the  executive  council  may  forthwith  direct  the 
publication  thereof.  Where  the  efforts  of  the  council  lead 
to  the  settlement  of  the  dispute  a  statement  shall  be  pub- 
lished indicating  the  nature  of  the  dispute  and  that  of  set- 
tlement, together  with  such  explanations  as  may  be  appro- 
priate. 

If  the  dispute  has  not  been  settled  a  report  by  the  coun- 
cil shall  be  published,  setting  forth  with  all  necessary  facts 
and  explanations  the  recommendations  which  the  council 
thinks  just  and  proper  for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute.  If 
the  report  is  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the  members  of  the 
council  other  than  the  parties  to  the  dispute  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  agree  that  they  will  not  go  to  war  with  any 
party  which  complies  with  the  recommendations  and  that,  if 
any  party  shall  refuse  so  to  comply,  the  council  shall  pro- 
pose measures  necessary  to  give  effect  to  the  recommenda- 
tions. 

If  no  such  unanimous  report  can  be  made  it  shall  be  the 
duty  of  the  majority  and  the  privilege  of  the  minority  to 
issue  statements  indicating  what  they  believe  to  be  the 
facts  and  containing  the  reasons  which  they  consider  to  be 
just  and  proper. 

The  executive  council  may  in  any  case  under  this  article 


The  Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations        209 

refer  the  dispute  to  the  body  of  delegates.  The  dispute 
shall  be  so  referred  at  the  request  of  either  party  to  the 
dispute,  provided  that  such  request  must  be  made  within 
fourteen  days  after  the  submission  of  the  dispute.  In  a 
case  referred  to  the  body  of  delegates  all  the  provisions  of 
this  article  and  of  Article  XII,  relating  to  the  action  and 
powers  of  the  executive  council  shall  apply  to  the  action 
and  powers  of  the  body  of  delegates. 

ARTICLE  XVI 

Should  any  of  the  high  contracting  parties  break  or  dis- 
regard its  covenants  under  Article  XII,  it  shall  thereby  ipso 
facto  be  deemed  to  have  committed  an  act  of  war  against 
all  the  other  members  of  the  league,  which  hereby  undertakes 
immediately  to  subject  it  to  the  severance  of  all  trade  or 
financial  relations,  the  prohibition  of  all  intercourse  between 
their  nations  and  the  nationals  of  the  covenant  breaking 
State,  and  the  prevention  of  all  financial,  commercial  or  per- 
sonal intercourse  between  the  nationals  of  the  covenant 
breaking  State,  and  the  nationals  of  any  other  State,  whether 
a  member  of  the  league  or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  executive  council  in  such  case 
to  recommend  what  effective  military  or  naval  force  the 
members  of  the  league  shall  severally  contribute  to  the  armed 
forces  to  be  used  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  league. 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  further  that  they 
will  mutually  support  one  another  in  the  financial  and  ecor 
nomic  measures  which  may  be  taken  under  this  article  in 
order  to  minimize  the  loss  and  inconvenience  resulting  from 
the  above  measures  and  that  they  will  mutually  support  one 
another  in  resisting  any  special  measures  aimed  at  one  of 
their  number  by  the  covenant  breaking  State,  and  that  they 
will  afford  passage  through  their  territory  to  the  forces 
of  any  of  the  high  contracting  parties  who  are  cooperating 
to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  league. 


210  The  Causes  Of  War 


ARTICLE  XVII 

In  the  event  of  disputes  between  one  State  member  of  the 
league  and  another  State  which  is  not  a  member  of  the 
league,  or  between  States  not  members  of  the  league,  the 
high  contracting  parties  agree  that  the  State  or  States  not 
members  of  the  league  shall  be  invited  to  accept  the  obliga- 
tions of  membership  in  the  league  for  the  purposes  of  such 
dispute  upon  such  conditions  as  the  executive  council  may 
deem  just,  and  upon  acceptance  of  any  such  invitation  the 
above  provisions  shall  be  applied  with  such  modifications  as 
may  be  deemed  necessary  by  the  league. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given  the  executive  council 
shall  immediately  institute  an  inquiry  into  the  circumstances 
and  merits  of  the  dispute  and  recommend  such  action  as  may 
seem  best  and  most  effectual  in  the  circumstances. 

In  the  event  of  a  Power  so  invited  refusing  to  accept  the 
obligations  of  membership  in  the  league  for  the  purposes 
of  the  league  which  in  the  case  of  a  State  member  of  the 
league  would  constitute  a  breach  of  Article  XII,  the  pro- 
visions of  Article  XVI,  shall  be  applicable  as  against  the 
state  taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute  when  so  invited  refuse  to 
accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  league  for  the 
purpose  of  such  dispute  the  executive  council  may  take  such 
action  and  make  such  recommendations  as  will  prevent  hos- 
tilities and  will  result  in  the  settlement  of  the  dispute. 


ARTICLE  xvin 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  the  league  shall 
be  intrusted  with  general  supervision  of  the  trade  in  arms 
and  ammunition  with  the  countries  in  which  the  control  of 
this  traffic  is  necessary  in  the  common  interest. 


The  Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations        211 


ARTICLE   XIX 

To  those  colonies  and  territories  which  as  a  consequence 
of  the  late  war  have  ceased  to  be  under  the  sovereignty  of 
the  States  which  formerly  governed  them  and  which  are  in- 
habited by  peoples  not  yet  able  to  stand  by  themselves  un- 
der the  strenuous  conditions  of  the  modern  world  there 
should  be  applied  the  principle  that  the  well  being  and 
development  of  such  peoples  form  a  sacred  trust  of  civili- 
zation, and  that  securities  for  the  performance  of  this  trust 
should  be  embodied  in  the  constitution  of  the  league. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practical  effect  to  this  prin- 
ciple is  that  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples  should  be  intrusted 
to  advanced  nations  who  by  reason  of  their  resources,  their 
experience  or  their  geographical  position  can  best  undertake 
this  responsibility,  and  that  this  tutelage  should  be  exercised 
by  them  as  mandatories  on  behalf  of  the  league. 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  according  to 
the  stage  of  the  development  of  the  people,  the  geographical 
situation  of  the  territory,  its  economic  conditions  and  other 
similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities  formerly  belonging  to  the  Turkish 
Empire  have  reached  the  stage  of  development  where  their 
existence  as  independent  nations  can  be  provisionally  recog- 
nized subject  to  the  rendering  of  administrative  advice  and 
assistance  by  a  mandatory  Power  until  such  time  as  they  are 
able  to  stand  alone.  The  wishes  of  these  communities  must 
be  a  principal  consideration  in  the  selection  of  the  manda- 
tory Power. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  central  Africa,  are  at 
such  a  stage  that  the  mandatory  must  be  responsible  for  the 
administration  of  the  territory  subject  to  conditions  which 
will  guarantee  freedom  of  conscience  or  religion,  subject  only 
to  the  maintenance  of  public  order  and  morals,  the  prohibi- 
tion of  abuses  such  as  the  slave  trade,  the  arms  traffic  and 


212  The  Causes  Of  War 

the  liquor  traffic,  and  the  prevention  of  the  establishment  of 
fortifications  or  military  and  naval  bases  and  of  military 
training  of  the  natives  for  other  than  police  purposes  and 
the  defence  of  territory,  and  will  also  secure  equal  oppor- 
tunities for  the  trade  and  commerce  of  other  members  of 
the  league. 

There  are  territories  such  as  southwest  Africa  and  cer- 
tain of  the  South  Pacific  isles  which,  owing  to  the  sparse- 
ness  of  their  populations  or  their  small  size  or  their  remote- 
ness from  the  centers  of  civilization  or  their  geographical 
contiguity  to  the  mandatory  State,  and  other  circumstances, 
can  be  best  administered  under  the  laws  of  the  mandatory 
State  as  integral  portions  thereof,  subject  to  the  safeguards 
above  mentioned  in  the  interests  of  the  indigenous  popula- 
tion. 

In  every  case  of  mandate  the  mandatory  State  shall  ren- 
der to  the  league  an  annual  report  in  reference  to  the  terri- 
tory committed  to  its  charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  control  or  administration  to  be 
exercised  by  the  mandatory  State  shall,  if  not  previously 
agreed  upon  by  the  high  contracting  parties  in  each  case, 
be  explicitly  defined  by  the  executive  council  in  a  special 
act  or  charter. 

The  high  contracting  parties  further  agree  to  establish 
at  the  seat  of  the  league  a  mandatory  commission  to  receive 
and  examine  the  annual  reports  of  the  mandatory  powers, 
and  to  assist  the  league  in  insuring  the  observance  of  the 
terms  of  all  mandates. 

ARTICLE  XX 

The  high  contracting  parties  will  endeavor  to  secure  and 
maintain  fair  and  human  conditions  of  labor  for  men,  women 
and  children  both  in  their  own  countries  and  in  all  countries 
to  which  their  commercial  and  industrial  relations  extend, 


The  Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations        213 

and  to  that  end  agree  to  establish  as  part  of  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  league  a  permanent  bureau  of  labor. 

ARTICLE  XXI 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  provision  shall 
be  made  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  league  to  se- 
cure and  maintain  freedom  of  transit  and  equitable  treat- 
ment for  the  commerce  of  all  States  members  of  the  league, 
having  in  mind,  among  other  things,  special  arrangements 
with  regard  to  the  necessities  of  the  regions  devastated  dur- 
ing the  war  of  1914-1918. 

ARTICLE  XXn 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  to  place  under  the 
control  of  the  league  all  international  bureaus  already  es- 
tablished by  general  treaties  if  the  parties  to  such  treaties 
consent.  Furthermore  they  agree  that  all  such  international 
bureaus  to  be  constituted  in  future  shall  be  placed  under 
control  of  the  league. 

ARTICLE  XXIII 

The  high  contracting  parties  agree  that  every  treaty  or 
international  engagement  entered  into  hereafter  by  any 
State,  member  of  the  league,  shall  be  forthwith  registered 
with  the  secretary-general  and  as  soon  as  possible  published 
by  him,  and  that  no  such  treaty  or  international  engage- 
ment shall  be  binding  until  so  registered. 

ARTICLE   XXIV 

It  shall  be  the  right  of  the  body  of  delegates  from  time 
to  time  to  advise  the  reconsideration  by  States,  members 
of  the  league,  of  treaties  which  have  become  inapplicable, 


214  The  Causes  Of  War 

and  of  international  conditions,  of  which  the  continuance 
may  endanger  the  peace  of  the  world. 

AETICLE   XXV 

The  high  contracting  parties  severally  agree  that  the 
present  covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogating  all  obligations 
inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  thereof,  and 
solemnly  engage  that  they  will  not  hereafter  enter  into  any 
engagements  inconsistent  with  the  terms  thereof.  In  case 
any  of  the  Powers  signatory  hereto  or  subsequently  admitted 
to  the  league  shall,  before  becoming  a  party  to  this  covenant, 
have  undertaken  any  obligations  which  are  inconsistent  with 
the  terms  of  this  covenant,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  Power 
to  take  immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release  from  such 
obligations. 

ARTICLE  XXVI 

Amendments  to  this  covenant  will  take  effect  when  rati- 
fied by  the  States  whose  representatives  compose  the  execu- 
tive council  and  by  three-fourths  of  the  States  whose  repre- 
sentatives compose  the  body  of  delegates. 


APPENDIX  I 

PEESiDENT  Wilson's  address  at  paeis 

On  February  14,  1919,  Before  the  Peace  Conference,  at  the  Reading 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations 

MR.  CHAIRMAN:  I  have  the  honor,  and  assume  it  a 
very  great  privilege,  of  reporting  in  the  name  of  the 
commission  constituted  by  this  conference  on  the  formulation 
of  a  plan  for  the  League  of  Nations.  I  am  happy  to  say 
that  it  is  a  unanimous  report,  a  unanimous  report  from  the 
rep<resentatives  .of  foiirteen  nations — the  United  States, 
Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  Belgium,  Brazil,  China, 
Czechoslovakia,  Greece,  Poland,  Portugal,  Rumania,  and 
Serbia. 

"I  think  it  will  be  serviceable  and  interesting  if  I,  with 
your  permission,  read  the  document,  as  the  only  report  we 
have  to  make." 

After  having  read  the  entire  document,  President  Wilson 
continued  as  follows: 

"It  gives  me  pleasure  to  add  to  this  formal  reading  of 
the  result  of  our  labors  that  the  character  of  the  discussion 
which  occurred  at  the  sittings  of  the  commission  was  not  only 
of  the  most  constructive  but  of  the  most  encouraging  sort. 
It  was  obvious  throughout  our  discussions  that,  although 
there  were  subjects  upon  which  there  were  individual  differ- 
ences of  judgment  with  regard  to  the  method  by  which  our 
objects  should  be  obtained,  there  was  practically  at  no 
point  any  serious  differences  of  opinion  or  motive  as  to  the 
objects  which  we  were  seeking. 

"Indeed,  while  these  debates  were  not  made  the  oppor- 
tunity for  the  expression  of  enthusiasm  and  sentiment,  I 

215 


216  The  Causes  Of  War 

think  the  other  members  of  the  commission  will  agree  with 
me  that  there  was  an  undertone  of  high  respect  and  of  en- 
thusiasm for  the  thing  we  were  trying  to  do,  which  was 
heartening  throughout  every  meeting,  because  we  felt  that  in 
a  way  this  conference  did  intrust  unto  us  the  expression  of 
one  of  its  highest  and  most  important  purposes,  to  see  to 
it  that  the  concord  of  the  world  in  the  future  with  regard  to 
the  objects  of  justice  should  not  be  subject  to  doubt  or 
uncertainty,  that  the  co-operation  of  the  great  body  of  na- 
tions should  be  assured  in  the  maintenance  of  peace  upon 
terms  of  honor  and  of  international  obligations. 

"The  compulsion  of  that  task  was  constantly  upon  us, 
and  at  no  point  was  there  shown  the  slightest  desire  to  do 
anything  but  suggest  the  best  means  to  accomplish  that 
great  object.  There  is  very  great  significance,  therefore, 
in  the  fact  that  the  result  was  reached  unanimously. 

"Fourteen  nations  were  represented,  among  them  all  of 
those  powers  which  for  convenience  we  have  called  the  great 
powers,  and  among  the  rest  a  representation  of  the  greatest 
variety  of  circumstances  and  interests.  So  that  I  think  we 
are  justified  in  saying  that  the  significance  of  the  result, 
therefore,  has  the  deepest  of  all  meanings,  the  union  of 
wills  in  a  common  purpose,  a  union  of  wills  which  cannot 
be  resisted,  and  which,  I  dare  say,  no  nation  will  run  the 
risk  of  attempting  to  resist. 

"Now  as  to  the  character  of  the  document.  While  it  has 
consumed  some  time  to  read  this  document,  I  think  you  will 
see  at  once  that  it  is  very  simple,  and  in  nothing  so  simple 
as  in  the  structure  which  it  suggests  for  a  League  of  Nations 
— a  body  of  delegates,  an  Executive  Council,  and  a  perma- 
nent secretariat. 

"When  it  came  to  the  question  of  determining  the  charac- 
ter of  the  representation  in  the  body  of  delegates,  we  were 
all  aware  of  a  feeling  which  is  current  throughout  the  world. 
Inasmuch  as  I  am  stating  it  in  the  presence  of  the  official 
representatives  of  the  various  Governments  here  present,  in- 


Appendio!  I  2Vt 

eluding  myself,  I  may  say  that  there  is  a  universal  feeling 
that  the  world  cannot  rest  satisfied  with  merely  official  gui- 
dance. There  has  reached  us  through  many  channels  the 
feeling  that  if  the  deliberating  body  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions was  merely  to  be  a  body  of  officials  representing  the 
various  Governments,  the  peoples  of  the  world  would  not  be 
sure  that  some  of  the  mistakes  which  preoccupied  officials 
had  admittedly  made  might  not  be  repeated. 

"It  was  impossible  to  conceive  a  method  or  an  assembly 
so  large  and  various  as  to  be  really  representative  of  the 
great  body  of  the  peoples  of  the  world,  because  as  I  roughly 
reckon  it,  we  represent,  as  we  sit  around  this  table,  more 
than  twelve  hundred  million  people.  You  cannot  have  a  rep- 
resentative assembly  of  twelve  hundred  million  people,  but 
if  you  leave  it  to  each  Government  to  have,  if  it  pleases,  one 
or  two  or  three  representatives,  though  only  with  a  single 
vote,  it  may  vary  its  representation  from  time  to  time,  not 
only,  but  it  may  [originate]  the  choice  of  its  several  rep- 
resentatives.    [Wireless  here  unintelligible.] 

"Therefore,  we  thought  that  this  was  a  proper  and  a 
very  prudent  concession  to  the  practically  universal  opinion 
of  plain  men  everywhere  that  they  wanted  the  door  left  open 
to  a  variety  of  representation,  instead  of  being  confined  to  a 
single  official  body  with  which  they  could  or  might  not  find 
themselves  in  sympathy. 

"And  you  will  notice  that  this  body  has  unlimited  rights 
of  discussion — I  mean  of  discussion  of  anything  that  falls 
within  the  field  of  international  relations — and  that  it  is 
especially  agreed  that  war  or  international  misunderstand- 
ings, or  anything  that  may  lead  to  friction  or  trouble,  is 
everybody's  business,  because  it  may  affect  the  peace  of  the 
world. 

"And  in  order  to  safeguard  the  popular  power  so  far  as 
we  could  of  this  representative  body,  it  is  provided,  you  will 
notice,  that  when  a  subject  is  submitted,  it  is  not  to  arbitra- 
tion, but  to  discussion  by  the  Executive  Council.     It  can, 


«18  The  Causes  Of  War 

upon  the  initiative  of  either  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  be 
drawn  out  of  the  Executive  Council  into  the  larger  forum 
of  the  general  body  of  delegates,  because  through  this  in- 
strument we  are  depending  primarily  and  chiefly  upon  one 
great  force,  and  this  is  the  moral  force  of  the  public  opinion 
of  the  world — the  pleasing  and  clarifying  and  compelling 
influences  of  publicity,  so  that  intrigues  can  no  longer  have 
their  coverts,  so  that  designs  that  are  sinister  can  at  any 
time  be  drawn  into  the  open,  so  that  those  things  that  are 
destroyed  by  the  light  may  be  promptly  destroyed  by  the 
overwhelming  light  of  the  universal  expression  of  the  con- 
demnation of  the  world. 

"Armed  force  is  in  the  background  in  this  program,  but  it 
is  in  the  background,  and  if  the  moral  force  of  the  world  will 
not  suflice,  the  physical  force  of  the  world  shall.  But  that 
is  the  last  resort,  because  this  is  intended  as  a  constitution  of 
peace,  not  as  a  league  of  war, 

"The  simplicity  of  the  document  seems  to  me  to  be  one 
of  its  chief  virtues,  because,  speaking  for  myself,  I  was  un- 
able to  see  the  variety  of  circumstances  with  which  this 
League  would  have  to  deal.  I  was  unable,  therefore,  to  plan 
all  the  machinery  that  might  be  necessary  to  meet  the  diff"er- 
ing  and  unexpected  contingencies.  Therefore,  I  should  say 
of  this  document  that  it  is  not  a  strait  jacket,  but  a  vehicle 
of  life. 

"A  living  thing  is  bom,  and  we  must  see  to  it  what  clothes 
we  put  on  it.  It  is  not  a  vehicle  of  power,  but  a  vehicle  in 
which  power  may  be  varied  at  the  discretion  of  those  who 
exercise  it  and  in  accordance  with  the  changing  circum- 
stances of  the  time.  And  yet,  while  it  is  elastic,  while  it  is 
general  in  its  terms,  it  is  definite  in  the  one  thing  that  we 
were  called  upon  to  make  definite.  It  is  a  definite  guarantee 
of  peace.  It  is  a  definite  guarantee  by  word  against  ag- 
gression. It  is  a  definite  guarantee  against  the  things  which 
have  just  come  near  bringing  the  whole  structure  of  civiliza- 
tion into  ruin. 


Appendix  I  £19 

"Its  purposes  do  not  for  a  moment  lie  vague.  Its  pur*- 
poses  are  declared,  and  its  powers  are  unmistakable.  It  is 
not  in  contemplation  that  this  should  be  merely  a  league  to 
secure  the  peace  of  the  world.  It  is  a  league  which  can  be 
used  for  co-operation  in  any  international  matter.  That 
is  the  significance  of  the  provision  introduced  concerning 
labor.  There  are  many  ameliorations  of  labor  conditions 
which  can  be  effected  by  conference  and  discussion.  I  antici- 
pate that  there  will  be  a  very  great  usefulness  in  the  Bureau 
of  Labor  which  it  is  contemplated  shall  be  set  up  by  the 
League.  Men  and  women  and  children  who  work  have  been 
in  the  background  through  long  ages,  and  sometimes  seemed 
to  be  forgotten,  while  Governments  have  had  their  watchful 
and  suspicious  eyes  upon  the  manoeuvres  of  one  another, 
while  the  thought  of  statesmen  has  been  about  structural 
action  and  the  larger  transactions  of  commerce  and  finance. 

"Now,  if  I  may  believe  the  picture  which  I  see,  there 
comes  into  the  foreground  the  great  body  of  the  laboring 
people  of  the  world,  the  men  and  women  and  children  upon 
whom  the  great  burden  of  sustaining  the  world  must  from 
day  to  day  fall,  whether  we  wish  it  to  do  so  or  not,  people 
who  go  to  bed  tired  and  wake  up  without  the  stimulation  of 
lively  hope.  These  people  will  be  drawn  into  the  field  of 
international  consultation  and  help,  and  will  be  among  the 
wards  of  the  combined  Governments  of  the  world.  There  is, 
I  take  leave  to  say,  a  very  great  step  in  advance  in  the  mere 
conception  of  that. 

"Then,  as  you  will  notice,  there  is  an  imperative  article 
concerning  the  publicity  of  all  international  agreement*. 
Henceforth  no  member  of  the  League  can  claim  any  agree- 
ment valid  which  it  has  not  registered  with  the  Secretary- 
General,  in  whose  office,  of  course,  it  will  be  subject  to  the 
examination  of  anybody  representing  a  member  of  the 
League.  And  the  duty  is  laid  upon  the  Secretary-General 
to  publish  every  document  of  that  sort  at  the  earliest  pos- 
sible time. 


220  The  Causes  Of  War 

"I  suppose  most  persons  who  have  not  been  conversant 
with  the  business  of  foreign  affairs  do  not  realize  how  many 
hundreds  of  these  agreements  are  made  in  a  single  year,  and 
how  difficult  it  might  be  to  publish  the  more  unimportant  of 
them  immediately,  how  uninteresting  it  would  be  to  most  of 
the  world  to  publish  them  immediately,  but  even  they  must 
be  published  just  as  soon  as  it  is  possible  for  the  Secretary- 
General  to  publish  them. 

"Then  there  is  a  feature  about  this  covenant  which,  to 
my  mind,  is  one  of  the  greatest  and  most  satisfactory  ad- 
vances that  has  been  made.  We  are  done  with  annexations 
of  helpless  peoples,  meant  in  some  instances  by  some  powers 
to  be  used  merely  for  exploitation.  We  recognize  in  the  most 
solemn  manner  that  the  helpless  and  undeveloped  peoples  of 
tlie  world,  being  in  that  condition,  put  an  obligation  upon 
us  to  look  after  their  interests  primarily  before  we  use 
them  for  our  interests,  and  that  in  all  cases  of  this  sort 
hereafter  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  League  to  see  that  the 
nations  who  are  assigned  as  the  tutors  and  advisers  and 
directors  of  these  peoples  shall  look  to  their  interests  and 
their  development  before  they  look  to  the  interests  and 
desires  of  the  mandatory  nation  itself. 

"There  has  been  no  greater  advance  than  this,  gentlemen. 
If  you  look  back  upon  the  history  of  the  world  you  will  see 
how  helpless  peoples  have  too  often  been  a  prey  to  powers 
that  had  no  conscience  in  the  matter.  It  has  been  one  of 
the  many  distressing  revelations  of  recent  years  that  the 
great  power  which  has  just  been,  happily,  defeated,  put  in- 
tolerable burdens  and  injustices  upon  the  helpless  people 
of  some  of  the  colonies  which  it  annexed  to  itself,  that  its 
interest  was  rather  their  extermination  than  their  develop- 
ment, that  the  desire  was  to  possess  their  land  for  Euro- 
pean purposes  and  not  to  enjoy  their  confidence  in  order  that 
mankind  might  be  lifted  in  these  places  to  the  next  higher 
level. 

"Now,  the  world,  expressing  its  conscience  in  law,  says 


Appendix  I  221 

there  is  an  end  of  that,  that  our  consciences  shall  be  settled 
to  this  thing.  States  will  be  picked  out  which  have  already 
shown  that  they  can  exercise  a  conscience  in  this  matter, 
and  under  their  tutelage  the  helpless  peoples  of  the  world 
will  come  into  a  new  light  and  into  a  new  hope. 

"So  I  think  I  can  say  of  this  document  that  it  is  at  one 
and  the  same  time  a  practical  document  and  a  human  docu- 
ment. There  is  a  pulse  of  sympathy  in  it.  There  is  a  com- 
pulsion of  conscience  throughout  it.  It  is  practical,  and 
yet  it  is  intended  to  purify,  to  rectify,  to  elevate.  And  I 
want  to  say  that  so  far  as  my  observation  instructs  me,  this 
is  in  one  sense  a  belated  document.  I  believe  that  the  con- 
science of  the  world  has  long  been  prepared  to  express  itself 
in  some  such  way.  We  are  not  just  now  discovering  our 
sympathy  for  these  people  and  our  interest  in  them.  We  are 
simply  expressing  it,  for  it  has  long  been  felt,  and  in  the 
administration  of  the  affairs  of  more  than  one  of  the  great 
States  represented  here — so  far  as  I  know,  all  of  the  great 
States  that  are  represented  here — that  humane  impulse  has 
already  expressed  itself  in  their  dealings  with  their  colonies, 
whose  peoples  were  yet  at  a  low  stage  of  civilization. 

"We  have  had  many  instances  of  colonies  lifted  into  the 
sphere  of  complete  self-government.  This  is  not  the  dis- 
covery of  a  principle.  It  is  the  universal  application  of  a 
principle.  It  is  the  agreement  of  the  great  nations  which 
have  tried  to  live  by  these  standards  in  their  separate  ad- 
ministrations to  unite  in  seeing  that  their  common  force  and 
their  common  thought  and  intelligence  are  lent  to  this  great 
and  humane  enterprise.  I  think  it  is  an  occasion,  therefore, 
for  the  most  profound  satisfaction  that  this  humane  decis- 
ion should  have  been  reached  in  a  matter  for  which  the  world 
has  long  been  waiting  and  until  a  very  recent  period  thought 
that  it  was  still  too  early  to  hope. 

"Many  terrible  things  have  come  out  of  this  war,  gentle- 
men, but  some  very  beautiful  things  have  come  out  of  it. 
Wrong  has  been  defeated,  but  the  rest  of  the  world  has  been 


222  The  Causes  Of  War 

more  conscious  than  it  ever  was  before  of  the  majority  of 
right.  People  that  were  suspicious  of  one  another  can  now 
live  as  friends  and  comrades  in  a  single  family,  and  desire 
to  do  so.  The  miasma  of  distrust,  of  intrigue,  is  cleared 
away.  Men  are  looking  eye  to  eye  and  saying,  'We  are 
brothers  and  have  a  common  purpose.  We  did  not  realize 
it  before,  but  now  we  do  realize  it,  and  this  is  our  covenant 
of  friendship.*  '* 


APPENDIX  II 


On    February    24,    1919,    on    the    Subject    of    the    Constitution    of   the 
League  of  Nations 

GOVERNOR  COOLWGE,  Mr.  Mayor,  Fellow  Citizem: 
I  wonder  if  you  are  half  as  glad  to  see  me  as  I  am  to  see 
you.  It  warms  my  heart  to  see  a  great  body  of  my  fellow  cit- 
izens again,  because  in  some  respect  during  the  recent  months 
I  have  been  very  lonely  indeed  without  your  comradeship  and 
counsel,  and  I  tried  at  every  step  of  the  work  which  fell  to 
me  to  recall  what  I  was  sure  would  be  your  counsel  with  re- 
gard to  the  great  matters  which  were  under  consideration. 

I  do  not  want  you  to  think  that  I  have  not  been  apprecia- 
tive of  the  extraordinarily  generous  reception  which  was 
given  to  me  on  the  other  side.  In  saying  that  it  makes  me 
very  happy  to  get  home  again  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that 
I  was  not  very  deeply  touched  by  the  cries  that  came  from 
the  great  crowds  on  the  other  side.  But  I  want  to  say  to 
you  in  all  honesty  that  I  felt  them  to  be  a  call  of  greeting 
to  you  rather  than  to  me. 

I  did  not  feel  that  the  greeting  was  personal.  I  had  in 
my  heart  the  overcrowning  pride  of  being  your  representa- 
tive and  of  receiving  the  plaudits  of  men  everywhere  who 
felt  that  your  hearts  beat  with  theirs  in  the  cause  of  liberty. 
There  was  no  mistaking  the  tone  in  the  voices  of  those 
great  crowds.  It  was  not  a  tone  of  mere  greeting;  it  was 
not  a  tone  of  mere  generous  welcome;  it  was  the  calling  of 
comrade  to  comrade,  the  cries  that  come  from  men  who 
say,  "We  have  waited  for  this  day  when  the  friends  of  liberty 
should  come  across  the  sea  and  shake  hands  with  us,  to  see 

223 


^M  The  Causes  Of  War 

that  a  new  world  was  constructed  upon  a  new  basis  and 
foundation  of  justice  and  right." 

I  can't  tell  you  the  inspiration  that  came  from  the  senti- 
ments that  came  out  of  those  simple  voices  of  the  crowd, 
and  the  proudest  thing  I  have  to  report  to  you  is  that  this 
great  country  of  ours  is  trusted  throughout  the  world. 

I  have  not  come  to  report  the  proceedings  or  the  results 
of  the  proceedings  of  the  Peace  Conference;  that  would  be 
premature.  I  can  say  that  I  have  received  very  happy  im- 
pressions from  this  conference;  the  impression  that  while 
there  are  many  differences  of  judgment,  while  there  are  some 
divergencies  of  object,  there  is  nevertheless  a  common  spirit 
and  a  common  realization  of  the  necessity  of  setting  up  new 
standards  of  right  in  the  world. 

Because  the  men  who  are  in  conference  in  Paris  realize  as 
keenly  as  any  American  can  realize  that  they  are  not  the 
masters  of  their  people ;  that  they  are  the  servants  of  their 
people  and  that  the  spirit  of  their  people  has  awakened  to 
a  new  purpose  and  a  new  conception  of  their  power  to  realize 
that  purpose,  and  that  no  man  dare  go  home  from  that  con- 
ference and  report  anything  less  noble  than  was  expected 
of  it. 

The  conference  seems  to  you  to  go  slowly;  from  day  to 
day  in  Paris  it  seems  to  go  slowly;  but  I  wonder  if  you 
realize  the  complexity  of  the  task  which  it  has  undertaken. 
It  seems  as  if  the  settlements  of  this  war  affect,  and  affect 
directly,  every  great,  and  I  sometimes  think  every  small, 
nation  in  the  world,  and  no  one  decision  can  prudently  be 
made  which  is  not  properly  linked  in  with  the  great  series  of 
other  decisions  which  must  accompany  it,  and  it  must  be 
reckoned  in  with  the  final  result  if  the  real  quality  and  char- 
acter of  that  result  is  to  be  properly  judged. 

What  we  are  doing  is  to  hear  the  whole  case ;  hear  it  from 
the  mouths  of  the  men  most  interested;  hear  it  from  those 
who  are  officially  commissioned  to  state  it;  hear  the  rival 
claims;  hear  the  claims  that  affect  new  nationalities,  that 


Appendix  II  225 

affect  new  areas  of  the  world,  that  affect  new  commercial 
and  economic  connections  that  have  been  established  by  the 
great  world  war  through  which  we  have  gone.  And  I  have 
been  struck  by  the  moderateness  of  those  who  have  repre- 
sented national  claims. 

I  can  testify  that  I  have  nowhere  seen  the  gleam  of  pas- 
sion. I  have  seen  earnestness,  I  have  seen  tears  come  to 
the  eyes  of  men  who  plead  for  downtrodden  people  whom 
they  were  privileged  to  speak  for;  but  they  were  not  the 
tears  of  anguish,  they  were  the  tears  of  ardent  hope. 

And  I  don't  see  how  any  man  can  fail  to  have  been  sub- 
dued by  these  pleas,  subdued  to  this  feeling,  that  he  was  not 
there  to  assert  an  individual  judgment  of  his  own  but  to 
try  to  assist  the  case  of  humanity. 

And  in  the  midst  of  it  all  every  interest  seeks  out  first  of 
all,  when  it  reaches  Paris,  the  representatives  of  the  United 
States.  Why?  Because,  and  I  think  I  am  stating  the  most 
wonderful  fact  in  history — ^because  there  is  no  nation  in 
Europe  that  suspects  the  motives  of  the  United  States. 

Was  there  ever  so  wonderful  a  thing  seen  before?  Was 
there  ever  so  moving  a  thing?  Was  there  ever  any  fact 
that  so  bound  the  nation  that  had  won  that  esteem  forever 
to  deserve  it? 

I  would  not  have  you  understand  that  the  great  men  who 
represent  the  other  nations  there  in  conference  are  dises- 
teemed  by  those  who  know  them.  Quite  the  contrary.  But 
you  understand  that  the  nations  of  Europe  have  again  and 
again  clashed  with  one  another  in  competitive  interest.  It 
is  impossible  for  men  to  forget  those  sharp  issues  that  were 
drawn  between  them  in  times  past. 

It  is  impossible  for  men  to  believe  that  all  ambitions  have 
all  of  a  sudden  been  foregone.  They  remember  territory  that 
was  coveted;  they  remember  rights  that  it  was  attempted  to 
extort;  they  remember  political  ambitions  which  it  was  at- 
tempted to  realize,  and,  while  they  believe  that  men  have 
come  into  a  different  temper  they  cannot  forget  these  things, 


226  The  Causes  Of  War 

and  so  they  do  not  resort  to  one  another  for  a  dispassion- 
ate view  of  the  matters  in  controversy.  They  resort  to  that 
nation  which  has  won  the  enviable  distinction  of  being  re- 
garded as  the  friend  of  mankind. 

Whenever  it  is  desired  to  send  a  small  force  of  soldiers 
to  occupy  a  piece  of  territory  where  it  is  thought  nobody 
else  will  be  welcome  they  ask  for  American  soldiers,  and 
where  other  soldiers  would  be  looked  upon  with  suspicion  and 
perhaps  met  with  resistance  the  American  soldier  is  welcomed 
with  acclaim. 

I  have  had  so  many  grounds  for  pride  on  the  other  side 
of  the  water  that  I  am  very  thankful  that  they  are  not 
grounds  for  personal  pride,  but  for  national  pride.  If  they 
were  grounds  for  personal  pride  I'd  be  the  most  stuck  up 
man  in  the  world,  and  it  has  been  an  infinite  pleasure  to  me 
to  see  those  gallant  soldiers  of  ours,  of  whom  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  made  me  the  proud  commander. 

You  may  be  proud  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Division,  but  I 
commanded  the  Twenty-sixth  Division,  and  see  what  they 
did  under  my  direction,  and  everybody  praises  the  American 
soldier  with  the  feeling  that  in  praising  him  he  is  subtract- 
ing from  the  credit  of  no  one  else. 

I  have  been  searching  for  the  fundamental  fact  that  con- 
verted Europe  to  believe  in  us.  Before  this  war  Europe  did 
not  believe  in  us  as  she  does  now.  She  did  not  believe  in  us 
throughout  the  first  three  years  of  the  war.  She  seems 
really  to  have  believed  that  we  were  holding  off  because  we 
thought  we  could  make  more  by  staying  out  than  by  going 
in.  And  all  of  a  sudden,  in  a  short  eighteen  months,  the 
whole  verdict  is  reversed. 

There  can  be  but  one  explanation  for  it.  They  saw  what 
we  did — that  without  making  a  single  claim  we  put  all  our 
men  and  all  our  means  at  the  disposal  of  those  who  were 
fighting  for  their  homes,  in  the  first  instance,  but  for  a  cause, 
the  cause  of  human  rights  and  justice,  and  that  we  went  in 
not  to  support  their  national  claims  but  to  support  the 
great  cause  which  they  held  in  common. 


Appendix  II  ^27 


V 


And  when  they  saw  that  America  not  only  held  ideals 
but  acted  ideals  they  were  converted  to  America  and  became 
firm  partisans  of  those  ideals. 

I  met  a  group  of  scholars  when  I  was  in  Paris — some 
gentlemen  from  one  of  the  Greek  universities  who  had  come 
to  see  me,  and  in  whose  presence,  or  rather  in  the  presence 
of  whose  traditions  of  learning,  I  felt  very  young  indeed.  I 
told  them  that  I  had  one  of  the  delightful  revenges  that 
sometimes  come  to  a  man.  All  my  life  I  had  heard  men 
speak  with  a  sort  of  condescension  of  ideals  and  of  idealists, 
and  particularly  those  separated,  encloistered  persons  whom 
they  choose  to  term  academic,  who  were  in  the  habit  of  utter- 
ing ideals  in  the  free  atmosphere  when  they  clash  with  nobody 
in  particular. 

And  I  said  I  have  had  this  sweet  revenge.  Speaking 
with  perfect  frankness  in  the  name  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States  I  have  uttered  as  the  objects  of  this  great  war 
ideals,  and  nothing  but  ideals,  and  the  war  has  been  won  by 
that  inspiration.  Men  were  fighting  with  tense  muscle  and 
lowered  head  until  they  came  to  realize  those  things,  feeling 
they  were  fighting  for  their  lives  and  their  country,  and 
when  these  accents  of  what  it  was  all  about  reached  them 
from  America  they  lifted  their  heads,  they  raised  their  eyes 
to  heaven,  when  they  saw  men  in  khaki  coming  across  the 
sea  in  the  spirit  of  crusaders,  and  they  found  that  these  were 
strange  men,  reckless  of  danger  not  only,  but  reckless  because 
they  seemed  to  see  something  that  made  that  danger  worth 
while. 

Men  have  testified  to  me  in  Europe  that  our  men  were 
possessed  by  something  that  they  could  only  call  a  religious 
fervor.  They  were  not  like  any  of  the  other  soldiers.  They 
had  a  vision,  they  had  a  dream,  and  they  were  fighting  in  the 
dream,  and  fighting  in  the  dream  they  turned  the  whole  tide 
of  battle  and  it  never  came  back. 

One  of  our  American  humorists,  meeting  the  criticism  that 
American  soldiers  were  not  trained  long  enough,  said:  "It 
takes  only  half  as  long  to  train  an  American  soldier  as  any 


MS  The  Causes  Of  War 

other,  because  you  only  have  to  train  him  one  way  and  he 
did  only  go  one  way,  and  he  never  came  back  until  he  could 
do  it  when  he  pleased." 

And  now  do  you  realize  that  this  confidence  we  have  es- 
tablished throughout  the  world  imposes  a  burden  upon  us — 
if  you  choose  to  call  it  a  burden.  It  is  one  of  those  burdens 
which  any  nation  ought  to  be  proud  to  carry.  Any  man  who 
resists  the  present  tides  that  run  in  the  world  will  find  him- 
self thrown  upon  a  shore  so  high  and  barren  that  it  will 
seem  as  if  he  had  been  separated  from  his  human  kind  for- 
ever. 

The  Europe  that  I  left  the  other  day  was  full  of  something 
that  it  had  never  felt  fill  its  heart  so  full  before.  It  was 
full  of  hope.  The  Europe  of  the  second  year  of  the  war, 
the  Europe  of  the  third  year  of  the  war  was  sinking  to  a 
sort  of  stubborn  desperation.  They  did  not  see  any  great 
thing  to  be  achieved  even  when  the  war  should  be  won.  They 
hoped  there  would  be  some  salvage;  they  hoped  that  they 
could  clear  their  territories  of  invading  armies;  they  hoped 
they  could  set  up  their  homes  and  start  their  industries 
afresh,  but  they  thought  it  would  simply  be  the  resumption 
of  the  old  life  that  Europe  had  led — ^led  in  fear,  led  in  anx- 
iety, led  in  constant  suspicious  watchfulness.  They  never 
dreamed  that  it  would  be  a  Europe  of  settled  peace  and  of 
justified  hope. 

And  now  these  ideals  have  wrought  this  new  magic,  that 
all  the  peoples  of  Europe  are  buoyed  up  and  confident  in 
the  spirit  of  hope,  because  they  believe  that  we  are  at  the 
eve  of  a  new  age  in  the  world  when  nations  will  understand 
one  another,  when  nations  will  support  one  another  in  every 
just  cause,  when  nations  will  unite  every  moral  and  every 
political  strength  to  see  that  the  right  shall  prevail. 

If  America  were  at  this  juncture  to  fail  the  world,  what 
would  come  of  it.^*  I  do  not  mean  any  disrespect  to  any 
other  great  people  when  I  say  that  America  is  the  hope  of 
the  world;  and  if  she  does  not  justify  that  hope  the  results 


Appendix  II  229 

are  unthinkable.  Men  will  be  thrown  back  upon  the  bitter- 
ness of  disappointment  not  only  but  the  bitterness  of  de- 
spair. 

All  nations  will  be  set  up  as  hostile  camps  again ;  the  men 
at  the  peace  conference  will  go  home  with  their  heads  upon 
their  breasts,  knowing  that  they  have  failed — for  they  were 
bidden  not  to  come  home  from  there  until  they  did  something 
more  than  sign  a  treaty  of  peace. 

Suppose  we  sign  the  treaty  of  peace  and  that  it  is  the  most 
satisfactory  treaty  of  peace  that  the  confusing  elements  of 
the  modern  world  will  afford  and  go  home  and  think  about 
our  labors,  we  will  know  that  we  have  left  written  upon  the 
historic  table  at  Versailles,  upon  which  Vergennes  and  Ben- 
jamin Franklin  wrote  their  names,  nothing  but  a  modern 
scrap  of  paper;  no  nations  united  to  defend  it,  no  great 
forces  combined  to  make  it  good,  no  assurance  given  to  the 
downtrodden  and  fearful  people  of  the  world  that  they  shall 
be  safe.  Any  man  who  thinks  that  America  will  take  part 
in  giving  the  world  any  such  rebuff  and  disappointment  as 
that  does  not  know  America. 

I  invite  him  to  test  the  sentiments  of  the  nation.  We  set 
this  up  to  make  men  free  and  we  did  not  confine  our  concep- 
tion and  purpose  to  America,  and  now  we  will  make  men 
free.  If  we  did  not  do  that  the  fame  of  America  would  be 
gone  and  all  her  powers  would  be  dissipated.  She  then  would 
have  to  keep  her  power  for  those  narrow,  selfish,  provincial 
purposes  which  seem  so  dear  to  some  minds  that  have  no 
sweep  beyond  the  nearest  horizon. 

I  should  welcome  no  sweeter  challenge  than  that.  I  have 
fighting  blood  in  me,  and  it  is  sometimes  a  delight  to  let  it 
have  scope,  but  if  it  is  a  challenge  on  this  occasion  it  will 
be  an  indulgence.  Think  of  the  picture,  think  of  the  utter 
blackness  that  would  fall  on  the  world.  America  has  failed.' 
America  made  a  little  essay  at  generosity  and  then  withdrew* 
America  said:  "We  are  your  friends,"  but  it  was  only  for 
today,  not  for  tomorrow.     America  said:     "Here  is  our 


230  The  Causes  Of  War 

power  to  vindicate  right/'  and  then  the  next  day  said :  "Let 
right  take  care  of  itself  and  we  will  take  care  of  ourselves. '^ 
America  said:  "We  set  up  a  fight  to  lead  men  along  the 
paths  of  liberty,  but  we  have  lowered  it ;  it  is  intended  only 
to  light  our  own  path."  We  set  up  a  great  ideal  of  liberty 
and  then  we  said:  "Liberty  is  a  thing  that  you  must  win 
for  yourself.  Do  not  call  upon  us,"  and  think  of  the  world 
that  we  would  leave.  Do  you  realize  how  many  new  nations 
are  going  to  be  set  up  in  the  presence  of  old  and  powerful 
nations  in  Europe  and  left  there,  if  left  by  us,  without  a  dis- 
interested friend.'' 

Do  you  believe  in  the  Polish  cause,  as  I  do.?*  Are  you 
going  to  set  up  Poland,  immature,  inexperienced,  as  yet  un- 
organized, and  leave  her  with  a  circle  of  armies  around  her.'' 
Do  you  believe  in  the  aspiration  of  the  Czecho-Slovaks  and 
the  Jugo-Slavs  as  I  do.''  Do  you  know  how  many  Powers 
would  be  quick  to  pounce  upon  them  if  there  were  not  the 
guarantees  of  the  world  behind  their  liberty.'' 

Have  you  thought  of  the  sufferings  of  Armenia?  You 
poured  out  your  money  to  help  succor  the  Armenians  after 
they  suffered ;  now  set  your  strength  so  that  they  shall  never 
suffer  again. 

The  arrangements  of  the  present  peace  cannot  stand  a 
generation  unless  they  are  guaranteed  by  the  united  forces 
of  the  civilized  world.  And  if  we  do  not  guarantee  them 
cannot  you  not  see  the  picture .''  Your  hearts  have  instructed 
you  where  the  burden  of  this  war  fell.  It  did  not  fall  upon 
the  national  treasuries,  it  did  not  fall  upon  the  instruments 
of  administration,  it  did  not  fall  upon  the  resources  of  the 
nation.  It  fell  upon  the  victims'  homes  everywhere,  where 
women  were  toiling  in  hope  that  their  men  would  come  back. 

When  I  think  of  the  homes  upon  which  dull  despair  would 
settle  were  this  great  hope  disappointed,  I  should  wish  for 
my  part  never  to  have  had  America  play  any  part  whatever 
in  this  attempt  to  emancipate  the  world.  But  I  talk  as  if 
there  were  any  question.    I  have  no  more  doubt  of  the  ver- 


Appendix  II  231 

diet  of  America  in  this  matter  than  I  have  doubt  of  the 
blood  that  is  in  me. 

And  so,  my  fellow  citizens,  I  have  come  back  to  report 
progress,  and  I  do  not  believe  that  the  progress  is  going  to 
stop  short  of  the  goal.  The  nations  of  the  world  have  set 
their  heads  now  to  do  a  great  thing,  and  they  are  not  going 
to  slacken  their  purpose.  And  when  I  speak  of  the  nations 
of  the  world  I  do  not  speak  of  the  governments  of  the  world. 
I  speak  of  the  peoples  who  constitute  the  nations  of  the 
world.  They  are  in  the  saddle,  and  they  are  going  to  see 
to  it  that  if  their  present  governments  do  not  do  their  will 
some  other  governments  shall,  and  the  secret  is  out  and  the 
present  governments  know  it. 

There  is  a  great  deal  of  harmony  to  be  got  out  of  com- 
mon knowledge.  There  is  a  great  deal  of  sympathy  to  be 
got  of  living  in  the  same  atmosphere  and  except  for  the 
differences  of  languages,  which  puzzled  my  American  ear 
very  sadly,  I  could  have  believed  I  was  at  home  in  France  or 
in  Italy  or  in  England  when  I  was  on  the  streets,  when  I  was 
in  the  presence  of  the  crowds,  when  I  was  in  great  halls 
where  men  were  gathered  together  irrespective  of  class. 

I  did  not  feel  quite  as  much  at  home  there  as  I  do  here, 
but  I  felt  that  now,  at  any  rate,  after  this  storm  of  war  had 
cleared  the  air,  men  were  seeing  eye  to  eye  everywhere  and 
that  these  were  the  kind  of  folks  who  would  understand  what 
the  kind  of  folks  at  home  would  understand  and  that  they 
were  thinking  the  same  things. 

I  feel  about  you  as  I  am  reminded  of  a  story  of  that  ex- 
cellent witness  and  good  artist,  Oliver  Herford,  who  one  day, 
sitting  at  luncheon  at  his  club  was  slapped  vigorously  on  the 
back  by  a  man  whom  he  did  not  know  very  well.  He  said: 
"Oliver,  old  boy,  how  are  you.?"  He  looked  at  him  rather 
coldly.  He  said,  "I  don't  know  your  name,  I  don't  know 
your  face,  but  your  manners  are  very  familiar."  And  I  must 
say  that  your  manners  are  very  familiar,  and  let  me  add, 
very  delightful. 


The  Causes  Of  War 

It  is  a  great  comfort  for  one  thing  to  realize  that  you  all 
understand  the  language  I  am  speaking.  A  friend  of  mine 
said  that  to  talk  through  an  interpreter  was  like  witnessing 
the  compound  fracture  of  an  idea.  But  the  beauty  of  it  is 
that,  whatever  the  impediments  of  the  channel  of  communi- 
cation the  idea  is  the  same,  that  it  gets  registered,  and  it 
gets  registered  in  responsive  hearts  and  receptive  purposes. 

I  have  come  back  for  a  strenuous  attempt  to  transact 
business  for  a  little  while  in  America  but  I  have  really  come 
back  to  say  to  you,  in  all  soberness  and  honesty,  that  I  have 
been  trying  my  best  to  speak  your  thoughts. 

When  I  sample  myself  I  think  I  find  that  I  am  a  typical 
American,  and  if  I  sample  deep  enough  and  get  down  to 
what  is  probably  the  true  stuff  of  a  man,  then  I  have  hope 
that  it  is  part  of  the  stuff  that  is  like  the  other  fellow's  at 
home. 

And,  therefore,  probing  deep  in  my  heart  and  trying  to 
see  the  things  that  are  right  without  regard  to  the  things 
that  may  be  debated  as  expedient,  I  feel  that  I  am  inter- 
preting the  purpose  and  the  thought  of  America;  and  in 
loving  America  I  find  I  have  joined  the  great  majority  of 
my  fellowmen  throughout  the  world. 


APPENDIX  III 


On  March  4,  1919,  in  Further  Explanation  of  the  League  of  Nations 

IX/fY  Fellow  Citizens:  I  accept  the  intimation  of  the  air 
-^  ^-^  just  played ;  I  will  not  come  back  "till  it's  over,  over 
there."  And  yet  I  pray  God,  in  the  interests  of  peace  and 
of  the  world,  that  that  may  be  soon. 

The  first  thing  that  I  am  going  to  tell  the  people  on  the 
other  side  of  the  water  is  that  an  overwhelming  majority  of 
the  American  people  is  in  favor  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
I  know  that  that  is  true;  I  have  had  unmistakable  intima- 
tions of  it  from  all  parts  of  the  country,  and  the  voice  rings 
true  in  every  case.  I  account  myself  fortunate  to  speak  here 
under  the  unusual  circumstances  of  this  evening.  I  am 
happy  to  associate  myself  with  Mr.  Taft  in  this  great  cause. 
He  has  displayed  an  elevation  of  view  and  a  devotion  to 
public  duty  which  is  beyond  praise. 

And  I  am  the  more  happy  because  this  means  that  this  is 
not  a  party  issue.  No  party  has  the  right  to  appropriate 
this  issue,  and  no  party  will  in  the  long  run  dare  oppose  it. 

We  have  listened  to  so  clear  and  admirable  an  exposition 
of  many  of  the  main  features  of  the  proposed  covenant  of 
the  League  of  Nations  that  it  is  perhaps  not  necessary  for 
me  to  discuss  in  any  particular  way  the  contents  of  the 
document.  I  will  seek  rather  to  give  you  its  setting.  I  do, 
not  know  when  I  have  been  more  impressed  than  by  the  con- 
ferences of  the  commission  set  up  by  the  Conference  of  Peace 
to  draw  up  a  covenant  for  the  League  of  Nations.  The  rep- 
resentatives of  fourteen  nations  sat  around  that  board — not 
young  men,  not  men  inexperienced  in  the  affairs  of  their  own 

233 


234  The  Causes  Of  War 

I 

countries,  not  men  inexperienced  in  the  politics  of  the  world ; 
and  the  inspiring  influence  of  every  meeting  was  the  concur- 
rence of  purpose  on  the  part  of  all  those  men  to  come  to 
an  agreement  and  an  effective  working  agreement  with  regard 
to  this  League  of  the  civilized  world. 

There  was  a  conviction  in  the  whole  impulse;  there  was 
conviction  of  more  than  one  sort;  there  was  the  conviction 
that  this  thing  ought  to  be  done,  and  there  was  also  the  con- 
viction that  not  a  man  there  would  venture  to  go  home  and 
say  that  he  had  not  tried  to  do  it. 

Mr.  Taft  has  set  the  picture  for  you  of  what  a  failure  of 
this  great  purpose  would  mean.  We  have  been  hearing  for 
all  these  weary  months  that  this  agony  of  war  has  lasted  of 
the  sinister  purpose  of  the  Central  Empires,  and  we  have 
made  maps  of  the  course  that  they  meant  their  conquests  to 
take.  Where  did  the  lines  of  that  map  lie,  of  that  central 
line  that  we  used  to  call  from  Bremen  to  Bagdad?  They  lay 
through  these  very  regions  to  which  Mr.  Taft  has  called 
your  attention,  but  they  lay  then  through  a  united  empire, 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  whose  integrity  Germany 
was  bound  to  respect,  as  her  ally  lay  in  the  path  of  that  line 
of  conquest;  the  Turkish  Empire,  whose  interests  she  pro- 
fessed to  make  her  own,  lay  in  the  direct  path  that  she  in- 
tended to  tread.  And  now  what  has  happened  ?  The  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire  has  gone  to  pieces  and  the  Turkish  Em- 
pire has  disappeared,  and  the  nations  that  effected  that  great 
result — for  it  was  a  result  of  liberation — are  now  respon- 
sible as  the  trustees  of  the  assets  of  those  great  nations. 
You  not  only  would  have  weak  nations  lying  in  this  path,  but 
you  would  have  nations  in  which  that  old  poisonous  seed  of 
intrigue  could  be  planted  with  the  certainty  that  the  crop 
would  be  abundant ;  and  one  of  the  things  that  the  League 
of  Nations  is  intended  to  watch  is  the  course  of  intrigue. 
Intrigue  cannot  stand  publicity,  and  if  the  League  of  Na- 
tions were  nothing  but  a  great  debating  society  it  will  kill 
intrigue. 


Appendix  III  235 

It  IS  one  of  the  agreements  of  this  covenant  that  it  is  the 
friendly  right  of  every  nation  a  member  of  the  League  to  call 
attention  to  anything  that  it  thinks  will  disturb  the  peace 
of  the  world,  no  matter  where  that  thing  is  occurring.  There 
is  no  subject  that  may  touch  the  peace  of  the  world  which 
is  exempt  from  inquiry  and  discussion,  and  I  think  every- 
body here  present  will  agree  with  me  that  Germany  would 
never  have  gone  to  war  if  she  had  permitted  the  world  to 
discuss  the  aggression  upon  Serbia  for  a  single  week.  The 
British  Foreign  Office  suggested,  it  pleaded,  that  there  might 
be  a  day  or  two  delay  so  that  the  representatives  of  the  na- 
tions of  Europe  could  get  together  and  discuss  the  possibili- 
ties of  a  settlement.  Germany  did  not  dare  permit  a  day's 
discussion.  You  know  what  happened.  So  soon  as  the  world 
realized  that  an  outlaw  was  at  large,  the  nations  began  one 
by  one  to  draw  together  against  her.  We  know  for  a  cer- 
tainty that  if  Germany  had  thought  for  a  moment  that 
Great  Britain  would  go  in  with  France  and  with  Russia  she 
never  would  have  undertaken  the  enterprise,  and  the  League 
of  Nations  is  meant  as  a  notice  to  all  outlaw  nations  that 
not  only  Great  Britain,  but  the  United  States  and  the  rest 
of  the  world  will  go  in  to  stop  enterprises  of  that  sort.  And 
so  the  League  of  Nations  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the 
covenant  that  the  world  will  always  maintain  the  standards 
which  it  has  now  vindicated  by  some  of  the  most  precious 
blood  ever  spilled. 

The  liberated  peoples  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire 
and  of  the  Turkish  Empire  call  out  to  us  for  this  thing.  It 
has  not  arisen  in  the  council  of  statesmen.  Europe  is  a 
bit  sick  at  heart  at  this  very  moment,  because  it  sees  that 
statesmen  have  had  no  vision,  and  that  the  only  vision  has 
been  the  vision  of  the  people.  Those  who  suffer  see.  Those 
against  whom  wrong  is  wrought  know  how  desirable  is  the 
right  and  the  righteous.  The  nations  that  have  long  been 
under  the  heel  of  the  Austrian,  that  have  long  cowered  before 
the  German,  that  have  long  suffered  the  indescribable  agonies 


«86  The  Causes  Of  War 

of  being  governed  by  the  Turk,  have  called  out  to  the  world, 
generation  after  generation,  for  justice,  for  liberation,  for 
succor;  and  no  Cabinet  in  the  world  has  heard  them.  Pri- 
vate organizations,  pitying  hearts,  philanthropic  men  and 
women  have  poured  out  their  treasure  in  order  to  relieve 
these  sufferings;  but  no  nation  has  said  to  the  nations  re- 
sponsible, "You  must  stop ;  this  thing  is  intolerable,  and  we 
will  not  permit  it."  And  the  vision  has  been  with  the  people. 
My  friends,  I  wish  you  would  reflect  upon  this  proposition; 
the  vision  as  to  what  is  necessary  for  great  reforms  has  sel- 
dom come  from  the  top  in  the  nations  of  the  world.  It  has 
come  from  the  need  and  the  aspiration  and  the  self-assertion 
of  great  bodies  of  men  who  meant  to  be  free.  And  I  can 
explain  some  of  the  criticisms  which  have  been  leveled  against 
this  great  enterprise  only  by  the  supposition  that  the  men 
who  utter  the  criticisms  have  never  felt  the  great  pulse  of 
the  heart  of  the  world. 

And  I  am  amazed — not  alarmed,  but  amazed — that  there 
should  be  in  some  quarters  such  a  comprehensive  ignorance 
of  the  state  of  the  world.  These  gentlemen  do  not  know 
what  the  mind  of  men  is  just  now.  Everybody  else  does. 
I  do  not  know  where  they  have  been  closeted,  I  do  not  know 
by  what  influence  they  have  been  blinded;  but  I  do  know 
that  they  have  been  separated  from  the  general  currents  of 
the  thought  of  mankind. 

And  I  want  to  utter  this  solemn  warning,  not  in  the  way 
of  a  threat ;  the  forces  of  the  world  do  not  threaten,  they 
operate.  The  great  tides  of  the  world  do  not  give  notice 
that  they  are  going  to  rise  and  run;  they  rise  in  their  maj- 
esty and  overwhelming  might,  and  those  who  stand  in  the 
way  are  overwhelmed.  Now  the  heart  of  the  world  is  awake, 
and  the  heart  of  the  world  must  be  satisfied.  Do  not  let 
yourselves  suppose  for  a  moment  that  the  uneasiness  in  the 
populations  of  Europe  is  due  entirely  to  economic  causes  or 
economic  motives;  something  very  much  deeper  underlies  it 
all  than  that.    They  see  that  their  Governments  have  never 


Appendix  III  237 

been  able  to  defend  them  against  intrigue  or  aggression,  and 
that  there  is  no  force  of  foresight  or  of  prudence  in  any  mod- 
ern Cabinet  to  stop  war.  And  therefore  they  say,  "There 
must  be  some  fundamental  cause  for  this,"  and  the  funda- 
mental cause  they  are  beginning  to  perceive  to  be  that  na- 
tions have  stood  singly  or  in  little  jealous  groups  against 
each  other,  fostering  prejudice,  increasing  the  danger  of 
war  rather  than  concerting  measures  to  prevent  it ;  and  that 
if  there  is  right  in  the  world,  if  there  is  justice  in  the  world, 
there  is  no  reason  why  nations  should  be  divided  in  the  sup- 
port of  justice. 

They  are  therefore  saying  if  you  really  believe  that  there 
is  a  right,  if  you  really  believe  that  wars  ought  to  be  stopped, 
stop  thinking  abojut  the  rival  interests  of  nations,  and  think 
about  men  and  women  and  children  throughout  the  world. 
Nations  are  not  made  to  afford  distinction  to  their  rulers  by 
way  of  success  in  the  manoeuvres  of  politics;  nations  are 
meant,  if  they  are  meant  for  anything,  to  make  the  men  and 
women  and  children  in  them  secure  and  happy  and  prosper- 
ous, and  no  nation  has  the  right  to  set  up  its  special  inter- 
ests against  the  interests  and  benefits  of  mankind,  least  of  all 
this  great  nation  which  we  love.  It  was  set  up  for  the  benefit 
of  mankind;  it  was  set  up  to  illustrate  the  highest  ideals 
and  to  achieve  the  highest  aspirations  of  men  who  wanted 
to  be  free ;  and  the  world — the  world  of  today — ^believes  that 
and  counts  on  us,  and  would  be  thrown  back  into  the  black- 
ness of  despair  if  we  deserted  it. 

I  have  tried  once  and  again,  my  fellow  citizens,  to  say  to 
little  circles  of  friends  or  to  larger  bodies  what  seems  to  be 
the  real  hope  of  the  peoples  of  Europe,  and  I  tell  you  frankly 
I  have  not  been  able  to  do  so  because  when  the  thought  trifes 
to  crowd  itself  into  speech  the  profound  emotion  of  the 
thing  is  too  much;  speech  will  not  carry.  I  have  felt  the 
tragedy  of  the  hope  of  those  suffering  peoples. 

It  is  tragedy  because  it  is  a  hope  which  cannot  be  realized 
in  its  perfection,  and  yet  I  have  felt  besides  its  tragedy,  its 


288  The  Causes  Of  War 

compulsion — its  compulsion  upon  every  living  man  to  exer- 
cise every  influence  that  he  has  to  the  utmost  to  see  that  as 
little  as  possible  of  that  hope  is  disappointed,  because  if  men 
cannot  now,  after  this  agony  of  bloody  sweat,  come  to  their 
self-possession  and  see  how  to  regulate  the  affairs  of  the 
world,  we  will  sink  back  into  a  period  of  struggle  in  which 
there  will  be  no  hope,  and,  therefore,  no  mercy.  There  can 
be  no  mercy  where  there  is  no  hope,  for  why  should  you  spare 
another  if  you  yourself  expect  to  perish?  Why  should  you 
be  pitiful  if  you  can  get  no  pity?  Why  should  you  be  just  if, 
upon  every  hand,  you  are  put  upon? 

There  is  another  thing  which  I  think  the  critics  of  this 
covenant  have  not  observed.  They  not  only  have  not  ob- 
served the  temper  of  the  world,  but  they  have  not  even  o\> 
served  the  temper  of  those  splendid  boys  in  khaki  that  they 
sent  across  the  seas.  I  have  had  the  proud  consciousness  of 
the  reflected  glory  of  those  boys,  because  the  Constitution 
made  me  their  Commander-in-Chief,  and  they  have  taught 
me  some  lessons.  When  we  went  into  the  war,  we  went  into 
it  on  the  basis  of  declarations  which  it  was  my  privilege  to 
utter,  because  I  believed  them  to  be  an  interpretation  of  the 
purpose  and  thought  of  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
And  those  boys  went  over  there  with  the  feeling  that  they 
were  sacredly  bound  to  the  realization  of  those  ideals;  that 
they  were  not  only  going  over  there  to  beat  Germany ;  they 
were  not  going  over  there  merely  with  resentment  in  their 
hearts  against  a  particular  outlaw  nation;  but  that  they 
were  crossing  those  three  thousand  miles  of  sea  in  order  to 
show  to  Europe  that  the  United  States,  when  it  became  neces- 
sary, would  go  anywhere  where  the  rights  of  mankind  were 
threatened.  They  would  not  sit  still  in  the  trenches.  They 
would  not  be  restrained  by  the  prudence  of  experienced  con- 
tinental commanders.  They  thought  they  had  come  over 
there  to  do  a  particular  thing,  and  they  were  going  to  do 
it  and  do  it  at  once.  And  just  as  soon  as  that  rush  of  spirit 
as  well  as  rush  of  body  came  in  contact  with  the  lines  of  the 


Appendix  III  239 

enemy,  they  began  to  break,  and  they  continued  to  break 
until  the  end.  They  continued  to  break,  my  fellow  citizens, 
not  merely  because  of  the  physical  force  of  those  lusty 
youngsters,  but  because  of  the  irresistible  spiritual  force  of 
the  armies  of  the  United  States.  It  was  that  they  felt.  It 
was  that  that  awed  them.  It  was  that  that  made  them  feel, 
if  these  youngsters  ever  got  a  foothold,  they  could  never  be 
dislodged,  and  that  therefore  every  foot  of  ground  that  they 
won  was  permanently  won  for  the  liberty  of  mankind. 

And  do  you  suppose  that  having  felt  that  crusading  spirit 
of  these  youngsters,  who  went  over  there  not  to  glorify 
America  but  to  serve  their  fellow  men,  I  am  going  to  per- 
mit myself  for  one  moment  to  slacken  in  my  effort  to  be 
worthy  of  them  and  of  their  cause?  What  I  said  at  the 
opening  I  said  with  a  deeper  meaning  than  perhaps  you  have 
caught ;  I  do  mean  not  to  come  back  until  it's  over  over  there, 
and  it  must  not  be  over  until  the  nations  of  the  world  are 
assured  of  the  permanency  of  peace. 

Gentlemen  on  this  side  of  the  water  would  be  very  much 
profited  by  getting  into  communication  with  some  gentlemen 
on  the  other  side  of  the  water.  We  sometimes  think,  my 
fellow  citizens,  that  the  experienced  statesmen  of  the  Euro- 
pean nations  are  an  unusually  hard-headed  set  of  men,  by 
which  we  generally  mean,  although  we  do  not  admit  it,  that 
they  are  a  bit  cynical,  that  they  say  "This  is  a  very  prac- 
tical world,"  by  which  you  always  mean  that  it  is  not  an 
ideal  world;  that  they  do  not  believe  that  things  can  be 
settled  upon  an  ideal  basis.  Well,  I  never  came  into  intimate 
contact  with  them  before,  but  if  they  used  to  be  that  way, 
they  are  not  that  way  now.  They  have  been  subdued,  if  that 
was  once  their  temper,  by  the  awful  significance  of  recent 
events  and  the  awful  importance  of  what  is  to  ensue;  and 
there  is  not  one  of  them  with  whom  I  have  come  in  contact 
who  does  not  feel  that  he  cannot  in  conscience  return  to  his 
people  from  Paris  unless  he  has  done  his  utmost  to  do  some- 
thing more  than  attach  his  name  to  a  treaty  of  peace.    Every 


g40  The  Catises  Of  War 

man  in  that  Conference  knows  that  the  treaty  of  peace  in 
itself  will  be  inoperative,  as  Mr.  Taft  has  said,  without  this 
constant  support  and  energy  of  a  great  organization  such 
as  is  supplied  by  the  League  of  Nations. 

And  men  who  when  I  first  went  over  there  were  skeptical 
of  the  possibility  of  forming  a  League  of  Nations  admitted 
that  if  we  could  but  form  it  it  would  be  an  invaluable  in- 
strumentality through  which  to  secure  the  operation  of  the 
various  parts  of  the  treaty;  and  when  that  treaty  comes 
back,  gentlemen  on  this  side  will  find  the  covenant  not  only 
in  it,  but  so  many  threads  of  the  treaty  tied  to  the  covenant 
that  you  cannot  dissect  the  covenant  from  the  treaty  with- 
out destroying  the  whole  vital  structure.  The  structure  of 
peace  will  not  be  vital  without  the  League  of  Nations,  and 
no  man  is  going  to  bring  back  a  cadaver  with  him. 

I  must  say  that  I  have  been  puzzled  by  some  of  the  criti- 
cisms— not  by  the  criticisms  themselves ;  I  can  understand 
them  perfectly,  even  when  there  was  no  foundation  for  them ; 
but  by  the  fact  of  the  criticism.  I  cannot  imagine  how  these 
gentlemen  can  live  and  not  live  in  the  atmosphere  of  the 
world.  I  cannot  imagine  how  they  can  live  and  not  be  in 
contact  with  the  events  of  their  times,  and  I  particularly 
cannot  imagine  how  they  can  be  Americans  and  set  up  a  doc- 
trine of  careful  selfishness,  thought  out  to  the  last  detail. 
I  have  heard  no  counsel  of  generosity  in  their  criticism.  I 
have  heard  no  constructive  suggestion.  I  have  heard  nothing 
except,  "Will  it  not  be  dangerous  to  us  to  help  the  world.?" 
It  would  be  fatal  to  us  not  to  help  it. 

From  being  what  I  will  venture  to  call  the  most  famous 
and  the  most  powerful  nation  in  the  world  we  would  of  a 
sudden  have  become  the  most  contemptible.  So,  I  did  not 
need  to  be  told,  as  I  have  been  told,  that  the  people  of  the 
United  States  would  support  this  covenant.  I  am  an  Ameri- 
can and  I  knew  they  would.  What  a  sweet  revenge  it  is  upon 
the  world.  They  laughed  at  us  once,  they  thought  we  did 
not  mean  our  professions  of  principle.     They  thought  so 


Appendix  III  £41 

until  April  of  1917.  It  was  hardly  credible  to  them  that 
we  would  do  more  than  send  a  few  men  over  and  go  through 
the  forms  of  helping,  and  when  they  saw  multitudes  hasten- 
ing across  the  sea,  and  saw  what  those  multitudes  were  eager 
to  do  when  they  got  to  the  other  side,  they  stood  at  amaze 
and  said:  "The  thing  is  real,  this  nation  is  the  friend  of 
mankind  as  it  said  it  was."  The  enthusiasm,  the  hope,  the 
trust,  the  confidence  in  the  future  bred  by  that  change  of 
view  are  indescribable.  Take  an  individual  American  and 
you  may  often  find  him  selfish,  and  confined  to  his  special 
interests ;  but  take  the  American  in  the  mass  and  he  is  willing 
to  die  for  an  idea.  The  sweet  revenge,  therefore,  is  this,  that 
we  believed  in  righteousness,  and  now  we  are  ready  to  make 
the  supreme  sacrifice  for  it,  the  supreme  sacrifice  of  throwing 
in  our  fortunes  with  the  fortunes  of  men  everywhere.  Mr. 
Taft  was  speaking  of  Washington's  utterance  about  en- 
tangling alliances,  and  if  he  will  permit  me  to  say  so,  he  put 
the  exactly  right  interpretation  upon  what  Washington  said, 
the  interpretation  that  is  inevitable  if  you  read  what  he  said, 
as  most  of  these  gentlemen  do  not.  And  the  thing  that  he 
longed  for  was  just  what  we  are  now  about  to  supply;  an 
arrangement  which  will  disentangle  all  the  alliances  in  the 
world. 

Nothing  entangles,  nothing  enmeshes  a  man  except  a  self- 
ish combination  with  somebody  else.  Nothing  entangles  a 
nation,  hampers  it,  binds  it,  except  to  enter  into  a  combina- 
tion with  some  other  nation  against  the  other  nations  of  the 
world.  And  this  great  disentanglement  of  all  alliances  is 
now  to  be  accomplished  by  this  covenant,  because  one  of  the 
covenants  is  that  no  nation  shall  enter  into  any  relationship 
with  another  nation  inconsistent  with  the  covenants  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  Nations  promise  not  to  have  alliances. 
Nations  promise  not  to  make  combinations  against  each 
oth^r.  Nations  agree  that  there  shall  be  but  one  combina- 
tion, and  that  is  the  combination  of  all  against  the  wrong- 
doer. 


aiil  The  Caiises  Of  War 

And  so  I  am  going  back  to  my  task  on  the  other  side  with 
renewed  vigor.  I  had  not  forgotten  what  the  spirit  of  the 
American  people  is,  but  I  have  been  immensely  refreshed  by 
coming  in  contact  with  it  again.  I  did  not  know  how  good 
home  felt  until  I  got  here. 

The  only  place  a  man  can  feel  at  home  is  where  nothing 
has  to  be  explained  to  him.  Nothing  has  to  be  explained  to 
me  in  America,  least  of  all  the  sentiment  of  the  American 
people.  I  mean  about  great  fundamental  things  like  this. 
There  are  many  differences  of  judgment  as  to  policy — and 
perfectly  legitimate — sometimes  profound  differences  of 
judgment;  but  those  are  not  differences  of  sentiment,  those 
are  not  differences  of  purpose,  those  are  not  differences  of 
ideals.  And  the  advantage  of  not  having  to  have  anything 
explained  to  you  is  that  you  recognize  a  wrong  explanation 
when  you  hear  it. 

In  a  certain  rather  abandoned  part  of  the  frontier  at  one 
time  it  was  said  they  found  a  man  who  told  the  truth ;  he 
was  not  found  telling  it,  but  he  could  tell  it  when  he  heard 
it.  And  I  think  I  am  in  that  situation  with  regard  to  some 
of  the  criticisms  I  have  heard.  They  do  not  make  any  im- 
pression on  me,  because  I  know  there  is  no  medium  that  will 
transmit  them,  that  the  sentiment  of  the  country  is  proof 
against  such  narrowness  and  such  selfishness  as  that.  I  com- 
mend these  gentlemen  to  communion  with  their  fellow  citizens. 

What  are  we  to  say,  then,  as  to  the  future  .^^  I  think,  my 
fellow  citizens,  that  we  can  look  forward  to  it  with  great 
confidence.  I  have  heard  cheering  news  since  I  came  to  this 
side  of  the  water  about  the  progress  that  is  being  made  in 
Paris  toward  the  discussion  and  clarification  of  a  great  many 
difficult  matters  and  I  believe  that  settlements  will  begin  to 
be  made  rather  rapidly  from  this  time  on  at  those  confer- 
ences. But  what  I  believe,  what  I  know  as  well  as  believe,  is 
this :  That  the  men  engaged  in  those  conferences  are  gath- 
erning  heart  as  they  go,  not  losing  it ;  that  they  are  finding 
community  of  purpose  and  community  of  ideal  to  an  extent 
that  perhaps  they  did  not  expect;  and  that  amidst  all  the 


Appendk:  III  243 

inter-play  of  influence — because  it  is  infinitely  complicated 
— amidst  all  the  inter-play  of  influence,  there  is  a  forward 
movement  which  is  running  toward  the  right.  Men  have  at 
last  perceived  that  the  only  permanent  thing  in  the  world 
is  the  right,  and  that  a  wrong  settlement  is  bound  to  bo  a 
temporary  settlement — bound  to  be  a  temporary  settlement 
for  the  very  best  reason  of  all,  that  it  ought  to  be  a  tem- 
porary settlement,  and  the  spirits  of  men  will  rebel  against 
it,  and  the  spirits  of  men  are  now  in  the  saddle. 

When  I  was  in  Italy  a  little  limping  group  of  wounded 
Italian  soldiers  sought  an  interview  with  me.  I  could  not 
conjecture  what  it  was  they  were  going  to  say  to  me,  and 
with  the  greatest  simplicity,  with  a  touching  simplicity,  they 
presented  me  with  a  petition  in  favor  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. Their  wounded  limbs,  their  impaired  vitality  were  the 
only  argument  they  brought  with  them.  It  was  a  simple  re- 
quest that  I  lend  all  the  influence  that  I  might  happen  to 
have  to  relieve  future  generations  of  the  sacrifices  that  they 
had  been  obliged  to  make.  That  appeal  has  remained  in  my 
mind  as  I  have  ridden  along  the  streets  in  European  capitals 
and  heard  cries  of  the  crowd,  cries  for  the  League  of  Na- 
tions, from  lips  of  people  who,  I  venture  to  say,  had  no  par- 
ticular notion  of  how  it  was  to  be  done,  who  were  not  ready 
to  propose  a  plan  for  a  League  of  Nations,  but  whose  hearts 
said  that  something  by  way  of  a  combination  of  all  men 
everywhere  must  come  out  of  this.  As  we  drove  along  coun- 
try roads  weak  old  women  would  come  out  and  hold  flowers 
up  to  us.  Why  should  they  hold  flowers  up  to  strangers 
from  across  the  Atlantic?  Only  because  they  believed  that 
we  were  the  messengers  of  friendship  and  of  hope,  and  these 
flowers  were  their  humble  off^erings  of  gratitude  that  friends 
from  so  great  a  distance  should  have  brought  them  so  great 
a  hope. 

It  is  inconceivable  that  we  should  disappoint  them,  and  we 
shall  not.  The  day  will  come  when  men  in  America  will  look 
back  with  swelling  hearts  and  rising  pride  that  they  should 
have  been  privileged  to  make  the  sacrifice  which  it  was  ncces- 


244  The  Causes  Of  War 

sary  to  make  in  order  to  combine  their  might  and  their  moral 
power  with  the  cause  of  justice  for  men  of  every  kind  every- 
where. 

God  give  us  the  strength  and  vision  to  do  it  wisely !  God 
give  us  the  privilege  of  knowing  that  we  did  it  without  count- 
ing the  cost  and  because  we  were  true  Americans,  lovers  of 
liberty  and  of  the  right ! 


LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

EEVISED  DEAFT ADOPTED  AT  PARIS,  APRIL  28,  1919 

IN  order  to  promote  international  co-operation  and  to 
achieve  international  peace  and  security,  by  the  accept- 
ance of  obligations  not  to  resort  to  war,  by  the  prescrip- 
tion of  open,  just  and  honorable  relations  between  nations, 
by  the  firm  establishment  of  the  understanding  of  interna- 
tional law  as  to  actual  rule  of  conduct  among  governments, 
and  by  the  maintenance  of  justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect 
for  all  treaty  obligations  in  the  dealings  of  organized  peo- 
ples with  one  another,  the  high  contracting  parties  agree  to 
this  covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

(In  the  original  preamble  the  last  sentence  read:  ** Adopt 
this  constitution"  instead  of  "Agree  to  this  covenant  ") 

Article  One 

The  original  members  of  the  League  of  Nations  shall  be 
those  of  the  signatories  which  are  named  in  the  annex  to  this 
covenant,  and  also  such  of  those  other  states  named  in  the 
annex  as  shall  accede  without  reservation  to  this  covenant. 
Such  accessions  shall  be  affected  by  a  declaration  deposited 
with  the  secretariat  within  two  months  of  the  coming  into 
force  of  the  covenant.  Notice  thereof  shall  be  sent  to  all 
other  members  of  the  league. 

Any  fully  self-governing  state,  dominion  or  colony  not 
named  in  the  annex  may  become  a  member  of  the  league  if 
its  admission  is  agreed  by  two-thirds  of  the  assembly,  pro- 
vided it  shall  give  effective  guarantees  of  its  sincere  inten- 
tion to  observe  its  international  obligations  and  shall  accept 

245 


M6  The  Causes  Of  War 

such  regulations  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  league  in  re- 
gard to  its  military  and  navel  forces  and  armaments. 

Any  member  of  the  league  may,  after  two  years'  notice  of 
its  intention  so  to  do,  withdraw  from  the  league,  provided 
that  all  its  international  obligations  and  all  its  obligations 
under  this  covenant  shall  have  been  fulfilled  at  the  time  of 
its  withdrawal. 

(This  article  is  new,  emhodymg  with  alterations  and  ad- 
ditions the  old  article  seven.  It  provides  more  specificallz/ 
the  method  of  admitting  new  members  and  adds  the  entirely 
new  paragraph  providing  for  withdrawal  from  the  league. 
No  mention  of  withdrawal  was  made  in  the  original  docu- 
ment,) 

Article  Two 

The  action  of  the  league  under  this  covenant  shall  be  ef- 
fective through  the  instrumentality  of  an  assembly  and  of  a 
council,  with  permanent  secretariat. 

(Originally  this  was  a  part  of  Article  One,  It  gives  the 
name  "assemhly^^  to  the  gathering  of  representatives  of  the 
members  of  the  league ,  formerly  referred  to  merely  as  "the 
body  of  delegates,'*) 

Article  Three 

The  assembly  shall  consist  of  representatives  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  league. 

The  assembly  shall  meet  at  stated  intervals  and  from  time 
to  time  as  occasion  may  require,  at  the  seat  of  the  league,  or 
at  such  other  places  as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  assembly  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  matter 
within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  league  or  affecting  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

At  meetings  of  the  assembly,  each  member  of  the  league 
shall  have  one  vote,  and  may  have  not  more  than  three  rep- 
resentatives. 

( This  embodies  parts  of  the  origin^  articles  one,  two  and 


League  of  Nations  247 

three  with  only  minor  changes.  It  refers  to  "members  of  the 
league"  where  the  term  "high  contracting  parties'*  originally 
was  used,  and  this  change  is  followed  throughout  the  revised 
draft.) 

Article  Four 

The  council  shall  consist  of  representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  of  the  British  Empire,  of  France,  of 
Italy  and  of  Japan,  together  with  representatives  of  four 
other  members  of  the  league.  These  four  members  of  the 
league  shall  be  selected  by  the  assembly  from  time  to  time  in 
its  discretion.  Until  the  appointment  of  the  representatives 
of  the  four  members  of  the  league  first  selected  by  the  as- 
sembly, representatives  of  (blank)  shall  be  members  of  the 
council. 

With  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the  assembly  the 
council  may  name  additional  members  of  the  league,  whose 
representatives  shall  always  be  members  of  the  council;  the 
council  with  like  approval  may  increase  the  number  of  mem- 
bers of  the  league,  to  be  selected  by  the  assembly  for  repre- 
sentation on  the  council. 

The  council  shall  meet  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  may 
require,  and  at  least  once  a  year,  at  the  seat  of  the  league, 
or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  council  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  matter 
within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  league  or  affecting  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

Any  member  of  the  league  not  represented  on  the  council 
shall  be  invited  to  send  a  representative  to  sit  as  a  member 
at  any  meeting  of  the  council  during  the  consideration  of 
matters  specially  affecting  the  interests  of  that  member  of 
the  league. 

At  meetings  of  the  council  each  member  of  the  league  rep- 
resented on  the  council  shall  have  one  vote,  and  may  not 
have  more  than  one  representative. 

(This  embodies   that  part  of  the  original  article  three 


248  The  Causes  Of  War 

designating  the  original  members  of  the  council.  The  para- 
graph providing  for  increase  in  the  membership  of  the  covmr 
cil  is  new,) 

Article  Five 

Except  where  otherwise  expressly  provided  in  this  coven- 
ant, decisions  at  any  meeting  of  the  assembly  or  the  council 
shall  require  the  agreement  of  all  the  members  of  the  league 
represented  at  the  meeting. 

All  matters  of  procedure  of  meetings  of  the  assembly  or 
of  the  council,  the  appointment  of  committees  to  investigate 
particular  matters,  shall  be  regulated  by  the  assembly  or  by 
the  council,  and  may  be  decided  by  a  majority  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  league  represented  at  the  meeting. 

The  first  meetings  of  the  assembly  and  the  first  meeting 
of  the  council  shall  be  summoned  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

{The  first  paragraph  requiring  unanimous  agreement  in 
both  assembly  and  council  except  where  otherwise  provided 
is  new.  The  other  two  paragraphs  originally  were  included 
in  article  four.) 

Article  Six 

The  permanent  secretariat  shall  be  established  at  the  seat 
of  the  lea^e.  The  secretariat  shall  comprise  a  secretariat- 
general  and  such  secretaries  and  staff  as  may  be  required. 

The  first  secretary-general  shall  be  the  person  named  in 
the  annex;  thereafter  the  secretary-general  shall  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  council  with  the  approval  of  the  majority  of 
the  assembly. 

The  secretaries  and  the  staff  of  the  secretariat  shall  be 
appointed  by  the  secretary-general  with  the  approval  of  the 
council. 

The  secretary-general  shall  act  in  that  capacity  at  all 
meetings  of  the  assembly  and  of  the  council. 

The  expenses  of  the  secretariat  shall  be  borne  by  the 


League  of  Nations  249 

members  of  the  league  in  accordance  with  the  apportion- 
ment of  the  expenses  of  the  International  Bureau  of  the  Uni- 
versal Postal  Union. 

{This  replaces  the  original  article  -jive.  In  the  original 
the  appointment  of  the  first  secretary-general  was  left  to  the 
councUf  and  approval  of  the  majority  of  the  assembly  was 
not  required  for  subsequent  appointments,) 

Article  Seven 

The  seat  of  the  league  is  established  at  Geneva. 

The  council  may  at  any  time  decide  that  the  seat  of  the 
league  shall  be  established  elsewhere. 

AU  positions  under,  or  in  connection  with  the  league,  in- 
cluding the  secretariat,  shall  be  open  equally  to  men  and 
women. 

Representatives  of  the  members  of  the  league  and  officials 
of  the  league  when  engaged  on  the  business  of  the  league 
shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and  immunities. 

The  buildings  and  other  property  occupied  by  the  league 
or  its  officials,  or  by  representatives  attending  its  meetings, 
shall  be  inviolable. 

(Embodying  parts  of  the  old  articles  five  and  six,  this 
article  names  Geneva  instead  of  leaving  the  seat  of  the  league 
to  be  chosen  later  and  adds  the  provision  for  changing  the 
seat  in  the  future.  The  paragraph  opening  positions  to 
women  equally  with  men  is  new, ) 

Article  Eight 

The  members  of  the  league  recognize  that  the  maintenance 
of  peace  requires  the  reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the 
lowest  point  consistent  with  national  safety  and  the  enforce- 
ment by  common  action  of  international  obligations. 

The  council,  taking  account  of  the  geographical  situation 
and  circumstances  of  each  state,  shall  formulate  plans  for 


gSO  The  Causes  Of  War 

such  reduction  for  the  consideration  and  action  of  the  sev- 
eral governments. 

Such  plans  shall  be  subject  to  reconsideration  and  revi- 
sion at  least  every  ten  years. 

After  these  plans  shall  have  been  adopted  by  the  several 
governments,  Umits  of  armaments  therein  fixed  shall  not  be 
exceeded  without  the  concurrence  of  the  council. 

The  members  of  the  league  agree  that  the  manufacture  by 
private  enterprise  of  munitions  and  implements  of  war  is  open 
to  grave  objections.  The  council  shall  advise  how  the  evil 
effects  attendant  upon  such  manufacture  can  be  prevented, 
due  regard  being  had  to  the  necessities  of  those  members  of 
the  league  which  are  not  able  to  manufacture  the  munitions 
and  implements  of  war  necessary  for  their  safety. 

The  members  of  the  league  undertake  to  interchange  full 
and  frank  information  as  to  the  scale  of  their  armaments, 
their  military  and  naval  programmes  and  the  condition  of 
such  of  their  industries  as  are  adaptable  to  warlike  pur- 
poses. 

(This  covers  the  ground  of  the  original  article  eight,  but 
is  rewritten  to  make  it  clearer  that  armament  reduction 
plans  must  he  adopted  by  the  nations  affected  before  they 
become  effective.) 

Article  Nine 

A  permanent  commission  shall  be  constituted  to  advise  the 
council  on  the  execution  of  the  provisions  of  article  1  and  8 
and  on  military  and  naval  questions  generally. 

{Unchanged  except  for  the  insertion  of  the  words  "Article 

Article  Ten 

The  members  of  the  league  undertake  to  respect  and  pre- 
serve as  against  external  aggression  the  territorial  integrity 
and  existing  political  independence  of  all  members  of  the 
league.  In  case  of  any  such  aggression,  or  in  case  of  any 
threat  or  danger  of  such  aggression,  the  council  shall  ad- 


League  of  Nations  251 

vise  upon  the  means  by  which  this  obligation  shall  be  ful- 
filled. 

{Virtually  unchanged,) 

Article  Eleven 

Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  immediately  affecting 
any  of  the  members  of  the  league  or  not,  is  hereby  declared 
a  matter  of  concern  of  the  whole  league,  and  the  league  shall 
take  any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to 
safeguard  the  peace  of  nations.  In  case  any  such  emergency 
should  arise,  the  secretary-general  shall,  on  the  request  of 
any  member  of  the  league,  forthwith  summon  a  meeting  of  the 
council. 

It  is  also  declared  to  be  the  fundamental  right  of  each 
member  of  the  league  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  assem- 
bly, or  of  the  council,  any  circumstances  whatever  affecting 
international  relations  which  threatens  to  disturb  either  the 
peace  or  the  good  understanding  between  nations  upon  which 
peace  depends. 

{In  the  original  it  was  provided  that  the  **high  contract- 
ing parties  reserve  the  right  to  take  any  action,^'  etc.,  where 
the  revised  draft  reads,  "the  league  shall  take  any  action,*' 
etc) 

Article  Twelve 

The  members  of  the  league  agree  that  if  there  should  arise 
between  them  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture  they 
will  submit  the  matter  either  to  arbitration  or  to  inquiry  by 
the  council,  and  they  agree  in  no  case  to  resort  to  war  until 
three  months  after  the  award  by  the  arbitrators  or  the  re- 
port by  the  council. 

In  any  case  under  this  article  the  award  of  the  arbitrators 
shall  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  the  report  of  the 
council  shall  be  made  within  six  months  after  the  submission 
of  the  dispute. 

{Virtually  unchanged,  except  that  soTne  provisions  of  the 
original  are  eliminated  for  inclusion  in  other  articles.) 


25S  The  Causes  Of  War 

Article  Thirteen 

The  members  of  the  league  agree  that  whenever  any  dis- 
pute shall  arise  between  them  which  they  recognize  to  be 
suitable  for  submission  to  arbitration,  and  which  cannot  be 
satisfactorily  settled  by  diplomacy,  they  will  submit  the 
whole  subject  matter  to  arbitration.  Disputes  as  to  the  in- 
terpretation of  a  treaty,  as  to  any  question  of  international 
law,  as  to  the  existence  of  any  fact  which  if  established 
would  constitute  a  breach  of  any  international  obligation, 
or  as  to  the  extend  and  nature  of  the  reparation  to  be  made 
for  any  such  breach,  are  declared  to  be  among  those  which 
are  generally  suitable  for  submission  to  arbitration.  For 
the  consideration  of  any  such  dispute  the  court  of  arbitra- 
tion to  which  the  case  is  referred  shall  be  the  court  agreed 
on  by  the  parties  to  the  dispute  or  stipulated  in  any  conven- 
tion existing  between  them. 

The  members  of  the  league  agree  that  they  will  carry  out 
in  full  good  faith  any  award  that  may  be  rendered  and  that 
they  will  not  resort  to  war  against  a  member  of  the  league 
which  complies  therewith.  In  the  event  of  any  failure  to 
carry  out  such  an  award,  the  council  shall  propose  what 
steps  should  be  taken  to  give  effect  thereto. 

(Only  Tmnor  changes  in  language.) 

Article  Fourteen 

The  council  shall  formulate  and  submit  to  the  members  of 
the  league  for  adoption  plans  for  the  establishment  of  a  per- 
manent court  of  international  justice.  The  court  shall  be 
competent  to  hear  and  determine  disputes  of  an  international 
character  which  the  parties  thereto  submit  to  it.  The  court 
may  also  give  an  advisory  opinion  upon  any  dispute  or  ques- 
tion referred  to  it  by  the  council  or  by  the  assembly. 

{Unchanged  except  for  the  addition  of  the  last  sentence.) 


League  of  Nations  ^53 

Article  Fifteen 

If  there  should  arise  between  members  of  the  league  any 
dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture,  which  is  not  submitted  to 
arbitration  as  above,  the  members  of  the  league  agree  that 
they  will  submit  the  matter  to  the  council.  Any  party  to 
the  dispute  may  effect  such  submission  by  giving  notice  of 
the  existence  of  the  dispute  to  the  secretary-general,  who 
will  make  all  necessary  arrangements  for  a  full  investigation 
and  consideration  thereof.  For  this  purpose  the  parties  to 
the  dispute  will  communicate  to  the  secretary-general,  as 
promptly  as  possible,  statements  of  their  cases,  all  the  rele- 
vant facts  and  papers ;  the  council  may  forthwith  direct  the 
publication  thereof. 

The  council  shall  endeavor  to  effect  a  settlement  of  any 
dispute,  and  if  such  efforts  are  successful,  a  statement  shall 
be  made  public  giving  such  facts  and  explanations  regarding 
the  dispute,  terms  of  settlement  thereof  as  the  council  may 
deem  appropriate. 

If  the  dispute  is  not  thus  settled,  the  council,  either  unani- 
mously or  by  a  majority  vote,  shall  make  and  publish  a  re- 
port containing  a  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute  and 
the  recommendations  which  are  deemed  just  and  proper  in 
regard  thereto. 

Any  member  of  the  league  represented  on  the  council  may 
make  public  a  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute  and  of 
its  conclusions  regarding  the  same. 

If  a  report  by  the  council  is  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the 
members  thereof  other  than  the  representatives  of  one  or 
more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the  members  of  the  league 
agree  that  they  will  not  go  to  war  with  any  party  to  the  dis- 
pute which  complies  with  the  recommendations  of  the  report. 

If  the  council  fails  to  reach  a  report  which  is  unanimously 
agreed  to  by  the  members  thereof,  other  than  the  representa- 
tives of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  league  reserve  to  themselves  the  right  to  take 


264  The  Causes  Of  War 

such  action  as  they  shall  consider  necessary  for  the  main- 
tenance of  right  and  justice. 

If  the  dispute  between  the  parties  is  claimed  by  one  of 
them,  and  is  found  by  the  council  to  arise  out  of  a  matter 
which  by  international  law  is  solely  within  the  domestic  jur- 
isdiction of  that  party,  the  council  shall  so  report,  and  shall 
make  no  recommendation  as  to  its  settlement. 

The  council  may  in  any  case  under  this  article  refer  the 
dispute  to  the  assembly.  The  dispute  shall  be  so  referred  at 
the  request  of  either  party  to  the  dispute,  provided  that 
such  request  be  made  within  fourteen  days  after  the  submis- 
sion of  the  dispute  to  the  council. 

In  any  case  referred  to  the  assembly  all  the  provisions  of 
this  article  and  of  article  twelve  relating  to  the  action  and 
powers  of  the  council  shall  apply  to  the  action  and  powers 
of  the  assembly,  provided  that  a  report  made  by  the  assem- 
bly, if  concurred  in  by  the  representatives  of  those  members 
of  the  league  represented  on  the  council  and  of  a  majority 
of  the  other  members  of  the  league,  exclusive  in  each  case  of 
the  representatives  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  shall  have 
the  same  force  as  a  report  by  the  council  concurred  in  by  all 
members  thereof  other  than  the  representatives  of  one  or 
more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute. 

{The  paragraph  specifically  excluding  matters  of  ''domes- 
tic jurisdiction'*  from  action  hy  the  council  is  new.  In  the 
last  sentence  the  words  ''if  concurred  in  hy  the  representa- 
tives of  those  members  of  the  league  represented  on  the 
cowncHy^  etc.,  have  been  added.) 

Article  Sixteen 

Should  any  member  of  the  league  resort  to  war  in  disre- 
gard of  its  covenants  under  Articles  Twelve,  Thirteen  or 
Fifteen,  it  shall  ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have  committed  an 
act  of  war  against  all  other  members  of  the  league,  which 
hereby  undertake  immediately  to  subject  it  to  the  severance 


League  of  Nations  255 

of  all  trade  or  financial  relations,  the  prohibition  of  all  in- 
tercourse between  their  nationals  and  the  nationals  of  the 
covenant-breaking  state  and  the  prevention  of  all  financial 
intercourse  between  the  nationals  of  the  covenant-breaking 
member  of  the  league  and  the  nationals  of  any  other  state, 
whether  a  member  of  the  league  or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  council  in  such  case  to  recom- 
mend to  the  several  governments  concerned  what  effective 
military  or  naval  forces  the  members  of  the  league  shall 
severally  contribute  to  the  armaments  of  forces  to  be  used 
to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  league. 

The  members  of  the  league  agree,  further,  that  they  will 
mutually  support  one  another  in  the  financial  and  economic 
measures  which  are  taken  under  this  article,  in  order  to  min- 
imize the  loss  and  inconvenience  resulting  from  the  above 
measures,  and  that  they  will  mutually  support  one  another 
in  resisting  any  special  measures  aimed  at  one  of  their  num- 
ber by  the  covenant-breaking  state,  and  that  they  will  take 
the  necessary  steps  to  afford  passage  through  their  terri- 
tory to  the  forces  of  any  of  the  members  of  the  league  which 
are  co-operating  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  league. 

Any  member  of  the  league  which  has  violated  any  coven- 
ant of  the  league  may  be  declared  to  be  no  longer  a  member 
of  the  league  by  a  vote  of  the  council,  concurred  in  by  the 
representatives  of  all  the  other  members  of  the  league  repre- 
sented thereon. 

{Unchanged  except  for  the  addition  of  the  last  sentence,) 

Article  Seventeen 

In  the  event  of  a  dispute  between  a  member  of  the  league 
and  a  state  which  is  not  a  member  of  the  league,  or  between 
states  not  members  of  the  league,  the  state  or  states  not 
members  of  the  league  shall  be  invited  to  accept  the  obliga- 
tions of  membership  in  the  league  for  the  purpose  of  such 
dispute,  upon  such  conditions  as  the  council  may  deem  just. 


256  The  Causes  Of  War 

If  such  invitation  is  accepted,  the  provisions  of  articles 
twelve  to  sixteen,  inclusive,  shall  be  applied,  with  such  modi- 
fications as  may  be  deemed  necessary  by  the  council. 

Upon  such  invitations  being  given  the  council  shall  imme- 
diately institute  an  inquiry  into  the  circumstances  of  the 
dispute,  and  recommend  such  action  as  may  seem  best  and 
most  effectual  in  the  circumstances. 

If  a  state  so  invited  shall  refuse  to  accept  the  obligations 
of  membership  in  the  league  for  the  purpose  of  such  dispute, 
and  shall  resort  to  war  against  a  member  of  the  league,  the 
provisions  of  article  sixteen  shall  be  applicable  as  against 
the  state  taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute,  when  so  invited,  refuse  to 
accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  league  for  the 
purpose  of  such  dispute,  the  council  may  take  such  measures 
and  make  such  recommendations  as  will  prevent  hostilities 
and  will  result  in  the  settlement  of  the  dispute. 

(  Virtually  unchanged, ) 

Article  Eighteen 

Every  convention  or  international  engagement  entered  into 
henceforward  by  any  member  of  the  league  shall  be  forth- 
with registered  with  the  secretariat  and  shall,  as  soon  as 
possible,  be  published  by  it.  No  such  treaty  or  international 
engagement  shall  be  binding  until  so  registered. 

{Same  as  original  article  twenty-three,) 

Article  Nineteen 

The  assembly  may  from  time  to  time  advise  the  reconsid- 
eration by  members  of  the  league  of  treaties  which  have  be- 
come inapphcable,  and  the  consideration  of  international 
conditions  whose  continuance  might  endanger  the  peace  of 
the  world. 

(Virtually  the  same  as  original  article  twenty-four.) 


League  of  Nations  267 

Article  T  went  if 

The  members  of  the  league  severally  agree  that  this  cov- 
enant is  accepted  as  abrogating  all  obligations  or  under- 
standings inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms 
hereof,  and  solemnly  undertake  that  they  will  not  hereafter 
enter  into  any  engagements,  inconsistent  with  the  terms 
thereof. 

In  case  members  of  the  league  shall,  before  becoming  a 
member  of  the  league,  have  undertaken  any  obligations  in- 
consistent with  the  terms  of  this  covenant,  it  shall  be  the 
duty  of  such  member  to  take  immediate  steps  to  procure  its 
release  from  such  obligations. 

{Virtually  the  same  as  original  article  twenty-five,) 

Article  Twenty-one 

Nothing  in  this  covenant  shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the 
validity  of  international  agreements  such  as  treaties  of  arbi- 
tration or  regional  understandings  like  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
for  securing  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

{Entirely  new.) 

Article  Twenty-two 

To  those  colonies  and  territories,  which,  as  a  consequence 
of  the  late  war,  have  ceased  to  be  under  the  sovereignty  of 
the  states  which  formerly  governed  them  and  which  are  in- 
habited by  peoples  not  yet  able  to  stand  by  themselves  un- 
der the  strenuous  conditions  of  the  modern  world,  there 
should  be  applied  the  principle  that  the  well-being  and  de- 
velopment of  such  peoples  from  a  sacred  trust  of  civilization 
and  that  securities  for  the  performance  of  this  trust  should 
be  embodied  in  this  covenant. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practicable  effect  to  this  princi- 
ple is  that  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples  be  entrusted  to  ad- 


The  Causes  Of  War 

vanced  nations,  who,  by  reasons  of  their  resources,  their  ex- 
perience or  their  geographical  position,  can  best  undertake 
this  responsibility  and  who  are  willing  to  accept  it,  and  that 
this  tutelage  should  be  exercised  by  them  as  mandatories  on 
behalf  of  the  league. 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  according  to 
the  stage  of  the  development  of  the  people,  the  geographical 
situation  of  the  territory,  its  economic  condition  and  other 
similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities  formerly  belonging  to  the  Turkish 
Empire  have  reached  a  stage  of  development  where  their  ex- 
istence as  independent  nations  can  be  provisionally  recog- 
nized subject  to  the  rendering  of  administrative  advice  and 
assistance  by  a  mandatory  until  such  time  as  they  are  able 
to  stand  alone.  The  wishes  of  these  communities  must  be  a 
principal  consideration  in  the  selection  of  the  mandatory. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  Central  Africa,  are  at 
such  a  stage  that  the  mandatory  must  be  responsible  for  the 
administration  of  the  territory  under  conditions  which  will 
guarantee  freedom  of  conscience  or  religion,  subject  only  to 
the  maintenance  of  public  order  and  morals,  the  prohibition 
of  abuses  such  as  the  slave  trade,  the  arms  traffic  and  the 
liquor  traffic  and  the  prevention  of  the  establishment  of  for- 
tifications or  military  and  naval  bases  and  of  military  train- 
ing, of  the  nations  for  other  than  police  purposes  and  the 
defense  of  territory,  and  will  also  secure  equal  opportunities 
for  the  trade  and  commerce  of  other  members  of  the  league. 

There  are  territories,  such  as  Southwest  Africa  and  cer- 
tain of  the  South  Pacific  islands,  which,  owing  to  the  sparse- 
ness  of  their  population  or  their  small  size  or  their  remote- 
ness from  the  centers  of  civilization  or  their  geographical 
contiguity  to  the  territory  of  the  mandatory  and  other  cir- 
cumstances can  he  best  administered  under  the  laws  of  the 
mandatory  as  integral  portions  of  its  territory  subject  to 
the  safeguards  above  mentioned  in  the  interests  of  the  in- 
digenous population.    In  every  case  of  mandate,  the  manda- 


League  of  Nations  259 

tory  shall  render  to  the  council  an  annual  report  in  reference 
to  the  territory  committed  to  its  charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  control  or  administration  to  be 
exercised  by  the  mandatory  shall,  if  not  previously  agreed 
upon  by  the  members  of  the  league,  be  explicitly  defined  in 
each  case  by  the  council. 

A  permanent  commission  shall  be  constituted  to  receive 
and  examine  the  annual  reports  of  the  mandatories  and  to 
advise  the  council  on  all  matters  relating  to  the  observance 
of  the  mandates. 

(This  is  the  original  article  19,  virtually/,  except  for  the 
insertion  of  the  words  *^and  who  are  willing  to  accept'*  in  de- 
scribing  nations  to  he  given  mandatories,) 

Article  Twenty-three 

Subject  to  and  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  inter- 
national conventions  existing,  or  hereafter  to  be  agreed 
upon,  the  members  of  the  league  (a)  will  endeavor  to  secure 
and  maintain  fair  and  humane  conditions  of  labor  for  men, 
women  and  children,  both  in  their  own  countries  and  in  all 
countries  to  which  their  commercial  and  industrial  relations 
extend,  and  for  that  purpose  will  establish  and  maintain  the 
necessary  international  organizations;  (b)  undertake  to  se- 
cure just  treatment  of  the  native  inhabitants  of  territories 
under  their  control;  (c)  will  entrust  the  league  with  the  gen- 
eral supervision  over  the  execution  of  agreements  with  re- 
gard to  the  traffic  in  women  and  children,  and  the  traffic  in 
opium  and  other  dangerous  drugs;  (d)  will  entrust  the 
league  with  the  general  supervision  of  the  trade  in  arms  and 
ammunition  with  the  countries  in  which  the  control  of  this 
traffic  is  necessary  in  the  common  interest;  (e)  will  make 
provision  to  secure  and  maintain  freedom  of  communication 
and  of  transit  and  equitable  treatment  for  the  commerce  of 
aU  members  of  the  league.  In  this  connection  the  special 
necessities  of  the  regions  devastated  during  the  war  of  1914- 


260  The  Causes  Of  War 

1918  shall  be  in  mind;  (f)  will  endeavor  to  take  steps  in 
matters  of  international  concern  for  the  prevention  and  con- 
trol of  disease. 

(This  replaces  the  original  article  twenty  and  embodies 
parts  of  the  original  articles  eighteen  and  twenty-one.  It 
eliminates  a  specific  provision  formerly  made  for  a  bureau 
of  labor  and  adds  the  clauses  (b)  and  ( c ) . ) 

Article  Twenty-four 

There  shall  be  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  league  all 
international  bureaus  already  established  by  general  treaties 
if  the  parties  to  such  treaties  consent.  All  such  interna- 
tional bureaus  and  all  commissions  for  the  regulation  of 
matters  of  international  interest  hereafter  constituted  shall 
be  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  league. 

In  all  matters  of  international  interest  which  are  regu- 
lated by  general  conventions,  but  which  are  not  placed  under 
the  control  of  international  bureaus  or  commissions,  the 
secretariat  of  the  league  shall,  subject  to  the  consent  of  the 
council,  and  if  desired  by  the  parties,  collect  and  distribute 
all  relevant  information  and  shall  render  any  other  assist- 
ance which  may  be  necessary  or  desirable. 

The  council  may  include  as  part  of  the  expenses  of  the 
secretariat  the  expenses  of  any  bureau  or  commission  which 
is  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  league. 

(Same  as  article  twenty-two  in  the  original,  with  the  mat- 
ter after  the  first  two  sentences  added.) 

Article  Twenty-five 

The  members  of  the  league  agree  to  encourage  and  pro- 
mote the  establishment  and  co-operation  of  duly  authorized 
voluntary  national  Red  Cross  organizations  having  as  pur- 
poses improvement  of  health,  the  prevention  of  disease  and 
the  mitigation  of  suffering  throughout  the  world. 

(Entirely  new,) 


'    League  of  Nations  261 

Article  Twenty-six 

Amendments  to  this  covenant  will  take  effect  when  ratifiea 
by  the  members  of  the  league,  whose  representatives  compose 
the  council  and  by  a  majority  of  the  members  of  the  league 
whose  representatives  compose  the  assembly. 

No  such  an  amendment  shall  bind  any  member  of  the 
league  which  signifies  its  dissent  therefrom,  but  in  that  case 
it  shall  cease  to  be  a  member  of  the  league. 

{Sonne  as  the  originaly  except  that  a  majority  of  the 
league  instead  of  three-fourths  is  required  for  ratification  of 
amendments  with  the  last  sentence  added.) 

Annex  to  Covenant 

One — Original  members  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Signatories  of  the  treaty  of  peace: 

United  States  of  America,  Belgium,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Brit- 
ish Empire,  Canada,  Australia,  South  Africa,  New  Zealand, 
India,  China,  Cuba,  Czecho-Slovakia,  Ecuador,  France, 
Greece,  Guatemala,  Haiti,  Hedjaz,  Honduras,  Italy,  Japan, 
Liberia,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Peru,  Poland,  Portugal,  Ru- 
mania, Serbie,  Siam,  and  Uruguay. 

States  invited  to  accede  to  the  covenant: 

Argentine  Republic,  Chile,  Colombia,  Denmark,  Nether- 
lands, Norway,  Paraguay,  Persia,  Salvador,  Spain,  Sweden, 
Switzerland,  Venezuela. 

Two — First  secretary  general  of  the  League  of  Nations 
(blank). 

(The  annex  was  not  published  with  the  original  draft  of 
the  covenant,) 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Oeneral 


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3.  Anitchkow:    War  and  Labor  (1900),  Part  II,  page  189.    Archibald 

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Gens.  Paris,  1904. 

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1899. 

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Brown  &  Co.,  Boston,  1899. 

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Brown  &  Co.,  Boston,  1907. 

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1901. 

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1.  Doyle,  A.  Conan:     The  War  in  South  Africa,  Its  Cause  and  Con- 

duct.    McClure,  Phillips  &  Co.,  N.  Y.,  1902. 

2.  Green,   James:     Causes  of  the  War  in   South  Africa,  Worcester, 

Mass.     June,  1900. 

263 


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1898. 

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Chicago,  1899. 

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1900.     Two  Vols.     Putnam's,  N.  W.   1905. 

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Murray,   London,   1905). 

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York,  1910. 


INDEX 


Aaronsohn,  "With  the  Turks  in 
Palestine,"  126 

Agidir,  incident,  56 

Algeciras,  conference,  56 

Alsace-Lorraine,  recovery  of,  a 
motive  of  France,  57;  Germany's 
selfish  motive  concerning,  44\  a 
cause  for  war  on  part  of  the 
French,  60,  67  \  Prussia's  mon- 
ster crime  in  1871,  120  \  French 
army  concentrated,  not  expect- 
ing German  advance  through 
Belgium,  130  •,  armistice  terms, 
15^-5 \  Pope's  proposal  concern- 
ing (p.  4),  166 \  President  Wil- 
son's statement  concerning,  180 
(point  6) 

Allenhy,  General,  captures  Jeru- 
salem, IJ^If. 

Allepo,  capture  of,  150 

Argonne,  battle  of,  Americans  in, 
147,  149 

Armistice,  terms  for  Germany, 
154-8;  for  Austria-Hungary, 
152-4;  for  Bulgaria,  152;  Tur- 
key,  152 

Assassination,  of  Franz-Ferdinand, 
135 

AnstriunH  ungary,  fundamental 
cause  for  war,  28;  arch-enemy 
of  Italian  freedom  and  unity, 
36;  revolution  of  her  peoples 
certain,  33;  "Dreibund,"  1881, 
52;  intervention  in  Russo-Turk- 
ish  war,  1878,  53;  imperial  de- 
signs, 55,  56,  57;  causes  for  war 
in  1914,  63,  70;  aggressions  since 
1900,  75,  78,  79;  terms  of  armis- 
tice (see  Armistice  above) 

Bagdad,  railway,  63,  70;  city  cap- 
tured by  Turks,  I4O;  recaptured 
by  British,  144 

Baker,  Secretary,  "The  Nation  in 
Arms,"  170 


Baku,  evacuated  by  Turks,  150 

Balkan  States,  causes  for  war, 
1914-16,  61;  troubled  past,  76-8 

Balkan  Wars,  1912-13,  causes  of, 
73 

Bank,  German  Imperial,  finances 
Bolsheviki,  176 

Bapaume,  in  Second  battle  of  the 
Somme,  I42 

Belgium,  causes  of  war,  1914,  62; 
invasion  by  Germany  planned, 
59,  192;  armistice  terms,  154; 
Brand  Whitlock's  "Story  of," 
125 

Belgrade  (Serbia),  captured  by 
Austro-Bulgarian  armies,  137 

Berard,  Victor,  prophecy  of  War, 
79 

Bernhardt,  General,  principles,  72, 
187-92;  quotations  from,  187-92 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  von,  speech  in 
Reichstag,  189;  resignation,  174 

Bismarck,  policies,  34-35;  at  Con- 
gress of  Berlin,  52-53-54 

Bolsheviki,  rise  of,  143;  effect  on 
Russian  army,  I43,  145;  and  on 
Russia,  145,  176-7;  danger  of, 
159 

Boris,  of  Bulgaria,  succeeds  to 
throne,  150;  abdicates,  151 

Boxer,  uprising,  131-2 

Brest-Litovsk,  treaty,  nature  of, 
176-7;  German  violation  of, 
145 

Breslau,  German  warship,  enters 
Dardanelles,  136;  sunk  by  Brit- 
ish, 148 

Bryan,  W.  J.,  treaties,  48 

Bryce,  James,  on  the  Balkan  ques- 
tion, 79,  80 

Bosnia-Herzegovina,  annexation, 
26,  55-6 

Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  76,  and  oth- 
er Balkans,  53,  76-8;  causes  of 
war,  64;  Armistice  terms,  152 


265 


266 


Index 


Byng,  General,  advance,  14S\  re- 
verses, 14s 

Cambrai,  falls  to  British,  I49 
Carthage,  commercial  struggle,  5i, 

Chadwick,  Admiral,  on  Spanish- 
American  War,  105-6 

Chateau-Thierry,  American  ad- 
vance, 146 

China,  declares  war,  I4I 

Commercial  causes  of  war,  ^^,  30, 
31 

Congress,  of  Berlin,  54^  76 

Conquest,  wars  of,  37-8 

Constitution  of  League  of  Nations, 
202-14;  of  United  States,  197 

Crown  Prince,  German,  46^  48 

Cuba,  why  not  independent  in 
1825?  106-7',  American  interests 
in,  107-8,  112,  II4 

Czar  of  Russia,  not  the  aggressor 
in  1914,  129;  guilt  of  his  gov- 
ernment, 67;  overthrow,  174 

Dardanelles,  neutralization  of,  31- 

2;    British    and    French    at,   46, 

138 
Denmark,   war   with    Prussia    and 

Austria,  35 
Doyle,  A.  C,  on  British-Boer  war, 

92,  95 

Economic  wars,  Sl-iS 

Ecquador,  1^2 

England,  Causes  of  war  in  1914, 
60;  causes  of  war  with  Boers,  S. 
Africa,  103-4;  Opium  War  with 
China,  31;  England  and  Ireland, 
44;  colonial  expansion,  5;^,  dv,  46; 
Great  Britain  and  the  Triple  Al- 
liance, 55-4-5-6;  Nature  of  Brit- 
ish government,  26,  32,  34,  44, 
46,  47,  60,  64-5;  Great  Britain 
and  the  "League  of  Nations," 
194-5 

European  War,  1914,  causes  of, 
58-64;  background  of,  51-7 

Falkenhayn,    Gen.    von,    in    Rou- 

mania,  139 
Ferdinand,    of    Bulgaria,    resigns, 

160 


Finland,  reference  to,  45;  and  Bol- 
sheviki,  145;  German  conquest 
of,  148 

Foch,  General,  in  battle  of  Marne, 
136,  allied  commander-in-chief, 
142;  in  Italy,  I44 

Formosa,  ceded  to  Japan,  84 

France,  confronted  with  danger  of 
war,  18,  26,  35,  37,  53,  56,  60,  66, 
116-18;  causes  of  war,  1914,  60; 
causes  of  Franco-Prussian  war, 
115;  military  program,  59,  66; 
treaty  relation,  5^-5,  59,  60;  Ger- 
man invasion,  61,  135;  General 
Bernhardi's  statement  concern- 
ing, 192 

Franz-Ferdinand,  Archduke,  assas- 
sination, 59,  135 

Frederick  the  Great,  his  principles 
and  wars,  47,  187;  Bernhardi,  a 
German  authority  on  these  wars, 
190 

Gerard,  Ambassador,  book  on  Ger- 
many, 126 

Germany,  causes  of  war,  1914,  63; 
ultimatums,  39,  59;  invasion  of 
Belgium,  34,  39,  59,  62,  66,  135, 
154,  191-2;  atrocities  and  policy 
of  frightfulness,  22,  34,  63  (mili- 
tarism) 52-3,  60,  62,  64,  65,  69, 
131-4,  170;  starvation  in  con- 
quered territory,  132-4 

German  ideals  and  political  prac- 
tices, 17-18,  27,  31,  34-6,  44,  46, 
53,  55,  59,  63,  65,  66,  69-72,  131- 
2;  treaty  obligations  broken,  58, 
60,  62,  66,  145-177;  ("necessity 
knows  no  law")  131,  191-2; 
Propaganda  in  United  States, 
27,  69-71,  123,  125;  progress  in 
industries,  66;  in  militarism,  27, 
35,  66,  131,  186-7,  187-93 

Goeben,  enters  Dardanelles,  136; 
sunk  by  British,  I48 

Great  Britain  (see  England) 

Greece,  causes  of  war,  1914,  61; 
declaration  of  war,  142;  strug- 
gles for  liberty  and  union  of  her 
peoples,  49,  77 

Guatemala,  war  on  Germany,  I42 

Heligoland,  Battle  of,  136 
Hershey,  A.  S.,  on  Spanish-Ameri- 


Index 


267 


can  War,  lOS-,  on  Russo-Japan- 
ese War,  81-83,  88 

Hindenhurg,  Gen.  von,  stops  Rus- 
sian advance,  136 1  drive  in  Po- 
land, 137 

"Hindenhurg  Line,"  14^ 

Hindus,  IfS 

Holy  Alliance,  51 

Hoover,  Herbert,  and  U.  S.  food 
administration  (testify  to  starva- 
tion by  Germans)  133-4 

Hungary,  revolution  of  1848,  49  \ 
freedom,  4^ 

Huns,  reason  for  name,  131-2 

India,  44 

Italy,  war  with  Turkey,  68,  73,  80; 
causes  of  war,  1914,  61;  Italian 
unity  and  nationality,  35,  37,  4^* 
52,  67-8;  Declares  war  on  Aus- 
tria, 137;  on  Germany,  139;  in- 
terest in  Adriatic  and  Balkans, 
61,  79;  Great  victory  in  close  of 
war,  149-50 

Jameson  Raid,  97,  100 

Japan,  causes  of  Russo-Japanese 
war,  81,  90;  causes  of  war,  1914, 
62;  war  with  China,  83,  84;  in 
Korea,  82-4-7,  88-9-90;  in  Man- 
churia, 83,  86,  87-89,  90;  Ger- 
man proposals  to,  69,  123 

Jerusalem,  captured  by  British, 
144 

Jutland,  battle  of,  I40 

Kaiser,  the  German,  claims  to  di- 
vine right,  27,  124;  speeches  and 
character  of  rule,  27,  48,  56-7, 
59,  60,  63,  65,  131;  threats  to 
peace  of  Europe,  55-7,  128-30; 
visits  to  Turkey,  and  responsibil- 
ity for  Turkish  massacres,  57, 
65;  abdication,  152 

Karl,  Emperor,  leaves  Austria, 
151 

Kemmel,  Mt.,  captured  by  Ger- 
mans, 146 

Korea   (see  Japan) 

Kossuth,  49 

Kruger,  Paul,  in  S.  Africa,  99- 
100 

League  of  Nations,  a  discussion, 
186-201;  German  attitude,  187- 
9S 


League    of   Nations    ("to   enforce 

peace")    49,   76,  162,  164-5,  178, 

180,  184 
League  Covenant,  text  of  February 

draft,  202-214;  final  draft,  244- 

261 
Lens,  coal   city,   siege  by   British, 

137,  142;  evacuated,  I49 
Liberia,  declares  war  on  Germany, 

174 
Lille,  evacuated  by  Germans,  I49 
Lloyd-Oeorge,   answer   to   German 

peace  proposal,  171 
Lodge,  Henry  Cabot,  on  Spanish- 
American  war,  107,  112 

Mackensen,  Gen.  von,  expels  Rus- 
sians, 136;  in  Roumania,  139 

Mohan,  Capt.,  on  Spanish-Ameri- 
can war,  112 

Marne,  first  battle  of,  59,  130,  136; 
second  battle  of,  146-9 

Messines  Ridge,  I42,  I46 

Mexico,  German  intrigues  in,  69, 
123 

Mihiel,  St.,  battle  of,  I47 

Monxistir,  taken  by  Allies,  139 

Monroe  Doctrine,  26,  52,  122;  Gen. 
Bernhardi  on,  191 

Morgamthau,  Henry,  Ambassador's 
"story,"  126,  183 

Nationality,   growth   of,   as    cause 

for  war,  23,  34-6,  61-3,  67-8 
Navigation  Laws,  4^ 
Neuve  Chapelle,  battle,  137 
Nicaragua,    declares    war,   I42 
Noyon,  battle  line,  I46 

Ostend,  Sub-base,  British  attack 
on,  148 

Panama,  canal  and  neutralization, 
32;  war  on  Germany,  I4I 

Paris,  German  Super-gus  fires  on, 
132,  146 

Peronne,  capture  of,  I47 

Poland,  partitions,  50,  182;  must 
be  restored  50,164,180;  "When 
the  Prussians  Came  to  Poland," 
126;  German  government  in,  44* 
123  ("Ireland  and  Poland"), 
126;  efforts  to  Germanize,  200 

Portugal,  revolution  in,  36;  ally  of 
England,  62;  in  Belgium,  I46 


268 


Index 


Prussia,  and  Bismarck,  S5\  Triple 
Alliance,  52;  War  with  France, 
115-20  \  militarism,  S5^  168  (war 
lords),  193 

Quotations,  from  Pres.  Wilson's 
Flag  Day  Address,  68-72;  from 
Jan.  22,  1917  speech,  162-4;  Re- 
ply to  Pope,  166;  "Four  points" 
from  July  4,  1918  speech,  177- 
178;  "five  points"  from  Sept.  27, 
1918  speech,  179;  from  German 
leaders  on  war,  and  arbitration, 
187-92 

Red  Cross,  hospitals  fired  upon  by 

Germans,  132 

Religion,  wars  of,  23^  29 

Rheims,  shelling  by  Germans,  132 
(cathedral) ;  German  attack  in 
Rheims  salient,  I46;  French  and 
Americans  wipe  out  salient,  1^7 

Routers,  recaptured  by  Belgians, 
149 

Roumania,  historical  sketch,  76-8; 
declares  war  on,  139;  Germany, 
Turkey,  Bulgaria  declare  war 
on,  139;  overrun  by  armies  of 
Central   Powers,  139 

Russia,  member  of  Triple  Entente, 
54-5;  Crimean  War,  75-6;  war 
with  Turkey,  1878,  76;  and  Con- 
gress of  Berlin,  53,  76-7,  and 
Constantinople,  28,  61,  67;  access 
denied  to  Mediterranean,  76; 
causes  of  war  in  1914,  61; 
causes  of  Russo-Japanese  war, 
81,  90;  revolution,  and  overthrow 
of  Czar,  11,  17,  28,  174,  US 

Russo-Japanese  War,  causes  of 
(see  Russia  above) 

Selective  Service  Draft,  in  U  S., 
Ul 

Serbia,  causes  of  war,  1914,  61 1 
historical  sketch,  75,  77-8;  Aus- 
tria declares  war  upon,  135;  re- 
sists Austrians,  135;  crushed  by 
Austro-Bulgarian  invasion,  137; 
nucleus  of  new  Jugo-Slav  state, 
78 

Spain,  negotiations  with  U.  S.  over 
Cuba,  106;  revolution  in,  110-36; 
Moroccan   crisis,   56;    war   with 


U.  S.,  1898    (causes),  IIS-I4 
Spanish-American  War,  causes  of, 
113-14;     Chadwick     on,     105-S; 
Lodge  on,  107,  112;   Capt.  Ma- 
han  on,  112 

Tannenhurg,  battle  of,  136;  junker, 

193 
Tanf,  protective,  43,  183-4 
Turkey,  character  of  government, 
33,  183;  war  with  Italy,  80;  First 
Balkan  war,  74;  Crimean  War, 
76;  with  Russia,  1878,  76;  causes 
of  war,  1914,  63;  in  thrall  of 
Germany,  65,  70;  declares  war 
on  Russia,  135;  Great  Britain 
and  France  declare  war  on,  135; 
declares  war  on  Roumania,  139; 
armistice  terms,  152;  fortifica- 
tions at  Dardanelles,  138 

United  States,  interest  in  Cuba, 
107-9,  114;  causes  of  war,  1914, 
64,  68-72,  122-3;  part  in  League 
of  Nations,  196-8;  importance  of 
entry  into  World  War,  17;  Ger- 
man hatred  toward,  36;  greatest 
contribution  to  the  world,  39; 
military  program  in  1917,  I4I 

Uruguay,  I42 

Valenciennes,  capture  of,  149 

Venezuela,  Roosevelt  and  the 
Kaiser,  122 

Verdun,  first  battle  of,  I4O;  French 
counter-stroke  at,  I4O;  second 
counter-thrust  by  French,  143 

Versailles,  congress  of,  51;  Pres. 
Wilson  at,  182 

Vienna,  Congress  of,  51;  responsi- 
bility for  this  war,  51 

War,  an  instinct,  29-30;  classifica- 
tion of  causes,  23-4;  funda- 
mental causes,  31-9;  pretexts 
and  excuses,  28,  35,  40,  4I,  43-4, 
45;  Austrian  and  German  pre- 
texts, 59-60;  nature  and  func- 
tion of,  22;  causes  of  World 
War,  58-64;  outline  for  study  of, 
in  U.  S.  A.,  135-59;  immediate 
causes  for  U.  S.,  and  fundamen- 
tal (outline),  121-27, 
First  year  of,  1S5 


Index 


269 


Second    year   of,   1S7 
Third  year  of,  138 
Fourth  year  of,  I4I 
Fifth  year  of,  I45 
Last  events,  I49 
Balkan  Wars,  causes  of,  73-f£ 
British-Boer     War,     causes     of, 

9i-ff 
Franco-Prussian  War,  causes  of, 

ii5-ff 
Russo-Japanese  War,  causes  of, 

5/-ff 
Spanish-American    War,    causes 

of,  105-ft 


No  longer  same  necessity  for  war, 
50y  199-201;  war  and  the  League 
of  Nations,  49,  76,  196-201;  war 
the  political  gospel  of  the  Ger- 
man government,  187-92 


Y.  M.  C.  A.,  duty  to  support,  125; 
treatment  by  Germans,  132 


Zimmermann,  German  foreign  min- 
ister, notes  to  Mexico  and  Japan, 
69,  123 


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